JUDGMENT The Court: Two applications AP No. 60 of 2005 and GA No. 3982 of 2005 filed in the aforesaid Suit being CS. No. 338 of 2002 have been heard one after another. The application being AP No. 60 of 2005 has been taken out on Notice of Motion by the first defendant in the suit namely Emirates Grains Products LLC and Others (hereinafter referred to as the said company) for an order referring the plaintiff and the first defendant to arbitration in respect of subject-matter of Civil Suit being No. 338 of 2003 mentioned above in accordance with the agreement dated 15th September, 2003 as referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the petition. The said application mention arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant which is part of parent agreement. The said arbitration agreement is adoption of Grain and Food Trade Association (in short GAFTA) Arbitration Rules, whereby and whereunder all disputes and differences between the parties are to be resolved as per procedure provided in the said Rule. The instant application was taken out on or about 22nd January 2005. The second mentioned application has been taken out by the plaintiff on or about 18th Day of March 2005 for interlocutory reliefs in the form of injunction restraining the defendant No.1 whether by itself or by its servants or agents or assigns or otherwise whosoever from giving any effect or further effect to any of the writings dated October 6, 2004 or October 14, 2004 or February 25, 2005 or March 7, 2005. The primary object of this interlocutory application of the plaintiffs is to obtain order of injunction against the first defendant from taking any step to initiate or to proceed with the arbitration proceedings in terms of the alleged agreement stated in their application. 2. Both these applications have been contested mutually by both the parties by filing their respective affidavits. I feel decision on the application of the first defendant for referring the dispute to arbitration agreement is having considerable being in the second application, for the first application succeeds obviously second application will automatically fail. The situation might be reversed in the event first application fails. Thus the decision on the first application is required to be rendered first before it is taken on the second application. 3. The situation might be reversed in the event first application fails. Thus the decision on the first application is required to be rendered first before it is taken on the second application. 3. The learned Counsel for the first defendant/applicant in AP No. 60 of 2005 highlighting the fact that despite existence of the valid arbitration agreement and the issues in the suit are covered by the same, the present suit has been filed. 4. The learned Counsel for applicant/1st defendant submits that reading section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 1996 Act) once it is established that there has been an arbitration agreement between the parties and the disputes in the plaint are covered thereby, the Court has to refer the parties to arbitration. 5. He says that the other defendants have been made parties' deliberately to defeat the arbitration clause as the disputes arose essentially between the plaintiff and the first defendant and other defendants did not have any connection nor bearing with the same. Actually the disputes canvassed in the plaint directly concerned with breach of the contract entered into by and between the plaintiff and first defendant as the plaintiff failed and neglected to ship and/or dispatch milling wheat as agreed upon. Second defendant is an agent of first one, whereas third is the ship owner. In support of his submission he has relied on decision of the Supreme Court in case of Shakti Bhog Foods Limited vs. Kola Shipping Limited, 2008(4) Vol 74 Arb LR I (SC). 6. His further contention is that although first defendant at one point of time had filed an application seeking extension of time to file written statement but such step cannot be said to be waiver of the arbitration agreement nor be construed to be submitting to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court abandoning arbitration agreement. In this connection he has referred to a Supreme Court decision rendered in case of Food Corporation of India & Anr. vs. Yadav Engineer & Contractor, 1982(2) SCC 499 . The said decision though rendered in connection with section 3 of Foreign Award Enforcement Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as Foreign Act) but the principle laid down therein will carry force in this case as there is no substantial change between Foreign Act and corresponding provision of 1996 Act. 7. vs. Yadav Engineer & Contractor, 1982(2) SCC 499 . The said decision though rendered in connection with section 3 of Foreign Award Enforcement Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as Foreign Act) but the principle laid down therein will carry force in this case as there is no substantial change between Foreign Act and corresponding provision of 1996 Act. 7. He further contends that even despite presence of third party in the suit, the Court has power to make arbitration agreement operative. The decision of the law Courts are consistent on this point and he has referred to two decisions - one rendered by Delhi High Court and another by this Court. The decision of Delhi High Court is of course an unreported one and rendered in case of WPIL Limited vs. National Thermal Power Corporation Limited & Ors., C.S. (O.S.) No. 1363 of 2005 dt. 16.01.2009, whereas the decision of this Court was reported in 1996(2) CHN 97 (PWH Analgen & Systeme GMBH vs. Damodar Ropeway & Construction Company Pvt. Ltd.) which of course was rendered in connection with section 3 of the Foreign Act. 8. His next contention is that once the dispute is covered by Arbitration Agreement jurisdiction of this Court is ousted. He has referred to decision of Supreme Court reported in 2006(1) SCC 206 (Rite Approach Group Limited vs. Rosoboronexport). 