ORDER T. NK. Singh, J. 1. This revision petition under Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr. P. C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 11-7-2008 passed in Criminal Misc. (Bail) Case No. 52 of 2008 by the learned Sessions Judge, Manipur West for granting anticipatory bail to the respondent Shri Thokchom Jadumani Singh, an accused in the FIR Case No. 102 (4) 2008 Thoubal P. S. under Section 121/121-A, I.P.C. and 17, 20 UA (P) A Act, 2004 for an indefinite period. For easy reference, the impugned order dated 11-7-2008 is quoted hereunder: I have heard the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner and the ld. Addl. P. P. for State. After hearing the ld. Counsel for the petitioner/accused and on perusal of the available materials on record it is found that the accused/petitioner. Th. Jadumani Singh has been suspected of using terrorist fund raised by underground organization PLA in establishing one Petrol Pump of Khangabok under the name of Sorojini filling station as sanctioned vide order No. GDO/New R.O. Khangabok dated 24-11-2003 from IBP Co. Ltd. by Sr. Divisional Manager. But today no incriminating article is recovered from his possession to support the allegation raised by the prosecution though there appears prima facie case of disproportionate property of the accused/petitioner. He is not likely to abscond as he is ready to furnish bail bonds if released on bail. So with a view to the nature of the case and its gravity I find sufficient reason to release the petitioner/accused on anticipatory bail. Hence it is ordered that the interim bail of the petitioner/accused. Th. Jadumani Singh dated 23-6-2008 is made absolute. Send copy of this order to the I. O. of the case for information. Announced in the open court. Sd/- Th. Surbala Devi, Sessions Judge, Manipur West. 2. A short factual matrix which gives rise to the filing of the present revision petition is noted in brief. Th. Jadumani Singh dated 23-6-2008 is made absolute. Send copy of this order to the I. O. of the case for information. Announced in the open court. Sd/- Th. Surbala Devi, Sessions Judge, Manipur West. 2. A short factual matrix which gives rise to the filing of the present revision petition is noted in brief. The O.C., Thoubal P. S. basing on a reliable source, conducted an inquiry and in the course of such inquiry material evidences have been collected that one Shri Moirangthem Balaram alias Suresh Bhaiya, S/S Finance Secretary of the banned organization namely People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Khangabok, Thoubal District is a close friend of respondent Shri Thokchom Jadumani Singh of Khangabok and with the financial assistance from the fund of PLA the respondent Shri Th. Jadumani Singh has established a petrol pump at Khangabok under the name and style of "Sorojini Filling Station". It is also established on further inquiry that for opening the petrol pump a land measuring an area of 4733 hectare located just near the NH 39 at Khangabok was purchased from one Kh. Satpa and Kh. Ibomcha, sons of Kh. Angou of Khangabok Khullakpam Leikai for a consideration amount of Rs. 50,000/- vide Registration No. 472 dated 13-6-2003 by concealing the exact purchase amount to evade the non-judicial stamp fee and registration fee. One Shri Waikhom Chandra Singh, S/o. W. Manitomba Singh (the then Sub-Registrar, Thoubal) was examined in the course of the inquiry and he stated that market value of the land for the petrol pump which was purchased vide registered sale deed No. 472 dated 13-6-2003 would be Rs. 28.50,000/-(Rupees twenty-eight lakhs fifty thousand) and he had issued valuation certificate of the said land. On examination of the Bank Manager, SBI, Thoubal, Shri Bipin Sharma, he stated that his bank had availed a loan of Rs. 32,00,000/- (Rupees thirty two lakhs) on 28-10-2006 and also on examination of the bank documents it is clear that the respondent Shri Jadumani Singh had submitted movable asset of Rs. 40 lakhs (vehicles/trucks). As indicated from the record of the District Transport Office, Thoubal, it is found that the said vehicles valued at Rs. 40 lakhs were Auto-Rickshaw, Bajaj Super Scooter, LML Vespa, NV Scooter etc.. thus fraudulent submission of documents to the Bank. 40 lakhs (vehicles/trucks). As indicated from the record of the District Transport Office, Thoubal, it is found that the said vehicles valued at Rs. 40 lakhs were Auto-Rickshaw, Bajaj Super Scooter, LML Vespa, NV Scooter etc.. thus fraudulent submission of documents to the Bank. It is also stated that in the course of investigation of the case, two witnesses, Shri Moirangthem Rameshwer Singh of Khangabok Awang Leikai and Shri Pijam Shyamkishore Singh of Kairenbhikhok stated that the respondent Shri Jadumani Singh does not have enough money to raise fund for establishment of the Petrol Pump and other witnesses namely, Shri Khundrakpam Lalbabu Singh of Khangabok Awang Leikai and Shri Sapam Prem Singh of Wangbal also stated that the respondent Shri Th. Jadumani Singh does not have enough resources to establish the petrol pump. It is stated that the value of the petrol pump is estimated at Rs. 61 lakhs and respondent, Shri Jadumani Singh and his associates are raising fund for the PLA and also there are materials against them for waging war against the Government by hatching conspiracy with the PLA cadres. A suo motu case under FIR No. 102(4) 08 Thoubal P. S. under Section 121/121-A I.P.C. 17/21 UA(P)A Act 2004 has been registered against the respondent/accused, Thokchom Jadumani Singh. 