Judgment :- 1. The Petitioner has challenged the order of the First Respondent herein dated 210. 2004 setting aside the order of the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (Appeals). 2. It is seen that the Respondents issued notice for short landing of the goods imported. The consignee, who received the cargo did not file any Civil Suit claiming shortage. The Petitioner contends that the liability to the carrier ceased on arrival with the full cargo at the anchorage, thus the obligation under the bill of lading had been duly discharged. However, the Petitioner, steamer agent, was visited with a show cause notice dated 17. 1999 from the Assistant Commissioner, Customs alleging that the vessel had short landed a quantity of 332.658 Mts. The Petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 8. 1999 and sought for certain documents and clarifications for verification before proceeding further in the matter. However, the Petitioner’s contentions were rejected and an order was passed imposing penalty of Rs. 8,35,000/- at twice the amount of import duty payable on the cargo. 3. Aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioner preferred an Appeal before the second Respondent. By order dated 25. 2002, the Appellate Authority held that the survey report not countersigned by the customs authorities would not make the document invalid in law and he was satisfied with the report prepared by the natural surveyor, set aside the order of the Third Respondent. Admittedly, as against the order, the Department did not file Revision as provided under Section 129-DD of the Customs Act. 4. In respect of the similar issue raised on short landing, the Revenue went on Revision before the Government of India under Section 129-DD of the Customs Act after presenting the Appeal papers before the CEGAT. By a common order dated 210. 2004, the Government of India reversed the order of the Appellate Authority. As against which, the Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition. 5. It is seen from the documents produced before this Court that in respect of one of the orders passed restoring the penalty by the Government, Writ Petition was filed in W.P. No.1442 of 2005. By an order dated 16. 2009, learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the Writ Petition, against which, it is stated that the Petitioner had gone on Appeal. By an order dated 16. 2009, learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the Writ Petition, against which, it is stated that the Petitioner had gone on Appeal. The present Writ Petition is as against the order bearing No.F.No.380/12SL/2003-RA passed in Order No.525/04 dated 210. 2004 restoring penalty. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner pointed out that the order passed by the First Respondent is hit by the provisions contained in Section 129-DD of the Customs Act. In the circumstances, the Writ Petition has to be allowed quashing the order passed by the First Respondent. 7. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents pointed out that in the face of the order passed by this Court dismissing the Wirt Petition W.P.No.1442 of 2005 dated 16. 2009, the present Writ Petition also has to be dismissed or posted along with the Writ Appeal preferred therein. 8. On the question o limitation, learned Counsel for the First Respondent submitted that having regard to the view expressed by the revisional authority, namely, the First Respondent as to the condoning of delay, there are no merits in the Writ Petition and the same has to be dismissed. 9. Heard the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents. 10. Certain facts relevant for the purpose of considering the merits of the case are as follows: A show cause notice proposing to levy penalty dated 17. 1999 under Section 116 of the Customs Act was issued; an order passed on 1. 2000 imposing penalty; the Appeal preferred by the Petitioner was allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under order dated 25. 2002; the said order was received by the Commissioner on 16. 2002. Admittedly, as against this order, there is a right of Revision and no Appeal before the Tribunal. Section 129-DD of the Customs Act is the relevant provision to deal with the filing of Revision by the Central Government. Under sub-section (2) to Section 129-DD of the Customs Act, the Revision Petition has to be filed by the aggrieved party within a period of three months from the date of communication of the order against which the Application is being made. 11. For an easy reference, the said provision needs to be extracted, which reads as follows: “129-DD. Under sub-section (2) to Section 129-DD of the Customs Act, the Revision Petition has to be filed by the aggrieved party within a period of three months from the date of communication of the order against which the Application is being made. 11. For an easy reference, the said provision needs to be extracted, which reads as follows: “129-DD. Revision by Central Government- (1) The Central Government may, on the Application of any person aggrieved by any order passed under Section 128-A, where the order is of the nature referred to in the First Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 129-A, annul or modify such order: Provided that the Central Government may in its discretion, refuse to admit an Application in respect of an order where the amount of duty or fine or penalty, determined by such order does not exceed five thousand rupees. Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section. “order passed under Section 128-A “included an order passed under that Section before the commencement of Section 40 of the Finance Act, 1984”, against which an Appeal has not been preferred before such commencement and could have been, if the said Section had not come into force, preferred after such commencement, to the Appellate Tribunal. (1-A) The Commissioner of Customs may, if he is of the opinion that an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 128-A is not legal or proper, direct the proper officer to make an Application on his behalf to the Central Government for revision of such order. (2) An application under sub-section (1) shall be made within three months from the date of the communication to the applicant of the order against which the Application is being made: Provided that the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that the Applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the Application within the aforesaid period of three months, allow it to be presented within a future period of three months.” 12. Going by the said Section, it is clear that the aggrieved party has to maintain his Application by filing the same within a period of three months and as per the Proviso, the authority of the Government to condone the delay beyond three months is restricted to a further period of three months. Hence, totally the period of limitation available for condonation is 180 days. 13. Hence, totally the period of limitation available for condonation is 180 days. 13. As far as the present case is concerned, admittedly, the Respondents have preferred Appeal before the Tribunal on 20.9.2002, who had no authority at all to receive the same. The Petition papers were returned by the Tribunal on 112. 2002. Thereafter, the period of limitation, hence, as per Section 129-DD of the Customs Act expired on 19. 2002, taking note of the date of receipt as 16. 2002. Further, the period of limitation, hence, has to be reckoned from 19. 2002, which again expires by 112. 2002. Even though the Respondents have time enough to make a proper presentation before the authority competent to receive the Revision, yet for reasons best known to them, the Revision Petition was presented only in the month of January 2003. Going by Section 129-DD of the Customs Act, by this time, the condonable period of even three months had expired. Hence, even on the date of presentation of the Revision, the Revisional Authority had no jurisdiction to receive the same, even for the purpose of condoning the delay. The order passed by the First Respondent, now under challenge before this Court, hence, has to be held as one without jurisdiction. 14. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents pointed out that since the matter relates to Revenue, some leniency may be shown in the matter of condoning the delay. The said question arises if and when the authority concerned had approached the Revisional Authority within the time given under the Act. While it is not denied that as a proposition of law, a discretionary order like a condonation of delay does not normally go for interference by this Court, yet, when an order is passed by the authority who has totally no jurisdiction even to condone the delay, this Court has no hesitancy in setting aside the order passed, which is now impugned in the Writ Petition. 15. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the order passed by the Respondent is a common order in two Revisions, similar to the one already passed by the First Respondent in Revision order No. 524 of 2004. In the circumstances, when this Court had already considered the merits of the order passed, the present Writ Petition, hence, has to be dismissed. 16. I do not agree with the said submission. In the circumstances, when this Court had already considered the merits of the order passed, the present Writ Petition, hence, has to be dismissed. 16. I do not agree with the said submission. A perusal of the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.1442 of 2005 shows particularly in paragraph 20 holding that the discretionary right of a competent Revisional Authority condoning the delay cannot be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 when the Revisional Authority is satisfied of the reasons for the delay. However, the claim as has now been projected as regards the lack of jurisdiction on account of limitation was not placed before the Court for consideration. In the circumstances, I do not find any jurisdiction in the submission of the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents that the Court has not follow the order passed in W.P.No.1442 of 2005 dated 16. 2009. 17. Considering the issue now raised by the Petitioner particularly with reference to lack of jurisdiction in terms of Section 129-DD of the Customs Act and on the admitted facts that the Respondents had approached the Revisional Authority only on the expiry of even the condonable period under Section 129-DD of the Customs Act, I have no hesitation in quashing the order, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the First Respondent, hence, has to be viewed void ab initio. In the above circumstances, even though this Court has upheld the order of the Revisional Authority in the other Writ Petition, I am not persuaded to adopt the same course, having regard to the issue raised and argued by the Petitioner as to the authority of the First Respondent to pass an order. Consequently, the Writ Petition is allowed, thereby the order impugned is quashed. 18. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner pointed out that in W.P.M.P. No. 1616 of 2005 in this Writ Petition by the order dated 20th January 2005, this Court while granting interim prayer, directed the Petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. One lakh with the Third Respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of that order, failing which the injunction granted will get automatically vacated. 19. In view of the order passed allowing the Writ Petition, the amount deposited by the Petitioner, hence, has to be refunded to the Petitioner. One lakh with the Third Respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of that order, failing which the injunction granted will get automatically vacated. 19. In view of the order passed allowing the Writ Petition, the amount deposited by the Petitioner, hence, has to be refunded to the Petitioner. Consequently, the Third Respondent is directed to refund the amount deposited pursuant to the directions of this Court to the Petitioner. No costs. Consequently, W.P.M.P. No. 1616 of 2005 is closed.