9. While referring to section 5 of the 1996 Act he urges judicial intervention on face of existence of arbitration agreement is not permissible. In this connection he has drawn my attention to a case of Supreme Court in case of Kuaemer Cementation India Ltd. vs. Bajranglal Agarwal & Anr., 2001(6) SCC 206. 10. He therefore, submits that dispute must be referred to arbitration as the first defendant has already invoked arbitration clause and has taken steps for going to arbitration. naturally order of injunction passed by this Court must be vacated. 11. Mr. Debal Banerjee, Senior Advocate, appearing for the plaintiff highlighting the facts mentioned in the plaint, submits that the instant application is not maintainable as the same is not really at all verified as is evident from page 8 of the said petition. naturally order of injunction passed by this Court must be vacated. 11. Mr. Debal Banerjee, Senior Advocate, appearing for the plaintiff highlighting the facts mentioned in the plaint, submits that the instant application is not maintainable as the same is not really at all verified as is evident from page 8 of the said petition. To elaborate this point he contends that the deponent of the affidavit namely one Sanjib Bhatia to verify the petition has not mentioned any of the paragraphs of the petition nor there is any reference of his representation on behalf of the first defendant. Furthermore he has no locus in absence of any valid power-of-attorney to represent the first defendant. He contends that application is also not maintainable in view of the fact that the first defendant has abandoned the arbitration agreement by submitting its jurisdiction to this suit applying for extension of time to tile written statement. 12. He submits further that the third defendant is not a party to the arbitration agreement nor can be in arbitration proceeding. The suit is a joint action against all the defendants as above claiming reliefs on the cause of action that owing to collusion, connivance and conspiracy with each other the plaintiff was prevented from loading, consequently shipping cargo and as such the goods were lying at the port and for which the plaintiff has suffered enormous loss and damages. Therefore the cause of action is so inter-linked and/or inter-wined with each other that it cannot be dissected for the purpose of splitting of trial. 13. He also contends that in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 there is no provision for splitting up of cause of action for separate trial by two different fora. In support of his submission he has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2003(5) SCC 531 [Sukanya Holding (P) Limited vs. Jayesh H. Pandya & Anr.]. 14. His further contention is that section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is in the second part of the said Act which is independent of the first part. Therefore reference to sections 5 and 8 which are in Part I has no manner of relevancy. Whole question is whether the said arbitration agreement is inoperative on the facts and circumstances of this case or not. Therefore reference to sections 5 and 8 which are in Part I has no manner of relevancy. Whole question is whether the said arbitration agreement is inoperative on the facts and circumstances of this case or not. To put it differently whether all the disputes disclosed in the plaint can be referred to in the arbitration without the presence of the third defendant. The claim of the plaintiff is really not arising out the commercial or contractual relationship strictly but certainly it amounts to breach or rather frustration of the contract which has been brought about by collusive and conniving act and action of first and third defendants. 15. On the other hand if the suit is tried all the parties will be before this Court as by virtue of section 9 of CPC the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits either expressly or impliedly barred. 16. As far as interlocutory application taken out by the plaintiff is concerned, he submits that interlocutory application can be maintained for the arbitration proceeding is allowed to continue there will be serious loss and injury. If two different fora proceed simultaneously there is possibility of conflict of decision, thus weighing balance of convenience and inconvenience continuance of injunction is justified. 17. The respective contention of the learned counsels both on facts and law have been examined by me carefully. The plaintiff has raised question of maintainability of the present application on two grounds namely; that instant application has not been verified in accordance with law, as the deponent is not authorized to verify the affidavit and further there has been no reference of petition in the affidavit intending to verify. While examining this aspect I have seen the affidavit of one Sanjib Bhatia I find in paragraph 2 he has stated that the statements made in paragraphs 1 to 7 and 11 are true to the best of his knowledge and 8 and 9 are his humble submission before this Court. Thus contention in this respect has some substance. It seems to me the said affidavit is an independent one and has no relation or nexus with the body of the petition. Upon close look it appears to me that the affidavit was affirmed before Notary Public on 22nd January 2005 whereas the application has been presented on 10th of March 2005. It seems to me the said affidavit is an independent one and has no relation or nexus with the body of the petition. Upon close look it appears to me that the affidavit was affirmed before Notary Public on 22nd January 2005 whereas the application has been presented on 10th of March 2005. This apart, the petition was prepared later but the affidavit was affirmed apparently without connecting the petition and it will be evident from the vakalatnama itself which was executed and accepted on the same day. Going by the above dates it cannot be said conclusively when the petition was prepared as no date has been mentioned at the bottom of the prayer of the petition. These are the factors which give rise to serious doubt as to genuineness of application. It could have been dismissed on the ground, but despite this infirmity when the application admitted for hearing overlooking the same. I do not wish to do based on above doubt. Moreover, this defect has been removed by filing supplementary affidavit and affidavit-in-reply. It is well-settled principle of law that defect of verification of any pleading is not so fatal at the first instance, but in spite of chance being given if such defect is not corrected then obviously such pleading cannot be allowed to be kept on record. Here the defect has been removed as indicated above. 18. Thus the contention of Mr. Banerjee on the preliminary point is not convincing to dismiss this application. Next question comes on maintainability of this application on the ground that after having made an application for extension of time to file written statement the first defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court, as such the present application is not maintainable. To decide this point provision of section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has to be looked into. Which is set out hereunder: 45. To decide this point provision of section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has to be looked into. Which is set out hereunder: 45. Power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration.––Notwithstanding anything contained in Part I or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), a judicial authority, when seized of an action in the matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in section 44, shall, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming through or under him, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. 19. A judicial authority does not have discretion to refuse to refer the parties to arbitration. Section 45 of the 1996 Act uses the mandatory expression 'shall' and makes it obligatory upon the judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, if conditions specified therein are fulfilled. Stay of suit was mandatory when conditions specified in section 3 of the Foreign Act, were fulfilled (State of Orissa vs. Klockner & Co., AIR 1996 SC 2140 ). 20. Thus it is clear as aforesaid that there is no mentioning as to the timing of making application unlike section 8 of the same Act in part 1 of section 8 which is set out hereunder: Section 8 sub-section 1. A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. 21. The legislature has made different provisions for different situation. In case of domestic arbitration (national arbitration) the legislature in its wisdom specifically made it clear about the stage and timings of making application of this nature namely before any submission of his first statement on the substance of the dispute but in section 45 of the said Act there is no such expression nor any restriction. Even the language in section 3 of Foreign Act expressly provide similar timing and stage. Even the language in section 3 of Foreign Act expressly provide similar timing and stage. Therefore, in my view prayer for stay of hearing can be made even after filing of written statement provided such a point is taken not intending to submit to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for adjudication of dispute on merit. In section 45 legislature did not make specific provision as to timing and stage presumably for the reason that it would not be possible or convenient always for the international party to come at an early stage as envisaged in section 8 sub-section 1. Thus the decision cited by Mr. Banerjee in this context of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1971 SC 1 is distinguishable for the reasons that firstly the same was rendered under section 3 of Foreign Act (since repealed). The legal proposition or even principle thereof laid down by the superior Court in connection with repealed Act cannot have any universal application particularly when there has been discernable change in the legislation in the same field. It is true object of providing both the said sections for both the Acts is same but there is different in procedure as to timing and stage of taking such action. I therefore overrule this contention that mere making an application for extension of time to file written statement is not submitting to jurisdiction to this Court a fortiori abandonment of the arbitration agreement. What point is to be taken in his written statement to contest the suit remains unknown till the same is filed. The suit may be contested either on preliminary point alone or may be on both the points. It could legitimately be imagined a party can take risk of resisting the suit only on the ground of existence of Arbitration agreement and may not state defence on merit by filing written statement. Therefore legal concept of taking steps to file written statement is expression of willingness to submit to jurisdiction of the Civil Court to contest the suit instead of arbitration proceedings, is not acceptable in view of present position of law. Now on the merit it has to be seen whether having regard to the dispute canvassed in the plaint section 45 can be of any help to the applicant or not. Now on the merit it has to be seen whether having regard to the dispute canvassed in the plaint section 45 can be of any help to the applicant or not. On careful reading of section 45 of the said Act I think following conditions are to be fulfilled before the said section is pressed into operation: (a) There must be a suit pending before an appropriate Court, (b) There must be admittedly valid arbitration agreement as mentioned in section 44 of the said Act, (c) The agreement must not be null and void or inoperative. 22. I have seen the pleading of the petition and also affidavit-in-opposition of the plaintiff, I find there is no denial or dispute that there exists an arbitration agreement as defined in section 44 of the said Act. 23. It has now to be examined whether the staid agreement is otherwise enforceable in the context of the dispute canvassed in the present suit. In the suit I find, apart from first defendant there are two more defendants one of whom, second one is an agent of first and in true sense its presence is immaterial. The presence of third defendant in this suit is absolute necessity. In order to decide this point at this stage the Court is to look into allegation purporting to constitute cause of action, in the plaint and not other things can possibly be considered as the defendant will not be coming forward to disclose its own defence or disputes. Admittedly the third defendant is not bound by the arbitration agreement as it is not party thereto. While reading carefully statement and averment constituting cause of action I have been able to summarize the same as follows: 24. The plaintiff contracted with the first defendant to supply considerable quantity of Indian Milling wheat to the first defendant at a particular agreed rate. Pursuant thereto the plaintiffs started dispatching the same chartering the vessel from third defendant and the goods were procured, tested and certified to be acceptable quality and quantity and as such the plaintiff brought the entire quantity of goods at the port of Tuticorin to be loaded for shipment on board, the vessels provided by third defendant by a charter party. As the loading was programming on the first defendant asked the plaintiff for discount on price for certain quantities however the plaintiff refused to accede to such demand. The allegations of the plaintiff is that because of this refusal the first defendant managed and/or influenced unduly the third defendant not to allow loading of the substantial quantity of wheat which was placed at the port, on the purported ground that a quantity of foreign materials were sought to be loaded. The cause of action is that the first defendant and third defendant in collusion with each other has prevented the plaintiff from loading the cargo and by their collusive act and conduct the plaintiff has been prevented from performing their part of contract. As such the plaintiff had suffered loss and damages on various counts as mentioned in the plant. Thus it is clear from the plaint going by its face value that dispute is not confined to between the plaintiff and the first defendant, involves third defendant also. According to me these disputes are to a great extent, outside the purview of contractual agreement between the plaintiff and first defendant. In the other words dispute between the plaintiff and first defendant is closely connected and/or interlined with those arisen between the plaintiff and third defendant. 25. I am not impressed with the argument that in view of section 5 of the said Act the Court has no jurisdiction to intervene in the dispute between the parties to the Arbitration: Firstly section 5 is part of part I of the said Act while section 45 is in part II thereof. According to me these two parts operate in different fields and for different situations and it is clear from the language of section 5 itself: "Extent of judicial intervention.––Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, (emphasis supplied) no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part." 26. The corresponding provision of section 5 is not to be found in any part of the Act. Secondly as I have already found that the third defendant is not the signatory to the arbitration agreement, thus question is whether the said arbitration agreement can be pressed into operation in this matter or not. The corresponding provision of section 5 is not to be found in any part of the Act. Secondly as I have already found that the third defendant is not the signatory to the arbitration agreement, thus question is whether the said arbitration agreement can be pressed into operation in this matter or not. On analyzing the dispute canvassed in the plaint it is found that these disputes are not absolutely covered by the arbitration agreement nor even it can be resolved making the third defendant as a witness. The presence of the third defendant in this case is absolutely necessary as relief has been claimed against it and also the allegations of collusion with first defendant has been made out. Under such circumstances I hold that the arbitration agreement as spoken of is inoperative at least for the time being. According to me after receipt of the written statement of both the defendants and even at the time of the trial or at the time of framing issues if it is found by the Court that third defendant is not at all a necessary party or the allegations brought against it cannot be entertained at all then at that stage the arbitration agreement can be operative and it is possible at that stage for the Court to refer the dispute to arbitration agreement, for unlike section 8 of the said Act, in section 45 of the Act there is no time mentioned when request can be made to the judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration. It has now become also easier for the Civil Court to refer at any stage of the suit the disputes amongst other to arbitration by virtue of section 89 of the Civil Procedure Code. 27. The unreported decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Dresser Rand S.A. vs. Bindal Agro Chem. Ltd. & Anr. and K.G. Khosla Compressors Ltd. & Anr. (Civil Appeal Nos. 1455 and 51456 of 1994) is not an authority in any sense to help this case as it appears to me nothing has been decided on the question of law the Court is facing here. It appears that the Supreme Court only set aside the interim order of stay of arbitration granted by the learned Trial Judge in High Court at the interim stage and such interim order of stay was not approved by the Supreme Court. It appears that the Supreme Court only set aside the interim order of stay of arbitration granted by the learned Trial Judge in High Court at the interim stage and such interim order of stay was not approved by the Supreme Court. It was merely an order deciding on a particular matter. Moreover this case was decided in the context of section 3 of Foreign Act and third party was not involved. 28. Similar is the position in the case of another unreported Supreme Court decision in case of Centrotrade vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (SLP (C) No. 10818 of 2000). Moreover we noticed the aforesaid two judgments were rendered not in connection with the present Act but in connection with the old Arbitration Act 1940. 29. The decision of the Supreme Court in case of Modi Entertainment Network & Anr. vs. WSG Cricket Pte. Ltd., 2003(4) SCC 341 , is an inappropriate citation in this case as in that case the Supreme Court dealt with where the parties have chosen the forum for adjudication of disputes they cannot be allowed to resile from such agreement. There cannot be disputes with regard to that proposition. In that case Supreme Court found that both the parties have by an agreement chosen forum which is one of the natural and appropriate forums and one of the parties wanted to ignore such an agreement. 30. The decision of Madras High Court in case of ANDRITZ OY. REP. vs. Enmas Engineer Pvt. Ltd., 2007(3) Vol. 68 Arb. LR. 545 (Madras), is not at all helpful in this case as I find the learned Judge amongst others has held that before the Court decides an arbitration agreement being void or inoperative under section 45, parties should be given opportunity to lead oral and documentary evidence. Here there is no such issue, existence of the arbitration agreement is not denied, nor it is pleaded that the same is void rather it is pleaded inoperative, for this purpose no oral evidence is required only to examine the pleading namely plaint and plaint alone as I have already observed. 31. Similar is the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Korp Gems (India) Put. Ltd. & Ors. vs. Precious Diamond Limited & Ors., 2007(3) Vol 68 Arb LR 32 (Calcutta), which does not lend any support to the points involved in this case. 31. Similar is the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Korp Gems (India) Put. Ltd. & Ors. vs. Precious Diamond Limited & Ors., 2007(3) Vol 68 Arb LR 32 (Calcutta), which does not lend any support to the points involved in this case. In that case it was found there was no arbitration agreement as such the application under section 45 cannot be allowed. 32. The judgment of learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in case of ITE India Put. Ltd. vs. Mullesh Shama & Ors. 2006(1) Vol. 61 Arb. LR 155 (Delhi), is also not an 'authority in this matter as it appears from the facts and decisions rendered by the learned Single Judge that the matter canvassed in the plaint was not totally outside the purview of the arbitration clause. In that case it was found at that stage the arbitration agreement was neither null and void nor could be found inoperative. 