Judgment : Joseph, J. The appellant is the third respondent in a claim petition filed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, by the petitioners, who claimed as legal heirs and dependents of one Dinto Mathew, who died as a result of the injury sustained in an accident, due to the negligence on the part of the driver of a lorry. This appeal is directed against the award passed by the Tribunal, by which the claimants/respondents are granted an amount of Rs.4,12,500/- 2. We heard the learned Senior counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant, Shri. Mathew Jacob raised three contentions before us. Firstly it is contended that the Tribunal erred in fixing the income at Rs. 3,000/- p.m. The complaint is that apart from producing certain documents, which may show that the deceased possessed certain qualifications, there is no evidence to show the actual income that is derived by the deceased. Secondly it is contended that this is a case where the multiplier adopted by the Tribunal is erroneous. It is contended that proper multiplier should have been 13. However, the Tribunal has taken the multiplier as 17. The Tribunal has taken the multiplier considering the age of the deceased as 23. It is contended that having regard to the decision of the Apex Court in Ramesh Singh v. Satbuir Singh (2008 (1) KLT 614 (SC) the Tribunal has erred in taking the multiplier as 17. 4. Thirdly it is contended that the Tribunal has erred in deducting only one-third towards the personal expenses of the deceased. The contention is that having regard to the fact the deceased was a bachelor, should have been one half. 5. The learned for the respondents would submit that as far as the income is concerned, no interference is called for. There is evidence regarding the qualifications of the deceased. As far as adoption of multiplier 17 is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondents tried to justify the same. In an application under Section 163A of the M.V. Act (for short 'the Act') the schedule provides for multiplier with reference to the age. It is impermissible to adopt the age of the claimants for taking the multiplier for deciding the amount of compensation, he contended. In an application under Section 163A of the M.V. Act (for short 'the Act') the schedule provides for multiplier with reference to the age. It is impermissible to adopt the age of the claimants for taking the multiplier for deciding the amount of compensation, he contended. He relied on the decision in Damodaran v. Valsala (2008 (1) KLT 396), which we shall refer to in the course of the judgment. 6. As far as the question of income is concerned, we would nor think that the appellant has made out a case for interference. The accident occurred on 3.5.2002. It is claimed that the deceased was a Diploma holder in Hotel Management and was having an income of Rs.3,333,33. Ext.A8 is the certificate of Diploma in Hotel Management, which indicates that he passed the course with Second Class in 1999. Ext.A9 is an identity card issued from the Consult Inn Institute of Hotel Management to the deceased. Ext.A10 is the mark list of the Diploma in Hotel Management. Ext.A11 is the character and conduct certificate. Ext.A12 is the certificate issued from the Indian Technical Education Society, Mumbai, certifying that the deceased had passed Automobile Mechanic Course in IInd Class in 1997. Ext.A13 is a certificate issued by Umanath Devadige, Personnel Manager of Hotel Tunga Paradise, Andheri, Mumbai to the deceased certifying that the deceased had worked as Steward in the Food and Beverage (Service) Department from 10.1.2000 to 30.10.2000. Ext.A14 is yet another certificate issued Shri. K. Atma Menon, General Manager, Kodal Resort Hotel, Kodaikanal certifying that the deceased had served in the hotel from 12.7.99 to 20.12.1999. Ext.A17 is the copy of the passport of the deceased. 7. May be that the claimants have not produced any document to show that the deceased had any income. We cannot say that there is no material, having regard to the qualifications and the certificates showing that he had been working and he possessed necessary qualifications. In such circumstances, we do not think it fit having regard to the date of the accident, to interfere with the income fixed by the Tribunal. 8. As far as the second question is concerned, the deceased was aged 23 at the time of the accident. The multiplier applicable is 17. The Tribunal has fixed the multiplier with reference to the age of the deceased. The first claimant is the father, who was aged 52 years. 8. As far as the second question is concerned, the deceased was aged 23 at the time of the accident. The multiplier applicable is 17. The Tribunal has fixed the multiplier with reference to the age of the deceased. The first claimant is the father, who was aged 52 years. The second claimant is the mother, who was aged 46 years and the third claimant is the sister of the deceased, who cannot set up a claim as such. The learned counsel for the respondents would submit that it is an application under Section 163A of the Act and being an application under Section 163A, there is no discretion for the Tribunal in the matter of selection of appropriate multiplier because it is fixed by the schedule. He also relied on the decision in Damodaran (supra). Therein the Division Bench of this Court, no doubt, took the view that it is the age of the victim which is crucial for determining the multiplier. The Court held as follows: "From the Second Schedule it appears that the age of the victim is the factor to identify the multiplier. Structured formula is legally sanctified and its application is mandatory and not directory in nature. 9. We think that in view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Apex Court on the very same issue in the decision reported in Ramesh Singh (supra), the appellant is entitled to succeed on this question. Therein, the Apex Court held in paragraph 4 and 5, which read as follows: "4. We have given anxious consideration to these contentions and are of the opinion that the same are devoid of any merit. Considering the law laid down in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Charlie (2005 (3) KLT 227 (SC)=(2005) 10 SCC 720), it is clear that the choice of multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased or claimants whichever is higher. Admittedly, the age of the father was 55 years. The question of mother's age never cropped up because that was not the contention raised even before the Trial Court or before us. Taking the age to be 55 years, in out opinion, the courts below have not committed any illegality in applying the multiplier of 8 since the father was running 56th year of his life. 5. The question of mother's age never cropped up because that was not