Judgment : Common Judgment: Sri Vasantha Venu Gopala Swamy Vari Temple, Gottumukkala village, Kanchikacherla Mandal, Krishna District, represented by its Chairman had preferred C.M.A.No.717 of 2008 as against an order made in I.A.No.284 of 2008 in O.S.No.101 of 2008 on the file of the Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam (In the court of the Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama). 2. Likewise, C.M.A.No.718 of 2008 is preferred by the self same Temple (hereinafter in short referred to as "the Temple" for the purpose of convenience) as against an order made in I.A.No.285 of 2008 in O.S.No.102 of 2008 on the file of the Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam (In the Court of the Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama). 3. Respondents/petitioners/plaintiffs in both these matters being Mukkapati Venkateswara Rao and Seelamneni Venkateswara Rao though different, since similar questions are involved in both these civil miscellaneous appeals, for the purpose of convenience, these civil miscellaneous appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment. 4. Though these civil miscellaneous appeals are appearing under the caption of "interlocutory", at the request of Sri C.V.R. Rudra Prasad, learned counsel representing appellant and Sri V.V.L.N. Sarma, learned counsel representing respondents in both these civil miscellaneous appeals, these civil miscellaneous appeals are being disposed of finally. 5. These civil miscellaneous appeals are preferred under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter in short referred to as "the Code" for the purpose of convenience). It appears, initially as against these orders, civil revision petitions had been moved by way of house-motion and interim orders had been obtained, but however on 20.6.2008 in the light of Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code, the learned counsel was permitted to convert the civil revision petitions into civil miscellaneous appeals and in the meanwhile the parties were directed to maintain status quo for all purposes. 6. Sri C.V.R. Rudra Prasad, learned counsel representing the appellant in both these civil miscellaneous appeals had taken this Court through the orders made by the learned Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam and would maintain that though it is interim injunction, as against such orders civil miscellaneous appeals would lie under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code. 6. Sri C.V.R. Rudra Prasad, learned counsel representing the appellant in both these civil miscellaneous appeals had taken this Court through the orders made by the learned Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam and would maintain that though it is interim injunction, as against such orders civil miscellaneous appeals would lie under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code. The learned counsel also pointed out that the appellant as defendant in both these suits had lodged Caveat No.23 of 2008 and Caveat No.21 of 2008 respectively and despite the lodging of caveats in both the matters and service of notice on respective opposite parties-plaintiffs, suppressing the same without putting the appellant-temple on notice, an ex parte interim order had been obtained. The learned counsel also further had taken this Court through the averments made in the respective plaints and also the affidavits filed in support of the applications praying for temporary injunction and would maintain that even on the face of the averments made in the pleadings, without going into further details, the suits are clearly barred by virtue of Section 151 of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (hereinafter in short referred to as "the Act" for the purpose of convenience). The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on the decision in Sri Rama Sri Kanyakaparameswari Srinagareswara Swamy Varla Alayamulu v. Jampa Satyanarayana and others 2005 (4) ALT 435 . Reliance also was placed on the decision in Sri Sanjeeva Anjaneya Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Rajahmundry v. Thokkula Dasaradharamayya and another W.A.No.1207 of 2008 dt.25.11.2008 and certain submissions were made relating to the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain a suit of this nature. The learned counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to certain subsequent events and further pointed out to Sections 82 and 83 of the Act aforesaid and also order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code. While further explaining the scope, ambit and relevant provisions of the Act aforesaid the learned counsel would maintain that the only inference that can be drawn is that the Civil Court cannot entertain suits of this nature at all and when such civil suits are not maintainable at all, the question of granting temporary injunction would not arise in such suits. The learned counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 148 A of the Code and further placed strong reliance on the decision in Reserve Bank of India Employees Association and another v. The Reserve Bank of India and others AIR 1981 Andhra Pradesh 246. 7. On the contrary, Sri V.V.L.N. Sarma, learned counsel representing respondents-plaintiffs in both these civil miscellaneous appeals had taken this Court through the chronological events in seriatum and would maintain that the respondents-tenants in both these matters lodged caveats before this court in the civil miscellaneous appeals, but the temples filed civil revision petitions and moved the said civil revision petitions by way of house-motion without giving notice to the respective respondents in these civil miscellaneous appeals. The counsel also pointed out to the relevant orders made by the court permitting the temple to convert the civil revision petitions into civil miscellaneous appeals under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code. The learned counsel had taken this Court through the averments made in the respective plaints by respondents-plaintiffs in both the suits and would maintain that no caveats had been lodged by the temple before the Court of the Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam and, hence, the question of issuance of advance notice to the temple would not arise. The learned counsel also pointed out that the inherent lack of jurisdiction in a Civil Court to entertain a suit had not been raised as a ground in these civil miscellaneous appeals. The counsel also would maintain that since the caveats had been lodged in the CMAs, these parties were not put on notice and intentionally civil revision petitions were filed and interim orders had been obtained. When the same was brought to the notice of this Court, the interim orders of suspension made had been modified to one of status quo to be maintained in the meanwhile. The learned counsel also pointed out to Sections 82, 83, 84, 85, 151 and 153 of the Act and made elaborate submissions relating to the factual controversy between the parties. The learned counsel also pointed out to the payments made and also to the other relevant factors. The learned counsel also pointed out certain discrepancies in schedules and the extents. The learned counsel also pointed out to Sections 82, 83, 84, 85, 151 and 153 of the Act and made elaborate submissions relating to the factual controversy between the parties. The learned counsel also pointed out to the payments made and also to the other relevant factors. The learned counsel also pointed out certain discrepancies in schedules and the extents. The counsel also would maintain that Section 83 of the Act in general and explanation in particular would deal with the term or expression "encroacher". The counsel also pointed out to the procedure to be followed for evicting such encroachers even if the tenants are to be treated as encroachers. The learned counsel also would maintain that the fact that the possession is with these respective respondents-plaintiffs and they have been cultivating the lands in question, this fact is not in serious controversy. The learned counsel also would maintain that the exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. The learned counsel laid strong emphasis on the words "for which provision is made in this Act", in Section 151 of the Act since for the present remedy no provision is made under the Act, these civil suits are perfectly maintainable. Even otherwise since this is a question to be gone into further inasmuch as against the ex parte orders these civil miscellaneous appeals had been preferred and without filing any application to vacate the interim orders straight away the Temple had approached this Court by way of civil miscellaneous appeals. It would be just and proper to maintain status quo and remit these matters to the concerned court with appropriate direction to dispose of the applications in accordance law. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on the under noted decisions. (1) Dhulabhai etc., v. State of M.P. and another (AIR 1969 Supreme Court 78(1); (2) Innovative Pharma Surgicals v. Pigeon Medical Devices Pvt. Ltd. & others ( 2004 (4) CCC 427 (A.P.); (3) Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams and another v. Thallappaka Anantha Charyulu and others AIR 2003 Supreme Court 3290; (4) Government of A.P. v. Boyapati Sleeva Reddy ( 2006 (4) ALT 193 ); (5) Sahebgouda (dead) by L.Rs. and others v. Ogeppa and others (AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2743); (6) State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (D) by L.Rs and others (AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2220;) (7) Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by L.Rs. and others v. Ogeppa and others (AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2743); (6) State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (D) by L.Rs and others (AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2220;) (7) Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by L.Rs. and another v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala and others AIR 2003 Supreme court 2696; 8. Heard the counsel on record and perused the material available on record. 9. In the light of the elaborate submissions made by the counsel on record, the following points arise for consideration in these civil miscellaneous appeals. (1) Whether the orders challenged in these civil miscellaneous appeals are liable to be set aside or to be confirmed or to be modified in the facts and circumstances of the case? (2) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled? 10. Point No.1:- As specified supra, these civil miscellaneous appeals are filed by the Temple aggrieved by the ex parte orders of interim injunctions made in the respective applications specified above by the learned Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam. It is not in serious controversy that the subject matter of these respective suits would fall within the limit of the learned Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama. Further it is also not in serious controversy that on the file of the learned Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama, the Temple had taken the care by lodging caveats anticipating the suits to be instituted by the respondents in these civil miscellaneous appeals-plaintiffs in the respective suits. It is also not in serious controversy that the Temple had not lodged the caveats on the file of the Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam. Further there appears to be no dispute that at the relevant point of time the caveats lodged on the file of the learned Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama were operative and they were not lapsed by the lapse of time. It also appears from the record that despite the lodging of the caveats on the file of the learned Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama, the respective plaintiffs-respondents in these CMAs had chosen to institute these suits on the file of the Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam and obtained interim orders without serving any notice on the Temple. It also appears from the record that despite the lodging of the caveats on the file of the learned Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama, the respective plaintiffs-respondents in these CMAs had chosen to institute these suits on the file of the Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam and obtained interim orders without serving any notice on the Temple. The stand taken is that since the caveats had been lodged on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama, the learned Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna had made these orders in accordance with law, since no caveats lodged were either pending or were in force at the relevant point of time on the file of the learned Vacation Civil Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam. No doubt, it also appears that anticipating civil miscellaneous appeals to be preferred to this court, the respondents-plaintiffs also lodged caveats on the file of this court, but initially civil revision petitions had been preferred and subsequent thereto the Temple was permitted to convert these civil revision petitions into the present civil miscellaneous appeals. There cannot be any serious controversy relating to the maintainability of these civil miscellaneous appeals in the light of the clear language of Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code even as against the ex parte orders of temporary injunction. 11. Section 83 of the Act deals with encroachment by persons on land or building belonging to charitable or religious institution or endowment and the eviction of encroachers. The explanation to sub-section 1 of Section 83 of the Act specifies as hereunder. "For the purpose of this Chapter the expression 'encroacher' shall mean any person who unauthorisedly occupy any land or building or space and deemed to include any person who is in occupation of the land or building or space without the approval of the competent authority sanctioning lease or mortgage, or licence and also a person who continues to remain in the land or building or space after the expiry of termination or cancellation of the lease, mortgage or licence in respect thereof granted to him or it." 12. Sections 83, 84 and 85 of the Act and also certain Rules, strongly, had been relied upon. Section 151 of the Act deals with Bar of jurisdiction. Section 153 of the Act deals with Power to make rules. Section 151 of the Act dealing with Bar of jurisdiction reads as hereunder. Sections 83, 84 and 85 of the Act and also certain Rules, strongly, had been relied upon. Section 151 of the Act deals with Bar of jurisdiction. Section 153 of the Act deals with Power to make rules. Section 151 of the Act dealing with Bar of jurisdiction reads as hereunder. "No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matters of dispute for determining or deciding for which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any court of Law except under and in conformity with the provisions of this Act." 13. Emphasis had been laid on the words "for which provision is made in this Act". Strong reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Sri Rama Sri Kanyakaparameswari Srinagareswara Swamy Varla Alayamulu v. Jampa Satyanarayana and others (1 supra) wherein the learned Judge at paras 7 to 10 observed as hereunder. The uncertainty as to the applicability of the provisions of the A. P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act to the lands held by religious institutions