33. The decision of Supreme Court in case of Shakti Bhog Foods Ltd. vs. Kola Shipping Ltd., 2008(4) Vol. 74 Arb. LR 1 (SC), cited by the applicant cannot be an authority in this case firstly: there was one plaintiff and lone defendant nor third party and further Hon'ble Supreme Court found factually there has been valid arbitration agreement in the charter party between the parties to the suit, the same was subsisting and binding upon the parties. No application under Section 45 of the said Act was allowed. 34. The decision of the Supreme Court in case of Food Corporation of India & Anr. vs. Yadav Engineer & Contractor, 1982(2) SCC 499 , is of no help in this case as it was dealt with the old Arbitration Act, 1940, more so factually, even if the principle laid down in the said judgment is sought to be applied, still then it is of no help as it was found that both the parties in the suit were the signatories to the undisputed arbitration agreement and disputes were covered by the arbitration agreement. 35. In the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of PWH Analgen & Systeme GMBH vs. Damodar Ropeways & Construction Company Pvt. Ltd., 1996(2) CHN 97 , it was found that bank being a third party in the said suit was closely connected with principal contract. 35. In the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of PWH Analgen & Systeme GMBH vs. Damodar Ropeways & Construction Company Pvt. Ltd., 1996(2) CHN 97 , it was found that bank being a third party in the said suit was closely connected with principal contract. The issue of invocability of bank guarantee was closely connected with the dispute relating to the contract which contained arbitration clause. In other words the learned judge found factually that invocation of bank guarantee is also part and parcel of the dispute in the suit between the contracting parties bound by the arbitration agreement, because the bank cannot have any say in the matter of invocation of bank guarantee, its position is akin to a party plaintiff in a suit inter-pleader. As such the bank cannot be a disputant in the controversy between two contracting parties which relate to performance and non-performance of the contact which will have bearing with regard to bank guarantee. So the said decision cannot be helpful in this case as I have already said that here two sets of dispute which are inter-linked and intertwined with each other and cannot be dissected. 36. The judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Rite Approach Croup Ltd. vs. Rosoboronexport; 2006(1) SCC 206 , is totally misplaced here as in that case the Supreme Court was concerned with a situation if parties in the arbitration agreement itself choose any Court for initiation of judicial proceedings what would be the impact. The Supreme Court in that case held that when in the arbitration agreement itself the parties had lawfully contracted out the jurisdiction of any other Court then parties are bound to approach that Court chosen by the parties. 37. The decision of the Supreme Court in case of Kuaerner Cementation India Ltd. vs. Bajrangilal Agarwal & Anr. 2001(6) Supreme 265 , is an authority on different subject and issue altogether. In that case it was held that the Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction to go into the question of existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. Why it has been cited in this case is not understood by me. 38. 2001(6) Supreme 265 , is an authority on different subject and issue altogether. In that case it was held that the Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction to go into the question of existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. Why it has been cited in this case is not understood by me. 38. Similarly the decision of Supreme Court in case of Sundaram Finance Ltd. vs. NEPC India Ltd., 1999(2) SCC 479 , is absolutely out of place and has been cited only for the purpose of wasting the valuable time of the Court. 39. In view of the aforesaid discussion as above I held that the aforesaid arbitration agreement is inoperative for the time beings, this application is liable to be dismissed and the same is hereby rejected. 40. Now I shall deal with above interlocutory application taken out by the plaintiff where the interim order of injunction was already passed. It is said that on the strength of section 5 of the said Act the judicial intervention in any form is not possible. I have already discussed applicability of the said section in this case. The Civil Court's power as rightly urged by Mr. Banerjee for the plaintiff, under section 9 of the Civil Procedure is pervasive of all subject concerning civil dispute, unless it is ousted either expressly or implication. No such case has been established that jurisdiction of this Court has been ousted. As I have already held that the arbitration agreement is for the time being inoperative, if the arbitration proceedings is allowed to continue or for that matter arbitration agreement is allowed to remain after holding the same being inoperative it would be irrational idea to vacate the interim order as the arbitration proceedings will continue and there will be conflict of judicial decision. Moreover this will cause serious loss and injury to the plaintiff. Order 39 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code has made it specifically clear that Court has power to grant order of injunction when facts and circumstances will otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff. As such the interim order passed by this Court will stand confirmed. Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J.: Application of first defendant rejected.