Judgment :- 1. In this Writ Petition, Petitioner is challenging the Notifications published under Section 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act dated 20.03.1986 and 04.05.1987 vide Annexure 'A' & 'B' respectively on the ground that the entire acquisition proceedings stood lapsed as no award under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was passed within a period of two years. 2. Petitioner was the owner of the land bearing Sy.No.19/2 of Kadirenahalli Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. This land was proposed for acquisition under Section 4(1) of the Act in favour of the 4th respondent – M/s. Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha Niyamitha, Bangalore vide Notification dated 20.03.1986 published in the Gazette on 24.04.1986. This was followed by Final Notification under Section 6(1) of the Act dated 04.05.1987 published in the Official Gazette on 05.05.1987. The acquisition proceedings were challenged by the petitioner in W.P.No.8958/1987. In the said writ petition, an interim order of stay of dispossession was granted by this Court on 19.06.1987 produced vide Annexure 'C' to the Writ Petition. This challenge made to the acquisition proceedings by the petitioner has culminated in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha Vs. Narayanamma (Smt.) (Since Deceased) By L.Rs. and Others ( 2003 (1) S.C.C. 228 ) and the acquisition proceedings are held valid. It is also relevant to note here that during the pendency of the challenge made to the acquisition proceedings by the petitioner there was a proceeding dated 15.07.1989 issued under Section 48(1) of the Act for de-notifying the land of the petitioner from acquisition and the matter ultimately went up to the Apex Court. The Apex Court remanded the matter back and the Government ultimately declined to delete the land from the purview of acquisition, which was again challenged in W.P.No.6073/2004, wherein the learned Single Judge remitted the matter back to the State Government for fresh consideration vide Order dated 15.07.2005. The same was challenged by the 4th respondent-Society in W.A.No.3667/2005. The Appeal was allowed by the Division Bench of this Court with an observation that as far as the question of fraud is concerned it was open for the owners or the petitioners to agitate their grievance before the State Government which is the Authority competent to look into and decide the matter regarding existence of fraud. The Appeal was allowed by the Division Bench of this Court with an observation that as far as the question of fraud is concerned it was open for the owners or the petitioners to agitate their grievance before the State Government which is the Authority competent to look into and decide the matter regarding existence of fraud. This order passed by the Division Bench of this Court has been confirmed by the Apex Court. 3. It is relevant to state here that the Land Acquisition Officer had passed an award on 29.09.1988, which came to be approved by the State Government on 20.02.1989. It is also relevant to emphasize that the interim order passed by this Court staying dispossession of the petitioner from the land was granted on 19.06.1987, that is to say, prior to passing of the award by the Land Acquisition Officer. In fact the petitioner had filed a claim petition, without prejudice to his contentions, regarding the illegality in the Notifications acquiring the land, seeking determination of compensation. The petitioner appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer in the proceedings which culminated in the passing of the award. The factum of passing of the award was also brought to the notice of the Court by the 4th respondent-Society by filing Statement of Objections on 19.08.1991 in W.P.No.8985/1989, which is produced vide Annexure R-1 to the writ petition. In paragraphs 6 & 7 of the said Statement of Objections, the 4th respondent-Society has stated about the passing of the award. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the acquisition proceedings under Section 11-A of the Act stood lapsed as the Land Acquisition Officer could not have passed any award when the interim order of stay of dispossession passed by this Court was in force with effect from 19.06.1987. Therefore, the award passed on 29.09.1988, being in violation of the interim order passed, cannot be recognized in the eye of law as a valid award. He therefore contends that once the said award is ignored, as there is no other award passed within the statutory period prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act, the entire acquisition proceedings stood lapsed and hence the Notifications under Section 4(1) and 6(1) should be declared as illegal. 5. He therefore contends that once the said award is ignored, as there is no other award passed within the statutory period prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act, the entire acquisition proceedings stood lapsed and hence the Notifications under Section 4(1) and 6(1) should be declared as illegal. 5. In support of this contention, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Vs. Vasantha Bai (A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1778). He has invited the attention of the Court to the observations made in paragraph 6, 7 and 8 of the aforementioned judgment. In the said case, the question that fell for consideration was whether the period during which stay of dispossession operated results in stay of further proceedings under the Act so as to disable the Land Acquisition Officer from passing an award within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration, as prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. The effect of Section 11-A being that if the award is not passed within two years from the date of publication of the declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition shall lapse. As per the provisions, in computing the period of two years referred to in the Section, the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of the Court, the same shall be excluded. The Division Bench of the High Court in the said case had held that the order