Judgment : Common Order: (B. Chandra Kumar, J.) Heard the learned counsel. 2. Since all these Applications are interconnected, they are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The brief facts of the case are as follows: In the suit in C.S.No.14 of 1958 filed by one Dildarunnisa Begum and others for partition of Matruka properties of Khurshid Jah Paiga, a preliminary decree was passed on 28-06-1963. The parties in Application No.729 of 2007 have compromised the matter out of the Court. Accordingly, they have filed a compromise memo along with a plan signed by all the parties and consequently the compromise had been recorded on 23-08-2007. 4. M/s. IDPL Employees Cooperative House Building Society Ltd., Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as “IDPL Housing Society”) had filed Application No.728 of 2007 along with a plan showing A-schedule property to pass final decree in C.S.No.14 of 1958 to the extent of Ac.58-00 out of out of Ac.65-00 in Sy.No.163 of Hydernagar Village, Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Basing on the same, a final decree had been passed on 23-08-2007. The specific case of the IDPL Housing Society is that by mistake it had wrongly mentioned the western side measurement of A-schedule as 2678’-6” instead of 2853’-00” and the southern side measurement of A-schedule property as 1329’-3” instead of 1319’-3” in the plan annexed to Application No.728 of 2007 for passing final decree. It is their further contention that in fact the western and southern side measurements were shown correctly as 2853’-00” and 1319’-3” respectively in the plan annexed to the compromise memo in Application No.729 of 2007. 5. The IDPL Housing Society had also filed Application No.1084 of 2007 seeking a direction to send the final decree to the District Registrar (Registration and Stamps) under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. 6. After filing Application No.1084 of 2007, IDPL Housing Society seems to have realized that a mistake occurred in attaching the plan to Application No.728 of 2007 and therefore, filed Application No.38 of 2008 stating that instead of attaching the correct plan to the compromise decree in Application No.728 of 2007, an incorrect plan was attached, where the western and southern side measurements of A-schedule property are wrongly mentioned and accordingly, the incorrect plan had been attached to the final decree passed in Application No.728 of 2007. Their specific case is that in order to bring the final decree in conformity with the terms of the compromise decree and the plan attached thereto, the Society may be permitted to correct the mistakes in the plan attached to Application No.728 of 2007 by replacing the same with a correct plan attached to the compromise memo. 7. The IDPL Housing Society had also filed Application No.259 of 2009 seeking amendment of the prayer in Application No.1084 of 2007 by adding the sentence “together with the A-schedule plan attached to the memorandum of compromise filed in Application No.729 of 2007” after the words in ‘C.S.No.14/58’ before the words “to the concerned District Registrar”. 8. Respondent Nos.4 to 14 in Application No.728 of 2007 (hereinafter referred to as ‘R-4 to R’14’) had filed Application No.11 of 2009 stating that some mistakes had crept in mentioning the measurements in respect of B-schedule land in the plan attached thereto and to bring the said measurements in conformity with the terms of compromise, it is just and necessary to correct the measurements as shown in their Application. 9. R-4 to R-14 had filed Application No.47 of 2009 stating that in the plan annexed to the compromise memo the measurements in respect of B-schedule land were wrongly mentioned and that they got B-schedule land surveyed with the electronic survey equipment and found that the correct measurements to maintain the extent of B-schedule lands as Ac.4-00 should be on the southern side 354’ 7” instead of 336’-11”, on the eastern side 693’-7” instead of 689’-0” and on the western side 642’-0” instead of 641’-4”. It is further contended that as per the terms of compromise, B-schedule land should be Ac.4-00 and there is no controversy with regard to the extents of A and C schedule lands and the controversy with regard to the measurements of the B-schedule land can conveniently and easily be resolved by ordering survey of B-schedule land with the measurements given by both the parties. It is further contended that the plan attached to the compromise petition should be in conformity with the terms of the compromise and as per the terms of compromise mutually agreed by all the parties, B-schedule land should be Ac.4-00 and therefore, to ascertain and confirm the extent of B-schedule land as Ac.4-00, it is just and necessary to issue direction to the Mandal Surveyor to survey the B-schedule land and submit a report to the Court. 10. As the things stood thus, M/s Durga Matha House Building Construction Cooperative Housing Society Limited (hereinafter referred to as “Durga Matha Housing Society”) had filed Applications 1264 of 2008 and 73 of 2009 to implead them as party in Application Nos.38 of 2008 and 1084 of 2007 respectively and to correct the figures on the northern and southern sides as 547 feet and 1310 feet respectively. The specific case of the Durga Matha Housing Society is that the society is the neighbouring landholder having an area of Ac.66-00 in 2 parts i.e., Ac.50-00 on the eastern side and Ac.16-00 on the western side of the land of the IDPL Housing Society and that only on filing Application No.38 of 2008 for correction of the measurements on the western and southern sides, it came to know that the wrong measurements have been shown in the plan attached to the compromise memo. Immediately, having came to know about the same, verification had been made on the ground in the presence of the members of the IDPL Housing Society and the fourth respondent basing on the plans of the IDPL Housing Society and it is noticed that there is variation of measurement on the northern and southern sides. In the plan annexed to the compromise memo, northern side is wrongly shown as 577 feet and it should be 547 feet and on the southern side, the correct figure is 1310 feet and not 1319 feet as shown in the plan annexed to the compromise memo. 11. R-4 to R-14 filed counter in Application No.38 of 2008 stating that there are certain other mistakes in the measurements mentioned in the plan annexed to the memorandum of compromise, which had crept into the plan annexed to the final decree passed in Application Nos.726 and 727 of 2007, and therefore all such mistakes in measurements in all the plans should be corrected simultaneously. It is further stated that in the plan annexed to the memorandum of compromise the measurement of the land its northern side abutting N.H.9, are wrongly shown as 200’ + 139’-3” + 239’, whereas the same should be as 200’ + 109’-3” + 239’. Likewise the measurements of southern boundary of B-schedule land are wrongly shown as 336’, whereas the same should be as 357’ and on the eastern side the measurements of B-schedule land are wrongly shown as 689’, whereas the same should be 700’-8”. On the western side of B-schedule land also the measurements are wrongly mentioned as 641’-4”, whereas the same should be as 651’-2”. Thus their case is that all the above stated mistakes in measurements of the plans annexed to the memorandum of compromise and the final decree passed in terms of the said compromise have to be corrected. They have also annexed the plan along with their counter. 