THAVARDAS VASANTMAL BHARVANI v. JAGDISH BHAI TEKCHAND BHAI PAMNANI
2009-07-28
BANKIM N.MEHTA
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT BANKIM N. MEHTA, J. Petitioner-tenant has preferred this revision application under section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short “the rent Act”) and challenged legality of judgment and decree passed by the learned Presiding Officer, 6th Fast Track Court, Gondal camp Jetpur on 8.6.2007 in Regular Civil Appeal No.4 of 1999 confirming the judgment and decree of arrears of rent and possession passed by learned Joint Civil Judge (JD), Jetpur on 31.12.1998 in Regular Civil Suit No.43 of 1993. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as plaintiff landlord and defendant tenant in this judgment. 2. The plaintiff landlord filed suit for actual and vacant possession of the suit premises and arrears of rent contending that the defendant is the tenant of a room admeasuring about 19 x 22 and is paying rent of Rs.300/- per month; that he has not paid rent from 1.1.1992 to 1.2.1993 and despite repeated demands, as the defendant tenant did not pay arrears of rent for more than 6 months, a demand notice was served to him but he did not pay the rent, thereby he is in arrears of rent for more than six months and therefore, liable to be evicted. It is also contended that the defendant tenant agreed to hand over possession of suit premises as per the consent terms in Civil Misc. Application No.16 of 1992, but did not hand over possession and therefore, the plaintiff landlord is entitled for possession of the suit premises. It is further contended that the suit premises is required for his personal use and occupation and therefore, the suit is filed for recovery of arrears of rent of Rs.4200/- with actual and vacant possession of the suit premises. 3. The defendant tenant filed written statement contending that the size of the suit premises is 12 x 12 and the plaintiff landlord is taking Rs.150/- per month as rent and it is not standard rent, as the tenant occupying the same premises earlier was paying Rs.90/- per month. It is further contended that he has paid rent upto 31.5.1992, but the plaintiff landlord has not issued rent receipts and as he was requested to accept standard rent, he pressurized him to vacate the suit premises.
It is further contended that he has paid rent upto 31.5.1992, but the plaintiff landlord has not issued rent receipts and as he was requested to accept standard rent, he pressurized him to vacate the suit premises. It is further contended that the plaintiff landlord has not served any notice and has refused to accept the rent sent by money order with a view to obtain possession of the suit premises. It is also contended that it is not true that he agreed to hand over possession of the suit premises as alleged, but in fact, he signed the consent terms under pressure and agreed to give possession only if alternative accommodation was available, but as he could not arrange for alternative accommodation, he has not vacated the suit premises. It is also contended that he is not in arrears of rent and therefore, the suit is required to be dismissed. 4. On the basis of pleadings, the trial Court framed issues at Exh-13 and the parties adduced evidence. 5. At the end of trial, the Court passed decree of possession of the suit premises and a decree for Rs.4200/- towards arrears of rent for the period from 1.1.1992 to 1.2.1993 at the rate of Rs.300/-per month. Therefore, the defendant tenant preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.4 of 1999 in the Court of learned Assistant Judge, Rajkot at Gondal. Learned lower appellate Judge by his judgment and decree dated 8.6.2007 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Being aggrieved by the said decision, petitioner has approached this Court. 6. I have heard learned advocate Mr. Thacker for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. Raval for the respondent at length and in great detail. 7. Learned advocate Mr. Thacker has submitted that the defendant tenant served a notice to the plaintiff landlord to accept standard rent and in reply to the notice, the arrears was claimed, but the defendant tenant had filed an application to fix standard rent of suit premises and consent terms were filed in standard rent application before filing of the suit for possession and thereafter, without serving fresh notice, suit for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent was filed and hence, there is no legal and valid notice, therefore, the Courts below committed error in passing decree of possession on the ground of arrears of rent.
He has also submitted that the Court relying on consent terms filed in standard rent application, passed decree of possession. But under the provisions of Rent Act, no decree for eviction could be passed on the basis of consent terms and therefore, the judgments of the Courts below are contrary to law and hence are required to be set aside. He has relied upon the decision of Smt. Kaushalya Devi and others v. K.L. Bansal reported in AIR 1970 SC 838 , decision of Shah Rasiklal Chunilal v. Sindhi Shyamlal Mulchand reported in 1971 GLR 1012 and decision of P.M. Parmar v. Smt. Ambaben Hargovindas reported in 1995(1) GLH 950 . 8. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Raval has submitted that the plaintiff landlord had in clear terms claimed arrears of rent in the notice and under the provisions of Rent Act, suit could be filed after one month of notice, but after long time of the notice, the suit was filed. Therefore, there was due compliance of the provisions of the Rent Act and notice was legal and valid. He has also submitted that the defendant tenant has raised dispute about standard rent in written statement but no separate application for fixation of standard rent was filed and he is estopped from raising this plea as he had earlier withdrawn the standard rent application and such dispute is raised only with a view to come out from the rigours of Rent Act and the Courts committed no error of law in passing decree on the ground of arrears of rent. 9. Mr. Raval has also submitted that the defendant tenant had agreed to vacate the suit premises and consent terms were filed in legal proceedings and therefore, the courts below were justified in relying upon the consent terms and no error is committed by them. Hence, this revision application is required to be dismissed. He has relied upon the decision of Gauri Shankar Chittarmal Gupta v. Smt. Gangabai Tokersey reported in AIR 1971 SC 659 , in the decision of Gulamminya Hasuminya Decd. Through his heirs v. Sakhavatkhan Mohmadkhan Decd. Through legal heirs reported in 2001(2) GLR 1068 and in the decision of Mistry Premjibhai Vithaldas v. Ganeshbhai Keshavrji reported in 1977 GLR 790. 10.
Through his heirs v. Sakhavatkhan Mohmadkhan Decd. Through legal heirs reported in 2001(2) GLR 1068 and in the decision of Mistry Premjibhai Vithaldas v. Ganeshbhai Keshavrji reported in 1977 GLR 790. 10. The plaintiff landlord claimed possession of the suit premises on the ground of arrears of rent, consent terms and personal requirement, but the trial Court passed decree of possession only on the ground of arrears of rent and consent terms. Therefore, no decree of possession on the ground of personal requirement was passed. The lower appellate Court confirmed the decree passed by the trial Court. 11. Section 29(1) of the Rent Act provides for appeal from a decree or order made under the provisions of the Rent Act. Section 29(2) of the Rent Act provides that no further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub section (1) but the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that any such decision in appeal was according to law, call for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. 12. Learned advocate for the petitioner has assailed the judgment on two grounds; first the defendant tenant was not in arrears of rent for more than six months and Court could not have passed decree of possession on the ground of arrears of rent as there was no legal notice demanding such arrears of rent and second the Court could not have relied upon consent terms filed by the parties in another proceedings to pass decree of eviction without satisfying itself as to whether there was any ground under the Rent Act to pass decree of eviction. 13. As regards arrears of rent, the trial Court framed an issue that whether it is proved that the defendant tenant is in arrears for more than six months. In the plaint, arrears of rent of Rs.4200/- for the period from 1.1.1992 to 1.2.199 was claimed. The consent terms Exh-63 dated 28.9.1992 indicate that the account of rent was settled and nothing towards rent remained due from defendant tenant as on that day. In view of this evidence, it is difficult to accept that the defendant tenant was in arrears of rent as claimed in the suit. 14.
The consent terms Exh-63 dated 28.9.1992 indicate that the account of rent was settled and nothing towards rent remained due from defendant tenant as on that day. In view of this evidence, it is difficult to accept that the defendant tenant was in arrears of rent as claimed in the suit. 14. Section 12(2) of Rent Act provides that no suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Properties Act, 1882. Therefore, the question is whether plaintiff landlord served such notice? According to Mr. Raval as reply and notice dated 31.7.1992 Exh-65 was served to defendant tenant, no fresh notice was required to be served. The evidence indicates that prior to filing of suit the defendant-tenant raised dispute with regard to standard rent by serving notice dated 2.7.1992 Exh-70. The plaintiff landlord by his reply dated 31.7.1992 Exh-65 claimed arrears of rent. The plaintiff landlord filed an application for fixation of standard rent, but the parties filed consent terms in the standard rent application on 28.9.1992 and the application for fixation of standard rent was disposed of. Therefore, the notice correspondence that took place prior to filing of standard rent application and during the pendency thereof culminated into settlement between the parties and merged into consent terms. It is not in dispute that after filing of consent terms, no notice terminating tenancy and claiming arrears of rent was served to the defendant tenant. There is no averment in the plaint with regard to date of service of notice, but it can be inferred that suit was filed on the basis of notice dated 31.7.1992 Exh-65. As observed earlier the notice correspondence merged into settlement and by consent terms, the plaintiff landlord continued the defendant as tenant in the suit premises. Therefore, the plaintiff landlord was required to serve notice afresh to claim possession on the ground of arrears of rent but admittedly no such notice was served. Hence, notice dated 31.7.1992 Exh-65 could not be considered notice as required under the Rent Act.
