Judgment :- 1. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 24.01.2008 passed in W.P.No.13559/2003. The facts of the case in the nutshell is that the appellant was working as In-charge Accountant in the 4th respondent-bank at Gulbarga from the month of February 2000 to May 2001; that a show cause notice was issued to him on 30.05.2001 alleging certain misconduct (misappropriation of funds), for which he submitted his reply on 11.06.2001 denying the charges levelled against him and thereafter, disciplinary enquiry proceedings were initiated and based on the report of the enquiry officer, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order on 29.10.2002 imposing major penalty of compulsory retirement of appellant from the service. Challenging the said order, the appellant preferred W.P.No.13559/2003 and the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the charges are grave in nature, involving financial misappropriation in violation of the regulations and guidelines and that the penalty imposed on the appellant is in accordance with law. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant has preferred the present writ appeal. 2. We have heard Sri. Huleppa Heroor, learned counsel who has been appointed as counsel to represent the appellant through High Court Legal Services Committee and Sri.K.A. Kalburgi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1. The respondents-2, 3 & 4 remained un-represented despite service of notice. 3. The principal contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondents-authorities have not followed the mandatory procedures as contemplated under the Karnataka State Co-operative Societies Act and Regulation-58 of Regulations regarding – Appointment, transfers, disciplinary action and other service conditions of the employees of PCA and RD Banks in Karnataka which contemplates an appointment of an officer not below the rank of the District Manager. On the contrary, they appointed a retired officer as Enquiry Officer who is below the rank of District Manager. Further, a letter written to the member secretary of the Common Cadre Committee by the appellant dated 18.09.2001 requesting not to appoint one Sri. On the contrary, they appointed a retired officer as Enquiry Officer who is below the rank of District Manager. Further, a letter written to the member secretary of the Common Cadre Committee by the appellant dated 18.09.2001 requesting not to appoint one Sri. B.M. Jagannath as Presenting Officer to present the case on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority to prove the act of misconduct alleged against him has not been considered; that the charge sheet, making 25 allegations were very vague and that the material particulars, the substance of the imputations of the misconduct or misbehavior into definite and distinct articles of charge are not made and list of witnesses in support of the charges are also not furnished to the appellant and therefore, the enquiry proceedings are vitiated under the Regulations and the Disciplinary Authority did not prove the case of misconduct before the enquiry officer by producing documentary evidence which is in the custody of the 4th respondent bank in support of the finding of the enquiry officer in holding that the appellant is guilty of misconduct; that the respondents authorities have not at all furnished the copy of the enquiry report to enable the delinquent employee to submit his explanation to each one of the charges and therefore, the enquiry conducted against the appellant is in contravention of Section-128-A of the Act and Regulation-58 of the Service Regulations and in violation of the principles of natural justice, as the enquiry officer has suo-moto recorded that the appellant herein has admitted the charges which is contrary to the explanation offered by him and therefore, the proceedings are incorrectly recorded and the findings recorded on the basis of the incorrect proceedings is not based on the legal evidence and hence, the findings of the Enquiry Officer and subsequent order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, imposing major penalty on the employee are perverse in law. He further submits that the enquiry conducted by the respondents and consequential order of penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority, compulsorily retiring the appellant is not only against the mandatory provisions of the Service Regulations but also the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions and prays for setting aside the order of penalty imposed on the appellant. 4. Per contra, Sri. 4. Per contra, Sri. K.A. Kalburgi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 argued in support of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the learned Single Judge and prays for dismissal of the writ appeal. 5. Having regard to the legal contentions urged by the respective counsel, the points that would arise for our consideration are:- i) Whether the enquiry conducted against the appellant by respondents authorities is strictly in accordance with the service regulations? ii) Whether the Disciplinary Authority has committed an error in not following the mandatory requirements of the Regulation-58 of the Service Regulations? iii) Whether the enquiry held against the appellant and resultant penalty imposed upon him, compulsorily retiring the appellant from service is against the principles of natural justice? iv) Whether the learned Single Judge justified in dismissing the writ petition and consequently, affirming the findings of the Disciplinary Authority in the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant from his service ? 6. At the outset, it is just and necessary to note that the respondent bank is a cooperative bank governed by the provisions of the Karnataka State Co-operative Societies Act 1959 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) and the Regulations Regarding Appointment, Transfers, Disciplinary Action and other Service Conditions of the Employees of PCA & RD Banks in Karnataka (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation’ for short). 7. With the assistance of the learned counsel on both the sides, we have carefully gone through the documents which are made available to us namely, the show cause notice dated 30.05.2001 (Annexure-A), explanation offered by the appellant dated 11.06.2001 (Annexure – B), Proceedings of the enquiry officer (Annexure-D & E) and the order dated 25.02.2003 passed by the Appellate Authority vide Annexure-F, affirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, compulsorily retiring the appellant from his service and the letter dated 18.09.2001 written by the appellant to the Secretary of the Common Cadre Committee requesting him not to appoint one Sri, B. M. Jagannath as presenting Officer in the enquiry to present the case of the Disciplinary Authority, with a view to find out as to whether the order of compulsorily retiring the service of the appellant was preceded by valid enquiry in terms of the Regulation-58 and in compliance with the principles of natural justice. 8. 8. To consider and answer the above points, it is just and necessary for us to extract Regulation 58 and Sub Regulations (5), (7), (9) 10 (ii) & (iii) & Sub Regulation 14 of the Regulations which reads thus: “58 Procedure for imposing major penalties: 1. Wherever the disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for enquiring into the truth of any imputations of misconduct or misbehavior against any employee, it may itself enquire into or appoint any officer working in the Secretariat of the committee or any officer of the Federal Society not below the rank of District Manager or any other person. 2. Where it is proposed to hold an enquiry against an employee, the Member Secretary shall draw up or cause to be draw up. “5. The Disciplinary Authority shall, where it is not the inquiring Authority, forward to inquiry Authority. i) A copy of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior. ii) A copy of the written statement of defence, if any submitted by an employee; iii) A copy of the statements of witnesses, if any, referred to in sub-rule (3); iv) evidence proving the delivery of the documents referred to in sub-rule (iii) to the employee; and v) a copy of the order appointing the “presenting officer”. 7. An employee may take the assistance of any other employee to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority is a legal practitioner, or the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, to permits. 9. The inquiring Authority shall return a finding of guilt in respect of those articles of charge to which an employee pleads guilty. 10. xxxxxxx an employee may for the purpose of preparing his defence. ii) Submit a list of witnesses to be examined on his behalf; iii) apply orally or in writing to inspect and take extracts of the statements, if any, of witnesses mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule(3) and the inquiring Authority shall permit him to take such extracts as early as possible and in any case not later than three days before the commencement of the examination of the witness on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. 14. 14. If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority, the inquiring Authority may, in its discretion, allow the presenting officer to produce evidence not included in the list given to the employee or may itself call for new evidence or recall and re-examine any witness and in such case the employee shall be entitled to have, if he demands it, a copy of the list of further evidence proposed to be produced and an adjournment of the enquiry for three clear days before the production of such new evidence, exclusive of the day of adjournment and the day to which the enquiry is adjourned. The inquiring Authority shall give an employee an opportunity of inspecting such documents before they are taken on the record. The inquiring Authority may also allow the employee to produce new evidence if it is of the opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interests of justice.” 9. On careful perusal of the Regulations particularly, Regulation 58 Sub-regulations 5, 7, 9, 10 clauses (ii) & (iii) & 14 of the `Regulations’, prima facie we find that the Disciplinary Authority has not at all issued the list containing the articles of charges against the appellant/employee by furnishing the material particulars and the list of witnesses and the list of documents on which it places reliance in support of the allegations and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior made against the Appellant. Further, an Enquiry Officer appointed is a retired Assistant Director of Audit, department of co-operative societies, which is in contravention of the procedure prescribed in Regulation 58(1) which provides to appoint any officer working in the Secretariat of the Committee or any office working in the Secretariat not below the rank of District manager or any other person and also appointed one Mr. Jagannath as the Presenting Officer on behalf of disciplinary authority before the enquiry officer though the appellant has objected for his appointment as the Presenting Officer by writing letter dated 18.9.2001 and not given opportunity to engage either a co-employee or the officer of the appellant which is in violation of sub-regulation 7 and the enquiring authority has not submitted finding of guilt in respect of articles of charges as required under sub-regulations. The Disciplinary Authority has not permitted appellant to inspect the documents on which the reliance is placed to prove the charges against the appellant as required under sub-regulation 10 clause (ii) and also not permitted to inspect the documents or take out the extracts of the statement of documents mentioned in the list as provided under clause (iii) of sub-regulation 10 and not permitted to cross examine the management witnesses and not permitted to adduce defence evidence by examining witnesses as required under sub-regulation 15 and the enquiring officer has not questioned the employee on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the appellant to explain the circumstances appear against him and further not permitted him to file written brief as required under sub-regulation 18 and the enquiry report is not in conformity with the sub-clauses (a) to (d) of clause (i) of sub-regulation 20 of Regulation 58 and the report of enquiry officer along with second show-cause notice is not furnished to the appellant. Hence, the same is in contravention of statutory rules which are required to be strictly followed by the disciplinary authority and the enquiry officer. 