Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 5065 (MAD)

G. Maragatha Meenakshi & Others v. The District Collector & Others

2009-11-24

D.MURUGESAN, S.NAGAMUTHU

body2009
Judgment :- D. Murugesan, J. 1. In all these Writ Appeals, the Appellants question the common order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petitions filed by them. 2. The factual matrix of the grievance espoused in these Writ Appeals are as follows: The Appellants herein are working as Assistants in Various Panchayats, namely Respondent No.3 in the respective Writ Appeals, in the Madurai West Panchayat Union, Madurai. On the allegation that during the Years 1994-95 and 1995-96, they have committed irregularities in distribution of uniforms to the employees of the respective Panchayats, Charge Memos were issued to them during the Year 2005. The said Charge Memos were questioned by the respective Appellants before the Writ Court, primary on the following grounds: .(a) The alleged occurrence in question had taken place during the Years 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 and the Charge Memos were issued only after 10 Years and there was no explanation for such an inordinate delay, thereby serious prejudice had been caused to each of the Appellants. .(b) The Charge Memos themselves indicate the proposed punishment of dismissal and as such the issue was prejudged warranting only orders of dismissal. .(c) The charge are not that much serious, warranting Disciplinary proceedings, after 10 Years. The Writ Petitions came to be dismissed on the ground that the Charge Memos are only issued for calling upon the Appellants to show cause and there was no valid ground for interference. 3. We have heard Mr.K. Srinivasan, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, Learned Special Government Pleader for Respondent 1 and 2 and Mr.M. Srinivasan for Respondent No.3 in the respective Writ Appeals. 4. As far as the first contention relating to the delay in initiating the Disciplinary proceedings is concerned, we may point out that it is not the general rule that the delay in initiating of Disciplinary proceedings by itself would be a ground for quashing a Charge-Memo. The employee would always be entitled to explain such a delay to the satisfaction of the Court. Further, in the event the charges are very serious and the delay has also been explained, then the Court would not interference and quash the Charge Memo solely on the ground of delay in initiating the Disciplinary proceedings. 5. The employee would always be entitled to explain such a delay to the satisfaction of the Court. Further, in the event the charges are very serious and the delay has also been explained, then the Court would not interference and quash the Charge Memo solely on the ground of delay in initiating the Disciplinary proceedings. 5. However, on the facts of this case, though the occurrence was noticed during the Year 1994-95 and the respective 3rd Respondent-Panchayats became aware of the incident immediately, as could be seen from the fact that the prime officer, who had indulged in the purchase of ordinary clothes at the guise of purchasing uniforms, was punished in the Year 1996, had kept quiet to initiate action against the Appellants, who are staff of the Panchayats and through whom such clothes were distributed. Though the learned Counsel appearing of the 3rd Respondent-Panchayats has made fervent attempt that the delay was only in the process of file to get approval for initiating Disciplinary proceedings, in the absence of any acceptable materials indicating a reasonable explanation, atleast for such delay, mere submission that the delay had occasioned in the movement of files for approval cannot be accepted. In the absence of any such explanation, we are not inclined to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the respective 3rd Respondent-Panchayats that the Charge Memos cannot be quashed. In our considered view, the impugned Charge Memos are liable to be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay in the initiating of Disciplinary proceedings. 6. We may refer to some of the judgments of the Apex Court on the question of delay as to whether mere delay would be a ground to interfere and to quash the Charge Memo. (i) In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Another, 1990 Supp. SCC 2381, wherein it has been observed as follows: “The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiries is said to have taken place between the Years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities. If any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities. If any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more that 12 years to initiate the Disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the Charge Memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal’s orders and accordingly the we dismiss this Appeal.” .(ii) In State of A.P. v. N. Radhakrishnan, 1998 (4) SCC 154 , the Apex Court had held as under: “It is not possible to delay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the Disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the Disciplinary proceedings are not to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has been To take in to consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the Disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the Disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the Disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the Disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, Disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant Rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the Disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations” (iii) In the judgment reported in Mahadevan P.V. v. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2005 (4) CTC 403 : 1908 (21) LW 157, the Court considered a case of 10 Years delay in Issurance of Charge Memo ultimately held as under: “16. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the Respondent to proceed further with the Departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the Appellant. Keeping a higher Government official under charges of corruption and disputed integity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a Government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the Government employee but in public interest and also in the interest of inspiring confidence in the minds of the Government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The Appellant had already suffered though and more on account of the Disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the Appellant due to the protracted Disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The Appellant had already suffered though and more on account of the Disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the Appellant due to the protracted Disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the Disciplinary proceedings, the Appellant should not be made to suffer.” (iv) In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, 2006 (5) SCC 88 , the supreme Court had, in fact, after taking note of the fact that there was a delay of six Years in the initiation of Disciplinary proceedings and that the proceedings continued for a further period of seven years, interfered with the Enquiry proceedings and held that such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer. 7. It as also brought to our notice a judgment of this Court reported in Tirupathy, P. v. The District Collector, Madurai District, 2006 (2) CTC 574 , wherein a learned Single Judge had an occasion to consider a similar situation relating to the occurrence happened during 1994-95 and 1995-96 in different panchayats, in respect of which Charge Memos were issued only in the year 2005 and ultimately, on the ground of delay in initiation of Disciplinary proceedings, the learned judge quashed the Charge Memos. We have gone through the said judgment and in our opinion, the said judgment would squarely apply to the facts of the case put-forth by each of the Appellants herein. 8. As far as the second limb of argument is concerned, we have perused the Charge Memo. It appears that the Block Development Officer concerned, who is competent to purchase uniforms, had, at the guise of purchasing uniforms, purchase only ordinary clothes and made the Appellants to distribute those clothes to the employees of the panchayats. Therefore, the prime delinquent officer is the Block Development Officer and therefore the charges relating to these Appellants cannot be considered to be serious, warranting disciplinary proceedings, after a lapse of nearly 10 years. 9. Insofar as the Charge Memos are concerned, though the have been issued as Charge Memos, a perusal of the same would show the proposed punishment of dismissal to be imposed on each of the Appellants has been indicated therein. 9. Insofar as the Charge Memos are concerned, though the have been issued as Charge Memos, a perusal of the same would show the proposed punishment of dismissal to be imposed on each of the Appellants has been indicated therein. In fact, the proceedings of the Block Development Office, dated 2. 2005, also shows that it is more like a show cause notice for imposing the penalty of dismissal service, giving no room for the Appellants to make their explanation. 10. In addition to the above, we may also point out the charges by themselves are very vague, as they did not give a that ground also the Appellants are entitled to succeed. 11. In the result, all the Writ Appeals are allowed a the impugned Charge Memos are quashed. No order as to costs.