JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner is an employee of Dugrapur Steel Plant. He was promoted to E-5 Grade m 1995 in terms of the applicable promotion policy of the respondents. He was eligible for consideration for promotion to E-6 Grade after putting in 4 years service in E-5 Grade. It is claimed by the petitioner that though he had a fundamental right of being considered for promotion to E-6 Grade from 1999-onwards, he was not so considered and at the same time his juniors were promoted thereby resulting in his supersession. For the first time a representation dated 1.12.2004 was addressed by the petitioner to the Managing Director of Durgapur Steel Plant expressing his grievance. Since no action had been taken on the basis of such representation, the petitioner presented this petition before this Court on 19.1.2005 praying for, inter alia, the following relief: "a) A writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents and/ or their agents to give promotion and other benefits to the petitioner to E-6 Grade with effect from 30.6.1999 and also all consequential benefits attached thereto: b) A writ in the nature of certiorari directing the respondents and/or their agents to produce the records of the case before this Hon'ble Court So that conscionable justice may also be rendered;" 2. IT is. not in dispute that subsequent to filing of the present petition, the petitioner has in fact been promoted to E-6 Grade. It appears from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents that the petitioner was duly considered for promotion between the period 1999 and 2004. A comparative chart is set out indicating the marks obtained by the petitioner and the promotees on the basis of career progression report, qualification and length of service. All the promotees obtained more marks than the petitioner. In this petition there is no challenge to the promotion granted to the promotees who were junior to the petitioner insofar as the length of service is concerned. Since the petitioner has not challenged the decision of the respondents not to promote him during the period 1999 and 2005, it is not for the Court exercising power of judicial review to enter into the merit of such decision. The officers who had superseded him, it is also noted, have not been arrayed as respondents in the petition. Granting relief as claimed by the petitioner behind their back would unsettle settled matters. The officers who had superseded him, it is also noted, have not been arrayed as respondents in the petition. Granting relief as claimed by the petitioner behind their back would unsettle settled matters. That apart, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the petition ought to be dismissed on the ground of delay, and laches alone. He has referred to the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 2271 . It has besn held there as follows: "A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. In clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal- work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appellant." 3. MR. Ganguly, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, on the contrary, referred to the decisions of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1983 SC 653 and AIR 1974 SC 2106. In the former decision the Apex Court had the occasion to observe that there is no period of limitation prescribed by law for filing of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and in every case it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances whether the petitioner is guilty of laches. In the former decision the Apex Court had the occasion to observe that there is no period of limitation prescribed by law for filing of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and in every case it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances whether the petitioner is guilty of laches. It has also been observed that there may be cases where even short delay may be fatal whereas even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the petitioner. In the later decision it would appear that as and when the petitioner's rights were affected, he had approached the concerned authority with representations and since his grievance was not redressed, he ultimately approached the Court of Writ. In such circumstances, the Apex Court had observed that the grievance of the petitioner as ventilated in the writ petition could not be defeated on the jejune ground of delay. 4. CONSIDERING these authorities, the point of delay and laches may be decided. In the present case, supersession of the petitioner commenced right from 1999 and continued till 2004. During all these years, the petitioner sat on the fence and watched his juniors being promoted one after the other before him. There is no explanation worth the name as to why the petitioner did not question the action of the respondents by raising grievance at an appropriate stage. His conduct appears to be tardy and lethargic. If he had a genuine grievance against the respondents insofar as his supersession is concerned, there is no plausible reason as to why he did not exercise the right the Constitution guaranteed to him. The submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee is therefore justified. Mr. Ganguly contended that since the respondents did not raise the objection on the ground of delay and laches in the affidavit-in-opposition, they are estopped from raising it now. 5. THIS Court does not agree. The Court's discretion to grant relief or to deny relief is not dependent on whether a point has been taken in the affidavit-in-opposition or not. Delay and laches of the litigant in asserting his right has been long been considered to be a relevant factor to disentitle relief. The Writ Court does not aid the tardy, the indolent and the lethargic. Delay and laches of the litigant in asserting his right has been long been considered to be a relevant factor to disentitle relief. The Writ Court does not aid the tardy, the indolent and the lethargic. There is thus no reason to come to the aid of the petitioner who acquiesced in his supersession without battling an eye-lid. 6. THIS Court is inclined to hold that the petitioner by his conduct has disabled the Court from redressing his grievance. On the authority of the decision in AIR 1974 SC 2271 (supra), only the process initiated in 2004 could be judicially reviewed by this Court. However, the foundational facts are lacking and the concerned promotee is also not before this Court. In such circumstances, exercise of writ powers would not be justified. 7. THE writ petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 8. URGENT photostat copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties as early as possible.