12. On behalf of the IDPL Housing Society, its President Mr. Y. Nageswara Rao filed reply affidavit stating that it is not correct to say that there are certain other mistakes in the measurements mentioned in the compromise memo and the plan which had crept into the plan annexed to the final decree passed in Application Nos.726 and 727 of 2007. It is his further case that the memorandum of compromise as well as the plan annexed to the said compromise memo were signed by all the parties after scrutiny by the parties and their respective counsels. It is the specific case of the IDPL Housing Society that the measurements mentioned by respondents 4 to 14 in their counter are not correct and they cannot go beyond the compromise recorded by the Court and the plan annexed thereto, which was signed by them also. The further case of the IDPL Housing Society is that as per the plan annexed the total extent of the land comes to more than Ac.4-00, whereas as per the compromise it is Ac.4-00 only. It is further contended that respondents 4 to 14 have not right to claim such relief in this Application. 13. In Application No.259 of 2009, on behalf of respondents 4 to 14, B. Sudhakar filed counter affidavit contending that Application No.259 of 2009 is not maintainable particularly after the matter had been referred to the Bench. It is further contended that respondents 4 to 14 have not right to claim such relief in this Application. 13. In Application No.259 of 2009, on behalf of respondents 4 to 14, B. Sudhakar filed counter affidavit contending that Application No.259 of 2009 is not maintainable particularly after the matter had been referred to the Bench. It is further contended that through this amendment the applicant is seeking to send a document for registration, which is not attached to the final decree passed by the Court, which would amount to sending a different final decree for registration than what was passed by this Court, which is illegal and impermissible in law. 14. In Application No.47 of 2009, the IDPL Housing Society had filed counter stating that the final decree in respect of A-schedule had been passed by this Court on 23-08-2007 in Application No.728 of 2007 in favour of IDPL Housing Society. The final decree in respect of B-schedule property had also been passed in Application Nos.726 and 727 of 2007 in favour of R-4 to R-14. Similarly final decree in respect of C-schedule property is also passed in Application No.632 of 2007 in favour of respondents 2 to 4. It is further stated that in their Application No.38 of 2008 they had sought for correction of measurements in the plan annexed to the final decree to bring the same in conformity with the measurements mentioned in the plan annexed to the memorandum of compromise filed in Application No.729 of 2007. It is further contended that the IDPL Housing Society has no knowledge that respondents 4 to 14 got the land measured with electronic survey. So, their specific case is that respondents 4 to 14 cannot go beyond the compromise recorded in the final decree and the plan annexed thereto. It is further contended that the IDPL Housing Society has no knowledge that respondents 4 to 14 got the land measured with electronic survey. So, their specific case is that respondents 4 to 14 cannot go beyond the compromise recorded in the final decree and the plan annexed thereto. It is further mentioned that in the Counter filed by R-4 to R-14 in Application No.38 of 2008 they claimed larger extent of measurements than the measurements mentioned in the plan annexed to the compromise memo and that in Application No.11 of 2009 and Application No.47 of 2009, they are claiming different and contradictory measurements than what they claimed in the said counter, which clearly shows the attitude of R-4 to R14 in filing Application No.47 of 2009 to drag on the applications of the IDPL Housing Society in order to get illegal gain and to deny the fruits of the decree to the IDPL Housing Society. The following variations had been pointed out by the IDPL Housing Society in their counter affidavit: TABLE 15. Thus the IDPL Housing Society contended that R-4 to R-14 cannot claim more extent of land on the pretext of correction of measurements and that they should abide by the compromise and the assertion that the controversy with regard to the measurements of B-schedule land can conveniently and easily be resolved by ordering survey of B-schedule land with the measurements given by both the parties, is incorrect since there is no controversy with regard to the measurements of B-schedule land. It is also their case that the IDPL Housing Society paid an amount of Rs.4,21,08,000/-on 29-08-2007 towards stamp duty and the final decree has also been engrossed on the stamp paper and that the respondents 4 to 14 have not paid the required stamp duty and their final decree is not at all engrossed on the stamp paper for adequate value. 16. In Application No.1264 of 2008 filed by Durga Matha Housing Society, on behalf of the IDPL Housing Society, its President Mr. 16. In Application No.1264 of 2008 filed by Durga Matha Housing Society, on behalf of the IDPL Housing Society, its President Mr. Y. Nageswara Rao had filed counter affidavit and stated that Durga Matha Housing Society is a third party to these proceedings and it has no locus standi to contest Application No.38 of 2008 and that Durga Matha Housing Society is no way connected with the land covered by the compromise recorded in Application No.729 of 2007 and that the implead petition has been filed to protract the litigation in one way or the other and to deny the benefit of decree to the IDPL Housing Society. It is denied that Durga Matha Housing Society verified on the ground in the presence of the members of IDPL Housing Society basing on the plans of the IDPL Housing Society and noticed variation of measurement on the northern side and southern side. The specific stand of the IDPL Housing Society is that all the measurements mentioned in the plan annexed to the compromise memo, which is signed by all the parties, are true and correct and the total extent comes to Ac.65-00. The other allegations made by Durga Matha Housing Society had been denied. It is also denied that the IDPL Housing Society has shown 30 feet more on the northern side than the old plan and ground measurement. The other contention that as a consequence of change on western side and southern side correspondingly, the eastern side also changes, is false and incorrect. 17. The learned counsel appearing for the IDPL Housing Society submitted that all the parties have signed the compromise memo and also the plan annexed to it after due verification of all the facts and due to some mistake, the plan attached to the compromise memo was not filed along with the Application for passing of the final decree and mistakenly another plan was attached and since it is only a mistake, the same has to be corrected to bring the final decree in conformity with the plan and the memorandum of compromise. 18. 18. With regard to the Applications filed by R-4 to R-14 seeking corrections in the final decree and the map annexed thereto, it is submitted that the same cannot be accepted and there cannot be any correction in the memorandum of compromise or the plan annexed thereto unless all the parties agreed for the same. It is further contended that the terms of compromise cannot be altered without the consent of all the parties. 19. As far as the Application filed by Durga Matha Housing Society is concerned, the learned counsel for the IDPL Housing Society further submitted that Durga Matha Housing Society cannot be heard in these Applications since they are not party to the compromise. 