JUDGMENT : Jayant Patel, J. The present petition has been preferred by the petitioner seeking winding up of the respondent company by invoking the contention as mentioned under Section 33B of the National Housing Bank Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. Heard Mr. Chhatrapati, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Soparkar, learned Counsel for the respondent. 3. It appears from the pleadings on record that the respondent company was initially a housing finance company as per its objects and it also appears that as per the petitioner, since the registration was not obtained and the respondent company continued to accepts the deposits as housing finance company and functioned in breach of the provisions of the Act, it has preferred the present application for winding up of the respondent company. 4. It also appears from the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the respondent company read with the affidavit filed by Regional Manager of the petitioning company that the respondent company has substituted the objects clause vide meeting dated 17.11.2007 and as a result thereof it has ceased to be the housing finance company. The affidavit of the Manager of the petitioner dated 28.4.2007 shows that the petitioner has verified that the respondent company is not accepting/renewing deposits as per the report, which has been received by the petitioner in January 2006 from the Recovery Intelligence Officer. It is also stated in the said affidavit that the petitioner has not received any complaint from any depositor at least since 2003. It is also stated in the said affidavit that as per the annual return filed, fixed deposits from public and other loans aggregating to Rs.51,86,452/- along with the accrued interests on the deposits for Rs.18,62,515/- have been taken over by the other company belonging to the promoters and further the respondent company has not accepted and renewed the deposits for the year ending on 31.3.2005 and the balance of the public deposits as on 31.3.2005 was nil. 5. The aforesaid shows that the respondent company, after the proceedings initiated by the petitioner, has improved its position by paying of the deposits and further, in any case, the objects are changed and it has ceased to be the housing finance company. 5. The aforesaid shows that the respondent company, after the proceedings initiated by the petitioner, has improved its position by paying of the deposits and further, in any case, the objects are changed and it has ceased to be the housing finance company. If the respondent company has ceased to be the housing finance company, consequently the provisions of the Act as are applicable to a housing finance company may not apply after the change of the status by changing the object-clause of the company. 6. It is by now well settled that the winding up of any company is to be considered as by way of last resort. If the company has ceased to be a housing finance company and it has discontinued all its operations as housing finance company on account of the said change, no useful purpose would be served in exercising the power in winding up of the company. 7. Mr. Chhatrapati, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, attempted to contend that if the company is not ordered to be wound up, it will leave room for any limited company to commit breach of the provisions of the Act and thereafter to change the objects of the company to come out from the consequence of winding up. It was submitted that if on the date when the petition was preferred it was housing finance company, this Court may not decline to exercise the power for winding up of the respondent company more particularly because it has altered the objects. He submitted that if such is permitted, the purpose of the Act would be frustrated and, therefore, this Court may consider the matter for ordering winding up. 8. Whereas Mr. Soparkar, learned Counsel for the respondent Company contended that as such the respondent company has ceased to be the housing finance company and the provisions of the Act may not apply, since it would not be a company as per Section 2(d) of the Act. He alternately submitted that even if the provisions of the Act are to be made applicable, then also as per Section 33B(4) of the Act, the provisions of the Companies Act relating to the winding up are applicable. He alternately submitted that even if the provisions of the Act are to be made applicable, then also as per Section 33B(4) of the Act, the provisions of the Companies Act relating to the winding up are applicable. He, therefore, submitted that the discretion of this Court is not taken away in the event this Court finds that in view of the subsequent circumstances, it is not a case for winding up of the company. 9. Section 33B of the Act even if considered as it is, it entitles the petitioner to file an application for winding up of such housing finance institution. Therefore, even if the petition is considered as maintainable on the date when it was filed, the subsequent events of change of the status of the company as that of cessation of housing finance company cannot be ignored by the Court more particularly when cessation of such status is an admitted position. Further, merely because an application is filed the discretion to be exercised by the Company Court based on sound judicial proposition is not to be foreclosed or taken away. If the settled legal position is that winding up of a company should be resorted to by way of a last resort, the Court must be satisfied that considering the facts and circumstances, such last resort for winding up of a company should and must be resorted to. No such circumstances exists in the present case in view of the admitted position that the respondent company has ceased to be the housing finance company. 10. Apart from the above, it is not the case of the petitioner that any complaint is received or any depositor is duped or any depositor or any member of public has suffered on account of the so-called conduct of the business by the respondent company. If breach of the Act is committed by the respondent company, may be in capacity as the housing finance company, the consequence in accordance with law may follow but when subsequently the status is changed and the respondent company has ceased to be the housing finance company and there is no other adverse circumstances demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court, it appears to the Court that it would not be just and proper to order winding up of respondent company. 11. Mr. 11. Mr. Chhatrapati, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner did attempt to rely upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rameshwar and Ors. v. Jot Ram and Anr., reported in (1976) 1 SCC, 194 by contending that the right as existed on the date when the petition was filed must be considered for taking decision in the present proceedings and not the subsequent event. 12. If the said decision of the Apex Court is properly considered and more particularly the observations made at para 9, it appears that the Apex Court has not ruled out the scope for consideration of the subsequent event in all cases. On the contrary, it depends upon the right and the remedy under the statute. As observed earlier, winding up is only by way of last resort and keeping in view the aforesaid subsequent change and the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner referred to herein above, it appears that it is not a case where the last resort for winding up of respondent company should be resorted to in the present case. 13. Hence, the present petition is not granted. Disposed of accordingly. Petition dismissed.