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2009 DIGILAW 525 (BOM)

ASHWIN NEEMA v. MANGALAM CLOTHES PVT. LTD.

2009-04-17

ANOOP V.MOHTA

body2009
JUDGMENT ANOOP V. MOHTA, J. The petitioner has challenged the arbitral award dated 11.10.1999. The petitioner had challenged the said award by Arbitration Case No. 20 of 2000 on 18.01.2000 before the District Judge, Indore. The said order was passed after giving full opportunity to the parties including the petitioner. The petitioner has filed this petition in February 2009 on a foundation that the petitioner got the knowledge of dismissal order dated 24.04.2004, only on receiving the summons on 02.01.2009, as the respondents have filed execution petition in pursuance to the said award. The petitioner, therefore, applied for the certified copy on 3rd January, 2009 of the order dated 24.04.2004 passed by the learned District Judge, Indore. He got the copy on 6th January, 2009 and, therefore, this petition. The Apex Court has declared that the provision in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has to be construed strictly. The time limit so prescribed is absolute and unextendable [State of Goa v. Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 239 = 2006 SCACTC 353 (SC) = 2006 (3) Arb. LR 1 (SC)]. Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides exclusion of period [Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others, (2008) 7 SCC 169 = 2008 SCACTC 207 (SC) = 2008 (2) Arb. LR 139 (SC)]. In the case of Shakti Tubes Limited v. State of Bihar and others, (2009) 1 SCC 786 it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The facts and circumstances have to be seen. It does not apply automatically. The submission that he got the knowledge of dismissal order on 02.01.2009 is not acceptable in view of the order sheet Exhibit "F" of the matter. The petitioner's advocate has full knowledge of the order. Even otherwise, that itself cannot be the reason to condone the delay. In view of clear and mandatory provisions of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act and as observed by the Apex Court above, the submission based upon Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be extended in such matter. I see there is no reason or sufficient cause made out by the petitioner to condone the delay. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, in the present facts and circumstances of the case, is also not of any assistance. I see there is no reason or sufficient cause made out by the petitioner to condone the delay. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, in the present facts and circumstances of the case, is also not of any assistance. The explanation, whatsoever, cannot be taken note of after expiry of the statutory period of limitation. Even the pendency of the complaint against the advocate for professional misconduct, cannot protect or be sufficient reason to condone the delay of this nature. In view of this, the petition is dismissed on the ground of delay itself. The notice of motion is also disposed of accordingly. No costs.