SANJAY MISRA, J. These are two connected second appeals which have been heard today and are being decided together finally today itself. 2. These two second appeals have been filed against the judgment and decree dated 15. 12. 2007 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) Court No. 3, Pilibhit in Original Suit No. 45 of 1985 filed by Kunwar Vishwanath (now deceased) against Laxman Singh (now deceased) and others and the judgment and decree dated 1. 12. 2008 passed by the Additional District Judge/special Judge (SC/st Act) (Atrocities Prevention) Act, Pilibhit in Civil Appeal No. 10/2008 filed by Laxman Singh (now deceased) and others v. Kunwar Vishwanath Chandra (now deceased) and others. 3. Heard Dr. R. G. Padia learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Prakash Padia learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant and Sri Ravi Kant learned senior Counsel assisted by Sri Anupam Kulshrestha who have put in appearance on behalf of plaintiff-respondent No. 1/1 and 1/2. Respondent No. 2 is the Union of India, Ministry of Law & Central Affairs, Gov ernment of India through its Secretary. Re spondents No. 3/1 to 3/5 in Appeal No. 117 of 2009 are appellants of Appeal No. 116 of 2009 are the heirs and legal represen tatives of deceased Laxman Singh who was the retail outlet dealer of the defendant-appellant Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Mumbai. The dispute between the parties in the suit was between plaintiff-respondent No. 1/1 and 1/2 and the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. , Mumbai as also the retail outlet dealer of Bharat Petro leum Corporation Ltd. , Mumbai. 4. Dr. Padia learned senior Counsel for the defendant-appellant has submitted that the judgments of the Courts below re quire to be set aside primarily for the rea son that they are vitiated on account of set tled law mat a contract being void ab initio under section 23 of the Contract Act could not form the basis for the plaintiff-respondent 1/1 and 1/2 to claim that they could evict the defendant-appellant from the land in question by claiming title there upon, particularly when under the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 (hereinafter re ferred to as the act of 1956) a notification under section 8 had been issued on 1. 7. 7. 1961 whereby the right and title of the and in question vested in the State of U. P. and hence the estoppel under section 116 of the Evidence Act could not operate against the defendant-appellant who had in the writ ten statement categorically taken the plea regarding the notification dated 1. 7. 1961. Secondly, he has submitted that the boundaries of the land as given in the plaint did not identify the land in question since they differed from the sale deed ob- tained by the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiff-respondent No. 1/1 and 1/2 and hence also when the land was not identifi able, the defendant-appellant could not be ejected from the same. The third submis sion is that there can be no estoppel against the statute. 5. According to Dr. Padia a rent deed was executed between Late Sri Harish Chandra and Burmah-Shell, the predeces sor-in-interest of the defendant-appellant, on 7. 5. 1962 for a rent of Rs. 50/- p. m. for a period of 10 years for setting up a petro leum retail outlet. He submits that the de fendant-appellant, became successor-in-interest of Burmah-Shell by Act No. 2 of 1976 and Burmah-Shell paid the rent up to 1972 and although no fresh agreement was entered after expiry of period of 10 years, Burmah-Shell continued to pay the rent up to 31. 3. 1975 whereafter, the suit was filed in the year 1985 after Sri Harish Chandra had died on 1. 1. 1985. He states that the plaintiff-respondents had abandoned their claim of rent prior to 1982 by saying that they have only claimed rent for the past three years w. e. f. the date of filing of the suit in 1985. 6. In support of his first argument Dr. Padia submits that the Trial Court Ille gally found the land in question was not an agricultural land and it did not vest in the State of U. P. by the notification dated 1. 7. 6. In support of his first argument Dr. Padia submits that the Trial Court Ille gally found the land in question was not an agricultural land and it did not vest in the State of U. P. by the notification dated 1. 7. 1961, He submits that the Lower Appel late Court has recorded that such finding of the Trial Court is erroneous and has held that the land is agricultural land, but has confirmed the finding of the Trial Court on the question that the land in question did not vest in the State of U. P. He states that admittedly the State of U. P. has not been made a party in the suit and the plaintiff has not made any averments with respect to the vesting of right, title and interest in the land in question upon State of U. P. and therefore, the suit ought to have been thrown out in the very first instance in view of the pleading set up by the defendant-appellant regarding extinguishment of right of the plaintiff-respondents over the property in question by virtue of the notification under section 8 of the 1956 Act and hence, the Courts below have erred in shifting the burden of proof/onus to prove the averments made in the written state ment upon the defendant-appellant whereas when there was a denial of title of the plaintiff-respondent, the onus in law shifted upon the plaintiff-respondent to prove his title. 