20. The learned counsel also submitted that in view of the amendment to Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1989 brought w.e.f. 01-04-1999, Section 17 (1) (f) has been added and registration of a compromise decree is made compulsory. It is also argued that since Durga Matha Housing Society is not a party to the compromise memo, the decree is not binding on them. 21. The learned counsel for the respondents 4 to 14, submitted that the final decree has to be passed in terms of the compromise memo and according to the compromise, R-4 to R-14 got Ac.4-00 of land and respondents 15 to 17 should get Ac.3-00 of land and that the plan attached to the compromise memo cannot go against the terms of compromise wherein the measurements were wrongly mentioned and therefore correcting the plan attached to memorandum of compromise is necessary to bring the said plan in conformity with the terms of compromise. His submission is that the Application filed by IDPL Housing Society and their Application stands on the same footing. It is further submitted that where the amendment does not cause any prejudice or loss to other side, the final decree can be amended. 22. Sri A. Ramakrishna, the learned counsel appearing for Durga Matha Housing Society submitted that Durga Matha Housing Society is the adjacent owner of the property and since in the compromise memo and the plan attached thereto certain incorrect measurements have been given, thereby the land of Durga Matha housing society is shown as part of the land of IDPL Housing Society, the Durga Matha Housing Society is forced to file Application to implead them as a party. It is further argued that they are in possession of survey No.87 and the IDPL Housing Society says that due to mistake an incorrect plan is attached to the final decree and when they themselves submitted the incorrect plan attached is to the final decree, they should not have any objection to seek fresh measurements. It is further argued that if fresh measurements are taken, there will not be any dispute in future. 23. It is further contended that since Durga Matha Housing society is a party to the main suit, the final decree passed on the basis of the compromise memo would be binding on Durga Matha Housing Society also. It is further contended that since the final decree has been made by the High court, even if Durga Matha Housing Society files a suit in the Court lower to the High Court, such Court may not be in a position to correct a decree passed by the High Court. It is also submitted that when there are clear mistakes, the decree cannot be implemented. His main submission is that the mistakes cannot be allowed to continue and the same amounts to illegality and the Courts are empowered to correct such mistakes. It is also submitted that on the earlier occasion .this Court passed a decree and the final decree passed in terms of the compromise memo should be in conformity with the earlier Judgments of this Court. It is also submitted that the issue can be settled amicably and the illegality should not be perpetuated. It is also submitted that the High Court being a Court of record any decree passed by this Court cannot be corrected by the Courts below. 24. It is further submitted that Durga Matha Housing Society should be allowed to participate in the final decree proceedings and they should be impleaded as parties. It is further argued that under the guise of compromise, IDPL Housing Society cannot be allowed to encroach the land of Durga Matha Housing Society. 25. 24. It is further submitted that Durga Matha Housing Society should be allowed to participate in the final decree proceedings and they should be impleaded as parties. It is further argued that under the guise of compromise, IDPL Housing Society cannot be allowed to encroach the land of Durga Matha Housing Society. 25. The learned counsel for the IDPL Housing Society further submitted that their Application and the Application of R-4 to R-14 are not on the same footing, since their Application is only to replace an incorrect map attached to the final decree by the original plan attached to the compromise memo, which is agreed and signed by all the parties and whereas the application of R-4 to R-14 is to amend the compromise memo and the plan attached thereto, which cannot be permitted. It is also submitted that Durga Matha Housing Society has no right to intervene in the matter. It is also submitted that if any mistake is committed while drafting the compromise memo, the same has to be shared by all the parties proportionately and the terms of compromise cannot be altered by the Court. It is further submitted that if at all Durga Matha Housing Society is aggrieved, it ought to have filed a separate suit. 26. This matter earlier came up before one of us (Hon’ble Sri Justice P.S. Narayana) who passed orders on 26-02-2009 and opined that it would be appropriate if these Applications are decided by the learned Division Bench in the facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the matter had been placed before the Hon’ble The Chief Justice, who constituted this Bench for the disposal of these Applications. The questions referred to the Division Bench are as follows: 1) Whether the compromise decree in the context of the plan, be varied or incorporated, in the light of the facts and circumstances without the consensus of all the parties to the compromise? 2) Whether the I.D.O.L. Society can pray for a direction to send the Final Decree for the purpose of registration in the light of the facts and circumstance without further survey as requested by certain of the objectors, certain parties to the compromise? 2) Whether the I.D.O.L. Society can pray for a direction to send the Final Decree for the purpose of registration in the light of the facts and circumstance without further survey as requested by certain of the objectors, certain parties to the compromise? 3) Whether the Durga Matha House Building construction Cooperative Housing Society Limited., can be said to be having any locus standi to raise such objections in the present applications or whether the remedy available to this society is elsewhere? 27. Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. deals with the compromise of a suit. At the outset it is to be noted that it is not the case of any party that the compromise entered into between the IDPL Housing Society and other respondents is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act or that the same is opposed to public policy. It is also an admitted fact that all the parties to the compromise have signed the memorandum of compromise and the plan attached thereto and therefore, the same is a valid compromise. It is the settled legal position that a compromise can be enforced only against the parties to the compromise. 28. Rule 3A of Order 23 of C.P.C. prohibits a party to the compromise to file a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise, on which the decree is passed, was not lawful. Order 23 Rule 3A of C.P.C. reads as follows: “3A. Bar to suit.—No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is passed was not lawful.” 29. Rule 3B provides that No agreement or compromise in a representative suit shall be entered into without the leave of the Court. Admittedly the present suit is not a representative suit. 30. Coming to the provisions, which empower the court to amend the decree, a useful reference can be made to Sections 152 and 153A of C.P.C. which are as follows: “152. Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders.—Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decree or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties.” 153. Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders.—Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decree or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties.” 153. general power to amend.—The Court may at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit, amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit; and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceeding. 153A. Power to amend decree or order where appeal is summarily dismissed.