Judgment :- K.L. MANJUNATH, J. Challenging the concurrent findings of the Land Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.3411/2003 dated 17-02-2003 the present appeal is filed. 2. The facts relating to this case are as hereunder: The appellant was the owner of 10 Acres of land situated in Sy. No.31 (new No.45/01) of Lingdheer Mallasandra, Hoskote Taluk. The land was leased in favour of Late Ramaiah, who was the father of the respondents 3 to 6 herein. The lease in favour of Ramaiah is not in dispute. After the death of Ramaiah; his children were cultivating the land. Since the rainfall in Hoskote Taluk started receding, on the request of the tenant, the appellant permitted the tenant to grow casuarina trees instead of raising crops like ragi and pulses, etc., Accordingly casuarina trees were raised. 3. On vesting the land due to Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the respondent No.3 filed application in Form No.7 for grant of occupancy rights. The occupancy right was granted in favour of the respondent No.3 by the Land Tribunal on behalf of the joint family. Challenging the legality and correctness of the order of the Land Tribunal, Hoskote, dated 31-10-2002 the appellant filed a writ petition, which petition came to be dismissed on 17-02-2003. Challenging the concurrent finding the present appeal is filed. 4. Sri. P.S. Manjunath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised the following grounds in support of his arguments: (1) Raising of casuarina trees does not come under the definition of ‘agriculture’ and that no cultivation activities are taken place as on the date 01-03-1974. (2) The respondent No.3 being an employee of KEB is not entitled to file application in Form No.7. On these two grounds he requests the court to set aside the order passed by the Land Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge. 5. The learned Government Pleader supporting the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge contends that raising of casuarina trees amounts to cultivation and the same cannot be taken away from the definition of ‘agriculture’. She further submits that even though respondent No.3 is an employee of KEB since land was leased in favour of his father as respondent No.3 being elder brother and kartha of the joint family, he is entitled to file application for occupancy rights. She further submits that even though respondent No.3 is an employee of KEB since land was leased in favour of his father as respondent No.3 being elder brother and kartha of the joint family, he is entitled to file application for occupancy rights. She further submits that the land was granted to the respondent No.3 on behalf of his brothers and the lease is heritable one. Therefore, she requests the court to dismiss the writ appeal. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for parties what is required to be considered by us in this appeal is whether the learned Single Judge has committed an error in dismissing the writ petition? 7. The learned counsel for appellant is not disputing the fact that the land was leased by the appellant in favour of the father of the respondent No.3 – Late Ramaiah and appellant is also not disputing the cultivation of the land by the said Ramaiah. Further, it is also not in dispute that with the permission of the appellant Ramaiah had planted casuarina trees. The only dispute is whether rising of casuarina trees amounts to cultivation and whether there is any surrender of lease by Ramaiah during his life time or by his legal representatives after his death before 01-03-1974 in accordance with the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act and whether the respondent No.3 can maintain the application in Form No.7 claiming occupancy rights in respect of land in question even though he is working in KEB. 8. Section 2-A(1) denies what is ‘agriculture’. Which reads a hereunder: “2. Definitions.-(A) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- .(1) ‘agriculture; includes- .(a) acquaculture; (aa) horticulture; .(b) the raising of crops, grass or garden produce; .(c) dairy farming; .(d) poultry farming; .(e) breeding of livestock; .(f) grazing; But does not include the cutting of wood only.” 9. 8. Section 2-A(1) denies what is ‘agriculture’. Which reads a hereunder: “2. Definitions.-(A) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- .(1) ‘agriculture; includes- .(a) acquaculture; (aa) horticulture; .(b) the raising of crops, grass or garden produce; .(c) dairy farming; .(d) poultry farming; .(e) breeding of livestock; .(f) grazing; But does not include the cutting of wood only.” 9. Sub-Section (10) of Section 2 defines what is ‘cultivation, which reads as follows: “to cultivate’ with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means to till or husband the land for the purpose of raising or improving agricultural produce whether by manual labour or by means of cattle or machinery, or to carry on any agricultural operation thereon; and the expression “uncultivated’ shall be construed correspondingly; Explanation.-A person who takes up a contract to out grass, or to gather the fruits or other produce of any land, shall not on that account only be deemed to cultivate such land;” 10. It is not in dispute that with the permission of the appellant casuarina trees has been grown by the respondents 3 to 6. The casuarina trees will not be grown without there being any cultivation. The casuarina saplings have to be planted by a person and it has to be maintained regularly till it grows to some level. Therefore, having grown casuarina trees cannot be said that it does not fall within the definition of ‘agriculture’, it will be harvested once in four or five years and casuarina poles would be used for many purposes and there is great demand. If the tenant instead of cultivating the ragi or pulses with permission of the landlord has cultivated casuarina trees, the same cannot be held that there is no cultivation of the land. Therefore, the first point has to be held against the appellant. 11. So far as the surrender of land is concerned, it is not the case of the appellant that either during the life time of Ramaiah or after his death his children have surrendered the lease in favour of the appellant in accordance with the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act. When the tenant has not surrendered the lease and continued to be in possession by raising casuarina trees, appellant cannot contend that there is no relationship of tenant and owner of the land in question or tenancy of the land between the appellant and respondent No.3. 12. When the tenant has not surrendered the lease and continued to be in possession by raising casuarina trees, appellant cannot contend that there is no relationship of tenant and owner of the land in question or tenancy of the land between the appellant and respondent No.3. 12. So far as the last point is concerned, when the appellant has admitted the tenancy of the land, the tenancy right is heritable right, which has been inherited after death of Ramaiah to his legal representatives. Only because one of the children of Ramaiah has filed Form No.7 cannot contend that he cannot claim any right. On the contrary, Form No.7 filed by respondent No.3 would be for the benefit of his brothers. In the instant case, the Land Tribunal has granted occupancy rights in favour of the respondent No.3 for and on behalf of the other members of the family. Even though respondent No.3 is an employee of KEB, his tenancy was for the benefit of joint family and has been inherited by and on behalf of his brothers after death of his father. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for appellant has to be negatived. 13. In the result, we do not see any merit in this appeal and we cannot conclude that the learned Single Judge has committed any error in dismissing the appeal. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed.