Judgment :- Common Judgment: Both the appeals are field by the same individual, and against a common judgment. Hence, they are disposed of through a common judgment. The original appellant, by name Dilip D. Chatlani, died during the pendency of the appeals, and his legal representatives are brought on record. The respondent is the owner of shop No.70 of Chenoy Trade Centre, Ground Floor, 116 Parklane, Secunderabad (for short ‘the shop’). The appellant is the owner of shop No.69, which is on the rear side of shop No.70. The respondent gave his shop, on lease, to the appellant, in April, 1990. He filed O.S.No.511 of 2004 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), City Civil Court, Secunderabad, for eviction of the appellant, by pleading several grounds. The appellant filed written statement opposing that suit. On his part, the appellant filed O.S.No.315 of 2003, in the same Court, for the relief of specific performance of an oral agreement of sale, against the respondent. The suits were clubbed, and through a common judgment dated 27-06-2007, the trail Court decreed O.S.No.511 of 2004 and dismissed O.S.No.315 of 2003. CCCA No.213 of 2007 is filed against the decree in O.S.No.315 of 2003. Since the value of the suit in O.S.No.511 of 2004 is less, the appeal against that decree was filed in the Court of I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. On an application made by the appellant, it was transferred to this Court, and numbered as Tr.CCCA No.5 of 2008. Smt. Manjari S. Ganu, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there existed sufficient material in the form of oral and documentary evidence to establish that the respondent agreed to sell the shop to the appellant, and the trial Court was not justified in denying the relief of specific performance. She contends that EX.A-4, which provides for demolition of the wall that separated the two shops and works of renovation, connotes the preparedness of the respondent to sell the shop. She further submits that the payment of part of sale consideration was proved through cogent evidence. Sri Muralinarayana Bung, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the appellant had invented the peal of oral agreement of sale, with the sole object of grabbing the premises, taking advantage of his possession over the shop, as lessee. She further submits that the payment of part of sale consideration was proved through cogent evidence. Sri Muralinarayana Bung, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the appellant had invented the peal of oral agreement of sale, with the sole object of grabbing the premises, taking advantage of his possession over the shop, as lessee. He contends that when lease itself is under a registered sale deed, Ex.A.-3, and even minor aspects are covered by written document, such as Ex.A-4, it is just unimaginable that there exists an oral agreement for sale. He submits that the common judgment rendered by the trial Court does not warrant interference. The respondent, on the one hand, and the appellant on the other hand, filed suits for eviction, and specific performance of oral agreement of sale, respectively, in respect of the same premises. Pleadings in both the suits were broadly same, in their purport. The suit for eviction was filed earlier in point of time, as O.S.No.1686 of 2002, in the Court of I Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. On transfer, it was re-numbered as O.S.No.511 of 2004. The following issues were framed in O.S.No.511 of 2004. 1. Whether the notice of termination is valid and legal? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for vacant possession of suit schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for arrears of rent. 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for future mesne profits, if so, at what rate? Only one issue was framed in O.S.No.315 of 2003, viz., whether the appellant herein is entitled for the relief of specific performance? Evidence was common to both the suits. The respondent deposed as PW-1 and filed Exs.A-1 to A-4. On behalf of the appellant, DWs 1 to 5 were examined, and Exs.B-1 to B-26 were filed. As mentioned earlier, O.S.No.511 of 2004 was decreed, and O.S.No.315 of 2003 was dismissed. The entire controversy revolves around the truth or otherwise of the plea of oral agreement of sale raised by the appellant. If the alleged oral agreement is not proved, there does not exist much controversy, as to the termination of lease, and resultant eviction. On the other hand, if the oral agreement is held proved and decree of specific performance of contract is granted, the appellant cannot be evicted. If the alleged oral agreement is not proved, there does not exist much controversy, as to the termination of lease, and resultant eviction. On the other hand, if the oral agreement is held proved and decree of specific performance of contract is granted, the appellant cannot be evicted. The shop is located in one of the most prominent business centres in the twin cities. There is no dispute as to the ownership of the respondent, over the shop. Having regard to the importance of the premises, and the status of the parties, a lease deed was executed on 07-04-1990, and the same is marked as Ex.A-3. Within ten days after the lease commenced, the appellant sought permission of the respondent, to remove the wall, separating shop No.69, owned by the appellant, and the one, leased out him. The respondent agreed, and the consent is notified through Ex.A-4, dated 17-04-1990. Though there is no controversy as to commencement of lease, reference to these documents and facts is being made, to drive home the point, that the parties to these proceedings conduced their affairs through written documents, be it, for commencement of lease, or even for carrying out alteration works. Compared to lease of the premises, or grant of permission to effect alternations, sale is a very serious transaction, resulting in absolute transfer of title. Even where other transactions, such as, lease and mortgage are effected, otherwise than through written documents, an agreement of sale, of an item of immovable property would be in writing. This would be so, where the properties are in rural areas and parties are illiterate. As regards transactions in respect of urban properties, between businessmen, hardly there exists any possibility for oral agreements. If they exist, the evidence would be so clinching that it would be difficult to disbelieve it. In the instant case, the appellant miserably failed to establish the so-called oral lease. Not even the point of time, which can be said to have been entered into, was mentioned. The record discloses that the theory of oral sale was invented, only when the respondent instituted proceedings for eviction. It has already been mentioned that, when the matters of insignificant nature, such as the carrying out alterations in the premises, lead to written instrument, such as Ex.A.4, it is just unimaginable that an agreement of sale was oral. The record discloses that the theory of oral sale was invented, only when the respondent instituted proceedings for eviction. It has already been mentioned that, when the matters of insignificant nature, such as the carrying out alterations in the premises, lead to written instrument, such as Ex.A.4, it is just unimaginable that an agreement of sale was oral. The oral and documentary evidence adduced by the respondent did not at all touch the so-called oral agreement. It was mostly about the other unconnected aspects. The trial Court has examined the matter objectively and with reference to the evidence on record. A categorical finding was recorded to the effect that the plea of oral agreement raised by the appellant, is false and without basis. This Court is not inclined to take a different view. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the suit premises are placed for business and that his client may be granted reasonable time to vacate the premises. This request is strongly opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent. In view of the fact that the appellant is doing business in the premises, that too, by effecting alterations, he is granted time till 31.12.2009, on condition that arrears of rent, if any, shall be cleared by the end of September, 2009.