10. On perusal of the report of the enquiry officer, produced as Annexure-D, it is clear that he has recorded the finding of fact on the alleged charges that the appellant has admitted the charges levelled against him, which procedure is un-known to conduct of the Disciplinary Proceedings against the appellant. Enquiry officer should conduct enquiry in a fair and impartial manner, particularly when the appellant has denied the charges and therefore the Disciplinary Authority was required to prove the charges by adducing positive and substantive evidence on record. The recording of the enquiry proceedings prima facie incorrect for the reason that the appellant himself has stated that his explanation to the show cause notice as per Annexure-B, he denied the charges levelled against him. As such, it is understandable as to how the Enquiry Officer has reported to the Disciplinary Authority that the appellant has admitted the charges levelled against him. As such, it is understandable as to how the Enquiry Officer has reported to the Disciplinary Authority that the appellant has admitted the charges levelled against him. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the Disciplinary Authority had not at all complied with any one of the above statutory Rules and Regulations in conducting a fair and proper enquiry, which is mandatory `in conducting the enquiry against the appellant herein in law to prove the charges of misconduct alleged against him. Without examining the material evidence on record on behalf of the appellant by the Enquiry Officer, it could not have been held by him that the material evidence produced by the presenting officer before him the Disciplinary Authority should not have accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and held that charges made against the appellant are not proved. For the foregoing reasons, we have to hold that no fair and reasonable opportunity is afforded to the appellant by the enquiry office to adduce evidence on his behalf to prove that he is innocent of the charges levelled against him and that has not committed acts of misconduct as alleged against him therefore the same is in contravention of Constitution Bench Judgment of Supreme Court in case of Sukhdev Singh & Others vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and another ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ), wherein the Apex Court after referring to Judgment of the US Supreme Court in the case of Vitarelli v. Seaton ((1959) 359 US 535 at pp 546547) which is extracted at paragraph-122 of the said Judgment reads thus: “An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged… Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword.” (Emphasis laid by this Court) Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the entire enquiry proceedings from the stage of issuance of the Articles of charges till the order of compulsory retirement order passed are vitiated on account of non-compliance of the mandatory procedures contemplated under Regulation-58 and also in violation of principles of natural justice and consequently, the entire enquiry proceedings and the impugned order of compulsory retirement of the appellant also liable to be quashed as the same are vitiated both on facts and in law. 11. Recently, in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank ( (2009)2 SCC 570 ) wherein Apex court placed emphasis on principle of natural justice and held as follows; “23. Xxxxxxxxxxx The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.” 12. Further, in the case of Union of India –vs-Mohd. Ramzan Khan ( AIR 1991 SC 471 ) the Apex Court, while considering the same question held that “Disciplinary enquiry is quasi-judicial in nature. There is a charge and a denial followed by an enquiry at which evidence is led and assessment if the material before conclusion is reached. These facets do make the matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. With the Forty Second Amendment, the delinquent officer is not associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. These facets do make the matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. With the Forty Second Amendment, the delinquent officer is not associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. In case his conclusions are kept away from the delinquent officer and the Inquiry Officers submits his conclusions with or without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such material is used against him by disciplinary authority. The report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice would be affected. The concept of natural justice has existed from many centuries and it has crystallised into two rules; that no man should be judge in his own cause; and that no man should suffer without first being given a fair hearing. They (the Courts) have been developing and extending the principles of natural justice so as to build up a kind of code of fair administrative procedure to be obeyed by authorities of all kinds. They have done this once again, by assuming that parliament always intends powers to be exercised fairly”. 13. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India ( (2008) 3 SCC 484 ), wherein it was held at paragraph 17 which reads as follows: “The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference of facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. 14. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. ( (2006) 4 SCC 713 ), wherein Apex Court after referring to the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. Inference of facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. 14. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. ( (2006) 4 SCC 713 ), wherein Apex Court after referring to the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) held that: .