Judgment This matter came to be posted on being specially ordered by the Honble Chief Justice. 2. I have heard Mr.K. Govindaraj, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.R.Neelakantan, learned Government Advocate taking notice for the respondents and perused the records. 3. The impugned order, dated 28. 2008 is one of suspension pending enquiry. The petitioner is working as a Village Administrative Officer in the Kaveripattinam-II village, Krishnagiri Taluk. 4. The suspension is made under Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. The reason found in the order is that the petitioner was trapped in a case of receiving illegal gratification and he was arrested on 28. 2008. He came out on bail on the same day. Therefore, in public interest he was suspended. 5. The grievance of the petitioner is that even though the order of suspension has been passed as early as in the year 2008, there has been no review. Further, the order was passed by an in-charge officer, who has no power to do. 6. This Court is unable to go into the merits of the allegations made by the petitioner. So long as the power of suspension is available with the respondent and it has been exercised by the competent authority, the Court cannot go behind the order of suspension. 7.The Supreme Court in its decision reported in 1990 (3) SCC 60 (Director General and Inspector General of Police, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and others Vs. K. Ratnagiri) has held in paragraph 7 as follows: "7....The Rule 13(1) empowers the authority to keep the respondent under suspension pending investigation or enquiry into the criminal charges where such suspension is necessary in the public interest. When the first information report is issued, the investigation commences and indeed it has commenced when the respondent was kept under suspension. The order of suspension cannot, therefore, be said to be beyond the scope of Rule 13(1) merely because it has used the word prosecution instead of investigation into the charges against the respondent. A wrong wording in the order does not take away the power if it is otherwise available. The order of suspension cannot, therefore, be said to be beyond the scope of Rule 13(1) merely because it has used the word prosecution instead of investigation into the charges against the respondent. A wrong wording in the order does not take away the power if it is otherwise available. The Tribunal seems to have ignored this well accepted principle." 8.Further, it was observed in paragraph 3 as follows: "3....The government may review the case and make further or other order but the order of suspension will continue to operate till it is rescinded by an appropriate authority." .9. Once again, the Supreme Court vide its decision reported in 1994 (2) SCC 617 (State of Haryana Vs. Hari Ram Yadav and others) held in paragraph 10 as follows: ."10....The law is well settled that in cases where the exercise of statutory power is subject to the fulfilment of a condition then the recital about the said condition having been fulfilled in the order raises a presumption about the fulfillment of the said condition, and the burden is on the person who challenges the validity of the order to show that the said condition was not fulfilled. In a case, where the order does not contain a recital about the condition being fulfilled, the burden to prove that the condition was fulfilled would be on the authority passing the order if the validity of the order is challenged on the ground that the condition is not fulfilled...." .10. Further, in paragraph 11 of the judgment, it was observed as follows: ."11....There is no averment in the said petition challenging the validity of the impugned order of suspension on the ground that the Governor of Haryana was not satisfied that it was either necessary or desirable to place Respondent 1 under suspension. In the absence of any such averment it must be held that the impugned order was passed after fulfilling the requirement of Rule 3(1) of the Rules in view of the presumption as to the regularity of official acts which would be applicable and the absence of a recital in the order about the Governor being satisfied that it was either necessary or desirable to place respondent 1 under suspension is of no consequence...." 11. The contention that an in-charge officer had passed the order and hence it was not valid cannot be accepted by this Court. The contention that an in-charge officer had passed the order and hence it was not valid cannot be accepted by this Court. The petitioner relied upon the decision of a division bench of this Court in C.Baskaran Vs. The District Collector reported in 1997 Writ L.R. 33 in support of his contention. The Counsel for the petitioner very well aware that the said decision was specifically overruled by a Full Bench of this Court in A.Savariar Vs. The Secretary TNPSC and another reported in 2008 (4) CTC 753 (See para 8). In paragraphs 5 and 7 of the judgment, it was observed as follows: "5.Though not the term in-charge is defined in any of the Rules applicable in relation to the Government Offices, as per the above said judgment, when an officer is posted as in-charge of a post, he discharge the functions of the said post as an Officer of that post. Consequently, he can exercise the statutory powers of the said post. That apart when a vacancy is filled by way of an in-charge, unless the statutory functions of the said post is exercised by an officer who is posted as in-charge, the functions of the said post will become a stand still which will have a consequence in administration. ..... 7. Under such circumstances, unless contrary intention is expressed by the Government either by way of a statutory provision or by way of an executive instruction, a Government servant who holds the post as in-charge has got power/to discharge the statutory functions and responsibilities of the said post." 12. In the light of the above, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is misconceived and deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition shall stand dismissed. No costs. M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2009 will also stand dismissed.