Therefore, the plaintiff landlord was required to serve notice afresh to claim possession on the ground of arrears of rent but admittedly no such notice was served. Hence, notice dated 31.7.1992 Exh-65 could not be considered notice as required under the Rent Act. Therefore, there was no legal notice as required under the Rent Act and as the plaintiff landlord did not serve notice to defendant tenant terminating the tenancy and demanding arrears of rent, the Courts below committed error in passing decree on the ground of arrears of rent. Hence, findings in that regard are required to be set aside. 15. Now, the next question is whether the Court could pass decree of eviction on the basis of consent terms Exh-63? The consent terms indicate that the defendant tenant agreed that on getting alternative accommodation, he would vacate the suit premises and hand over vacant and actual possession on or before 31.12.1992. 16. Section 28 of the Rent Act provides for jurisdiction of the courts to entertain and try any suit or proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which the provisions of Rent Act apply. Section 13 of the Rent Act provides that a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied that any ground mentioned therein exists. The decree was passed only on consent terms. It is explicit that the Court did not satisfy itself that any of the ground of section 13 of the Rent Act existed to pass decree of eviction. Learned advocate Mr. Raval has submitted that the consent terms may be considered as agreement between the parties and as the defendant tenant did not perform his part of the agreement, the trial Court granted specific performance of agreement and hence, the Court was justified in passing decree of eviction. This argument cannot be accepted. The Court trying disputes between a landlord and a tenant is a Special Court and its jurisdiction is to entertain and try any suit or proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to recovery of rent and possession of the premises to which the provisions of Rent Act apply and to deal with any claim or question arising out of Rent Act.
Assuming for the sake of argument that by agreement, the tenant had agreed to vacate the suit premises; grant of relief of specific performance of agreement is neither a claim nor a question arising out of the Rent Act. Therefore, it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court established under the Rent Act to grant such relief and only civil Court has jurisdiction to grant relief of such a nature. Hence, the decree passed by learned appellate Court was not according to law. Therefore, as the trial Court did not satisfy itself that any of the ground existed for eviction under section 13 of the Rent Act and passed decree of eviction on the basis of consent terms; the decree confirmed by lower appellate Court is erroneous and is required to be set aside. 17. In the decision of Smt. Kaushalya Devi & Others Vs. K.L. Bansal reported in AIR 1970 SC 838 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where in a suit under Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act for ejectment of the defendant, the parties entered into a compromise that the decree for ejectment be passed against the defendant, executable after certain date; the decree passed on the basis of an award was in contravention of section 13(l) of the Act, because the Court had passed decree in terms of award without satisfying itself that the ground of eviction existed and therefore, decree insofar as it directed delivery of possession of premises to the landlord was a nullity and could not be executed. In the decision of this Court in the case Shah Rasiklal Chunilal v. Sindhi Shyamlal Mulchand reported in 1971 GLR 1012 , this Court held that Rent Court has no jurisdiction to pass decree on the consent of statutory tenant. In view of the settled legal proposition, the Courts below committed error in relying upon consent terms to pass decree of possession. 18. Learned advocate Mr. Raval has relied upon the decision of Gauri Shanker Chittarmal Gupta v. Smt. Gangabai Tokersey reported in AIR 1971 659 with regard to validity of notice, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that demand notice is not invalid merely because it does not give break up of the sum which was claimed as due per month. In the facts of the present case, as no notice was served, this decision is not applicable.
In the facts of the present case, as no notice was served, this decision is not applicable. He has also relied upon the decision of Gulamminya Hasuminya Decd. Through his heirs v. Sakhavatkhan Mohmadkhan Decd. Through legal heirs reported in 2001(2) GLR 1068 and decision of Mistry Premjibhai Vithaldas v. Ganeshbhai Keshavrji reported in 1977 GLR 790 with regard to raising dispute with regard to standard rent. In the facts of this case, dispute of standard rent raised by the defendant tenant was not a bona fide dispute. Learned advocate Mr. Thacker has relied upon decision of P.M. Parmar v. Smt. Ambaben Hargovindas reported in 1995(1) GLH 950 , wherein this Court fixed standard rent on consent decree without any support and thereby raising standard rent without assigning any reason. In the facts of this case, this decision is also not applicable. 19. In view of above, the lower appellate Court committed error in appreciation of evidence and recorded findings contrary to law. Therefore, this Court is required to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. Therefore, this revision application is required to be allowed and judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the lower appellate Court are required to be set aside. 20. In the result, this revision application is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Joint Civil Judge (JD), Jetpur on 31.12.1998 in Regular Civil Suit No.43 of 1993, and confirmed by learned Presiding Officer, 6th Fast Track Court, Gondal camp Jetpur on 8.6.2007 in Regular Civil Appeal No.4 of 1999, are hereby quashed and set aside. Regular Civil suit No.43 of 1993 filed by plaintiff landlord for arrears of rent and possession stands dismissed. Rule made absolute with no costs. (SBS) Petition allowed.