JUDGMENT : J.M. MALIK (Chairperson) 1. The appellant has called into question the judgment delivered by learned DRT on 7th January, 2004. Although, the appeal was preferred on 19th October, 2004, yet the same was put up before the learned Registrar on 18th March, 2005. No order sheet till 18th March, 2005, is available on the record. Private Secretary of this Court is directed to make a preliminary inquiry and fix the responsibility within a period of two months and submit the report. He is further directed to make preliminary inquiries or at least point out such like other cases, which ever come to his notice. 2. There was a delay of about seven months in filing this appeal. Application for condonation of delay was also moved. The then Chairperson ordered that notices be issued to the respondents vide order dated 5th July, 2005. The appeal was dismissed on 10th November, 2005. Order dated 10th November, 2005 is relevant whereby the appeal was dismissed, the same is reproduced as under: Learned Counsel for the appellant again submits that he has become undone due to client’s negligence. Although it is stated in the Bar that he made all efforts even from his pocket for doing the needful, but still then the appellant is not hearing him. This is a matter between the lawyer and the client. I have got nothing to say in the matter as the fact remains that the steps have not been taken properly for the three consecutive dates. The appeal is dismissed. 3. After the expiry of 14 months i.e. on 10th January, 2007 the application for restoration was moved by the appellant. Application for restoration was filed along-with application for condonation of delay and the then Chairperson vide his order dated 16th April, 2007 ordered to issue notices to the respondents on those applications for 31st July, 2007. On 31st July, 2007, Mr. Preetam Singh, Advocate for the appellant, appeared before the Court. He filed his own affidavit. But the then Chairperson ordered that the affidavit was not proper and admissible without initials of the concerned Oath Commissioner. He was directed to file fresh affidavit within 30 days. On 31st July, 2007, Mr. Preetam Singh, Advocate for the appellant, appeared before the Court. He filed his own affidavit. But the then Chairperson ordered that the affidavit was not proper and admissible without initials of the concerned Oath Commissioner. He was directed to file fresh affidavit within 30 days. Fresh affidavit was filed on 16th November, 2007 but the then Chairperson found that there was no mention of proper names of respondent No. 1 in the Memo of Appeal as well as in the application for condonation of delay in the description of opposite party No. 1 in accordance with the original application. The appellant was directed to file proper description of respondent No. 1 and it was further ordered that service on respondents be effected for 27th December, 2007. 4. Counsel for the respondent Bank appeared on 4th August, 2008, but on the next date of hearing i.e. 15th September, 2008 it was clarified that the presence of Counsel for the respondent was wrongly mentioned. Service was already effected for 15th September, 2008, but respondents were absent despite service, therefore, they were ordered to be proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 15th December, 2008. 5. I have heard the Counsel for the appellant. The learned Counsel for the appellant did not advance any argument on the application for restoration of this appeal which was dismissed on 10th November, 2005 but I have scrutinized the application for condonation of delay. It is explained that Shri Mangat Maheshwari, Officer-in-charge of the case, got transferred from the office and the file was misplaced in the office and the new General Manager, who was appointed in the place of Shri Mangat Maheshwari, was not aware of the fate of the appeal. The then previous Advocate did not send any communication. The Officer-in-charge came to know about this appeal recently. It is also explained that the State Government had given its guarantee to secure the employment of the workers of the borrower company in the welfare of the State. The applicant did not gain any benefit from the funds lent by the respondent. The borrower company is under liquidation and its assets have been sold by the Official Liquidator under the order of Hon’ble High Court of MP Bench at Indore. The borrower shall get payment from the sale proceeds of the assets of the company. The applicant did not gain any benefit from the funds lent by the respondent. The borrower company is under liquidation and its assets have been sold by the Official Liquidator under the order of Hon’ble High Court of MP Bench at Indore. The borrower shall get payment from the sale proceeds of the assets of the company. Otherwise also, the applicant has strong prima facie case, if any opportunity of being heard on merit is provided to it. 6. The pleas raised by the appellant is its affidavit remains unrebutted on the record. The appellant represents the Government and such like events are likely to happen in the Government Departments. Consequently, I find that the appellant has established sufficient ground for condonation of delay and accept the application for restoration. 