was put at rest by a recent judgment of the Supreme Court. It was held that the provisions of the said Act do not apply to the lands held by the religious institutions. Section 82 of the Act was suitably amended and provided for automatic termination of existing leases in respect of the agricultural lands held by religious institutions. Rules were also framed to enforce the statutory termination of leases. It was in this context that the first respondent was issued a notice requiring him to vacate the land. The petitioner categorically asserts that the first respondent delivered possession on 05-04-2003. Thereafter, the leasehold rights were put to auction and respondents 2 and 3 emerged as successful bidders. The first respondent filed the suit for perpetual injunction and obtained an ex parte order of temporary injunction. Once the trial court was informed of the developments that took place since 01-04-2003 and the purport of the provisions of the Act, it dismissed the I.A. In the C.M.A, the first respondent filed an I. A. The lower appellate Court did not choose to grant any ex parte injunction in the I. A. It ordered notice to the petitioner herein. Elaborate submissions were made. Elaborate submissions were made. Since the C. M. A. was directed against an order passed in an application under Order XXXIX rule 1 C. P. C. the lower appellate Court ought to have disposed of the C. M. A. itself, once it heard the parties extensively. However, it has chosen to pass an order in the I. A. and kept the C. M. A. pending. Such a course of action does not accord with the settled procedure. The lower appellate Court had undertaken extensive discussion on two aspects viz., payment of rents from time to time by the first respondent and non- initiation of proceedings before the competent authority under Section 83 of the Act. It proceeded on the assumption that even if the first respondent is to be treated as an encroacher, in view of the statutory termination of lease, he could have been evicted only through proceedings initiated under Section 83 of the Act. It failed to address itself to the categorical assertion made by the petitioner that the first respondent delivered possession on 05-04-2003. The necessity to initiate proceedings under Section 83 of the Act would arise if only the erstwhile lessee continues to be an encroacher. Before recording the finding that the proceedings under Section 83 of the Act ought to have been initiated, the lower appellate Court was required to satisfy itself that the assertion on the part of the petitioner that the first respondent delivered possession on 05-04-2003 is factually incorrect. No such finding is discernible from the order under revision. Apart from these factual aspects, the courts below failed to notice an important provision of the Act. Section 151 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain any suits on any matters for adjudication of which a provision is made. Admittedly, specific provisions are contained in the Act to deal with the grant of lease and termination thereof. Therefore, the maintainability of the suit itself becomes doubtful, in view of the bar contained under section 151 of the Act. At any rate, the auction was conducted and successful bidders were inducted into possession months before the suit itself came to be filed. There was no occasion or basis for grant of an injunction in favour of the first respondent." 14. At any rate, the auction was conducted and successful bidders were inducted into possession months before the suit itself came to be filed. There was no occasion or basis for grant of an injunction in favour of the first respondent." 14. In Dhulabhai etc., v. State of M.P. and another (3 supra) while dealing with the principles regarding inclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court the Apex Court at paras 1 to 7 observed as hereunder. These are four appeals by certificate against the common judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench), 16 December, 196 4/01/1965 dismissing the suits filed by the appellants to recover sales-tax alleged to be realized illegally from them by the State of Madhya Pradesh, the respondent in these appeals. The suits were earlier decreed by the District Judge, Ujjain. The facts in the suits are common and were as follows: The appellants are dealers in tobacco and have their places of business at Ujjain. They purchase and sell tobacco used for eating, smoking and for preparing bids. They get their tobacco locally or import it from extra-State places. The former Madhya Bharat State enacted in 1950 the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act (Act 30 of 1950), which came into force on 1/05/1950. Under S. 3 of the Act every dealer whose business in the previous year in respect of sales or supplies of goods exceeded in the case of an importer and manufacturer Rupees 5,000 and in other cases Rs.12,000, had to pay tax in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected in Madhya Bharat from 1/05/1950. Under S. 5, the tax was a single point tax and it was provided that the Government might by a notification specify the point of the sales at which the tax was payable. The section also fixed the minimum and maximum rates of tax leaving it to Government to notify the actual rate. Government in pursuance of this power issued a number of notifications on 30/04/19 5/05/19 5/10/1953 and 21/01/1954. All these notifications imposed tax at different rates on tobacco above described on the importer that is to say at the point of import. The tax was not levied on sale or purchase of tobacco of similar kind in Madhya Bharat. The tax was collected by the authorities in varying amounts from the appellants for different quarters. We are not concerned with the amounts. The tax was not levied on sale or purchase of tobacco of similar kind in Madhya Bharat. The tax was collected by the authorities in varying amounts from the appellants for different quarters. We are not concerned with the amounts. The appellants served notices under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and filed the present suits for refund of the tax on the ground that it was illegally collected from them being against the constitutional prohibition in Article 301 and not saved under Article 304 (a) of the Constitution. The State of Madhya Pradesh was formed on 1/11/1956. In Bhailal v. State of M. P., 1960 MPLJ 601 the High Court of Madhya Pradesh declared the notifications to be offensive to Article 301 of the Constitution on the ground that it was illegal to levy a tax on the importer when an equal tax was not levied on similar goods produced in the State. The decision was later confirmed on this point in State of M. P. v. Bhailal Bhai, 1964-6 SCR 261 = ( AIR 1964 SC 1006 ). The appellants did not take recourse to the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution but filed their suits on 21/12/1957. The suits were opposed by the State on the main ground that such a suit was barred by the provisions of S. 17 of the Act which provides: "17. Bar to certain proceedings. Save as is provided in S. 17, no assessment made and no order passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder by the assessing authority, appellate authority or the Commissioner shall he called into question in any Court, and save as is provided in Sections 11 and 12 no appeal or application for revision shall lie against any such assessment or order. " The State also pleaded that as appeals against the assessment were pending before the Sales Tax Appeal Judge the plaintiffs were not entitled to file the suits. By his judgment the District Judge following State of Tripura v. Province of East Bengal, ( AIR 1951 SC 23 and 1960 MPLJ 601 ) held that such a suit lay when a declaration was sought that the provisions of law relating to an assessment were ultra vires and demand was made for refund of amounts illegally collected under it. By his judgment the District Judge following State of Tripura v. Province of East Bengal, ( AIR 1951 SC 23 and 1960 MPLJ 601 ) held that such a suit lay when a declaration was sought that the provisions of law relating to an assessment were ultra vires and demand was made for refund of amounts illegally collected under it. On the second point the District Judge held that S.21 of the Act, which allows the Commissioner or the appellate authority to order refund of tax wrongly paid did not apply since no such appeal was proved to have been filed and the tax was not wrongfully paid but wrongfully realised. On appeal by the State the High Court reversed the decision. Before the High Court it was conceded (as it is conceded even now) that the tax could not be imposed in view of the bar of Article 301. The short question thus was whether the suit was barred expressly by S. 17 of the Act or any implication arising from the Act. The contention on behalf of the appellants was that if it was a question of the correctness of the imposition within the valid framework of the statute, rules or notifications S. 17 might have operated but not when the imposition was under a void law. In the latter event the assessee was free to challenge the validity of the law in a civil suit and also to claim a refund. The High Court considered the matter in the light of the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Raleigh Investment Co. v. G. G. in Council, AIR 1947 PC 78, Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. , AIR 1940 PC 105, Firm I. S. Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 322 , State of Andhra Pradesh v. Firm Subbayya and Sons, AIR 1961 Andh Pra 512, and others, and came to the conclusion that the suit was incompetent. The High Court conceded that both aspects of the case were well supported by authority. It is not necessary to enter into the reasons which weighed with the High Court because our discussion of the authorities in this judgment will clearly expose the rival views and the one preferred in the High Court." 15. The High Court conceded that both aspects of the case were well supported by authority. It is not necessary to enter into the reasons which weighed with the High Court because our discussion of the authorities in this judgment will clearly expose the rival views and the one preferred in the High Court." 15. Reliance also was placed on the decision in N. Haranath v. Sri Prasanna Anjaneya Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Nellore District and others 2008 (6) ALD (NOC 21) wherein the learned Judge observed as hereunder. "Even assuming that the contention of the respondents that the petitioner never made any application before the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments to declare him as a landless poor person is correct, the claim of the petitioner for statutory benefit under Section 82 of the Act cannot be rejected only on that ground. It is for the 2nd respondent who is the competent authority under the statute to conduct necessary enquiry and determine whether the petitioner is a landless poor person within the meaning of explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 82 of the Act. Even where it is declared that the tenant is a landless poor person, it is always open to the respondents not to accept the option exercised by the cultivating tenant if the other requirements under Section 82 of the Act are not satisfied. Hence, it is not necessary for the Court to express any opinion at this stage as to the rival claims made by the parties. However, since admittedly the enquiry into the petitioner's claim that he is a landless poor person has not yet been conducted and the petitioner is still continuing in possession of the land which is less than the limits specified under the explanation to Section 82(2) of the Act, the action of the 1st respondent in proposing to auction the leasehold rights in respect of the lands in possession of the petitioner is impermissible and illegal. Accordingly, the auction under the impugned notice to the extent of the lands in possession of the petitioner (Item No.3 of the impugned notice) is hereby declared as illegal. In view of the dispute with regard to the pendency of enquiry before the 2nd respondent, it is made clear that the petitioner shall appear before the 2nd respondent within two weeks from today with all the relevant material to substantiate his claim. In view of the dispute with regard to the pendency of enquiry before the 2nd respondent, it is made clear that the petitioner shall appear before the 2nd respondent within two weeks from today with all the relevant material to substantiate his claim. L In such an event, the 2nd respondent, after due notice to both the parties, shall conduct the necessary enquiry and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within four weeks thereafter. Till such orders are passed, the 1st respondent shall not put the leasehold rights of the land in possession of the petitioner." 16. Sri V.V.L.N. Sarma also placed strong reliance on the decision in Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by L.Rs. and another vs. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala and others (9 supra) wherein the Apex Court observed at paras 19 and 22 as hereunder. "A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions leaves no manner of doubt that thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court has not been ousted. The civil Court, in the instant case, was concerned with the rival claims of the parties as to whether one party has illegally been dispossessed by the other or not. Such a suit, apart from the general law, would also be maintainable in terms of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In such matters the Court would not be concerned even with the question as to title/ownership of the property. The dispute between the parties was eminently a civil dispute and not a dispute under the provisions of the Companies Act. Section 9 of the code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil courts to determine all disputes of civil nature unless the same is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar jurisdiction of civil Court requires strict interpretation. The court, it is well-settled, would normally lean in favour of construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted. (See Saahebgouda (dead) by L.Rs. and others v. Ogeppa and others ( 2003 (3) Supreme 13 ). Even otherwise, the civil Court's jurisdiction is not completely ousted under the Companies Act,1956." 17. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted. (See Saahebgouda (dead) by L.Rs. and others v. Ogeppa and others ( 2003 (3) Supreme 13 ). Even otherwise, the civil Court's jurisdiction is not completely ousted under the Companies Act,1956." 17. Further strong reliance was placed on the decision in State of A.P., vs. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (D) by L.Rs. and others (8 supra) wherein the Apex Court at paras 3, 5, 6 and 7 observed as hereunder. When the suit was pending in the trial Court the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') came into force from 26/01/1967 and defendants Nos. 4 to 12 filed a petition (O. A. No. 50 of 1969) under Section 77 of the Act before the third defendant in the suit and that petition ended in their favour by holding that the property had been purchased by the applicant and other members of his family in a Court auction and they had been enjoying the same for nearly 40 years and no one had questioned their enjoyment on the ground that the property was subject to any public charity of endowment. The third defendant made a declaration that the said property is not public charity or subject to any endowment. That order became final inasmuch as no appeal or suit as contemplated under the Act had been filed. In the circumstances when the order made by the Deputy Commissioner had attained finality and conclusiveness and the matter could not be challenged except in the manner provided under the Act and that course having not been adopted the High Court allowed the Letters Patent Appeals and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court as affirmed by the learned single Judge of the High Court. Hence this appeal. The normal rule of law is that civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislature intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ), it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special Tribunals jurisdiction of the civil Courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The suit is prior to initiation of proceedings under Section 77 of the Act and, therefore, the said suit cannot be a suit as contemplated under Section 78 of the Act. The Order under Section 77 of the Act is conclusive which determined the issue that the suit property is not subject to public charity or endowment upholding the case of the defendants Nos. 4 to 12 that the property is private property and is not an endowment. Such a question could have been decided in a proceeding under Section 77 (1) (d) of the Act as to whether any property is an endowment and, if so, whether it is charitable endowment or a religious endowment. A person aggrieved could file a suit under Section 78 of the Act. Since no such suit was filed the declaration made by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 77 of the Act the order made by him concluded the issue whether or not the suit property is a charitable or religious endowment. After the Act came into force the Deputy Commissioner was competent to deal with such a question. The subject matter in G. O. 1501 which was passed on 12/07/1966; the prayer in the suit in O. S. No. 11/67 and the decision under Section 77 pertains to the same question whether or not the property was an endowed property. After the Act came into force the Deputy Commissioner was competent to deal with such a question. The subject matter in G. O. 1501 which was passed on 12/07/1966; the prayer in the suit in O. S. No. 11/67 and the decision under Section 77 pertains to the same question whether or not the property was an endowed property. The Deputy Commissioner considered the very question raised in the suit as to nature of the suit property and held that it is private property and having concluded as public charity or endowment that conclusion became final. In the present case, there is no allegation that the Deputy Commissioner had acted contrary to the provisions of the Act or not having followed the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. On the other hand, the Deputy Commissioner having followed the due procedure made the order and that order could have been challenged as provided under Section 78 of the Act by way of a suit or by an appeal. When neither of these courses was adopted, the order made by the authority in its special jurisdiction must be held to be conclusive and final." 18. Further strong reliance was placed on the decision in Sahebgouda (dead) by L.Rs. and others v. Ogeppa and others (7 supra) wherein the Apex Court at paras 8, 11 and 12 observed as hereunder. The question whether the suit filed by the appellants is barred by the provisions of section 80 of the Act has to be examined in the light of the provisions referred to above. Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure clearly lays down that the civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is well settled that the civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature and the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be rightly inferred. Such exclusion must be either explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is well settled that the civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature and the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be rightly inferred. Such exclusion must be either explicitly expressed or clearly implied. In Musamia imam Haider Bax Razvi v. Rabri govindbhai Ratnabhai and Ors.( 2005 (4) ALT 435 ) this Court observed that it is necessary to bear in mind the important principle of construction which is that if a statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction of a civil court it must do so either by express terms or by the use of such terms as would necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion. This principle was reiterated in 1. 1969 (1) SCR 785 dewaji v. Ganpatlal W.A.No.1207 of 2008 dt.25.11.2008 The allegations made in the plaint show that the only right claimed by the appellants is that of being ancestral pujaris of the temple. The appellants do not claim themselves to be the trustees of any trust as defined under section 2 (18) of the Act. No declaration regarding the existence or otherwise of a trust or that any particular property is the property of such trust which comes within the purview of the Deputy or assistant Charity Commissioner under section 79 of the Act has been claimed. The only relief claimed is a declaration regarding the right of the appellants to function as hereditary pujaris or their pujariki rights of performing puja in the temple and a consequential decree for injunction for restraining the respondents from interfering with the aforesaid rights of the appellants. The reliefs so claimed do not at all come within the ambit of section 19 or section 79 of the act on which the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has the jurisdiction to hold an inquiry and give a decision. Therefore, the bar of section 80 of the Act which by the express language used is confined to "any question which is by or under this act be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under this Act and in respect of which the decision or order of such officer or authority has been made final and conclusive" would not apply. The only ground given by the High court for holding that the suit is barred by the aforesaid provision is that in para 3 of the plaint it is admitted that the appellants and other remaining bhaktas have taken steps to get the temple and land annexed to it, registered as public trust with the Assistant Charity Commissioner at Belgaum and that one of the appellants admitted in his statement that he along with others had moved an application for registering temple property as a public trust and inquiry in that regard was pending. In our opinion the mere fact that the appellants along with others had taken steps to get the temple and the land annexed to it registered as public trust by moving an application to that effect under section 18 of the Act before the Assistant Charity Commissioner cannot in any manner oust the jurisdiction of the civil court in view of the allegations disclosed in the plaint and the relief claimed therein. The cause of action for filing the suit is that in the night of March 3, 1982 respondents created obstruction in the performance of puja by the appellants in the temple and taking away of certain puja articles by them which made it impossible for the appellants to proceed with the puja. In our opinion the decision of the controversies raised in the suit do not at all require adjudication of any such matter which may have to be done by the Assistant Charity Commissioner while exercising his powers under section 19 of the Act on the application which was pending before him for registration of the temple and its property as public trust. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the High court is clearly erroneous in law and the judgment and decree passed by it must be set aside." 