7. The sum and substance of the first and third submissions of learned Counsel for the appellant revolves around the noti fication issued on 1. 7. 1961 under section 8 of the Act of 1956 to state that when the plaintiff-respondents had no title over the land in question, the agreement of 7. 5. 1962 was hit by the provisions of section 23 of the Contract Act and hence, the suit re quired to be dismissed at the first instance and there can be no estoppel against the statute. The second submission relates to the physical identification of the plot in suit. 8. Sri Ravi Kant learned Senior Counsel has contended that once the agreement dated 7. 5. The second submission relates to the physical identification of the plot in suit. 8. Sri Ravi Kant learned Senior Counsel has contended that once the agreement dated 7. 5. 1962 between the par ties has been acted upon for a period of 10 years and more, the defendant-appellant cannot resile from the said contract by de nying the title of the plaintiff-respondent in view of the provisions of section 116 of the Evidence Act where once the title at the commencement of the tenancy was not denied, the tenant cannot deny such title at a subsequent stage unless he has given upon possession of the premises in ques tion to the landlord. He has further submit ted that insofar as the boundaries of the premises in question detailed in the plaint are concerned, the same are exactly the boundaries given in the agreement dated 7. 5. 1962 executed between the parties and therefore, the reference to the sale deed by which Late Sri Harish Chandra had pur chased the property in the year 1956 and the boundaries given therein are of no rele vance and the said submission made on behalf of the appellant is misconceived. 9. Having considered the submis sions of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgments, there is a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Courts below that the notification dated 1. 7. 1961 issued under section 8 of the Act of 1956 was not brought on record. The sub-mission on this finding is that once the no tification clearly stated that the demarca tion has been done under section 5 of the Act, there can be no disbelieving the fact that the property in question stood vested in the State by virtue of the said notifica tion. The resistance to this submission is that the proceedings are of a civil suit where the plaintiff-respondent claimed to be the landlord of the defendant-appellant and there was no pleading relating to the Act of 1956 made by them. It was the de fendant-appellant who raised the plea of the notification under the Act of 1956 and therefore it was incumbent upon them to bring on record the notification dated 1. 7. 1961. Insofar as the aforesaid two con tentions are concerned, the fact that is not denied by learned Counsels is that the no tification of 1961 was not on record. 7. 1961. Insofar as the aforesaid two con tentions are concerned, the fact that is not denied by learned Counsels is that the no tification of 1961 was not on record. Sri Padia has submitted that it was a notifica tion issued under section 8 of the Act of 1956 and therefore, it required no proof and the Courts below could not ignore such notification on the flimsy ground that it was not produced nor brought on record. 10. While considering this submis sion, it will be seen that the Courts were not faced with the notification nor it was on record. The question whether demarcation under section 5 was done or not done was neither pleaded by the parties nor adjudi cated by the Courts below and therefore, insofar as the vesting of rights in the State of U. P. is concerned, the Lower Appellate Court has recorded that it would have not much relevance in deciding the controversy which is in issue between the landlord and the tenant. This Court finds that the said notification whereby the defendant-appellant claims extinguishment of rights and title of the plaintiff-respondent is not on record nor it was subject matter of ad judication before the Trial Court nor before this Court. Consequently, the plea raised at, this stage of second appeal regarding binding nature of the notification under section 8 of the 1956 Act cannot be permit ted to be taken, it having been not suffi ciently pleaded or proved before either of the Courts below. The question whether the plaintiff-respondent was owner of the land in question on the date of the agreement would therefore lose significance firstly because the consequences of vesting of rights saved under the Act of occupants and tenants have not been addressed by the Courts below nor the rights of the plaintiff-respondent could be affected at the in stance of the defendant-appellant and sec ondly because admittedly the possession of the land was taken by the defendant-appellant from the plaintiff-respondent by virtue of a registered agreement dated 7. 5. 1962 and the relationship of landlord and tenant was thereby created. 5. 