—Where an Appellate Court dismisses an Appeal under rule 11 of Order XLI, the power of the Court to amend, under Section 152, the decree or order appealed against may be exercised by the Court which had passed the decree or order in the first instance, notwithstanding that the dismissal of the appeal has the effect of confirming the decree or order, as the case may be, passed by the Court of first instance.” 31. The learned counsel for the IDPL Housing Society relied on the Judgments in support of his contentions: In BAPU v. VITHAL AIR 1914 Bombay 109 (1), the Bombay High Court held that a decree made by consent can only be varied by consent. In LACHIRAM v. JANA YESU MANG AIR 1914 Bombay 127, the Bombay High Court held that: “A consent decree can only be varied by consent. Therefore no modification of a consent decree can be allowed in execution on grounds not recognized in the decree itself as giving a right of such modification.” 32. In BYRAM PESTONJI GARIWALA v. UNION BANK OF INDIA (1992) 1 SCC 31 , the Supreme Court observed as follows: “A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment.” The Supreme Court further observed that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed by invitum. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment.” The Supreme Court further observed that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed by invitum. It was further observed that unless the compromise is found to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding or mistake, the decree passed thereon has the binding force of ‘res judicata’. 33. For the same proposition, reliance is placed on SHANKAR SITARAM SONTAKKE v. BALKRISHNA SITARAM SONTAKKE AIR 1954 SC 352 , wherein the Supreme Court held that: “A consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed by invitum. The compromise having been found not to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding or mistake, the decree passed thereon had the binding force of res judicata an the plaintiff was barred from reagitating the question of accounts in fresh suit.” 34. In T. KATHAVANGA NAIDU v. MUTLURU RAMAPPA (DIED) AND OTHERS 2007 (2) ALD 104, it was held that the compromise decree in earlier suit operates as res judicata in the subsequent suit and by virtue of doctrine of election, they are estopped from contending to contra to the compromise decree. 35. In IDPL EMPLOYEES CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING BUILDING SOCIETY LTD., v. B. RAMA DEVI 2004 (5) ALD 632 , it was held that: “A party can seek delivery of possession in accordance with final decree only after it is engrossed on a stamp of adequate value by initiating execution proceedings.” 36. In PERRAJU v. VENKAMMA AIR 1971 AP 74, it was held that amendment of consent decree can be done only by consent of the parties if the amendment is substantial. It was further held that: “A consent decree can be amended only by agreement between and consent of parties and cannot be corrected by the court exercising its jurisdiction under Sections 151 to 153, if it is a substantial correction that is sought. If, on the other hand, the correction is only of a clerical error, committed by a mutual mistake of parties in preparing them compromise petition there is no reason why it should not come within the purview of Sec. 152, Civil P.C. In that case, what the Court has to examine is whether it is a clerical error and whether it has crept into the record on account of a mutual mistake of both the parties to the compromise. When these requirements are satisfied, there is no doubt that the Court has jurisdiction to correct such an accidental error in the record.” 37. In WAMAN RAO v. DAULAT RAO AIR 1953 HYDERABAD 3, it was held as follows: “A person who is not a party to the suit for pre-emption or the decree passed therein has no right to apply for amendment of the decree under S. 152 on the ground that the decree for pre-emption could not be passed in respect of the whole property inasmuch as half of it had been sold to him by the vendor. In such a case the decree cannot be said to be at variance with judgment. The proper remedy of the applicant is to file a separate suit.” 38. In AITHA DUBBA RAJAM ALIAS RAJU v. AITHA POCHAIAH 2007 (2) ALT 464 , it was held that a third party has no remedy in the final decree proceedings, but can avail any of the following remedies to protect the title and possession (1) ex parte decree can be sought to be set aside to establish the right to the property; (2) causing obstruction of delivery and filing claim petition and get the right adjudicated; and (3) filing a suit for declaration of ownership to the property. 39. The learned counsel for the respondents 4 to 14 relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions that when there are certain clerical mistakes in the final decree and the plan annexed thereto, such mistakes can be corrected in the interest of justice and that the corrections sought by the respondents 4 to 14 in this case, in fact, bring the plan annexed to the compromise memo in conformity with the terms of the compromise. He has relied on PEETHANI SURAYANARAYANA v. REPAKA VENKATA RAMANA KISHORE 2009 (1) Decisions Today (SC) 145, wherein in a suit for partition and also for a decree for setting aside some sale deeds, an Application for amendment of a mistake said to be clerical one in the decree seeking deletion of town survey No.462 and substituting the same by town Survey No.463, came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was not in dispute that the suit land was described as revisional survey No.165. It was not in dispute that the suit land was described as revisional survey No.165. When the village became part of the municipality by reason whereof, a new Town Survey was assigned to the suit land being Town Survey No.463. However in the plaint and consequently in the preliminary decree and as also in the final decree, Town survey No.462 was mistakenly mentioned, which was evidently a typographical mistake. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court observed that: “The power of the Court to allow such an application for amendment of plaint is neither in doubt nor in dispute. Such a wide power on the part of the Court is circumscribed by two factors, viz., (i) the application must be bonafide; (ii) the same should not cause injustice to the other side and (iii) it should not affect the right already accrued to the defendants.” In the present case, we are dealing with a decree passed on the basis of a compromise memo and the plan annexed thereto, which have been signed by both parties. In the above decision, the decree was not passed basing on a compromise memo. Therefore, on facts the above decision can be distinguished. 40. The learned counsel also relied on TILAK RAJ v. BAIKUNTHI DEVI (D) BY LRS 2009 (2) SUPREME 737 , wherein a suit for decree of possession was filed. The suit was decreed and a petition for execution of the decree was filed and during execution, it was found that Khasra No.25R/52 has been wrongly mentioned in the decree, whereas the corrected Khasra number was 26R/52. The Supreme Court opined that “Patwari issued a wrong certified copy of Jamabandi incorporating therein Khasra No.25R/52 against Khewat No.50 Khatoni No.60 of Jamabandi for the year 1966-67 of the village Mojowal. In fact there was no Khasra No.25R/52 whereas it was actually 26R/52. On account of such wrong supply of materials in the certified copy of Jamabandi, the Appellant had sued by wrongly mentioning identity of land as Khasra No.25R/52. There was no dispute that the parties in the earlier suit were agitating regarding the Estate of Datta Ram. In that view of the matter, the Appellant was not at fault at all for suing the land as mentioned in the para-A of the plaint filed in suit No.149 of 1979. There was no dispute that the parties in the earlier suit were agitating regarding the Estate of Datta Ram. In that view of the matter, the Appellant was not at fault at all for suing the land as mentioned in the para-A of the plaint filed in suit No.149 of 1979. Actually this was a mistake on the part of the Patwari or some Revenue Officer, who had issued the aforesaid Khasra Girdawari. It was nowhere disputed that Khasra No.26R/52 was owned by Datta Ram and there was no Khasra Number described as 25R/52. The aforesaid mistake was of clerical nature, which could have been corrected by applying the provisions of Section 152 of C.P.C. It was further observed that in such matters the Courts should not bind itself by the shackles of technicalities.” As seen from the facts of the decision referred above, the Khasra Number was wrongly mentioned on the basis of the certified copy of the Jamabandi in which a wrong Khasra number was mentioned. As far as the present case is concerned, we are dealing with a decree and a plan annexed thereto, which are the outcome of a compromise memo on the basis of mutually agreed terms, therefore, the above decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 41. The learned counsel also relied on RAMCHANDRA G. SHINDE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1993) 4 SCC 216 , wherein it appears that orders by consent were obtained to hold the elections on the basis of the voters list which according to the rules of the society was not correct. It was alleged that the Chairman of the society, while giving consent for passing orders, himself got enrolled 2000 members and made them eligible to exercise franchise in his favour apprehending that he would be defeated in the general election, colluded with some of the members and got filed collusive writ petitions, abused the process of the Court, played fraud on the Court and obtained collusive orders to make the provisional list of voters to be as on June 30, 1992 and to conduct elections on that basis. Under the above circumstances, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “Undoubtedly, the order passed by the High Court under Article 226 is a judicial order exercising its constituent power but when its process is abused and an order of minutes obtained by consent hedged with collusion and fraud on the Court and obviously, though not pleaded, on general body of the members of the society, when the facts were brought to the notice of the High Court, it is the High Court alone or on appeal this Court which is to correct such and order. The faith of the people in the efficacy of judicial process would be disillusioned, if the parties are permitted to abuse its process and allowed to go scot free. It is but the primary duty and highest responsibility of the court to correct such orders at the earliest and restore the confidence of the litigant public, in the purity of fountain of justice; remove stains on the efficacy of judicial adjudication and respect for rule of law, lest people would lose faith in the courts and take recourse to extra-constitutional remedies which is a death-knell to the rule of law. In our view, acceding to it would amount to putting a premium on fraud, collusion or abuse of the process of the court creating disbelief and disillusionment of the efficacy of judicial process and rule of law and a feeling would be generated that persons capable to maneuver and abuse the judicial process would reap the benefit thereof and get away with the orders. Every endeavour would be made to inculcate respect for fair judicial process and faith of the people in the efficacy of law.” The main distinction between the facts of this case and the above referred decision is that in that case the allegation is that the orders of the Court were obtained by playing fraud on the Court. Whereas there is no such allegation in the present case. In this case the compromise decree has been passed basing on the compromise memo and there is no allegation that the compromise memo is the outcome of fraud or misrepresentation. 42. Whereas there is no such allegation in the present case. In this case the compromise decree has been passed basing on the compromise memo and there is no allegation that the compromise memo is the outcome of fraud or misrepresentation. 42. The learned counsel also relied on M. VENKATARAMANA BHAT v. RETURNING OFFICER (1993) 4 SCC 317 , wherein it was observed that the earlier writ petition was filed at the behest of the rival candidate (respondent 4) abusing the process of the Court; had ex parte order and prevented two nominated members to exercise their franchise and facilitated the rival candidate Sadananda get elected as Pradhan. But for the directions granted by the High Court the nominated members would have exercised their franchise in electing the Pradhan. The Supreme Court further held that: “It is but proper and higher duty of the High court to see that its judicial process is not abused and its order does not become an instrument or aid to overreach the adversary and when that interference or finding could be reached on proper consideration of the facts and circumstances, suitable remedy be given. We are informed that there is no procedure prescribed under the Act or the Rules, to challenge the validity of the election. Even otherwise the Election Tribunal cannot go into the validity or correctness of the order granted by the High court which is the foundation to disable two members to exercise their franchise. It should be remedied only in the proceedings under Article 226. Under these circumstances it is but fit, just, proper and legal that the injury suffered by the appellant should be remedied by declaring that the election of K.C. Sadananda Pradhan is not a validly conducted election and it is accordingly declared and set aside. It is open to the Returning Officer to conduct the election of Pradhan afresh according to rules. The writ is issued accordingly.” On facts, the above decision is distinguishable as the facts are different. 43. Mr. A. Ramakrishna, the learned counsel appearing for Durga Matha Housing Society had placed reliance on the order, dated 21-12-2005 in A.S.M.P.No.2464 of 2005 in A.S.No.719 of 2005 filed by Durga Matha Housing Society. Durga Matha Housing Society sought for injunction order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. against the respondents therein. 43. Mr. A. Ramakrishna, the learned counsel appearing for Durga Matha Housing Society had placed reliance on the order, dated 21-12-2005 in A.S.M.P.No.2464 of 2005 in A.S.No.719 of 2005 filed by Durga Matha Housing Society. Durga Matha Housing Society sought for injunction order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. against the respondents therein. This Court directed both parties to maintain status quo as on the date of the order. 44. IDPL Housing Society, B. Sudhkar and others, Cyrus Investments Limited, R-5 and others had filed Application No.1011 of 2004 and batch to implead them as party defendants in O.S.No.14 of 1958 after recommencing the assignment in Sy.No.163. This Court, through the order, dated 18-01-2005, observed as follows: “In my considered opinion, it is not necessary to go into the question of title of either the assignees or the proposed parties for deciding these petitions, because these are not petitions for passing of final decree. The fact remains that the proposed parties filed petitions to implead them as parties to the suit and were made parties to the suit after recognition of assignment in their favour and thereafter they had obtained delivery of possession of the property through Court also. It is well known that there can be number of final decrees in a suit for partition. The question as to what is the extent of land that was alienated by 1st respondent and defendants 334 and 335 in Sy.No.163, which is a part of item No.38 of schedule IV of the preliminary decree, earlier to the assignment in favour of the assignees, and if any part of the land is available for alienation by 1st respondent and defendants 334 and 335 in favour of the assignees and if by virtue of the registered document relied on by the assignees, they had acquired title to the land covered thereby, are matters to be decided after taking evidence as and when the assignees file a petition for passing a final decree and to put them in possession of the undivided land said to have been assigned to them by the 1st respondent. Since 1st respondent and defendants 334 and 335 were having right in Sy.No.163, which is a part of item No.38 of schedule IV of the preliminary decree, and since the assignees did obtain a registered document from them, they are entitled to come on record. The proposed parties also can come on record to defend their right because the assignment in their favour was recognized and since they were also put in possession of the land covered by S.No.163 by the Court. Hence, all the petitions are allowed. No costs.” 45. Basing on the above referred orders, the learned counsel appearing for Durga Matha Housing Society submits that the decree passed basing on a compromise memo cannot be against the orders passed by this Court on the earlier occasion referred above. Whether the decree obtained by filing a compromise memo and plan annexed thereto are in conformity with the earlier orders passed by this Court in other proceedings or not and whether the extent of land shown in the compromise memo or in the plan annexed thereto is showing the land of neighbours i.e., Durga Matha Housing Society or not and whether by obtaining a consent decree the parties collusively intend to encroach the land of neighbours or not, such questions in our view cannot be gone into in these Applications. Scope of all these Applications is limited. Terms of compromise and the plan attached thereto as mutually agreed by all the parties to compromise cannot be attached. If at all the rights of third parties involved, their remedy is elsewhere. 46. Suffice to say that since Durga Matha Housing Society is not a party to the compromise memo and the plan annexed thereto, they are not bound by the decree passed on the basis of such compromise memo. When they are not bound by the consent decree, they can resist execution proceedings, if any, filed in pursuance of the decree obtained on the basis of the compromise memo. 47. At the instance of a third party, a consent or compromise decree cannot be altered or modified. Merely because a consent decree had been obtained from the High Court, that does not mean that a party has no remedy if their land is being encroached taking undue advantage of the compromise decree passed by the High court particularly when the decree is not binding on such party. Merely because a consent decree had been obtained from the High Court, that does not mean that a party has no remedy if their land is being encroached taking undue advantage of the compromise decree passed by the High court particularly when the decree is not binding on such party. There is some force in the contention of the learned counsel Sri A. Ramakrishna that it may lead to multiplicity of proceedings. It may be true that in view of the settled legal position that a compromise decree cannot be altered without the consent of the parties and at the instance of a third party, the claim of the Durga Matha Housing Society cannot be considered in these Applications. 48. The learned counsel also relied on NARESH SHRIDHAR MIRAJKAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER AIR 1967 SC 1 , wherein when a witness requested the Court that publication in the press of his earlier evidence had caused loss to him in business, a learned single Judge of Mumbai High Court directed that the evidence of the said witness should not be published. Challenging the same, a writ petition was filed and when it was dismissed by the Division Bench, the matter was carried to the Supreme Court and the questions that fell for consideration are whether the Courts have power to ban publication of evidence recorded in public Court and whether the order violates Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “The person affected can always approach the court for relief even if he was not a party to the proceedings. The jurisdiction of the Court does not depend on who the person affected by its order, is. Courts often have to pass orders which affect strangers to the proceedings before them. To take a common case, suppose a court appoints a receiver of a property about which certain persons are litigating but which in fact belongs to another. That person is as much bound by the order appointing the receiver as the parties to it are. His remedy is to move the court by an application pro interesse suo. He cannot by force prevent the receiver from taking possession and justify his action on the ground that the order was without jurisdiction and, therefore, violated his fundamental right to hold property. His remedy is to move the court by an application pro interesse suo. He cannot by force prevent the receiver from taking possession and justify his action on the ground that the order was without jurisdiction and, therefore, violated his fundamental right to hold property. It would be an intolerable calamity if the law were otherwise.” The Supreme Court further observed that: “If a stranger to the proceeding feels aggrieved by the order, he may take appropriate steps for setting it aside, but while it lasts, it must be obeyed. Take a case where a Court appoints a receiver over a property in a suit concerning it. If a stranger interested in the property is prejudiced by the order, his proper course is to apply to the Court to enforce his right and the Court will then examine his claim and give him the relief to which he may be entitled. Similarly if a stranger is prejudiced by an order forbidding the publication of the report of any proceeding, his proper course is to apply to the Court to lift the ban. But while the order remains in force, he must obey it. Willful disobedience of the order is punishable as a contempt of Court, and it is not a defence that he was not a party to the proceeding in which the order was passed.” The facts of the above referred case are entirely different to the facts of this case since the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in that case. 49. The learned counsel for the IDPL Housing Society submits that Durga Matha Housing Society can resist the Execution Petition filed by the parties to the compromise decree if at all they are aggrieved under Rules 91 of Order 21 of C.P.C. The learned counsel relied on the following decisions: 50. In BHAGWANSINGH v. BABU SHIV PRASAD AIR 1974 MADHYA PRADESH 12, it was argued that after a decree has been transferred to the Collector for effecting partition, the Civil Court becomes functus officio and it cannot exercise its powers to amend the decree. After passing the final decree, the same was sent to the Collector for effecting the partition. After final decree was passed, the respondent defendant filed an Application for execution of the decree. After passing the final decree, the same was sent to the Collector for effecting the partition. After final decree was passed, the respondent defendant filed an Application for execution of the decree. In that case, the matter was referred to the Collector under Section 54 read with Order 20 Rule 18 (1) of C.P.C. The Court, considering Rule 18 (1) of Order 22 and Section 54, observed as follows: “A perusal of the aforesaid two provisions make it clear that the rule does not contemplate passing of a final decree. All that is required of a civil Court in a case for partition of an undivided estate assessed to the payment