JUDGMENT 1. The findings dated August 29, 2007 of the respondent No.1, namely the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Government of West Bengal, under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are under challenge in this writ application. 2. The petitioner was a limited company within the meaning of Companies Act, 1956. The respondent No.4 was working for gain in the "Tube Mill" department of factory of the petitioner company on and from December 26, 1979 and his service conditions were covered under the certified standing orders of the company, 3. According to the petitioner company, on an assessment of manpower for purposeful deployment the respondent No.4 became surplus in accordance with the provisions of the certified standing order of the company. Instead of terminating him from services, the petitioner company transferred him to Hyderabad office by a communication dated July 5, 2003. 4. The petitioner did not accept the above communication. Instead, he participated in agitation with other workers in the factory. The workers' union of the petitioner company requested the management for staying the above order of transfer. The management kept the above order of transfer in abeyance till August 7, 2003, making it clear that it would automatically become functional on expiry of the above cut off date and the respondent No.4 would stand released for Hyderabad office. 5. Due to non-compliance of the above direction, the management further directed the respondent No.4 to report at Hyderabad office. 6. Thereafter, the respondent No.4 was served with a chargesheet dated August 14, 2003, for refusing to act on the order of transfer and other misconducts stated therein. On a consideration of the reply to the above chargesheet, the management of the petitioner company decided to hold a domestic enquiry against the respondent No.4 appointing an enquiry officer. The enquiry officer submitted his report dated September 16, 2003 holding him guilty of the charges. It was served upon the respondent No.4. He submitted a representation to that chargesheet. The disciplinary authority, ultimately, decided to dismiss the petitioner from the services of the petitioner company. 7. The enquiry officer submitted his report dated September 16, 2003 holding him guilty of the charges. It was served upon the respondent No.4. He submitted a representation to that chargesheet. The disciplinary authority, ultimately, decided to dismiss the petitioner from the services of the petitioner company. 7. In view of pendency of a conciliation proceeding, the management of the petitioner company submitted an application dated September 30, 2003, before the conciliation officer for his approval under clause(b) of sub-section (2) of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). That was rejected on August 24, 2005. 8. The petitioner company challenged the above report/finding of the conciliation officer by way of filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India bearing W.P. No.25036(W) of 2005 and the same was allowed on January 24, 2006, on the ground that the conciliation officer could not sub plant his own view while rejecting an application under clause( b) of sub-section(2) of section 33 of the said Act. By the aforesaid order, the concerned authority was directed to consider the above application of the petitioner company afresh in the light of the settled position of law. 9. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 disapproved the action of dismissal of the respondent No.4 from the services by the impugned findings dated August 29, 2007. Hence, this writ application. 10. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner company Mr. D. K. Ghosh, learned Advocate, submits that admittedly the dispute raised by the workers' union was pending before the respondent No.2. No conciliation proceeding was held before the respondent No.1 in the matter under reference in accordance with the provisions of clause (e) of section 2 of the said Act. Nor the above proceeding was pending before the respondent No.I. According to Mr. Ghosh, there was no scope of granting approval on the application of the petitioner company or otherwise by the respondent No.1 under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 33 of the said Act. The above provisions conferred power on the authority before which the proceeding under reference was pending. 11. On merit, Mr. Ghosh submits that the impugned findings of the respondent No.1 suffered from perversity. The above provisions conferred power on the authority before which the proceeding under reference was pending. 11. On merit, Mr. Ghosh submits that the impugned findings of the respondent No.1 suffered from perversity. House rent allowance could not be included in the "one month's wages" as contemplated in proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 33 of the said Act. Mr. Ghosh relie, upon the provisions of section 4 of the West Bengal Workmen's House Rent Allowance Act, 1974. Mr. Ghosh relied upon the decisions of Lord Krishna Textiles Mills vs. Its Workmen, reported in 1961(1) LLJ 221; Delhi Cloth General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Ludh Budh Singh, reported in 1972(2) LLJ 180; Duncan Agro Industries Limited vs. Third Industrial Tribunal, reported in 1985 Lab.IC NOC 94; Bharat Electronics Limited vs. Industrial Tribunal, Karnataka, Bangalore, reported in 1990(2) LLJ 32 and Sub-Inspector Rooplal vs. Lt. Governor reported in 2000(1) SCC 644 . in support of his above submissions. 12. Mr. Ashok Sarkar, learned Senior Government Advocate, produces a notification issued in exercise of powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 33 of the said Act to submit that the respondent No.1 was appointed as conciliation officer of the area concerned. He further relied upon the decision of Bombay Tyres International Limited vs. B. P. Talathi & Anr., reported in 1992 Lab. IC 258, to submit house rent allowance is included in "one month's wages". 13. Appearing on behalf of the respondent No.4, it is submitted by Mr. Jayanta Das Gupta, learned Advocate, that the respondent No.1 was the authority for the area concerned within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 33 of the said Act. He had the jurisdiction to consider the application of the petitioner company, though the same was filed before the respondent No.2. 14. According to Mr. Das Gupta, the house rent allowance is a part of wages as defined in clause (rr) of section 2 of the said Act. 15. Mr. Das Gupta relies upon the decisions of GIP Railway vs. Mahadeo Ragho, reported in 1955 LLJ(l) 259; BN Ellias & Co. 14. According to Mr. Das Gupta, the house rent allowance is a part of wages as defined in clause (rr) of section 2 of the said Act. 15. Mr. Das Gupta relies upon the decisions of GIP Railway vs. Mahadeo Ragho, reported in 1955 LLJ(l) 259; BN Ellias & Co. vs. Authority under P. W. Act, reported in AIR 1960 Cal 603 ; Bombey Tyres Internationals Ltd. vs. B.P. Tahathi, reported in 1992 LLR 116; B. Yallappa vs. Presiding Officer reported in 1997 LLJ(2) 1047 and M. D. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation vs. Neethivilangam Kumbakonam. reported in 2001 Lab. LC 1801, in support of his submissions that the house rent allowance is included in one month's wages. 16. The first question that arises is the competency of the respondent No.1 to dispose of the application of the petitioner company tiled under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 33 of the said Act. To find out the correct proposition of law the above provisions are quoted below: "[33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.- (l) ....... (a) ..... (b) ..... (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute for where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman]. (a) (b) for any misconduct no connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer." 17. On the basis of the conditions contained in the proviso to the above section, it was mandatory to file the application under reference to the authority before which the proceeding was pending. Needless to point out that clause (e) of section 2 of the said Act defined "conciliation proceeding" as any proceeding held by a conciliation officer or Board under the said Act. 18. The petitioner company followed that mandate by filing the application to the respondent No.2 because the proceeding was pending before him. Needless to point out that clause (e) of section 2 of the said Act defined "conciliation proceeding" as any proceeding held by a conciliation officer or Board under the said Act. 18. The petitioner company followed that mandate by filing the application to the respondent No.2 because the proceeding was pending before him. And the respondent No.2 was the statutory authority to consider the aforesaid application of the petitioner company for approval. It was not the case of the respondents that the proceeding was pending before the respondent No.1 at any point of time. On a careful consideration of the provisions of proviso of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 33 of the said Act, I am not inclined to accept the submissions of the respondents that the respondent No.1 was the authority to consider the above application. Otherwise, the phrase "authority before which the proceeding is pending" used by the legislature in the above proviso would become redundant. 19. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in the matter of Patheja Brothers Forgings and Stamping vs. ICICI Ltd., reported in 2000(6) SCC 545 , as follows:- "12. We have analysed the relevant words in section 22 and found that they are clear and unambiguous and that they provide that no suit for the enforcement of a guarantee in respect of any loan or advance granted to the industrial company concerned will lie or can be proceeded with without the consent of the Board or the appellant authority. When the words of a legislation are clear the Court must give effect to them as they stand and cannot demur on the ground that the legislature must have intended otherwise." (Emphasis supplied) 20. So, the impugned finding of the respondent No.1 cannot be sustained in law and the same is set aside. 21. The controversy relating to inclusion of house rent allowance in one month's wages is an issue on merit and the same must be sent to the statutory authority before which the proceeding is pending for his approval or otherwise. This Court is not inclined to deal with that issue at this stage. 22. This writ application is thus allowed to the extent as indicated hereinabove. 23. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 24. This Court is not inclined to deal with that issue at this stage. 22. This writ application is thus allowed to the extent as indicated hereinabove. 23. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 24. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance with the necessary formalities in this regard. Appeal allowed.