1962 and the relationship of landlord and tenant was thereby created. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the tenant de nying the title of the landlord at the incep tion of tenancy itself is to be considered in view of the law cited by learned Counsel for the parties in the case of D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish, AIR 1987 (SC) Paragraph 4 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder: "4. The rule of estoppel embodied un der section 116 of the Evidence Act is that, a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title, however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by sur render to his landlord. During the continuance of the tenancy, the tenant cannot acquire by prescrip tion a permanent right of occu pancy in derogation of the land lords title by mere assertion of such a right to the knowledge of the landlord. See: Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, ILR (1915) 37 All. 557 = AIR 1915 PC 96 and Atyam Veerraju v. Pechetti Venkanna, (1966) 1 SCR 831 = AIR 1966 SC 629 . The general rule is however subject to certain exceptions. Thus a tenant is not precluded from denying the derivative title of the persons claiming through the landlord. See : Krishna Prasad lal Singha Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd. , AIR 1937 PC 251. Simi larly, the estoppel under section 116 of the Evidence Act is re stricted to the denial of the title at the commencement of the tenancy. From this, the exception follows, that it is open to the tenant even without surrendering possession to show that since the date of the ten ancy, the title of the landlord came to an end or that he was evicted by a paramount title holder or that even though there was no actual eviction or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction he had attorned to the paramount title- holder. In order to constitute eviction by title paramount. It has been established by decisions in England and in India, that it is not necessary that the tenant should be dispossessed or even that there should be a suit in ejectment against him. In order to constitute eviction by title paramount. It has been established by decisions in England and in India, that it is not necessary that the tenant should be dispossessed or even that there should be a suit in ejectment against him. It will be sufficient if there was threat of eviction and if the tenant as a result of such threat attorns to the real owner, he can set up such eviction by way of defence either to an action for rent or to a suit in ejectment. If the tenant how ever gives up possession voluntar ily to the title-holder, he cannot claim the benefit of this rule. When the tenancy has been determined by eviction by title paramount, no question of estoppel arises under section 116 of the Evidence Act. See: Adyanath Ghatak v. Krishna Prasad Singh, IR 1949 PC 124 the principle must equally apply when the tenant has attorned under a threat of eviction by the title paramount and there comes into existence a new jural relationship of landlord and tenant as be tween them. The law is stated in 27 Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edn. Para 238: "the estoppel contemplated by section 116 is restricted to the denial of title at the commencement of the ten ancy and by implication it follows that a tenant is not estopped from contending that the title of the les sor has since come to an end. " "238. Eviction under title paramount.-In order to constitute an eviction by a person claiming under title para mount, it is not necessary that the tenant should be put out of pos session, or that proceedings should be brought. A threat of eviction is sufficient, and if the tenant, in con sequence of that threat, attorns to the claimant, he may set this up as an eviction by way of defence to an action for rent, subject to his prov ing the evictors title. There is no eviction, however, if the tenant gives up possession voluntarily. A threat of eviction is sufficient, and if the tenant, in con sequence of that threat, attorns to the claimant, he may set this up as an eviction by way of defence to an action for rent, subject to his prov ing the evictors title. There is no eviction, however, if the tenant gives up possession voluntarily. " Quite recently, this Court in Man-gat Ram v. Sardar Meharban Singh, (1987) I Scale 964 = AIR 1987 SC 1656 at p. 1660 to which one of us was a party, ob served: "the estoppel contemplated by section 116 is restricted to the denial of title at the commencement of the ten ancy and by implication it follows that a tenant is not estopped from contending that the title of the les sor has since come to an end. " 11. It will be seen from the aforesaid law that the general rule is however subject to certain exceptions. A tenant is not pre cluded from denying the derivative title of the person claiming through the landlord. The submission is that there has to be an iota of title in order to attract the provisions of section 116 of the Evidence Act. It is ar gued that with the issue of the notification dated 1. 7. 