19. Sri V.V.L.N. Sarma also placed strong reliance on the decision in Government of A.P. v. Boyapati Sleeva Reddy (6 supra) wherein at paras 16 and 17 it was observed as hereunder. "In the classic decision of dhulabhai (supra) a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court after considering a number of cases, summarized the principles relating to the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Courts. "In the classic decision of dhulabhai (supra) a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court after considering a number of cases, summarized the principles relating to the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Courts. .(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the Special Tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. .(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) x x x x x. (4) x x x x x. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegality collected a suit lies. (6) x x x x x (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. It is well settled that it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of a civil Court to establish his contention. It is equally well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil Court must be strictly construed. It is well settled that it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of a civil Court to establish his contention. It is equally well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil Court must be strictly construed. Where such a contention is raised, it has to be determined in the light of the words used in the statute, the scheme of the relevant provisions, the object and purpose of the enactment etc. In case of doubt as to the jurisdiction, the court should lean towards assumption of jurisdiction. Where statutory enactments only create rights or liabilities without providing forums for remedies, any person having a grievance that he has been wronged or his right is being affected, can approach a civil Court on the principle of law that wherever there is a right, there is a remedy (Ubi jus ibi remedium). In Raja Ram v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 681 = AIR 1988 SC 752 , the Supreme Court stated as under: "generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right, not preexisting in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil Court's jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognized by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil Court's jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence. " 20. Further strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams and another v. Thallappaka Anantha Charyulu and others (5 supra). 21. Sri V.V.L.N. Sarma also placed strong reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Innovative Pharma Surgicals v. Pigeon Medical Devices Pvt. Ltd. and others (4 supra) wherein the learned Division Bench at paras 18, 21 and 24 observed as hereunder. 21. Sri V.V.L.N. Sarma also placed strong reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Innovative Pharma Surgicals v. Pigeon Medical Devices Pvt. Ltd. and others (4 supra) wherein the learned Division Bench at paras 18, 21 and 24 observed as hereunder. "So, it is clear that though an appeal is maintainable, such an appeal should be filed only in an extraordinary circumstance under which the party is able to explain as to why he prefers an appeal in the High Court instead of choosing to file a petition to vacate the ad interim injunction. Even in case of appeal against an ad interim injunction, the appellate court will not be bound to apply its mind to all the contentions, which the Original court is bound to consider on the case shown by the party affected by ad interim order. In case of granting injunction without issuing any notice to the opposite party, the opposite party is always at liberty under the provisions of Order 39 Rule 4 C.P.C. to apply to the Judge to vary or set aside the said order. Order 39 Rule 4 is intended to cover two classes of cases: (1) When an urgent ex parte order has been passed under Rule 3, Rule 4 will allow the party against whom it has been passed to apply to have it discharged or varied or set aside and (2) when an injunction order already in force has, owing to fresh circumstances, become unduly harsh or unnecessary or unworkable, it would be open to either party to apply under Rule 4 of the Court to discharge, vary or set it aside. The immediate remedy that is available to the opposite party in case of issuing temporary injunction without issuing notice is under the provisions of Order 39 Rule 4 C.P.C. which enables the Original Court to vary or set aside or discharge the ex parte order. In the light of the above provisions and also the legal propositions, no appeal lies, as a matter or course, against an ex parte order, except in extraordinary circumstances or the rarest of the rare cases where the order is perverse or biased or suffers from lack of jurisdiction, but it is not the case of the petitioner." 22. In the light of the above provisions and also the legal propositions, no appeal lies, as a matter or course, against an ex parte order, except in extraordinary circumstances or the rarest of the rare cases where the order is perverse or biased or suffers from lack of jurisdiction, but it is not the case of the petitioner." 22. It is no doubt true that when an ex parte injunction is granted without issuing notice to the opposite party, the opposite party is always at liberty to move appropriate application for vacating the said order. It is also equally true that in the light of the language of Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code these civil miscellaneous appeals as against such orders also are maintainable. 23. Sri C.V.R. Rudra Prasad placed strong reliance on the decision in Reserve Bank of India Employees Association and another v. The Reserve Bank of India and others (3 supra) (equivalent to 1981 (1) ALT 387 ) wherein a learned Judge of this Court observed at paras 4, 5, 6 and 7 as hereunder. Now the question is whether that order of the learned Assistant Judge injuncting the present petitioners without giving a notice to the petitioners and hearing them is null and void or is it an order which stand till it is set aside according to the procedure known to law. There is no doubt that the requirements of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of Section 148-A of the Code of Civil Procedure are fully satisfied in this case by the caveators as well as the plaintiffs. In fact in the case of Sub-section (4) they were even over fulfilled by the applicants. But it is the Court that failed to act in compliance with the statutory requirements of Section 148-A, Subsection (3 ). Under Sub-section (3) of Section 148-A where a caveat had been lodged, it becomes the duty of the Court to serve a notice of that petition on the caveators. Although the words "notice of application" are not defined in the Civil Procedure Code, these words have a settled meaning under the regime of the Civil Procedure Code established through the Civil Rules of Practice. Although the words "notice of application" are not defined in the Civil Procedure Code, these words have a settled meaning under the regime of the Civil Procedure Code established through the Civil Rules of Practice. Under the Civil Rules of Practice a notice of interlocutory application is required to be given to the other party to the suit or other matter, not less than three days before the day appointed for the hearing of the application. That is always taken to include the date of hearing. In any case, in the context of Sub-section (3) of Section 148-A the words "notice of application" cannot mean anything, if they do not refer to the exact date of hearing. It must, therefore, be taken that it is the duty of the Court under Section 148-A