of land revenue to the Government, or for the separate possession of a share of such an estate, is to only pass a preliminary decree and declare the rights of the several parties who are interested in the property and nothing more and give direction for such partition or separation to be made by the Collector or any gazetted officer subordinate to the Collector deputed by him in this behalf in accordance with such declaration and with the provisions of Section 54 of the Code. Thereafter, the execution has to be effected by the Collector. The reason is that the revenue authorities are more conversant and better qualified to deal with such matters than the Civil Court and interest of the Government with regard to the revenue assessed on the assets would be better safeguarded by the Collector executing the decree than by the Court. The partition contemplated by Section 54 is not confined to mere division of lands but includes also the delivery of the shares of the respective allottees. Thus, the Collector or his subordinate would be completely carrying out the partition. The civil Court after passing of the preliminary decree for partition of an undivided estate assessed to the payment of land revenue becomes functus officio and it would have no jurisdiction to act in any manner thereafter so as to pass a final decree or deliver possession to a party in accordance with the said decree.” The above decision is not applicable to the facts of this case, since revenue assessment was involved and partition had to be effected by the Collector under Section 54 read with Order 20 Rule 18 (1) of C.P.C. 51. RAMAKRISHNACHARYA v. SREENIVASACHARYA 1989 KARNATAKA 30, which deals with Section 54, Order 20 and Rule 18 of C.P.C., appears to be not applicable to the facts of this case. 52. The learned counsel also submitted that if any objections are raised by Durga Matha Housing Society at the time of execution of the decree, such objections have to be considered by the Court. Reliance is placed on BABULAL v. RAJ KUMAR AIR 1996 SC 2050 , wherein it was held that: “The executing Court was required to determine the question, when the objectors had objected to the execution of the decree as against them as they were not parties to the decree for specific performance.” 53. The learned counsel also relied on RACHAKONDA VENKAT RAO v. R. SATYA BAI (2003) 7 SCC 452 , wherein basing on the compromise entered into between the parties, a compromise decree was passed on 13-07-1978. However some properties were kept in joint. After 13 years, an Application was filed praying to appoint a Commissioner to divide the joint property by metes and bounds. The Supreme Court observed that: “If under the partition of 13-7-1978 some property or properties had been kept joint, it was because the parties had agreed to that course of action. The reason for this was also available from the record. The properties which had been kept joint were in a state that a partition by metes and bounds was not possible. Having agreed to keep the properties joint and having had the suit finally disposed of as per the prayer made to the Court, it did not lie in the mouth of the plaintiffs to ask for final decree proceedings again and to reopen the partition. For all practical purposes, there had been a complete partition of the suit properties. The only course open to the plaintiffs in such a case would have been to file a fresh suit for partition with respect to properties which had been kept joint.” In view of the above decision, it is clear that where a compromise decree has been passed, the same is binding upon the parties. 54. Mr. A. Ramakrishna, learned counsel appearing for Durga Matha Housing Society, relied on KHEMCHAND SHANKAR v. SISHNU HARI AIR 1983 SC 124 , wherein a suit for partition was decreed. The purchasers pendent lite asked for equitable allotment. 54. Mr. A. Ramakrishna, learned counsel appearing for Durga Matha Housing Society, relied on KHEMCHAND SHANKAR v. SISHNU HARI AIR 1983 SC 124 , wherein a suit for partition was decreed. The purchasers pendent lite asked for equitable allotment. Their claim was dismissed on the ground that they had no locus standi as their names did not figure in the decree. The Supreme Court observed that: “The position of a transferee pendent lite is somewhat similar to the position of an heir or a legatee of a party who dies during the pendency of a suit or a proceeding, or an official receiver who takes over the assets of such a party on his insolvency. All of them can participate in the execution proceedings even though their names may not have been shown in the decree, preliminary or final. The Collector who has to effect partition of an estate under Section 54 has no doubt to divide it in accordance with the decree sent to him. But if a party to such a decree dies leaving some heirs about whose interest there is no dispute he need not fold up his hands and return the paper to the Civil Court. He may proceed to allot the share of the deceased party to his heirs. Similarly in the case of transferees pendente lite also, if there is no dispute, the Collector may proceed to make allotment of properties in an equitable manner instead of rejecting their claim for such equitable partition on the ground that they have no locus standi. In any such case where there is no dispute if the Collector makes an equitable partition, he would neither be violating the decree nor transgressing any law.” The above case can be distinguished as the facts are different. In this case, Durga Matha Housing Society is neither purchaser pendent lite nor legal representative of any party who died, therefore, they have no locus standi in the present proceedings. 55. Under Order 21 Rules 97 and 99 of C.P.C., all the questions relating to the right, title and interest in the property, which is the subject matter of execution, may have to be decided by the court and for that purpose, parties have to be given opportunity to lead evidence both oral and documentary. 56. 55. Under Order 21 Rules 97 and 99 of C.P.C., all the questions relating to the right, title and interest in the property, which is the subject matter of execution, may have to be decided by the court and for that purpose, parties have to be given opportunity to lead evidence both oral and documentary. 56. The apprehension of Durga Matha Housing society that they may be affected or that their land may be encroached cannot be gone into. If the parties to the compromise decree, taking advantage of the compromise decree, in fact, try to dispossess Durga Matha Housing society from their land, then Durga Matha Housing Society may have some cause of action to resist the actions of parties to the compromise decree either by filing a civil suit or objections or claim petitions as under order 21 Rules 97 and 98 C.P.C. 57. It is true that Durga Matha Housing Society appears to be a party to the main suit, but it is not a party to the compromise memo, and the decree was passed in pursuance of the compromise memo. Therefore, though Durga Matha Housing Society is party to the suit it is not bound by the decree passed on the basis of the compromise memo in this case. Moreover, a third party cannot challenge a compromise entered into between the parties to the proceedings. 