1961, the plaintiff- respondent lost all iota of title and hence, the tenant was not estopped from denying the same and there would be no bar of estoppel under section 116 of the Evidence Act. This sub mission would not have much application in the present case inasmuch as the plain tiffs title was not derivative title claiming through a landlord and further the rela tionship between the parties is governed by the registered agreement dated 7. 5. 1962 wherein the possession was given to the defendant-appellant by the plaintiff-respondents on an agreed rent of Rs. 50/-p. m. rent. The rights of the plaintiff-respondent that accrued under the Act of 1956 as a consequence of vesting were nei ther raised nor adjudicated by the Courts below. They are consequential rights after issue of notification under section 8 of the Act. Admittedly the State did not assume possession over the land either physically or on paper nor the appellant made himself subject to, the rights acquired by the State as its tenant as a paramount title holder. They are consequential rights after issue of notification under section 8 of the Act. Admittedly the State did not assume possession over the land either physically or on paper nor the appellant made himself subject to, the rights acquired by the State as its tenant as a paramount title holder. Con sequently, for the sake of argument even if it is accepted that there was no title with the plaintiff-respondents after issue of the notification dated 1. 7. 1961 vesting all rights and title in the State of U. P. , the giving of possession by the plaintiff-respondents by virtue of the rent agreement is in fact cate gorically accepted by the defendant-appellant and therefore, the general rule being subject to exceptions, in this case, the issue of title of the plaintiff-respondents cannot in any manner have an adverse ef fect on his plaint case which was for dam ages. Insofar as the agreement dated 7. 5. 1962 settling the terms between the parties is concerned, it is registered and admitted and has been acted upon and has exhausted itself and its period hence the plea of section 23 of the Contract Act is not available since it is not sought to be en forced in this suit. Therefore, when the Lower Appellate Court has found that the notification dated 1. 7. 1961 would not have any adverse effect on the claim of damages and pendente lite and future damages made by the plaintiff-respondent this Court does not find such view to be erroneous in any manner whatsoever. There is also no sub stantial question of law involved in the aforesaid finding. 12. It has been argued that there is no estoppel against the statute. The principle is settled and there can be no dispute about it. The notification dated 1. 7. 1961 was is sued under section 8 of the Act of 1956 wherein it was stated that demarcation as required under section 5 of the Act had been done. The notification is not a statute. When it is argued that the notification has the force of the statute, it is incorrect. A notification can be issued under a statute and it can be assailed on various grounds. The statute provides for certain contingen cies which can be done upon issue of a no tification. The notification is not a statute. When it is argued that the notification has the force of the statute, it is incorrect. A notification can be issued under a statute and it can be assailed on various grounds. The statute provides for certain contingen cies which can be done upon issue of a no tification. The contingencies and require ments under the statute require compliance in order to issue a notification. Therefore, where there can be no estoppel against the statute, the notification issued thereunder cannot be placed on the same pedestal as the statute. The notification requires to be brought on record if reliance is to be placed upon it. The statute need not be brought on record. The fact that the notification dated 1. 7. 1961 recites that demarcation as re quired under section 5 has been done is proof only of the contents of the notifica tion and its issue. It is not proof that the requirements of section 5 have necessarily been complied with. Such recitation is al ways open to challenge. The statute on the other hand cannot be challenged on grounds which are available for challenge of the contents of the notification. There fore, the principle of no estoppel against a statute cannot be extended to apply to a notification issued thereunder, particularly when it recites compliance of the statutory requirements. Therefore, when the notifi cation has not been brought on record nor adjudicated upon and it does not possess the immunity enjoyed by a statute, the submissions advanced by the appellant are not only misconceived but the principle sought to be applied in this case is not at all applicable. No substantial question of law arises which requires to be decided in this second appeal on the third argument of learned Counsel. 13. Insofar as the decision cited by Dr. Padiya in the case of Ganesh v. Sri Ram Lalaji Maharaj (FB), AIR 1973 Alld. 116 is concerned, he has placed reliance on Paragraph 10 of the judgment. Paragraph 10 is quoted hereunder:- "10. 13. Insofar as the decision cited by Dr. Padiya in the case of Ganesh v. Sri Ram Lalaji Maharaj (FB), AIR 1973 Alld. 116 is concerned, he has placed reliance on Paragraph 10 of the judgment. Paragraph 10 is quoted hereunder:- "10. Before parting with the case we may also refer to Order VII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides:- "where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or num bers in a record of Settlement of survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers. " It will thus be seen that what the law requires is that the description of the property in suit given in the plaint must be sufficient to identify the property. If independently of the boundaries the property can be sufficiently identified, then any er ror or mis-description in the boundaries cannot affect either the suit or the decree passed in the suit. In the instant case, as already mentioned, no dispute at any time was raised that the suit property and the property in respect of which the decree was passed is not identifiable on the spot or it is a property different from the prop erty which was purchased by the plaintiff from Panna lal and for the delivery of which the suit was filed. In the circumstances, in our opinion, ends of justice require that the two applications should be al lowed and the amendments prayed for be made. " 14. It is on this decision that he sup ports his second submission that the prop erty was not properly identified so as to entitle the plaintiff-appellant to a decree. From, the record, it appears that the plaint has given identification of the property as under:- (1) East - Bareilly-Tanakpur Road (2) West-Land of Roop Narayan (3) South - Land of Shri Chet Ram (4) North - Land of M/s. Banwari lal Gauri Shankar 15. The plaint is available as annexure 3 of the affidavit supporting the stay application. The agreement dated 7. 5. 1962 is also available as annexure 1 to the affidavit. In the agreement dated 7. 5. The plaint is available as annexure 3 of the affidavit supporting the stay application. The agreement dated 7. 5. 1962 is also available as annexure 1 to the affidavit. In the agreement dated 7. 5. 1962, the bounda ries of the property in question which was the subject matter of the agreement is de tailed in the schedule as being: (1) East - Bareilly-Tanakpur Road (2) West - Land of Roop Narayan (3) South - Land of Shri Chet Ram (4) North - Land of M/s. Banwari lal Gauri Shankar 16. From the aforesaid two descrip tions of the property, it is quite clear that the plaintiff-respondent was very categori cal in claiming relief against the defendant-appellants relating to the land which was the subject matter the agreement dated 7. 5. 1962. The dispute with respect to the identity of the land was considered by the Courts below on the pleading of the defendant-appellant. The Courts below have considered that plot No. 71 was subse quently sub-divided into various plots and has cone into an extensive discussion over the extent and limit of plot No. 71/1 and 71/2 and have recorded that the land is even otherwise clearly identified. From the decision in the case of Ganesh (supra), it will be seen that the law requires that the description of the property in suit given in the plaint must be sufficient to identify such property. It has been held that if inde pendently of the boundaries, the property can be sufficiently identified then any error or mis-description in the boundaries cannot affect either the suit or the decree passed in the suit. In that case, the Court found that there is no dispute at any time that the suit property and the property in respect of which the decree was passed is not identi fiable on the spot or that it is a property different from tine property which was pur chased by the plaintiff Panna lal. The case of Ganesh (supra) was a case where the purchaser required to be put in possession and a dispute was raised with respect to the identity of the property purchased and for which delivery of possession was re quired. The case of Ganesh (supra) was a case where the purchaser required to be put in possession and a dispute was raised with respect to the identity of the property purchased and for which delivery of possession was re quired. The Court held that if the bounda ries are sufficiently able to identify the plot in question, the plaintiff cannot be defeated in his suit by not being granted a decree v only for that reason. While applying the said law in the present case, it will be seen that the property which was subject matter of agreement dated 7. 5. 1962 between the parties was the property in suit. There is no discrepancy with respect to description of the property given in the plaint and the description of the property given in the agreement dated 7. 5. 1962 and hence, the submission with respect to non-identification of the property on the spot for which a decree was issued cannot be accepted as having any merit whatsoever. There is no substantial question of law in volved or arises on the findings of fact con currently recorded by the Courts below. 17. The appeal has no merit and is ac cordingly dismissed. No order is passed as to costs. 18. As prayed by learned Counsel for the parties, let a certified copy of this order be made available to them on payment of usual charges within 48 hours. Appeal Dismissed. 0 .