3. The original ejahar of the FIR No. 102(4) 2008, Thoubal P.S. registered against the respondent, Shri Th. Jadumani Singh read as follows: During the course of inquiry, it has come to light that one Shri Moirangthem Balaram alias Suresh Bhaiya, S/S Finance Secy of PLA of Khangabok, Thoubal Distt. which is a terrorist organ is a very close friend of Shri Th. Jadumani Singh of Khangabok. The terrorist fund raised by the PLA is handled by Shri Moirangthem Balram alias Suresh Bhaiya, S/S Finance Secy, of PLA and out of the terrorist fund raised by the PLA Shri Th. Jadumani Singh has established one Petrol Pump at Khangabok under the name of Sorojini Filling Station as sanctioned vide order No. GDO/New R. O. Khangabok dated 24-11-2008 from IBP Co. Ltd. by Sr. Divisional Manager. During further inquiry, it is also established that for opening the said Petrol Pump, a land measuring an area of 0.4733 hectare of land just near NH 39 at Khangabok was purchased from one Kh. Satpa and Kh. Ibomcha S/o. Kh. Angou of Khangabok Khullakpam Leikai or a consideration of Rs. Ltd. by Sr. Divisional Manager. During further inquiry, it is also established that for opening the said Petrol Pump, a land measuring an area of 0.4733 hectare of land just near NH 39 at Khangabok was purchased from one Kh. Satpa and Kh. Ibomcha S/o. Kh. Angou of Khangabok Khullakpam Leikai or a consideration of Rs. 50,000/- vide registration No. 472 dated 13-6-2003 by concealing the exact purchase amount to evade the non-judicial stamp fee and registration fee. But the market value of the above land is Rs. 28,50,000/- as assessed by the SDC/Thoubal (copy enclosed). During inquiry, it is also established that Shri Th. Jadumani Singh does not have enough means to raise such huge amount for procuring such precious land near NH 39 without the help of PLA though Shri Suresh Bhaiya. But he has shown a sum of Rs. 32 lakh as loan from SBI, Thoubal against the value of assets such as cash in hand Rs. 10 lakh immovable properties Rs. 10 lakh, stock business Rs. 15 lakh, gold ornaments Rs. 50,000/- and movable assets Rs. 40 lakh (copy of loan sanction order is enclosed). At the movement, the Petrol Pump is transacting regularly and the total amount of the Petrol Pump may be estimated at Rs. 61 lakhs. Therefore, it is necessary to register a regular case punishable under Section17/21 UA(P)A Act against Shri Th. Jadumani Singh and has associates for raising the PLA fund and also for holding the proceeds of Terrorism to wage war against the Govt. by hatching conspiracy with the PLA cadres punishable under Sections 121/121-A of I.P.C. Hence, a suo motu case under FIR No. 102(4) 08 TBL P. S. under Section121/121-A, I. P. C, 17/21 UA (P) A Act 04 has been registered against the accused person for investigation. Sd/ (Insp. Kh. Sarat Singh), Officer-in-Charge, Thouble Police Station. 4. Before making arrest of the respondent, Shri Th. Jadumani Singh, he filed an application under Section 438, Cr. P. C. being Criminal. Misc. (Bail) C Case No. 52 of 2008 in the Court of Sessions, Judge, Manipur West for granting pre-arrest (anticipatory) bail. On the very day of filing the said application for pre-arrest bail, the learned Sessions Judge without giving opportunity to the learned Addl. Jadumani Singh, he filed an application under Section 438, Cr. P. C. being Criminal. Misc. (Bail) C Case No. 52 of 2008 in the Court of Sessions, Judge, Manipur West for granting pre-arrest (anticipatory) bail. On the very day of filing the said application for pre-arrest bail, the learned Sessions Judge without giving opportunity to the learned Addl. P. P. to put up the case of the prosecution and also not even taking any steps to see material evidence against the respondent/accused, Shri Thokchom Jadumani Singh, passed the interim order dated 23-6-2008 granting pre-arrest bail, which read as follows: This is an application under Section 438, Cr. P. C. filed by the petitioner/accused Thokchom Jadumani Singh praying to grant anticipatory bail in the event of his arrest in c/w FIR No. 102(4) 2008 TBL P.S. under Section 121/121-A, I.P.C. and 17, 20 UA (P) Act 2004. A copy of the petition is furnished to Addl. P.P. Register is as Cril. Misc. (B) Case. I have heard the ld. counsel for the petitioner who prays to release the accused on interim bail till the final disposal of the petition. Addl. P. P. objects the same. Call bail objection report and C. D. In the meantime it is ordered that the petitioner/accused Th. Jadumani Singh is to be released on interim bail on his furnishing Rs. 50,000/- P. Bond and Surety Bond of the like amount to the arresting authority in the event of his arrest with a condition to appear before the I. O. if required for investigation of the connected FIR case. Fix 5-7-2008 for hearing Addl. P.P. is to note. Sd/- Th. Surbala Devi, Sessions Judge, Manipur West. 5. The SDPO, Thoubal, I.O. of the case submitted bail objection report along with the Case Diary through the Addl. P. P. to the learned Sessions Judge, Manipur West. In the bail objection report it was stated that a number of witnesses were examined in the course of investigation and they stated against the respondent, Shri. Th. Jadumani Singh supporting the case registered against him. The bail objection report reads as follows: In the court of Sessions Judge, Manipur West, Through APP to S/Judge. Subject : Submission of bail objection report of Shri Th. Jadumani Singh. Reference : FIR No. 102(4) 08 TBL P.S. under Section 121/121-AI.P.C. and 17/21 UA (P) A Act,04. Jadumani Singh supporting the case registered against him. The bail objection report reads as follows: In the court of Sessions Judge, Manipur West, Through APP to S/Judge. Subject : Submission