to give sufficiently reasonable and definite time to the caveators to appear and also to oppose the interlocutory application intended to be moved by the plaintiffs-applicants and the Court should give a specified date for hearing of the interlocutory application. This duty of the Court is clearly different and distinct from the duty of the parties described in Subsections (2) and (4) of that section. The duty of the Court under Sub-section (3) is in addition to the other parts assigned to the other parties in the drama of litigation. The furnishing of copies of documents by the plaintiffs to the caveators on 27-10-1980 and informing them of the date of their moving their interlocutory application can-not, therefore, be taken as acts constituting compliance with the specific duty assigned to the Court under Sub-section (3) of Section 148-A. The duty of the applicants under Subsection (4) of Section 148-A is different and distinct from the duty of the Court under Sub-section (3). I, therefore, entertain no doubt whatsoever in holding that the lower Court had erred in passing the impugned order of injunction on 30th Oct., 1980 against the caveators without giving them a notice of the date of hearing. If that is all, I would have allowed this C.R.P, without anything more. But, unfortunately, for the petitioners there is a lot more to be said against them in this case. If that is all, I would have allowed this C.R.P, without anything more. But, unfortunately, for the petitioners there is a lot more to be said against them in this case. The precise question that is now raised is whether the afore-mentioned failure of the Court to act in accordance with the requirements of Sub-section (3) of Section 148-A is a failure relating to its jurisdiction or merely its procedure. If it is a jurisdictional fault, the order passed by the Court ignoring the requirements of Sub-section (3) of Section 148-A would be a void order and would not be allowed to be operative for any purpose. On the other hand, if it is a procedural error, the order stands till it is set-aside in an appropriately constituted legal proceeding. The word "caveat" has not been defined by the Civil Procedure Code. In fact it has been introduced into it only recently. We have to take its ordinary meaning. Wharton's Law Lexicon which is a dictionary combined with a small commentary on each word has the following interesting entry describing the office of caveat: "in Scotland any one who expects certain proceedings to be taken by another, may lodge with the Clerk of the Court a "caveat". He is then entitled to be informed by the Clerk if and when the proceedings are taken. " Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law gives the meaning of the word 'caveat' as an entry made in the books of the offices of a registry or Court lo prevent a certain step being taken without previous notice to the person entering the caveat, who is called the caveator. What appears to me to be significant from the above two meanings taken out from the two well known legal dictionaries is the fact that none of these standard works puts the caveat so high as to act as a fetter on the exercise of power by the Court. In other words, they do not say that any action taken by the Court without giving prior notice to the caveator would be a nullity. The reason seems to me to be that the caveat has no effect on the exercise of powers by the Court. It follows, therefore, that the order passed by a Court without giving a notice to the caveator cannot be treated as a nullity. The reason seems to me to be that the caveat has no effect on the exercise of powers by the Court. It follows, therefore, that the order passed by a Court without giving a notice to the caveator cannot be treated as a nullity. If a statute intends to demolish the ordinary powers of a Civil Court, it is well settled proposition of law that it can only be done by a direct piece of legislation enacted for that purpose and not by the effect of an indirect legislation as if it were by a side wind. The powers of a Civil Court are too sacrosanct to be allowed to be diluted or to be curtailed by a mere remote implication. I, therefore, hold that as there is no specific provision declaring any action taken by the Court contrary to its mandatory duty under Sub-section (3) to give a notice would be void, the order passed by the Court below on 30-10-1980 is not a nullity. In other words, it appears to me that the mere lodgment of a caveat would not deprive the Court of its power to pass an order even if the caveator was not informed of the dale of hearing of the matter. As the lodgment of a caveat is merely a right to be informed of the hearing date and it has no effect by way of curtailing the powers of a Civil Court to pass an appropriate order on the merits of the case, I hold that the order passed in this case on 30th October, 1980 is not without jurisdiction and is, therefore, operative till it is set aside in appropriate proceedings. This leads me to consider the question whether the present revision filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is an appropriate proceeding. It must be noted that against an order of injunction passed by the Court below under Order 39, Rule 1, C. P. C, the petitioners have a statutory right of appeal under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (r) of the Civil Procedure Code. Under Section 115 (2), C. P. C, the High Court is debarred from varying or reversing any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate to it. Under Section 115 (2), C. P. C, the High Court is debarred from varying or reversing any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate to it. As I hold that the order passed by the Court below is one passed not without jurisdiction, it follows that the order passed on 30-10-1980 is an appealable order and therefore, cannot be interfered with in a revision. It is argued by Mr. K. G. Kannabhiran that this revision petition is filed not against the merits of the order passed but about the correctness of the procedure adopted by the Court below. This argument in substance means that the Court below had no jurisdiction to pass the order under revision without giving a notice to the petitioners and that, therefore, the prohibition contained in Section 115, C. P. C, against entertaining any revision where an appeal is provided, would not apply. But, whatever may be the merits of that matter where an order is one passed totally without jurisdiction and is, therefore, for that reason a nullity, it will have no application to a case like the pre-rent one where the order is act a nullity but is only irregular. Accordingly, I hold that this revision petition should fait merely for the reason that it is not maintainable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure forbidding the entertaining of any revision against an order or decree, which is appealable either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate to it." 24. Section 148 A of the Code deals with right to lodge a caveat and the said provision reads as hereunder. "(1) Where an application is expected to be made, or has been made, in a suit or proceeding instituted, or about to be instituted, in a Court, any person claiming a right to appear before the Court on the hearing of such application may lodge a caveat in respect thereof. (2) Where a caveat has been lodged under sub-section (1), the person by whom the caveat has been lodged (hereinafter referred to as the caveator) shall serve a notice of the caveat by registered post acknowledgment due, on the person by whom the application has been, or is expected to be, made under sub-section (1). (2) Where a caveat has been lodged under sub-section (1), the person by whom the caveat has been lodged (hereinafter referred to as the caveator) shall serve a notice of the caveat by registered post acknowledgment due, on the person by whom the application has been, or is expected to be, made under sub-section (1). (3) Where, after a caveat has been lodged under sub-section (1), any application is filed in any suit or proceeding, the Court shall serve a notice of the application on the caveator. (4) Where a notice of any caveat has been served on the applicant, he shall forthwith furnish the caveator, at the caveator's expense, with a copy of the application made by him and also with copies of any paper or document which has been, or may be, filed by him in support of the application. (5) Where a caveat has been lodged under sub-section (1), such caveat shall not remain in force after the expiry of ninety days from the date on which it was lodged unless the application referred to in sub-section (1) has been made before the expiry of the said period." 