Judgment:- ORAL JUDGMENT: (S.A. BOBDE, J.) 1} The petitioner has challenged the proceedings of a Summary Court Martial and the consequent punishment of rigorous imprisonment for six months and dismissal from service imposed upon him under the provisions of the Army Act. 2} The petitioner was a Gunner at 20SATA Regiment Unit. Proceedings for misconduct were initiated against him and he was charged under Sections 38(1), 40(b) & 40(a) of the Army Act for the following offences: “I} Army Act : Section 38(1) : Attempting to desert the service: in that he, at field when on active service, at about 1915h, on 19 Jun 92, attempted to quit the lines, with the intention to desert the service, II} Second Charge : Army Act : Section 40(b) Using threatening language to his superior officer : in that he, at about 1930h, at the place and date aforesaid, when ordered by JC146299L Subedar (Operator) Chander Ram, his Senior JCO, to return to Unit lines, said to the said JC146299L Subedar (Operator) Chander Ram “Sale, tujhe main nahin chodunga, tujhe main jaan se maar doonga”, or words to that effect, III} Third charge : Army Act : Section 40(a) Assaulting his superior officer : in that he, at about 1935, at the place and date aforesaid when ordered by JC146299L Subedar (Operator) Chander Ram, his Senior JCO to return to Unit lines rushed towards him to strike him but was prevented from so doing by No. 13852933L Havildar (Driver) AK Singh, IV} Fourth charge : Army Act : Section 40(a) using criminal force to his superior officer : in that he, when on active service, at about 1725h on 21 Jun 92, struck a punch on the face of JC146299L Subedar (Operator) Chander Ram, his Senior JCO, during the proceedings of march up to his Officiating Battery Commander, Captain Lalit Belwal.” He was earlier punished for 7 days rigorous imprisonment and fined under the Army Act for acts of military indiscipline. In the present chargesheet, he has been charged inter alia with attempt to desert service when on active service; apart from using threatening language against his senior JCO, he has also been charged for rushing to strike him, as above. 3} A summary Court Martial was constituted. A chargesheet was issued to the petitioner by the Commanding Officer at 20SATA Regiment at Jagaram Camp. 3} A summary Court Martial was constituted. A chargesheet was issued to the petitioner by the Commanding Officer at 20SATA Regiment at Jagaram Camp. The petitioner was tried at the Summary Court Martial on the field by the Commanding Officer of the 20SATA Regiment. The Court Martial found the petitioner guilty as charged and convicted him under Sections 38(1), 40(b) & 40(a) of the Army Act. He was punished (a) to suffer six months’ rigorous imprisonment in Civil Prison and (b) to be dismissed from service. 4} There is no dispute before us that the offence was committed, the chargesheet was served and the petitioner was tried and convicted near Jagaram Camp about 80 kms. from Jalandhar in the State of Punjab. There is also no dispute that the petitioner was imprisoned in a jail at Ludhiana also in the State of Punjab. 5} After the petitioner was released from jail, he came to Yavatmal, in the State of Maharashtra where he received a certificate to the effect that he was dismissed from his services as a result of the above Court Martial. He has challenged the proceedings of the Court Martial and the punishment by way of this Writ Petition. 6} At the outset, Shri R.S. Sundaram, the learned Counsel for the respondents, has raised a preliminary objection to the tenability of the petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. According to the learned Counsel, no part of the cause of action, i.e. the offence, the trial, the punishment and the imprisonment imposed on the petitioner has taken place within the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, no cause of action can be said to have arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. 7} Shri D.N. Mathur, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the petitioner received a discharge certificate in the town of Yavatmal and, therefore, a part of the cause of action, however, small a fraction it might be, has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. 7} Shri D.N. Mathur, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the petitioner received a discharge certificate in the town of Yavatmal and, therefore, a part of the cause of action, however, small a fraction it might be, has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. 8} Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India reads as follows: “Article 226(2): The power conferred by cl.(1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” This Article provides that the power conferred upon the High Court by Article 226 may be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of a High Court can be exercised even if part of the cause of action or a small fraction thereof has arisen within the jurisdiction of that High Court (vide M/s. Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and another reported in AIR 2004 S.C. 2321 ). It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether any part of the cause of action, even a small fraction thereof, has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. 9} The petitioner committed the offence on the field while posted at Jagaram Camp near Jalandhar in the State of Punjab. The Court Martial was constituted on the field. He was tried, convicted and punished by that Court Martial. He was dismissed from services at Jagaram camp. Then he underwent imprisonment in prison at Ludhiana for a period of six months. This completes the cause of action. After his release, he came to Yavatmal in the State of Maharashtra where he received a discharge certificate. The discharge certificate which is on record gives personal details of the petitioner, such as date of birth, character, abilities, medals and other details, such as whether the petitioner is fit for future employment. It also certifies the mode of termination of his services. The discharge certificate which is on record gives personal details of the petitioner, such as date of birth, character, abilities, medals and other details, such as whether the petitioner is fit for future employment. It also certifies the mode of termination of his services. Having regard to the contents of his discharge certificate, it cannot be said that any part of the cause of action for the present petition arose at Yavatmal where the petitioner received the discharge certificate by post. The discharge certificate or its contents are not in issue in this petition and the certificate is not integrally connected to the cause of action for this petition, namely, the offence, the trial and the punishment. We are, therefore, of the view that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. 10} