Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 522 (AP)

T Kumar Babu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh

2009-07-31

C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY

body2009
JUDGMENT (1) The petitioner, who is an Advocate by profession, filed this writ petition assailing appointment of respondent nos. 2 to 11 (herein referred to as the private respondents) vide G. O. Rt. No. 958, dated 16. 6. 2009 as Government Pleaders of this court as being arbitrary and contrary to the andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions 2000 (for short, "the Instructions") published in g. O. Ms. No. 187, dated 6. 12. 2000. (2) In his affidavit, the petitioner averred that he is an applicant for the post of Law Officer in the High Court of Andhra pradesh, that by the impugned G. O. , respondent No. 1 appointed 29 Government pleaders for the High Court, Andhra Pradesh administrative Tribunal, Special Court established under the Andhra Pradesh Land grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and the andhra Pradesh State Consumer Disputes redressal Commission, Hyderabad for a period of 3 years commencing from 16. 6. 2009 and that the private respondents are also among the said appointees. He further averred that clause 8 of the instructions provides that the Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years. The Law Officers so appointed may be considered for a second term, if the government are satisfied that they have proven efficiency, high rate of success and good performance and for a third term in exceptional cases and that the private respondents having been initially appointed on 11. 6. 2004 for a period of three years, their term was extended until further orders and that they were appointed for a third term under the impugned G. O. It is the case of the petitioner that in the absence of the instructions providing for extension of time, the continuance of the private respondents beyond the initial term of three years is deemed to be their appointment for a second term and that their further appointment under the impugned G. O. , shall be deemed to be for a third term, which could be done only in exceptional cases as per the above mentioned instructions. The petitioner pleaded that the private respondents do not fall under the category of "exceptional cases" and that as they are politically highly influential, they managed to get appointed for a third term by trampling over the rights of other eligible and more meritorious advocates. The petitioner pleaded that the private respondents do not fall under the category of "exceptional cases" and that as they are politically highly influential, they managed to get appointed for a third term by trampling over the rights of other eligible and more meritorious advocates. According to the petitioner, the private respondents' appointments were made purely for extraneous considerations, but not on merit and suitability. The petitioner maintained that though the instructions are not statutory in nature, yet they are binding on the State and its actions are liable to be interfered by this Court, if they are vitiated by mala fides, irrationality, arbitrariness or extraneous considerations. The petitioner further pleaded that having framed the instructions, the Government is bound to follow the same. At the stage of admission, this court felt it appropriate to put respondent no. 1 to notice while keeping open the option of issuing notices to the private respondents at a later stage. (3) A detailed counter-affidavit is filed by the Secretary to Government of Andhra pradesh, Legal Affairs on behalf of respondent No. 1. The substance of the contents of the counter-affidavit is mentioned hereunder. (4) There is no conscious infraction or violation of the instructions. The guidelines contained in the instructions were borne in mind during the process of consultation between the Government and the learned advocate General and that the engagement of the private respondents is accordingly done. The petitioner is not entitled to seek enforcement of the instructions through a mandamus in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in S. Nagender v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 (4)ALD 210 = 2006 (4) ALT 66 . While the government applied its mind having due regard to the instructions and made the appointments in complete compliance with the said instructions and even if there are any violations or departure from the instructions, the same is in public interest and on the basis of the objective consideration of the performance of each of respondent nos. 2 to 11. It is not correct to state that the private respondents were engaged for a third term, because the extension of their term beyond the initial tenure of three years under G. O. Rt. No. 1088, dated 5. 7. 2 to 11. It is not correct to state that the private respondents were engaged for a third term, because the extension of their term beyond the initial tenure of three years under G. O. Rt. No. 1088, dated 5. 7. 2007 "until further orders" does not amount to their appointment for a second term and for a tenure of three years within the meaning of clause 8 of the instructions. Therefore, continuance of the private respondents between 5. 7. 2007 and 16. 6. 2009 cannot be construed as their appointment for a second term. The parameters applied while considering the suitability of the private respondents are as under; a. Their basic understanding of the law. b. Professional integrity, merit and suitability. c. Promptness in pleadings. d. Demeanour in Court Room appearances. e. Quality of assistance to the Courts. f. The rate of success, and g. Efficiency. (5) EACH one of the private respondents, on application of the parameters referred to above, was found to be exceptional and deserving re-engagement. The decision making process leading to the selection and engagement of the private respondents as Law Officers was undertaken with due regard to the guidance offered by the instructions and the appraisal of their performance in the past. The consolidated monthly statements of the government Pleaders were forwarded to the Government and all the engagements were made in public interest on a bona fide and objective assessment of their suitability to perform the functions attached to the Law Officer of the Government. No arbitrariness is involved in the said appointments. The allegation that the private respondents are politically highly influential and their appointments trampled over the rights of other eligible and meritorious Advocates are denied. The further allegation that the engagements are made purely on personal or political considerations is denied as untenable and without substance. (6) At the hearing, Sri Kumar Babu, the party-in-person, made strenuous efforts to present his case. He reiterated his plea in the affidavit that the appointment of the private respondents is for a third term. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in National industrial Corporation Ltd. v. Registrar of Companies, Punjab, (1963) 33 Company cases 265, the judgment of the Allahabad high Court in Sri Surendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U. P. , AIR 1994 All. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in National industrial Corporation Ltd. v. Registrar of Companies, Punjab, (1963) 33 Company cases 265, the judgment of the Allahabad high Court in Sri Surendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U. P. , AIR 1994 All. 349 and that of the Supreme Court in Collector of central Excise, Patna v. Usha Martin industries, AIR 1997 SC 3871 (1), in support of his above contention. The petitioner further argued that there is nothing on record to show that the private respondents have exceptional merit for being appointed for the third term. The petitioner also referred to the instructions and submitted that in the absence of the material showing proven efficiency, high rate of success and good performance of the private respondents, which is a sine qua non for appointing law Officers for the second term, respondent No. 1 ought not to have appointed them, even assuming that the private respondents are appointed only for the second term. The petitioner sought to draw a distinction between the instructions and the guidelines and argued that while in the latter case the guidelines were only recommendatory and do not strictly bind respondent No. 1 to follow them, in the former case every instruction is binding on the government. In this regard, he placed reliance on Black's Dictionary of Law, 4th edition and the Chamber's 21st Century dictionary. He also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Laljee Dubey and others v. Union of India and others, air 1974 SC 252 . The petitioner further argued that respondent No. 1 having framed its own policy through the instructions is bound by such policy and is therefore liable to carry out the instructions strictly in their letter and spirit. The petitioner further argued that respondent No. 1 having framed its own policy through the instructions is bound by such policy and is therefore liable to carry out the instructions strictly in their letter and spirit. In support of this contention, the petitioner placed reliance on the following judgments - Rameshwar Prasad v. Managing Director, U. P. Rajkiya Nirman nigam Limited and others, (1999) 8 SCC 381 , Collector of Central Excise, Patna's case (supra), Centre for Public Interest litigation and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 2001 SC 80 , Asif Hameed and others v. State of Jandk and others, air 1989 SC 1899 , Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11 (1), The General manager, Mysore State Road Transport corporation v. Devraj Urs and another, (1976) 2 SCC 862 , Suman Gupta and others v. State of J and K and others, AIR 1983 SC 1235 , Dr. Amarjit Singh ahluwalia v. The State of Pubjab and others, (1975) 3 SCC 503 , Union of India v. K. P. Joseph and others, AIR 1973 SC 303 (1), M/s. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. The State of Jandk and another, AIR 1980 SC 1992 (1) and The Manager, government Branch Press and another v. D. B. Belliappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 (1). (7) The petitioner further argued that there is a distinction between the administrative decision and administrative action. In the former case, the decision constitutes the policy which binds decision maker and all others and that every administrative action should be inconsonance with such administrative decision. He stated that having regard to the sanctity and binding force of the administrative decision every such decision is gazetted terming it as a manuscript (G. O. Ms.), whereas in the case of administrative action, the decisions are not gazetted and are described as documents issued in routine (G. O. Rt). He sought to distinguish the full Bench Judgment of this Court in S. Nagender's case (supra), by stating that most of the findings in the said judgment pertain to the only guideline contained in the instructions, namely, clause 7 and that the findings to the extent they pertain to the instructions are contrary to the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above. (8) OPPOSING the contentions of the petitioner, the learned Advocate General argued that the appointments of the private respondents are primarily and essentially in the nature of professional engagements and they have no public sanctity. The government formulated instructions and guidelines, which are not statutory and enforceable. The Government took into consideration the overall points in the guidelines and decided that there is no need to strictly adhere to the same. An infraction of guidelines need not vitiate the decision. The learned Advocate General maintained that the judgments cited by the petitioner pertain to the cases where rights of parties are involved or largesses are distributed. He submitted that the Full Bench judgment of this Court in S. Nagender 's case (supra), is a complete answer to the various contentions raised by the petitioner. He finally submitted that while no formal procedure was followed to assess the efficiency, performance and merit of the private respondents, the Law Secretary and the advocate General examined all those aspects and recommended to the Government on the basis of which the appointments of private respondents were made. Let me first dispose of the contention of the petitioner that the appointment of the private respondents should be deemed to be for a third term. As noted above, though respondent No. 1 denied the petitioner's plea in this regard and maintained that the appointments were for the second term only, I felt it unnecessary to delve into this aspect, since respondent No. 1 had taken the stance that on application of the parameters referred to in the counter-affidavit, each of the private respondents was found to be exceptional, deserving re-engagement. Therefore, the appointment of the private respondents can be tested by applying the parameter of exceptional merit needed for appointment for a third term. (9) The linchpin of the petitioner's argument is that clause 8 of the instructions bind respondent No. 1 and violation of the said clause results in invalidation of the appointments of the private respondents. In order to test this contention, it is necessary to briefly delve into the legal position discernible from the decided case law. (9) The linchpin of the petitioner's argument is that clause 8 of the instructions bind respondent No. 1 and violation of the said clause results in invalidation of the appointments of the private respondents. In order to test this contention, it is necessary to briefly delve into the legal position discernible from the decided case law. (10) In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1991 SC 537 , the Supreme Court held that the appointment of District Government Counsel by the State Government cannot be said to be only a professional engagement like between a private client and his lawyer or that it is purely contractual with no public element attached to it, which may be terminated at any time at the sweet will of the Government excluding judicial review, that the presence of the pubic element attached to the office or post of District government Counsel is sufficient to attract article 14 of the Constitution and bring the question of validity of termination of appointments of all District Counsel within the scope of judicial review and that the expression "professional engagement" in para 7 of Legal Remembrancer's (Government manual governing the appointments of government Counsel) is used to distinguish it from appointment to a post under the government in the strict sense. The supreme Court further held that the same, however, does not necessarily mean that a person, who- is not a Government Servant, holding a post under the Government does not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attached to it. While setting aside the termination of Government Pleaders en masse, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the Preamble and that exclusion of Article 14 in contractual matters is not permissible in constitutional scheme. In State of U. P. v. U. P. State law Officers Association, AIR 1994 SC 1654 , the Supreme Court held that the lawyer of the Government or a public body was not its employee but was a professional practitioner engaged to do the specified work though they are described as their Law officers and the relationship between the government and its Law Officers is similar to the relationship between the lawyer and the private client. (11) A Division Bench of this Court in government of Andhra Pradesh, Law department, Hyderabad and others v. Pushpindar Kaur, 2003 (6) ALD 214 = 2003 (6) ALT 30 (DB), held that the executive instructions regulating the appointments and conditions of service of the Law Officers of the Government of andhra Pradesh are non-statutory in nature, that the executive instructions were obviously issued by the Government to structure the discretion of those who are involved in the process of making appointments of the Law officers to represent the State and its instrumentalities and other authorities in various Courts including the High Court of andhra Pradesh and the Andhra Pradesh administrative Tribunal and that they are not recruited and appointed into any service as such. (12) In State of U. P. and another v. Johrimal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 , the Supreme court held that appointment of Law Officers is in the nature of professional engagement and not an appointment to the civil post, that the executive instructions framed by the State Government are not traceable to the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and the persons so appointed discharge public functions. It was further held that the duty of the Law Officers involves an element of public interest, but in engaging them, the concept of public office does not come into play. The three Judge Bench, which decided this case, while emphasizing on the freedom available to the Government in choosing its Counsel and absence of any right in any person to claim appointment, however, held as under: "the District Government Counsel represent the States. They, thus, represent the interest of general public before a Court of law. The public Prosecutors while presenting the prosecution case have a duty to see that innocent persons may not be convicted as well as an accused guilty of commission of crimes does not go unpunished. Maintenance of law and order in the society and, thus, to some extent maintenance of rule of law which is the basic fibre for upholding the rule of democracy lies in their hands. The Government Counsel, thus must have character, competence, sufficient experience as also standing at the Bar. The need for employing meritorious and competent persons to keep the standard of the high offices cannot be minimized. The holders of the post have a public duty to perform. Public element is, thus, involved therein. The Government Counsel, thus must have character, competence, sufficient experience as also standing at the Bar. The need for employing meritorious and competent persons to keep the standard of the high offices cannot be minimized. The holders of the post have a public duty to perform. Public element is, thus, involved therein. The provision of Article 14, however, will be attracted to a limited extent as the functionaries named in the Code of criminal Procedure are public functionaries. They also have a public duty to perform. If the State fails to discharge its public duty or act in defiance, deviation and departure of the principles of law, the Court may interfere. The Court may also interfere when the legal policy laid down by the government for the purpose of such appointments is departed from or mandatory provisions of law are not complied with. Judicial review can also be resorted to, if a holder of a public office is sought to be removed for reason de hors the statute. " (Emphasis added) A Full Bench of this Court in s. Nagender's case (supra), in the context of considering the challenge to appointments of some Government Pleaders on the ground of violation of the guidelines and some of the clauses contained in the same instructions, which are the subject-matter of the present writ petition, reiterated the legal principle reflected in the previous judgments of the supreme Court that the appointments of the office of Government Pleader are not to a post borne on the State cadre and is purely contractual and that the instructions do not confer any enforceable right in favour of a third party in order to make the appointments already made in violation of the instructions illegal. It further held that Courts would normally be reluctant to interfere with the assessment of the learned Advocate General barring in exceptional cases where the appointment is palpably against the public interest or mala fide. The Full Bench held that in the absence of any such foundation in the writ petition regarding prejudice to public interest and mala fides, no interference with the appointments was warranted. The Full Bench held that in the absence of any such foundation in the writ petition regarding prejudice to public interest and mala fides, no interference with the appointments was warranted. (13) AN analysis of the case law, referred to above, reveals that while in kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra), the Supreme Court has placed the relationship of the Government and its counsel on a far higher pedestal than that of between a lawyer and his private client, a different note was struck in State of u. P. 's case (supra). However, the three judge Bench judgment in State of U. P. 's case (supra), held in unequivocal terms that the holders of the post have a public duty to perform and public element is thus involved therein and that if the State fails to discharge its public duty or acts in defiance, deviation and departure of the principles of law, or legal policy laid down by the Government for the purpose of such appointments is departed, juridical review can be resorted to. (14) The petitioner took pains to convince this Court that though the instructions do not have force of law, they are nevertheless binding on the State government and the appointments made in deviation of these instructions are liable to be invalidated. The learned Advocate General does not dispute the obligation of the Government to follow the instructions from a broader perspective and maintained that at the same time it is not incumbent upon the Government to scrupulously follow these instructions as if they are statutory provisions. (15) THOUGH I find force in the submission of the petitioner that an instruction stands on a better pedestal than a mere guideline as could be gathered from the meanings from the dictionaries cited and also some of the judgments referred by him, the submission of the learned Advocate general that even such instructions cannot be equated to the status of a statutory provision for strict compliance contains equal merit. A small infraction of the instruction without serious adverse consequences can always be condoned. However, while implementing the policy governing appointments to the posts of Government and Assistant Government Pleaders and other law Officers, the State Government must adhere to the policy laid down and the norms it professed. A small infraction of the instruction without serious adverse consequences can always be condoned. However, while implementing the policy governing appointments to the posts of Government and Assistant Government Pleaders and other law Officers, the State Government must adhere to the policy laid down and the norms it professed. The oft quoted passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International airport Authority of India and others, (1979) 3 SCC 489 , which attained the status of locus classicus is apt to be recalled and reproduced in this context. "it is a well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Viteralli v. Saton, 359 US 535: Law Ed (Second series)1012, where the learned Judge said: an executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. . . . . . Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. . . . . This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword. This Court accepted the rule as valid and applicable in India in A. S. Ahluwalia v. Punjab, (1975) 3 SCR 82 = (1975) 3 SCC 503 , 504 and in subsequent decision given in sudhdev v. Bhagatram, (1975) 3 SCR 619 = (1975) 1 SCC 421 , 462, Mathew, J. , quoted the above referred observations of mr. Justice Frankfurter with approval. It may be noted that this rule, though supportable also as an emanation from article 14, does not rest merely on that article. It has an independent existence apart from Article 14. It is a rule of administrative law which has been judicially evolved as a check against exercise of arbitrary power by the executive authority. If we turn to the judgment of Mr. It has an independent existence apart from Article 14. It is a rule of administrative law which has been judicially evolved as a check against exercise of arbitrary power by the executive authority. If we turn to the judgment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and examine it, we find that he has not sought to draw support for the rule from the equality clause of the United States Constitution, but evolved it purely as a rule of administrative law. Even in England, the recent trend in administrative law is in that direction as is evident from what is stated at pages 540-41 in Prof. Wade's "administrative Law", 4th edition. There is no reason why we should hesitate to adopt this rule as a part of our continually expanding administrative law. Today with tremendous expansion of welfare and social service functions, increasing control of material and economic resources and large scale assumption of industrial and commercial activities by the State, the power of the executive Government to affect the lives of the people is steadily growing. The attainment of socio-economic justice being a conscious end of State policy, there is a vast and inevitable increase in the frequency with which ordinary citizens come into relationship of direct encounter with State power-holders. This renders it necessary to structure and restrict the power of the executive Government so as to prevent its arbitrary application or exercise. Whatever be the concept of the rule of law, whether it be the meaning given by Dicey in his "the Law of the Constitution" or the definition given by Hayek in his "road to serfdom" and "constitution of Liberty" or the exposition set forth by Harry Jones in his "the Rule of Law and the Welfare State", there is as pointed out by Mathew, J. , in his article on "the Welfare State, Rule of Law and Natural Justice" in "democracy, Equality and Freedom" "substantial agreement in juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found". It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affectation of some right or denial of some privilege. " (Emphasis added) (16) In a Society like ours, based on principles of democratic governance, every power holder draws power from public trust. The Executive, one of the three organs of the State, is no exception to this principle. A government Pleader not only represents the interests of the executive Government, which appoints him, but also of the State in its entirety. A fortiori, overwhelming public interest is involved in the selection and appointment of Law Officers by the government. It is indubitable that outcome of cases depends on the quality of assistance which the Law Officers render. One: crucial fact or a legal provision turns the verdict of the Court upside down. Lack of proper comprehension of facts and law and ability to project the relevant aspects of the case will be fatal to the result of the case. High professional standards, coupled with unflinching commitment and unquestionable integrity are the essential attributes required to hold the office of the Law Officer. There is no place for inefficiency, complacency and corruption. Those who clamour for the appointments and crib and fret about the burden of office thereafter will be square pegs in the round holes. A person, who longs for these offices, have to think twice before he ventures into this field and make every endeavour to redeem the faith and confidence reposed in him by the government in appointing him. (17) WHILE the prerogative and privilege of selecting and appointing the Law Officers, undoubtedly, rest with the Government at the helm, its responsibility to choose right and competent persons to represent the state's interest need not be overemphasized. It would be well to remember that these offices are not intended for rehabilitation of those who are otherwise not able to meet the demands of profession. It would be well to remember that these offices are not intended for rehabilitation of those who are otherwise not able to meet the demands of profession. While no Advocate has a right to insist for his appointment as a Law Officer, it is the sacred duty of the Government to select from among the chosen lot the best of the talent endowed with the qualities referred to above. Political or personal loyalty cannot be allowed to be given upper hand over loyalty to the office and devotion to work. (18) It is a matter of grave concern that performance of Law Officers is coming in for a lot of flak in recent times. Their absence in the Courts when cases are called, non-filing of counter-affidavits in time, non-production of records at the hearing of the cases and inadequate preparation resulting in their failure to answer the Courts' queries are forcing the Courts to adjourn the cases many times. Sagging quality of pleadings is another area of serious concern. The counter-affidavits in general are lacking in clarity and precision and at times are difficult to decipher. Generally they are verbatim reproduction of the para-wise remarks, which usually pass muster at the government Pleaders' office with the preamble and concluding portions being contributed by the Typists. The Assistant government Pleaders, who invariably represent the Government Pleaders at the hearing, are at the receiving end, unable to face the barrage of questions from the court on the poor quality of counters, reading of which often raises more questions than providing answers to the pleadings raised by the petitioners. (19) The invariable excuse being offered by the Government Pleaders for all the above shortcomings is their inadequate strength compared to the number of Courts and magnitude of work. Such a reason is not palatable, even if true. The Government cannot overlook the imperative needs of the institution of Justice, which is the last resort for a vexed citizen. It is the salutary responsibility of the Government to reinforce the strength by appointing more personnel commensurate with the work. It is necessary that a periodical assessment of the functioning of the Government Pleaders, volume of work, qua each Government Pleader, the number of subjects he is entrusted with and the number of Assistant Government Pleaders he is provided with, is undertaken to overcome the above mentioned deficiencies. It is necessary that a periodical assessment of the functioning of the Government Pleaders, volume of work, qua each Government Pleader, the number of subjects he is entrusted with and the number of Assistant Government Pleaders he is provided with, is undertaken to overcome the above mentioned deficiencies. (20) The present context of the case requires noticing of Clauses 7 and 8 of the instructions, which are apt to be quoted: "clause 7: Guidelines for selection of Law officers:-The selection of candidates for appointment as Law Officers shall, as far as possible, be in accordance with the following guidelines: (a) The selection shall be based primarily on merit and suitability. (b) In making the selection, every endeavour shall be made to provide equitable representation to members of Scheduled castes, Scheduled Tribes and backward Classes in accordance with the ratio of 15%, 6% and 25% respectively. Women shall be accorded reasonable representation to all categories. (c) When merit and suitability are equal, preference may be given to members of scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, backward Classes and Women. (d) For the above purpose, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh administrative Tribunal and other Courts and Tribunals at the State Level may be treated as one unit of appointment and each Zone may be treated as one unit of appointment. Explanation:-'zone' for the purpose of this instruction means a 'zone' specified in the second Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh public Employment (Organisation of local Cadres and Regulation of District recruitment) Order, 1975. Clause 8. Term of Law Officers:-Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years. The Law Officers so appointed may be considered for a second term, if the Government are satisfied that he has proven efficiency, high rate of success and good performance and for a third term in exceptional cases: provided that Government Pleaders, Assistant government Pleaders, Public Prosecutors and additional Public Prosecutors in Subordinate courts may be considered for appointment for a second term if their performance is very good and in the case of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes if their performance is satisfactory". While Clause 7 deals with threshold selection and appointment, Clause 8 laid down the criterion for appointing Law Officers for the second and third terms. Undoubtedly, the instructions cannot be elevated to the status of subordinate legislation. While Clause 7 deals with threshold selection and appointment, Clause 8 laid down the criterion for appointing Law Officers for the second and third terms. Undoubtedly, the instructions cannot be elevated to the status of subordinate legislation. Nevertheless they were issued by the Government to follow and not to ignore them. They are never intended to be mere incantations without implementation. It is in public interest that the Government, which issued these instructions, follow them at least in their spirit if not in letter. Otherwise, the very purpose for which they were issued will be rendered nugatory and the object frustrated. If they are meant to be followed, then how could the Government comply with the requirements contained therein unless a mechanism is evolved to judge the suitability for threshold appointments and assess their performance for appointing them for the second and third terms? Having regard to the nature of the duties to be performed by the Government and Assistant government Pleaders, it is no longer open to the Government to say that it is a matter purely between it and the appointees. The government and Assistant Government pleaders and other Law Officers, as noted above, represent the interest of the State. Therefore, the instructions contained in G. O. Ms. No. 187, which are intended to ensure appointment of lawyers with efficiency and professional integrity as Law Officers are required to be followed with punctiliousness, as long as they are in force. (21) AT the hearing, to the Court's query, the learned Advocate General replied that though the performance of the government Pleaders was not evaluated in the strict terms of G. O. Ms. No. 187, dated 6. 12. 2000, he, however, submitted that periodical review of their performance was sent by the Advocate General's Office to the Law Department. He produced a file purporting to contain those reviews. It is disappointing to notice from the record produced by the learned Advocate General that column No. 16 under the caption "performance of concerned Government law Officer" is kept blank in all the monthly consolidated statements. The other columns pertain to information such as the number of cases pending at the beginning of the relevant period, number of cases filed during that period, number of cases disposed of the result of those cases, etc. The other columns pertain to information such as the number of cases pending at the beginning of the relevant period, number of cases filed during that period, number of cases disposed of the result of those cases, etc. The learned advocate General candidly conceded that there was no formal evaluation of performance of the Government Pleaders at any level. He, however, submitted that the committee comprising the Advocate General and the Law Secretary took into consideration the performance of the government Pleaders before the Government finally selected them. (22) The question that requires to be considered is whether, in the absence of formal evaluation of their performance, the appointment of respondents 2 to 11 under the impugned G. O. , can be sustained? The petitioner has not made any allegations of inefficiency or lack of integrity against any of the Government Pleaders, who are impleaded as respondents 2 to 11. His contention is that they ought not to have been appointed for the purported third term without being satisfied about their exceptional efficiency, success and performance. While it was necessary for respondent No. 1 to have undertaken the exercise for finding out the efficiency, high rate of success and the good performance of the Government pleaders through a method evolved for this purpose, the fact remains that no such method was evolved by the Government. For its failure to do so, respondents 2 to 11 cannot be penalized. It would quite well be that it would be open to the private respondents to say that had respondent No. 1 undertaken such an exercise, each one of them would have satisfied the criteria mentioned in instruction No. 8 for their appointment for a second or third term, as the case may be. This is where absence of any material against these respondents produced by the petitioner raises a presumption in their favour that they satisfied all those requirements contained in instruction no. 8. (23) Therefore, I have not felt inclined to interfere with the appointments of respondents 2 to 11 merely for the reason of respondent No. 1's failure to assess their performance and efficiency. Though the petitioner raised the plea of mala fides, neither any material is placed nor any contentions were advanced in support thereof. The prayer of the petitioner, is therefore, rejected. Though the petitioner raised the plea of mala fides, neither any material is placed nor any contentions were advanced in support thereof. The prayer of the petitioner, is therefore, rejected. (24) HOWEVER, keeping in view the overwhelming importance of the offices in question and to avoid recurrence of a similar situation in future, I feel it necessary to give the following directions: (1) Within four weeks from the date of receipt of this judgment, the Chief secretary of the Government of andhra Pradesh shall constitute a committee headed by the learned advocate General with such officers as he deems necessary including the law Secretary, In-charge of the subject to critically examine the areas of deficiency in the system of appointments and functioning of the law Officers and to submit a report to him within a specified time frame. The study of the Committee inter alia should include: (a) The methodology to be evolved for constant monitoring of the functioning of the Law Officers including the Government and assistant Government Pleaders and to suggest measures to improve their performance. (b) To suggest the criterion for assessing the suitability of the law Officers with reference to clause 8 of the instructions. (c) To assess the volume of work each Government Pleader is handling and the number of assistant Government Pleaders required to assist him. (2) After examining the report of the committee, the Government shall consider the same and issue appropriate proceedings to give effect to those recommendations, which may be accepted by it, in the light of the views expressed in this judgment. The petitioner is given liberty to move this Court for implementation of the above directions if necessary. (25) SUBJECT to the above directions, the writ petition is disposed of. (26) As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, WP MP No. 16222 of 2009 filed by the petitioner for interim relief is disposed of as infructuous.