25. The word "caveat" had not been defined under the Code and the same is a Latin derivative. Caveat is a caution or a precautionary measure or warning given by the caveator to the Court not to take any action or to grant any relief to the petitioner without giving notice to the caveator and without offering opportunity of hearing to the caveator. In Nirmal Chandra v. Girindra narayan 2008 (6) ALD (NOC 21) it was observed that the term "caveat" is very common in testamentary proceedings and a caveat is a caution or warning giving notice to the Court not to issue any grant or take any step without notice being given to the party lodging the caveat and it is a precautionary measure taken against the grant of probate or letters of administration, as the case may be, by the person lodging caveat. The court also further observed that unlike the Indian Succession Act no form of a caveat has been prescribed by the said amendment Act while it introduced Section 148 A of the code and in the absence of such a form, it maybe in the shape of a petition in which the caveator has to specify the nature of the application which is expected to be made or has been made and also his right to appear before the Court on the hearing of such an application and under sub- section (2) of Section 148-A, the caveator has also to serve a notice of thecaveat on the person by whom the application has been, or is expected to be,made under sub-section (1) and it follows, therefore, that in the caveat the name of the person who is expected to file or has filed the application, the nature of the application and the right under which the person lodging the caveat claims to appear before the Court have to be stated. 26. In Seethaiah v. Government of A.P. 2008 (6) ALD (NOC 21) it was held that the intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 148-A is to enable the caveator to be heard before any orders are passed. It cannot be set at naught by the applicant under the plea that the caveator had not approached him for furnishing of application or copies of documents. 27. In Siddalingappa v. Veeranna AIR 1981 Karn 242 (Equivalent to (1981) 2 Karn LJ 323 it was held that once a caveat is lodged, the Court would be required to serve a notice of the application for an interim order on the caveator before such order is made. Once a caveat is filed, it is a condition precedent for passing an interim order to serve a notice of the application on the caveator who is going to be affected by such order. The Court would not be absolved from serving a notice of the application on the caveator on the ground that he refused to receive it when he was sought to be served with it by the applicant. 28. In Babubhai Nagindas v. State (1983) 24 (1) Guj 784), it was held that when a caveat is filed, the caveator is entitled to be heard before any interim relief is granted. 28. In Babubhai Nagindas v. State (1983) 24 (1) Guj 784), it was held that when a caveat is filed, the caveator is entitled to be heard before any interim relief is granted. But the caveator should remain present when the hearing of the application for interim relief takes place. If the caveator does not remain present at the time of hearing of application, and the Court finds that there is a prima facie case in favour of the applicant, ad interim relief can be granted to the applicant, so as to avoid an irreversible situation. The caveator can be heard immediately thereafter. 29. On a careful reading of the grounds raised in the present civil miscellaneous appeals, it is no doubt true that the ground of bar of jurisdiction of civil court and the maintainability of these suits in civil court had not been specifically raised. These submissions were made while arguing these civil miscellaneous appeals. 30. As already observed supra, it is also true that the Temple instead of approaching this Court could have moved applications praying for vacation of those orders. However, it is pertinent to note that these civil miscellaneous appeals are maintainable as against such orders also under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code. It is also true that during vacation the learned vacation judges in view of the urgency would be entertaining certain matters and also would be passing certain interim orders. It may be that in certain cases parties may be conscious of lodging separate caveats even on the file of the learned vacation judges. However, to my mind it appears that when before the concerned court,the competent regular court, a caveat already had been lodged and such caveat had not become inoperative by lapse of time and when vacation intervenes in between, since the leaned Vacation Judge would be entertaining a suit or a proceeding which otherwise should have been instituted or filed before such court, especially in a case where lodging of the caveat had been within the knowledge of the petitioner-plaintiff, such petitioner-plaintiff is duty bound to serve notice on the opposite party before moving such matter even before the learned Vacation Judge, if not serious prejudice would be caused to such parties though such parties had been careful and cautious by lodging the caveats before the appropriate competent courts. The learned vacation judges of the districts are expected to take care in this regard and see whether any caveat relating to a particular matter is pending or in force at the relevant point of time and it would be appropriate that the learned Vacation Judge also may have to verify the same. It is no doubt the duty of the Registry to verify and put up appropriate note. Appropriate steps to be taken in this regard and lapses in this direction may have to be avoided by the learned vacation judges. This is only the possible view that can be taken in the light of the provisions of the A.P. Civil Courts Act and also in the light of the relevant provisions of the Code as well. 31. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that respondents- plaintiffs in these civil miscellaneous appeals are not justified in obtaining ex parte interim injunction orders as against the Temple without putting the Temple on notice despite the fact that caveats had been duly lodged before the learned Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama, and the said caveats had been in force atthe relevant point of time. 32. Point No.2:- In the light of the same, the appellants are bound to succeed and accordingly the orders impugned in these civil miscellaneous appeals are hereby set aside, but however, in the light of the grounds raised in the present civil miscellaneous appeals, these matters are remitted to the learned Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama, to give opportunity to both the parties to advance submissions and decide these applications afresh in accordance with law. 33. Accordingly, the civil miscellaneous appeals are hereby allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.