of bail objection report of Shri Th. Jadumani Singh. Reference : FIR No. 102(4) 08 TBL P.S. under Section 121/121-AI.P.C. and 17/21 UA (P) A Act,04. Respected Madam, In submitting herewith the bail objection report of Shri Thokchom Jadumani Singh, S/o. (L) Th. Panchai Singh I have the honour to state that on 17-4-08 at about 12..15 p.m. Inspector Kh. Sarat Singh OC/Thoubal Police Station reported that during the course of inquiry, it has come to light that one Shri Moirangthem Balram alias Suresh Bhaiya S/S Finance Secretary of PLA of Khangabok, Thoubal District which is a terrorist Organisation, is a very close friend of Shri Th. Jadumani Singh of Khangabok. The terrorist fund raised by PLA is handled by Shri Moirangthem Balram alias Suresh Bhaiya, S/S Finance Secretary of PLA and out of the terrorist fund raised by the PLA Shri Th. Jadumani Singh has established one Petrol Pump at Khangabok under the name of Sorojini Filling Station as sanctioned vide order No. GDO/New RO Khangabok dated 24-11-2003 from IBP Co. Ltd. by Sr. Divisional Manager. During further inquiry, it is also established that for opening the said Petrol Pump, a land measuring an area of 0.4733 hectares of land located just near NH 39 at Khangabok was purchased from one Kh. Satpa and Kh. Ibomcha S/o. Kh. Angou Khullakpam Leikai for a consideration of Rs. 50,000/- vide registration No. 472 dated 13-6-2003 by concealing the exact purchase amount to evade the non-judicial stamp fee and registration fee. But the market value of the above land is Rs. 28,50,000/- as assessed by the SDC/Thoubal (copy enclosed). During inquiry, it is also established that Shri Th. Jadumani Singh does not have enough means to raise such huge amount for procuring such precious land near NH 39 without the help of PLA through Shri Suresh Bhaiya. But he has shown a sum of Rs. 32 lakh as loan from SBI, Thoubal against value of assets such as cash in hand Rs. 10 lakhs immovable properties Rs. 10 lakhs, stock business Rs. 15 lakh, Gold ornaments Rs. 50,000/- and movable assets Rs. 40 lakhs, (copy of loan sanctioned is enclosed). At the moment, the Petrol Pump is transacting regularly. 32 lakh as loan from SBI, Thoubal against value of assets such as cash in hand Rs. 10 lakhs immovable properties Rs. 10 lakhs, stock business Rs. 15 lakh, Gold ornaments Rs. 50,000/- and movable assets Rs. 40 lakhs, (copy of loan sanctioned is enclosed). At the moment, the Petrol Pump is transacting regularly. The total amount of the Petrol Pump may be estimated at Rs. 61 lakhs. A regular case is registered against Shri Th. Jadumani Singh and his associates for raising the PLA fund and also for holding the proceeds of terrorism to wage war against the Government by hatching conspiracy with the PLA cadres. Hence the case. During the course of investigation of the case examined the complaint Shri Kh. Sarat Singh OC/Thoubal Police Station very thoroughly, who corroborated with the Original Ezahar. Visited the spot and prepared a rough sketch map with proper index. During the course of investigation examined Shri Waikhom Chandra Singh, S/o. W. Manitomba Singh (then Sub-Registrar, Thoubal) and he stated that the land for the Petrol Pump was registered vide sale deed No. 472 dated 13-6-03 and Shri Th. Jadumani had purchased the land at a sum of Rs. 50,000/- from Khundrakpam Satpa Singh and Kh. Ibomcha Singh S/c (L) Kh. Angou of Khangabok Khullakpam at a low price. Further on examination of Shri Khwairakpam Goverdhan Singh S/o. Kh. Mangoljao, SDC/Thoubal he stated that the market value of the said land is Rs. 28,50,000/- (Rupees twenty-eight lakhs fifty thousand) and has issued a valuation certificate of the said land area situated on the NH 39 (copy enclosed). On examination of the Bank, Manager SBI, Thoubal Shri Bipin Sharma, he stated that his bank has availed a loan of Rs. 32,00,000/- (thirty two lakhs) on 28-10-06. It can also be stated that the land was purchased on 13-6-03 at a low rate of Rs. 50,000/- by concealing the market value of the land Rs. 28,50,000/- (twenty eight lakhs fifty thousand) only and the loan was availed after a gap of three years. On examination of the bank documents Shri Th. Jadumani has submitted movable assets of Rs. 40 lakhs (vehicles) as indicated at the Original Ezahar and on checking the four vehicles trucks, at the District Transport office Thoubal, it was found that the vehicles were Autorickshaw, Bajaj Super/Scooter, LML Vespa, NV Scooter etc. (copy enclosed). On examination of the bank documents Shri Th. Jadumani has submitted movable assets of Rs. 40 lakhs (vehicles) as indicated at the Original Ezahar and on checking the four vehicles trucks, at the District Transport office Thoubal, it was found that the vehicles were Autorickshaw, Bajaj Super/Scooter, LML Vespa, NV Scooter etc. (copy enclosed). Thus a fraudulent submission of documents has also been found at the Bank. On examination of the witnesses, Shri Moirangthem Rameshwar Singh of Khangabok Awang Leikai, Shri Pijam Shyamkishore Singh of Kairenbikhok they stated that Shri Jadumani Singh does not have enough money to raise for the establishment of Petrol Pump. Also examined PWs. Shri Khundrakam Lalbabu Singh of Khangabok Awang Leikai and Shri Sapam Prem Singh of Wangbal and they stated that Shri Thokchom Jadumani does not have enough resources to establish the Petrol Pump, and the Petrol Pump was originated/established in the year 2003 and the loans are availed in 2006 only (statements of PWs enclosed). Shri Kh. Sarat Singh OC/Thoubal P. S. has stated that the money for the establishment of the Petrol Pump was financed by Shri Suresh Bhaiya PLA. Finance Chief and also by the PWs. The complaint Kh. Sarat Singh has done a thorough enquiry in this matter. Inspite of purchasing the said land Shri Th. Jadumani Singh has deposited a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (two lakhs only) to IBP Company Ltd. for establishing the Petrol Pump vide letter No. GDO/New RO Khangabok dated 24-11-2003 and an amount of Rs. 5,45,723/- for electrification - Ref. GDO/WO/13/2003-04 dated 26-11-2003 and Rs. 4,24,613/- for installation of underground tanks. The PWD Thoubal has estimated the cost of Sales room, Compound walls, driveways etc. at Rs. 9,52,576/-. Thus the total amount spend is Rs. 49,72, 912/- at the establishment of the Petrol Pump. Thus in the order issued by DGP Manipur dated 10th June. 2008 vide No. V/2(23/H) PHQ-2007 has stated clearly for attachment of the Petrol Pump (copy enclosed) as there is a huge source of income (unknown) as disproportionate to the income of Th. Jadumani and the money is financed by the underground organization PLA and the Pump remain closed till today. Hon'ble Magistrate is prayed to kindly reject the anticipatory ball of Shri Th. Jadumani and the money is financed by the underground organization PLA and the Pump remain closed till today. Hon'ble Magistrate is prayed to kindly reject the anticipatory ball of Shri Th. Jadumani Singh as there is a huge investment of money from unknown sources/especially undergrounds and his arrest is required to conduct a proper investigation on how the money is funded and if he is released on bail investigation of the case will be hampered and the Petrol Pump is proceeds of terrorism. Your faithfully Sd/-D/-11-7-2008 C. JOGESCHANDRA HAOBIJAM) Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Thoubal. On 11-7-2008 the application for anticipatory bail was heard and passed the impugned order dated 11-7-2008, which has been quoted above, for granting pre-arrest ball to the respondent, Shri Th. Jadumani Singh for an indefinite period by making the interim order dated 23-6-2008 absolute. Hence the present revision petition. 6. Mr. Th. Ibohal, learned senior P. P. contends that the finding made by the learned Sessions Judge, Manipur that "no incriminating article has been seized from the accused", cannot be a ground for granting bail under Section 438, Cr. P. C. because the I. O. has not got the chance to arrest the respondent/accused to interrogate him and make necessary seizure of incriminating articles as the investigation of the FIR case is done under the special statute namely, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act which is enacted to maintain the sovereignty and integrity of the State. Seizure or attachment of the Director General of Police, Manipur in order to ensure that there is no arbitrary or illegality which amount to harassment to an individual, the seizure or attachment is to be confirmed by the designated authority specially appointed by the State Government. The designated authority is the Principal Secretary (Home) to the Government of Manipur. The designated authority has already been approached on 4-8-2008 for confirming the attachment order and the designated authority has given an opportunity to make a representation in writing to the person whose immovable property is being attached as required under Section 25 of the Act vide his order No. 6/13(1)/2008-H dated 16-8-2008. The designated authority has already been approached on 4-8-2008 for confirming the attachment order and the designated authority has given an opportunity to make a representation in writing to the person whose immovable property is being attached as required under Section 25 of the Act vide his order No. 6/13(1)/2008-H dated 16-8-2008. In the nature of the present case seizure of incriminating articles before arrest of the accused cannot be anticipated unless otherwise a chance of arrest to interrogate the respondent/accused, and seizure of relevant incriminating articles from the possession of the respondents/accused at his instance, is afforded, the investigation and prosecution have to be hampered and tampered by the respondent/accused. 7. Shri Th. Ibohal, learned senior P. P. further contends that the impugned order dated 11-7-2008 for granting anticipatory bail for an indefinite period is in total infraction of the law laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of cases and he also contends that if an anticipatory bail order is granted it should be only for a limited duration. He also contends that the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Manipur West granting pre-arrest ball under the impugned order dated 11-7-2008 for an indefinite period is a clear example of misuse of discretion conferred on the learned Sessions Judge under Section 438 of the Cr. P. C. 8. Mr. Kh. Mani, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent contends that the present revision petition is not maintainable inasmuch as there is no material to show that the learned Sessions Judge, Manipur West had misused her discretion conferred upon her under Section 438 of the Cr. P. C. and also the impugned order dated 11-7-2008 is only an interlocutory order. Mr. Mani, in support of his contention relied on the decision of the Apex Court : (1) Amar Nath and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. AIR 1977 SC 2185 , (2) Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra Amina Ahmad Dossa and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 2 SCC 675 : 2001 Cri LJ 965. 9. Mr. Th. Ibohal, learned senior PP also in support of his contention relied on : (1) Amar Nath's case AIR 1977 SC 2185 (supra), (2) Madhu Limaye's case 1978 Cri LJ 165, (3) the decision of the Bombay High Court in Miss R. Shakuntala v. Roshanlal Agarwal and Ors. 9. Mr. Th. Ibohal, learned senior PP also in support of his contention relied on : (1) Amar Nath's case AIR 1977 SC 2185 (supra), (2) Madhu Limaye's case 1978 Cri LJ 165, (3) the decision of the Bombay High Court in Miss R. Shakuntala v. Roshanlal Agarwal and Ors. 1985 Cri LJ 68, wherein the Bombay High Court held that 'bail orders are interlocutory in large variety of cases but every kind of ball order is not interlocutory', and (4) the decision of this Court in State of Manipur v. Vikas Yadav 2000 (3) GLT 253 : 2000 Cri LJ 4229. 10. The operation of Sections 438 and 439 of the Cr.P.C. are not overlapped inasmuch as they are meant for different purposes. Undisputedly, there is a clear distinction between post-arrest and pre-arrest bail. For making an application in terms of Section 439 of the Code a person has to be in custody and Section 438 of the Code deals with direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest. The Apex Court in Balchan Jain v. State of M.P. (1976) 4 SCC 572 : 1977 Cri LJ 225 observed that an expression "anticipatory bail" is really a misnomer because what Section 438 contemplates is not an anticipatory bail but merely an order directing the release of an accused on bail in the event of arrest. There is no question of bail unless a person is arrested in connection with non bailable offence by the police. Constitution bench of the Apex Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Seth v. State of Punjab observed that "distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, later is granted in anticipation of the arrest and is, therefore, effective at the very moment of arrest." The Apex Court in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra held that an anticipatory bail should be of a limited duration only. Ordinarily on the expiry of that duration or extended duration the Court granting anticipatory bail should left it to the regular Court to deal with the matter on appreciation of evidence placed before it after investigation has been made progress or charge-sheet is submitted. Ordinarily on the expiry of that duration or extended duration the Court granting anticipatory bail should left it to the regular Court to deal with the matter on appreciation of evidence placed before it after investigation has been made progress or charge-sheet is submitted. It should be realized that an order of anticipatory bail could have been obtained in the cases of serious nature as for example murder and, therefore, it is essential that duration of that order should be limited. Ordinarily the Court granting anticipatory bail should not substitute itself for the original Court which is expected to deal with the offence. It is that Court which is then to consider whether, having regard to the material placed before it, the accused person is entitled to bail. Therefore, the Apex Court in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh's case (supra) clearly held that order for anticipatory ball should be of a limited duration only and leave it to the regular Court to deal with the matter on appreciation of the evidence placed before it after investigation has been made progress or charge-sheet is submitted. 11. On bare perusal of the impugned order dated 11-7-2008 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Manipur West for granting pre-arrest ball for an unlimited period by not even allowing the regular Court to deal with the application for bail on appreciation of evidence placed before it after investigation has been made progress is in absolute infraction of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh's case 1996 Cri LJ 1368 case'(supra). 12. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh's case 1996 Cri LJ 1368 (supra) is also followed by the Apex Court in K.L. Verma v. State and Anr. (1998) 9 SCC 348 wherein the Apex Court observed that "anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest in non-bailable cases, but that does not mean that the regular Court which is to try the offender. is sought to be by passed. It was therefore. (1998) 9 SCC 348 wherein the Apex Court observed that "anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest in non-bailable cases, but that does not mean that the regular Court which is to try the offender. is sought to be by passed. It was therefore. pointed out that it was necessary that such anticipatory bail orders should be of a limited duration only and ordinarily on the expiry of that duration or extended duration the Court granting anticipatory bail should leave it to the regular Court to deal with the matter on an appreciation of evidence placed before it after the investigation has made progress or the charge-sheet is submitted. By this, what the Court desired to convey was that an order of anticipatory bail does not ensure till the end of trial but it must be of limited duration as the regular Court cannot be by passed. The limited duration must be determined having regard to the facts of the case and the need to give the accused sufficient time to move the regular Court for bail and to give the regular Court sufficient time to determine the bail application. In other words, till the bail application is disposed of one way or the other the Court may allow the accused to remain on anticipatory bail. To put it differently, anticipatory bail may be granted for a duration which may extend to the date on which the bail application is disposed of or even a few days thereafter to enable the accused persons to move the High Court, if they so desire. This decision was not intended to convey, that as soon as the accused persons are produced before the regular Court the anticipatory bail ends even if the Court is yet to decide the question of bail on merits. The decision is Salauddin case has to be so understood." Therefore, the Apex Court reiterated the view that order of anticipatory bail must be of a limited duration as the regular Court cannot be by passed. It is the regular Court to determine the bail application on appreciation of evidence placed before it after investigation has made progress or charge sheet is submitted. 13. It is the regular Court to determine the bail application on appreciation of evidence placed before it after investigation has made progress or charge sheet is submitted. 13. The ratio laid down in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh's case 1996 (1) Cri LJ 1368 (supra) and K.L. Verma's case (supra) are also followed and discussed by the Apex Court in Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar and Anr. AIR 2005 SC 498 Para 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the AIR in Sunita Devi's case (supra) read as follows: 21. For making an application under Section 439 the fundamental requirement is that the accused should be in custody. As observed in Salauddin's case (supra) the protection in terms of Section 438 is for a limited duration during which the regular Court has to be moved for ball. Obviously, such bail is bail in terms of Section 439 of the Code, mandating the applicant to be in custody. Otherwise, the distinction between orders under Section 438 and 439 shall be rendered meaningless and redundant. 22. If the protective umbrella of Section 438 is extended beyond what was laid down in Salauddin's case (supra) the result would be clear bypassing of what is mandated in Section 439 regarding custody. In other words, till the applicant avails remedies up to higher Courts, the requirements of Section439 become dead letter. No part of a statute can be rendered redundant in that manner. 23. These aspects were recently highlighted in Mirmai Jeet Kaur v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. JT 2004 (7) SC 161. Therefore the order of the High Court granting unconditional protection is clearly untenable and is set aside. However the petitioner is granted a month's time from today to apply for regular bail after surrendering to custody before the concerned Court which shall deal with the application in accordance with law. We express no option about the merits of the case. 24. Respondent No. 2 would surrender to custody as required in law so that his application under Section 439 of the Code can be taken for disposal. 14. The ratio laid down in Sunita Devi's case AIR 2005 SC 498 (supra) is clear that protection in terms of Section 438 Cr. 24. Respondent No. 2 would surrender to custody as required in law so that his application under Section 439 of the Code can be taken for disposal. 14. The ratio laid down in Sunita Devi's case AIR 2005 SC 498 (supra) is clear that protection in terms of Section 438 Cr. P. C. is for a limited duration during which the regular Court has to be moved for bail and that if the protective umbrella of Section 438 is extended beyond what was laid down in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh's case 1996 Cri LJ 1368 (supra) result will be clear bypassing of its mandate in Section 439 regarding custody. No portion of the statute can be redundant by passing order for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr. P. C. to the accused for an indefinite period. Therefore, the impugned order dated 11-7-2008 for anticipatory bail for an indefinite period is not sustainable in the eye of law as it was passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Manipur West by misusing the power under Section 438 of the Cr. P. C. accordingly, the impugned order is set aside. However, keeping in view the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in K.L. Verma's case (supra), Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh's case (supra) and Sunita Devi's case (supra), the respondent, Th. Jadumani is directed to approach the concerned Court for regular ball within a period of one month from today and the regular Court so approached by the respondent by filing application for bail shall consider and dispose of the bail application on appreciation of the evidence placed before it before expiry of 45 days from the date of pronouncement of this judgment. i.e. 22-1-2009 and the impugned order dated 11-7-2008 will be operative only for 45 days from the date of pronouncement of this judgment. i.e., 22-1-2009.' 15. This Court in Vikas Yadav's case 2000 Cri LJ 4229 (supra) entertained the revision petition under Section 397 and 401 of the Cr. P. C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Manipur East dated 15-5-1999 by misusing his power under Section 438 Cr. P. C. for granting pre-arrest bail to the respondent/accused and allowed the revision petition by setting aside the order for anticipatory bail passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Manipur East. 16. P. C. for granting pre-arrest bail to the respondent/accused and allowed the revision petition by setting aside the order for anticipatory bail passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Manipur East. 16. As stated above, both the learned senior P. P. Shri Th. Ibohal and Mr. Kh. Mani, learned Counsel for the respondent have heavily relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Amar Nath's case AIR 1977 SC 2185 (supra), (2) Madhu Limaye's case 1978 Cri LJ 165, in support of their cases. This Court also considered the case of the petitioner vis-a-vis that of the respondent while anxious consideration also to the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Amar Nath's case (supra), and (2) Madhu Limaye's case. It is well settled that every decision must be read as applicable to the particular fact. Only the essence of decision and its ratio is binding and not every observation found therein under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 17. The Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Dhnwanti Devi and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 44 : AIR1996 SCW 4020 held that it would not be profitable to extract the sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of decision is its ratio not every observation found therein. The relevant portion of para 9 of the SCC in Dhnwanti Devi's case (supra) is quoted hereunder: 9. ...It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates - (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its, ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is along binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. 18. The Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. held that 'judgment should be considered as a whole in the light of the question involved in the case and not the words or sentence from the judgment divorced from the context'. The Apex Court further observed that "It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the compete 'law' declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court to support their reasonings, In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India this Court cautioned: It is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment. 19. The Apex Court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 111 : observed that 'a little difference in fact or additional fact may make a lot of difference in the presidential value of a decision under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Para 59 of the SCC in Bhavnagar University 's case AIR 2003 SC 511 (supra) read as follows: 59. A decision, as is well known, is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. (See Ram Rakhi v. Union of India AIR 2002 Del 458 (FB), Delhi Admn. (NCT of Delhi) v. Manohar Lal (2002) 7 SCC 222 : 2002 CriLJ 4295 Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills (2002) 3 SCC 496 : AIR 2002 SC 834 and Nalini Mahajan (Dr.) v. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) (2002) 287 ITR 123 : 2003 Tax LR 18 (Del). 20. Mr. (NCT of Delhi) v. Manohar Lal (2002) 7 SCC 222 : 2002 CriLJ 4295 Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills (2002) 3 SCC 496 : AIR 2002 SC 834 and Nalini Mahajan (Dr.) v. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) (2002) 287 ITR 123 : 2003 Tax LR 18 (Del). 20. Mr. Mani, learned Counsel for the respondent by picking up only the observation of the Apex Court in Amarnath's case AIR 1977 SC 2185 (supra) in para 6 of the AIR that "thus for instance, order summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing order for bail, calling for report and such other steps in aid of the proceeding may no doubt amount to interlocutory order against which no revision petition will lie' under Section 397(2) of the Cr. P. C." submits that the present revision petition Is not maintainable inasmuch as the impugned order dated 11-7-2008 for granting final anticipatory bail to the respondent, Th. Jadumani Singh for an indefinite period is an interlocutory order. To the contra Mr. Th, Ibohal, learned senior PP. by referring to the same para in Amarnath's case (supra) submits that orders which are the matter of movement and which affect or adjudicate right of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial can not be said to be interlocutory order so as to oust the purview of revisional jurisdiction of the Court. 21. In Madhu Limaye's case 1978 Cri LJ 165 (supra) the Apex Court has indicated that even certain orders, which would be normally stamped as interlocutory orders, took in their embrace a final adjudication so far as certain important right of the parties are concerned and that if that was so, the order in question should not be considered as interlocutory. 22. In Amar Nath's case AIR 1977 SC 2185 (supra) the appellant, Amar Nath challenged the order of the learned judicial magistrate for issuing summon to the appellant by filing revision petition mainly on the ground that the magistrate had issued summon in a mechanical manner without applying his judicial mind to the fact of the case. The High Court dismissed the revision petition in lemine and refused to entertain it on the ground that as the order of the judicial Magistrate dated November 15, 1976 summoning the appellant was an interlocutory order, revision to the High Court was barred by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Cr. The High Court dismissed the revision petition in lemine and refused to entertain it on the ground that as the order of the judicial Magistrate dated November 15, 1976 summoning the appellant was an interlocutory order, revision to the High Court was barred by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Cr. P. C. The Apex Court by allowing the appeal in the fact of that case held that the impugned order was one which was a matter of moment which had involved a decision regarding the right of the appellant. If the appellants are not summoned then they could not have face trial at all. So, therefore, the said order for issuing summons finally decided the point as to the right of the appellant to put on trial. Therefore, it is clear from the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Amar Nath's case (supra) that even an interlocutory order deciding a point as to the right of the party finally is not an interlocutory order contemplated in sub-section 2 of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. Para 10 and 11 of the AIR in Madhu Limaye's case 1978 Cri LJ 165 (supra) read as follows: 10. A pointed out in Amar Nath's case AIR 1977 SC 2185 (supra) the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial of other proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing Sub-section (2) in Section 397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include Sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court." But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in Sub-section (2) of Section397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated shove, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a Situation which is an abuse of the process of. the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power vary sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power vary sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of Autrefois Acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused up to the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible. 11. In R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab 1960 SCR 388 : AIR 1960 SC 866 , Gajendragadkar J., as he then was, delivering the judgment of this Court pointed out if we may say so with respect, very succinctly the scope of the inherent power of the High Court for the purpose of quashing a criminal proceeding. Says the learned Judge at pages 392-93 (of SCR): (at p. 889 of AIR): Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable of expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. It is not possible, desirable of expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations to the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused person, A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there, is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there, is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Courts inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. We think the law as stated above is not affected by Section 397(2) of the new Code. It still holds good in accordance with Section 482. 23. In Madhu Limaye's case 1978 Cri LJ 165 (Supra) the appellant challenged the order of the Sessions Court rejecting the application filed by the appellant to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint by filing revision petition before the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court rejected the revision petition on the ground that it was not maintainable in view the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Cr. P. C. and High Court had not gone into the its merit. The Apex Court held that the impugned order in that case rejecting the application challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the trial even though it may not be a final in one sense, it is not surely an interlocutory so as to attract the bar of Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Cr. P. C. as if the plea of the appellant/accused on the point of jurisdiction is accepted that the particular proceeding will conclude. The Apex Court in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) observed that 'But then if the order assailed, is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. The Apex Court in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) observed that 'But then if the order assailed, is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court.' 24. The Bombay High Court in Miss R. Sakuntala v. Roshanlal Agarwal and Ors. 1985 Cri LJ 68observed that "it will be seen that having regard to this view taken by the Supreme Court, in fact in Madhu Limaye's case the larger Bench of the Supreme Court has expressed an opinion that the broad statement of law contained in Amar Nath's case needed certain modification. However, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision in Amar Nath's case and held that the order releasing some of the accused on perusal of the police report and subsequently summoning them was not an interlocutory order but was a final order. To my mind, reading the two cases together Amar Nath's case AIR 1977 SC 2185 and Madhu Limaye's case, no doubt is left about the legal position, namely, that an order rejecting the Department's application for remand of the accused to judicial custody is a final order and not an interlocutory order. 25. For the reasons discussed above, this Court, in the given case of the present revision petition, is of considered view that the impugned order dated 11-7-2008 which finally granted anticipatory bail to the respondent. Shri Th. Jadumani Singh for an indefinite period shall not be the interlocutory order of the nature mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, revision petition is maintainable and accordingly, allowed with the directions indicated in para No. 14 above. Registry is directed to circulate the copy of this order to all the learned Sessions Judges, the learned Addl. Sessions Judges, Special Judge (N. D. P. S.) and the Chief Judicial Magistrates of the State of Manipur. Registry is directed to circulate the copy of this order to all the learned Sessions Judges, the learned Addl. Sessions Judges, Special Judge (N. D. P. S.) and the Chief Judicial Magistrates of the State of Manipur. Further, the learned senior P. P. Manipur, shall furnish the copy of this order to all the learned PPs and the learned Addl. PPs of the State of Manipur.