restraining dispossession passed by the High Court did not amount to stay of further proceedings nor prevented the Land Acquisition Officer to take further action in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. It was held by the High Court that since no award was made within a period of two years from the date on which the local publication had been made, the proceedings stood lapsed. In such circumstances, the Apex Court referring to another decision in Sangappa G. Sajjan Vs. It was held by the High Court that since no award was made within a period of two years from the date on which the local publication had been made, the proceedings stood lapsed. In such circumstances, the Apex Court referring to another decision in Sangappa G. Sajjan Vs. State of Karnataka ( 1994 (4) S.C.C. 145 ) (for short Sajjan's case) wherein the question of delay under Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act had come up for consideration on account of stay granted by the Court and the question arose whether the period during which the stay operated had to be excluded. In Sajjan's case, Apex Court has held that in case where the validity of the Notification published under Section 4(1) is challenged and such challenge is pending adjudication before the High Court and the Court grants stay of dispossession, though no specific direction prohibiting the publication of Notification under Section 6 of the Act is granted, no useful purpose would be served by publishing 6(1) Notification when the matter is pending adjudication regarding legality of Section 4(1) Notification. If any action is taken to pre-empt the proceedings, it would be stigmatised either as 'undue haste' or action to 'overreach the Court's judicial process'. Therefore the period, during which the order of dispossession granted by the High Court operated, should be excluded in computation of the period of three years covered by clause (1) of the first proviso to the Land Acquisition Act. 6. In Vasantha Bai's case (A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1778) referred to herein above, the Apex Court referring to the above mentioned observations in Sajjan's Case observed in paragraph 8 as under, - "The ratio in the above cases would squarely apply to the facts in this case. The Division Bench of the High Court was clearly in error in taking the contrary view. We, therefore, hold that the stay of dispossession would tantamount to stay of further proceedings being taken under Section 11 and Explanation to Section 11-A, covers such an order and the entire period of stay has to be excluded in computing the period of two years prescribed by Section 11-A." 7. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.R. Naik has also sought sustenance for his contention from the following decisions:- a) Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.R. Naik has also sought sustenance for his contention from the following decisions:- a) Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Lichcho Devi & Others (A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3474); b) Vijaykumar & Others Vs. State of Karnataka & Others (2003 (7) K.L.J. 597); c) Surjit Singh & Others Etc. Vs. Harbans Singh & Others, Etc., (A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 135); d) N. Krishnamachari Vs. Managing Director, APSRTC, Hyderabad & Others (1994 (6) S.C.C. 74); e) Dhandapani & Anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu Rep. By Secretary to Government, Department of Housing & Urban Development (L.A.3) & Others ( 2008 (5) M.L.J. 1416 ); and f) Smt. Andalamma Vs. State of Karnataka Rep. by its Secretary of Revenue Department (I.L.R 2003 KAR 1466) 8. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. Ravi Varma Kumar, appearing for the 4th respondent and the learned Government Advocate strongly refute the contentions urged by the petitioner. Sri. Ravi Varma Kumar has contended that since the petitioner has himself participated in the award proceedings and has filed a claim petition, even after the interim order was passed by this Court, it is not open for him to take up the contention that the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer was in violation of the interim order. He further contends that the award has been passed in the year 1987 and at no stage of the proceedings in the previous round of litigation the petitioner made any grievance regarding the illegality of the award passed, though the factum of passing of the award was brought to the notice of the Court by filing objections as back as in the year 1994. He contends that the validity of the acquisition proceedings having been gone into upto the Apex Court twice and concluded after the award was passed, the present Writ Petition filed is barred by principles of constructive resjudicata. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the judgments in Ishwar Dutt Vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Another ( 2005 (7) S.C.C. 190 ), C.V. Rajendran and Another Vs. N.M. Muhammed Kunhi ( 2002 (7) S.C.C. 447 ). 9. He has next contended that the award passed in the year 1989 is sought to be challenged by filing a Writ Petition in the year 2008, hence the Writ Petition has to be dismissed solely on the ground of delay and latches. 10. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. N.M. Muhammed Kunhi ( 2002 (7) S.C.C. 447 ). 9. He has next contended that the award passed in the year 1989 is sought to be challenged by filing a Writ Petition in the year 2008, hence the Writ Petition has to be dismissed solely on the ground of delay and latches. 10. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. M.R. Naik has, however, contended that there was no occasion for the petitioner to raise the question of operation of Section 11-A, as long as the challenge made by him to the Notification issued under Section 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act was under consideration. He further contends that since there was denotification of the land in favour of the petitioner there was no scope for raising an issue regarding operation of Section 11-A of the Act, hence, neither the question of constructive resjudicata nor the point of delay raised by the petitioner can be sustained in law. 11. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on consideration of the materials on record, the only point/question that requires consideration in this case is "Whether the acquisition proceedings in the instant case stood lapsed, as no award was passed within a period of two years as contemplated under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act?" 12. In other words, if we dissect the contentions canvassed, the precise question would be: "Whether the award passed by the LAO on 20.02.1989 is no award in the eye of law as it was passed during the subsistence of the interim order of stay of dispossession granted on 19.06.1987 and if the same is ignored, the proceedings stand lapsed under Section 11-A of the Act?" 13. Section 11-A of the Act is enacted by the Parliament to prevent inordinate delay caused by the Land Acquisition Officer in passing the award. The price payable for the land acquired is pegged on to the date of publication of 4(1) Notification. The delay in making the award will certainly deprive the owner to deal with his land. Section 11-A of the Act is enacted by the Parliament to prevent inordinate delay caused by the Land Acquisition Officer in passing the award. The price payable for the land acquired is pegged on to the date of publication of 4(1) Notification. The delay in making the award will certainly deprive the owner to deal with his land. With a view to remove this hardship and prevent any lethargy or lapse on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer in passing the award early Section 11-A came to be enacted which enjoins a duty on the authority concerned to pass an award within an outer limit of two years from the date of publication of the declaration as envisaged under Section 6 of the Act. If no such award is passed, the acquisition proceedings would stand lapsed. How the period of two years has to be computed and what period has to be excluded from reckoning the two years period, is also stated by the Parliament by enacting an explanation to section 11-A wherein it is stated that the period during which action or proceedings taken in pursuance to the declaration under Section 6 is stayed by an order of the Court shall be excluded. 14. In the instant case, award has been passed well within the period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Question is whether this award has no legal sanctity and cannot be taken note of, as it is passed during the subsistence of interim order staying dispossession of the petitioner from the land. The contention of the petitioner that since stay of dispossession tantamounts to stay of further proceedings, as observed by the Apex Court, and as the Land Acquisition Officer has voilated the interim order in passing the award, it has no legal existence cannot be accepted. The ratio of the Apex Court cannot be understood in the manner it is sought to be presented by the petitioner. The Apex Court was only dealing with the period to be excluded for the purpose of explanation to Section 11-A of the Act. It has not held that any award passed during the subsistence of an Interim Order of stay of dispossession would be illegal and its existence cannot be taken note of by the Court. The Apex Court was only dealing with the period to be excluded for the purpose of explanation to Section 11-A of the Act. It has not held that any award passed during the subsistence of an Interim Order of stay of dispossession would be illegal and its existence cannot be taken note of by the Court. The observations of the Apex Court to the effect that stay of dispossession tantamount to stay of further proceedings for the purpose of Section 11 is made in the context of understanding the effect of the explanation to Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. In other words, for the purpose of excluding the period during which the stay of dispossession was in operation, the Apex Court has stated that it shall be construed that the stay of dispossession tantamount to stay of further proceedings. This observation cannot be made use of by the petitioner-land owner to contend that the award is passed during the operation of an interim order of stay of dispossession and hence it has to be treated as non-est or void for the purpose of understanding the effect of Section 11-A of the Act. It cannot be said that there is a restraint imposed to pass an award when stay of dispossession is granted. 15. It is not open to the petitioner, in the instant case, to contend that he was under the impression that the interim order of stay of dispossession prohibited the Land Acquisition Officer from passing the award and therefore he did not participate in the award proceedings. In fact, he had filed a claim petition and had participated in the award proceedings. Other decisions relied upon by the petitioner also do not support the contention urged by him. 16. It is unnecessary to go into the contention of the counsel for the respondent that the petition is barred by constructive resjudicata or that the petitioner is guilty of delay and latches. Since the legal position canvassed by the petitioner is held against him, the other defences taken by the 4th Respondent-Society need not be gone into. At any rate, the petitioner has come up with some plausible explanation for the delay in approaching the Court on the basis of Section 11-A of the Act contending that the acquisition proceedings were denotified and the matter was agitated up to the Supreme Court. At any rate, the petitioner has come up with some plausible explanation for the delay in approaching the Court on the basis of Section 11-A of the Act contending that the acquisition proceedings were denotified and the matter was agitated up to the Supreme Court. Therefore, even assuming, that he has explained the delay satisfactorily, he has to fail on the main contention urged by him regarding the effect of the interim order of stay of dispossession and the operation of Section 11-A of the Act. 17. For the aforementioned reasons, this Writ Petition, being devoid of merits, is dismissed. No order as to costs.