“If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conduct the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court’s sense of fair play the superior court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court of tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice.” 15. In Union of India v. Prakash Kumar Tandon ( (2009) 2 SCC 541 ), wherein Supreme Court at para 18 held as follows: .“18. In S.L.Kapoor v. Jagmohan ( (1980) 4 SCC 379 ) this Court has held that noncompliance with the principles of natural justice itself causes prejudice. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said principle has since been watered down but in a situation of this nature, we are of the opinion that the concurrent findings of the Tribunal, as also the High Court cannot be said to be unreasonable or suffering from any legal infirmity warranting interference”. 16. Further, the Apex Court, in the case of Babu Verghese –vs-Bar Council of Kerala ( AIR 1999 SC 1281 ) laid down the following law at paras 31 & 32. “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of going a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of going a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor –vs-Taylor (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426 which was followed by Lord Riche in Nazir Ahmad –vs-King Emperor, 63 Ind. App. 372: AIR 1936 PC 253 who stated as under: Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh -vs-State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1954 SCR 1098 : AIR 1954 SC 322 and again in Deep Chand –vs-State of Rajasthan (1962) 1 SCR 662 : AIR 1961 SC 1527 . These cases were considered by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh –vs-Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 SCWR 57 and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad’s case (supra) was again upheld. The rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by Courts and has also been recognized as a salutary principle of administrative law”. 17. In view of the discussions made above, we answer the points Nos.(i), (ii) and (iii) against the respondents. Thus it takes us to the fourth point as to whether the learned Single Judge justified in affirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, imposing major penalty of compulsorily retiring the appellant from service? 18. The Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, in the case of Managing Director, ECIL –vs-B. Karunakar ( AIR 1994 SC 1074 ), while examining the Articles-309 and 311 of the Constitution of India and while answering question Nos. (i) to (vii) in the said case has held in favour of employee by laying down the law, which relevant para reads as under: “xxxx If the Inquiry Officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the Disciplinary Authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the Inquiry Officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusion. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural jusrtice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the Inquiry Officer’s findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it. (Emphasis supplied by the Court) Xxx It is only if the Courts/Tribunals find that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Courts/Tribunals sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management too proceed with the enquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and not more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.” 19. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and not more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.” 19. The learned Single Judge failed to consider the above narrated procedural irregularities and illegalities committed by the disciplinary Authority and enquiry officer while conducting the inquiry as contemplated under Regulation-58 in proper perspective and failed to examine the aforesaid legal position and thereby he has erroneously recorded his findings in paragraph-5 of the impugned order that the report of the enquiry officer discloses that the “petitioner has not made any request before the enquiry officer to lead evidence and to produce documents, no other evidence is placed on record to show that petitioner offered to examine certain witnesses on his side and produced certain documents and that the same is not allowed by the enquiry officer.” Further, the learned Single Judge without considering the important aspects narrated above, has wrongly come to the conclusion at para 7 that the charges levelled against the appellant are grave in nature involving financial misappropriation and the penalty levied by the disciplinary authority is in accordance with law. Since the learned Single Judge has not examined the case of the appellant with reference to the grounds urged in the writ petition and also not applying his mind to the facts of the case and correctness of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer to find out as to whether the charges levelled against the appellant was proved with reference to the positive and legal evidence on record and therefore, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge is erred in holding that the penalty levied by the disciplinary authority is in accordance with law. 20. On appreciation of material on record with reference to the Regulation-58 and the law laid down by the Apex Court in its decisions cited supra, the enquiry conducted by the disciplinary Authority is vitiated in law. 20. On appreciation of material on record with reference to the Regulation-58 and the law laid down by the Apex Court in its decisions cited supra, the enquiry conducted by the disciplinary Authority is vitiated in law. Further we find that there is nothing on record to show that the inquiry report is furnished to the appellant herein before passing the impugned order of compulsory retirement by issuing second show cause notice, which is mandatory in law, as held by the Constitution Bench Decision of the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL vs. B. Karunakar (Ibid) referred supra and therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge confirming the order of Disciplinary Authority for compulsory retirement of the appellant from his service is honest in the eye of law and consequently, the same is liable to be set aside. As we have already held on point No. (ii) that the order of compulsorily retiring the appellant is not preceded by legal and valid inquiry as contemplated under Regulation-58 of the Service Regulations, therefore the order compulsorily retiring the appellant is also bad in law for noncompliance of the mandatory procedure on the part of the Inquiry Officer in not calling upon the employee to answer each one of the charges and therefore, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is also liable to be set aside as held by Apex Court in S.N. Chandrashekar v. State of Karnataka ( (2006) 3 SCC 208 ) while referring to the Hindustan Petroleum (Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627 ) case as follows. “35. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., v. Darius Shapur Chennai, this Court referring to Cholan Roadways Ltd., v. G. Thirugnanasambandam held: (SCC p.637, para 14). `14. Even a judicial review on facts in certain situations may be available. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. V. G. Thirugnanasambandam this Court observed: (SCC p.253, paras 34-35) “34. …. It is now well settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact. A wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. V. G. Thirugnanasambandam this Court observed: (SCC p.253, paras 34-35) “34. …. It is now well settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact. A wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer. In this case, furthermore, the misdirection in law committed by the Industrial Tribunal was apparent insofar as it did not apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur which was relevant for the purpose of this case and, thus, failed to take into consideration a relevant fact not germane for determining the issue, namely, that the passenger of the bus were mandatorily required to be examined. The Industrial Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a domestic enquiry, which is `preponderance of probability’ and applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review was, thus, clearly made out. 35. Errors of fact can also be a subject-matter of judicial review. Reference in this connection may also be made to an interesting article by Paul P. Craig, Q.C. tiled `Judicial Review, Appeal and Factual Error’ published in 2004 Public Law, p.788.” 21. As per Constitution Bench Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad (supra note 11) referred supra, non furnishing of the report along with second show-cause notice is in violation of decision of Apex Court, which is binding upon the disciplinary authority under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. On this ground itself the order of compulsory retirement is liable to be quashed. 22. We have to order for reinstatement of the Appellant with full backwages for the reason that disciplinary authority in blatant violation of regulations and rules and the decisions of Supreme Court and made the appellant and his family members to suffer as he could not be able to give education, livelihood and basic needs to his children for a period of 7 years, which must have adverse effect on the entire family of the appellant as held in celebrated case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India (AIR (1982) 1 SCC 271 ), wherein it was held at relevant portion of paragraph 17, which reads as follows: “17. xxxxxxxx Article 21 as a fundamental right in order to afford protection to the life and liberty of the people against all executive powers and therefore the Supremacy of the legislature cannot be replaced by making the executive supreme by allowing it to promulgate ordinances which have the effect of depriving the people of their life liberty. The extent of protection afforded to the right conferred by Article 21 consists, according to counsel, in the obligation imposed upon a democratic legislature to devise a fair, just and reasonable procedure for attenuating the liberties of the people.” Further for the reasons stated supra, the entire enquiry proceedings from the stage of issuing the Articles of charges till the order of compulsory retirement passed is vitiated in law and therefore the same is liable to be quashed and therefore we have to direct common cadre Authority and other respondents to pay full back wages to the Appellants from the date of order till his reinstatement. Therefore, we feel that it is a fit case for directing the respondents herein i.e. Common Cadre Authority and employer Bank to pay the back wages as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi (supra note 3) referred supra, wherein it was held that the reinstatement of a peon with full back wages is justified when he is dismissed from service without proper enquiry as required under the Conduct & Discipline Rules. 23. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. Hence, we pass the following order: O R D E R .(i) The writ appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 24.01.2008 passed by the learned Single Jude in W.P. No. 13559/2003 is set aside. The writ petition is allowed. The order dated 29.10.2002 bearing No. CCC/Sisthu /Gu /Vi/27/01-02 and Dated 25.02.2003 bearing No. CCC/Sisthu/Gulbarga/ Dandane/ Himbara/5/02-03 passed by the Respondent No.1 produced as Annexure-E & F respectively to the writ petition are quashed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the appellant into service with full back wages with interest at 6% per annum and all other consequential benefits within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order. However, liberty is given to the Disciplinary Authority to redo the inquiry denovo strictly in accordance with the provisions of Service Rules Regulation-58 of the Regulations, if they are so advised. However, liberty is given to the Disciplinary Authority to redo the inquiry denovo strictly in accordance with the provisions of Service Rules Regulation-58 of the Regulations, if they are so advised. .(ii) The fee of Sri Huleppa Heroor is fixed at Rs.2,500/-payable by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Circuit Bench, Gulbarga.