the contention raised even before the Trial Court or before us. Taking the age to be 55 years, in out opinion, the courts below have not committed any illegality in applying the multiplier of 8 since the father was running 56th year of his life. 5. The learned counsel relying on the 2nd Schedule of the Act contended that the deceased being about 16 or 17 years of age, a multiplier of 16 of 17 should have been granted. It is undoubtedly true that S.163-A was brought on the Statute book to shorten the period of litigation. The burden to prove the negligence or fault on the part of the driver and other allaied burdens under Ss.140 or 166 were really cumbersome and time consuming. Therefore as a part of social justice, a system was introduced via. S.163-A wherein such burden was avoided and thereby a speedy remedy was provided. The relief under S.163-A has been held not to be additional but alternate. The Schedule provided has been threadbare, discussed in various pronouncements including Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd (2004) (2) KLT 395 (SC) = (2004) 5 SCC 382). 2nd Schedule is to be used not only for referring to age of victim but also other factors relevant therefore. Complicated questions of facts and law arising in accident cases cannot be answered at all times by relying on mathematical equations. In fact in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra (1996 (2) klt 318(SC) = (1996 4 SCC 362)m Ahmedi, J. (As the Chief Justice then was) has pointed out the shortcomings in the said Schedule and has held that the Schedule can only be used as a guide. It was also held that the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely depending on the age of the deceased. If a young man is killed in the accident leaving behind aged parents who may not survive long enough to match with a high multiplier provided by the 2nd Schedule, then the Court has to offset such high multiplier and balance the same with the short life expectancy of the claimants. That precisely has happened in this case. If a young man is killed in the accident leaving behind aged parents who may not survive long enough to match with a high multiplier provided by the 2nd Schedule, then the Court has to offset such high multiplier and balance the same with the short life expectancy of the claimants. That precisely has happened in this case. Age of the parents was held as a relevant factor in case of minor's death in a recent decision in Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd. v, Syed Ibrahim & Ors. (2007 (4) KLT 319 (SC) = JT 2007 (11) SC 113). In our considered opinion, the Courts below rightly struck the said balance." 10. It may be true that the 2nd Schedule provides for multiplier with reference to the age of the victim. But when the Apex Court interprets the law, the law declared is binding on this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is also to be noted that it has been held that in an application under Section 166 of the Act the claimant will be entitled to atleast the amount which is vouchsafed for a claimant under Section 163A. If the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted, then, though indirectly, the result would be that even in a claim under Section 166, the multiplier would have been fixed not with reference to the analysis of the difference in the age between the deceased and the claimants inter se, but exclusively with reference to the age of the victim. 11. Going by the doctrine of multiplier the whole purport is to reach justice to the claimants by assuring them such compensation as would generate the income which they would have earned if the accident had not occurred. Therefore, we reject the contention of the respondents and hold that the Tribunal was in error in applying multiplier 17. The correct multiplier would have been 13, which is applicable to the age group, taking the average of the age of the father and the mother. 12. The last question to be considered is whether the Tribunal was justified in deducting only one-third towards personal expenses of the deceased. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Smt. Sarala Verma & ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & anr. (Civil Appeal No.3483 of 2008). 12. The last question to be considered is whether the Tribunal was justified in deducting only one-third towards personal expenses of the deceased. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Smt. Sarala Verma & ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & anr. (Civil Appeal No.3483 of 2008). Therein the Apex Court, no doubt, has held that in the matter of deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased, when the deceased is a bachelor, the deduction should normally be 50%. The appellant relies on paragraph 15 of the said judgment, which reads as follows: "15. When the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parents and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependent and the mother alone will be considered as a dependent. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependents, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father. Thus, even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two-third." 13. The learned counsel for the respondents however pointed out that the statute provides for deduction of one-third of the income towards the expenses of the deceased. There is no decision rendered in an application under Section 163A providing that the deduction can be upto 50%, he points out. The learned counsel for the respondents however pointed out that the statute provides for deduction of one-third of the income towards the expenses of the deceased. There is no decision rendered in an application under Section 163A providing that the deduction can be upto 50%, he points out. He would further submit that in such circumstances no interference is called for. 14. We notice that the judgment of the Apex Court, which we have referred to above, was one rendered in an application under Section 166 of the Act and not under Section 163A. This is clear from paragraph 20 of the judgment, wherein the Court has said so specifically. In the teeth of the statutory provisions and in the absence of any binding judicial pronouncement mandating that the deduction is to be anything other than what is provided in the statute, we feel that the respondents are right in regard to the contention that the Tribunal is correct in deducting only one-third. 15. The upshot of the discussion is that the appellant is entitled to succeed in respect of the second contention. The appeal is allowed in part. We modify the award. The amount of compensation will stand reduced by Rs. 96,000/- and the respondents are entitled to realize a sum of Rs.3,16,500/- in the place of what was awarded by the Tribunal.