7. Now I turn to the merits of this case. The learned Counsel for the appellant made only one short submission and did not press the other grounds set up in the appeal. He vehemently argued that the case filed by the appellant is hopelessly barred by the time. He drew my attention towards para No. 3 of the impugned judgment which is reproduced as follows: The applicant further averred that on or about 10th December, 1984, the applicant, on the request of Hukumchand Mills Ltd., granted Term Loan not exceeding Rs.60 lacs towards the cost of modernization-cum-rehabilitation scheme. The defendant No. 1, State of Madhya Pradesh, by guarantee deed dated : 27th March, 1984 executed in favour of the applicant for due repayment of the said loan, payment of interest and other moneys payable by Hukumchand Mills Ltd. unconditionally and irrevocable guarantee and also agreed that applicant, inter alia that the said Company shall duly and punctually pay/repay the said loan and the interest, commitment charges and all other moneys in accordance with the agreement between the Company and the applicant. Copy of guarantee is Ex A. 8. He contended that it is crystal clear that it is a case of term loan. The loan guarantee deed was executed on 27th March, 1985. It was argued that the deed of guarantee dated 27th March, 1985, was executed by the appellant in favour of the Bank. Likewise, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also executed guarantee deed jointly and severally unconditionally and irrevocably wherein they agreed to stand as guarantor in respect of the loan amount. It was argued that the deed of guarantee dated 27th March, 1985, was executed by the appellant in favour of the Bank. Likewise, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also executed guarantee deed jointly and severally unconditionally and irrevocably wherein they agreed to stand as guarantor in respect of the loan amount. The loan in question was lent and advanced on 9th May, 1985. The order passed by the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) curtailed the Managerial and Administrative power of the Agrawal family i.e. defendant Nos. 2 and 3. The resignation of respondent No. 3 was accepted by the Board and the new Directors were appointed on 11th September, 1991. Consequently, the Bank was obliged to file the suit till 11th September, 1994 but this case was filed on 15th December, 2000 which is clearly barred by the time. 9. I see no merit in this contention. I have perused the guarantee deed dated 27th March, 1985 as well as guarantee deed dated 11th May, 1985 executed by all the other respondents. The following terms and conditions are worth-noting. The guarantors agreed to pay the outstanding within 15 days from the date of dispatch of notices of the default of payment. It was also stipulated that it shall remain in force till such time the borrowers repay the said loan with interest due, charges and other moneys. No time limit was prescribed. The repayment was to be completed by 1992-93, then there was reschedulement of payment from 1992-93 and 1996-97. The appeal filed by the appellant before BIFR stood dismissed on 19th October, 1993. Notice were sent to the defendants on 11th September, 2000. In spite of services of demand notices, the defendants failed to deposit the said amount. It is thus crystal clear that this was a continuing security. It was to last till such time the borrowers paid the said loan with interest. These terms and conditions cannot be brushed under the carpet. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the case is time-barred. The limitation starts from the date when the demand notices were served upon the defendants/respondents. 10. It was to last till such time the borrowers paid the said loan with interest. These terms and conditions cannot be brushed under the carpet. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the case is time-barred. The limitation starts from the date when the demand notices were served upon the defendants/respondents. 10. The observations made in the celebrated authority reported in 274522, neatly dovetails with the facts of this case, wherein it was held: In case of a continuing guarantee an undertaking by the defendant to pay any amount that may be due by a Company to a Bank on the general balance of its account or any other account, so long as the account is live account in the sense that it is not settled and there is no refusal on the part of the guarantor to carry out the obligation, the period of limitation for a suit to enforce the bond could not be said to have commenced running. Limitation would only run from the date of breach under Act. 115. 11. The guarantee in question is a continuing guarantee. Viewed from any angle the case of the Bank is found to be well within limitation. The arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants deserved no consideration. 12. No other grounds were urged before me. 13. In the light of the above discussion, the appeal has no merits and, therefore it is dismissed. 14. Copy of this order be supplied to the parties as per law and another copy of the same be also dispatched to the learned DRT forthwith along with record.