58. From the foregoing discussion, the principles that emerge are a clerical mistake can be corrected even after passing of the final decree at the stage of execution proceedings, where the amendment does not cause injustice to the other side. 59. Sections 152 and 153 of C.P.C. enable the Court to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decree or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission at any time. In both the Sections, the words used are ‘at any time’. In the present case, the only point to be considered is whether the correction sought for is in the field of accidental or omission or not. 60. The difference in between Sections 152 to 153A and order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. has to be considered. In both the Sections, the words used are ‘at any time’. In the present case, the only point to be considered is whether the correction sought for is in the field of accidental or omission or not. 60. The difference in between Sections 152 to 153A and order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. has to be considered. What is to be seen is that whether the agreement or compromise is lawful or not and whether the agreement is in writing and signed by parties or not and if the agreement or compromise is lawful and signed by all the parties to the compromise, the Court shall order such agreement or compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. The words ‘so far it relates to the parties to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit’ were inserted by the Amendment Act 104 of 1976. 61. The compromise decree may be a voided only on the grounds like fraud, undue influence, coherent or opposed to the public policy or when it is violative of any statutory Rule. 62. A party to the compromise is estopped from saying that the terms, on which the decree was passed, are not lawful. The main purpose appears to be to see that the parties do not resile from the earlier compromise entered into between them and repudiated the same. 63. As far as the amendment of compromise decree is concerned, the legal position appears to be well settled. When the parties entered into a compromise and filed a written compromise signed by all the parties and confirm the same before the Court, the Court is bound to pass the Judgment in terms of the compromise. Even if some mistake occurred in mentioning the survey numbers or boundaries or extents, the same cannot be treated as a clerical mistake and could not be ordered to be corrected by the Court unless all the parties give consent for the amendment of compromise memo and consequently, the compromise decree. A consent decree made by consent can only be varied by the consent of the parties. The Court is not empowered to make any variation, alteration or amendment to the terms of compromise. 64. A consent decree made by consent can only be varied by the consent of the parties. The Court is not empowered to make any variation, alteration or amendment to the terms of compromise. 64. A consent decree is binding upon the parties thereto only, therefore, we are of the considered view that the petitions filed by R-4 to R-14 have to be rejected since the Court is not empowered to amend a compromise decree without the consent of the other parties to the compromise. Admittedly in this case the other parties to the compromise are opposing the petition filed by R-4 to R-14. 65. The contention of the respondents 4 to 14 that the memorandum of compromise and the plan annexed thereto are not in conformity with the original terms of the compromise and that the amendment sought by them is only to bring the same in conformity with the original terms of memorandum of compromise, cannot be considered as no amendment of compromise decree can be carried out without the consent of all the parties to the compromise. Similarly whether there are any variations in the ultimate compromise memo and the original terms of compromise in the plan annexed thereto also cannot be considered even if there are variations. Moreover in all these Applications the parties have filed affidavits and counter affidavits. When the facts are in dispute and when one party alleges that the plan and measurements are not in conformity with the terms of the original compromise memo and when the other side disputes the same, such disputed questions cannot be decided in interlocutory applications without adducing any evidence. 66. As far as the Application filed by the IDPL Housing Society is concerned, the same is on different footing. Admittedly the compromise was entered into between the parties and the compromise memo and the plan annexed thereto was also signed by all the parties. Therefore, the parties to the compromise memo are bound by the terms of compromise memo and the plan annexed thereto. Neither the terms of the compromise memo nor the plan annexed thereto can be varied by the Court even if it appears that there is some mistake in the compromise memo. Therefore, the parties to the compromise memo are bound by the terms of compromise memo and the plan annexed thereto. Neither the terms of the compromise memo nor the plan annexed thereto can be varied by the Court even if it appears that there is some mistake in the compromise memo. In this case, the case of IDPL Housing Society is that while enclosing a plan to the Application for passing final decree, they had mistakenly enclosed another plan with incorrect measurements and now they want to replace the said plan with the correct plan. Since it appears to be a clerical mistake and to bring the compromise decree and the plan annexed thereto totally in conformity with the compromise memo and the plan annexed thereto, it becomes necessary to allow the Application filed by the IDPL Housing Society. By allowing the Applications filed by the IDPL Housing Society, the original compromise memo and the plan annexed thereto would become the basis for passing amended final decree and the same is to be sent to the registration authorities. 67. From the above discussion, it is clear that the parties to the compromise are bound by the terms of compromise and the decree passed in pursuance of the compromise memo entered into between the parties cannot be altered, varied or amended on any ground unless and until the parties to the compromise give their consent. The Court has no power under Sections 152 to 153A of C.P.C. to amend the compromise decree even if it appears that there is a clerical mistake in the compromise decree without the consent of the parties to the compromise. Of course, the compromise decree can be amended to bring the same in conformity with the memorandum of compromise and the plan annexed thereto if the decree or plan annexed thereto is not in conformity with the compromise memo and the plan annexed therewith, but no amendment can be allowed to change the terms of compromise. 68. Similarly a third party cannot challenge a compromise decree and cannot be added as a party to the proceedings, even if the rights of the third party are being affected by the terms of compromise, the remedy is elsewhere. 68. Similarly a third party cannot challenge a compromise decree and cannot be added as a party to the proceedings, even if the rights of the third party are being affected by the terms of compromise, the remedy is elsewhere. As the compromise decree will not bind them, they can resist the execution proceedings, if any, initiated in terms of the compromise decree or file a civil suit and seek relief. 69. The compromise decree can be varied to bring the same in conformity with the terms of memorandum of compromise and the plan annexed thereto. Accordingly, the IDPL Housing Society can pray for a direction to send the final decree for the purpose of registration without further survey as required. 70. In view of the above discussion, we further hold that Durga Matha Housing Society cannot be said to have any locus standi to raise the objections in the present Applications and the remedy available to that Society is elsewhere. 71. Accordingly, the Applications filed by the IDPL Housing Society in Application Nos. 728 and 1084 of 2007, 38 of 2008 and 259 of 2009 are allowed and the Applications filed by R-4 to R-14 and Durga Matha Housing Society i.e., Application Nos.11 and 47 of 2009; and 1264 of 2008 and 73 of 2009 shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.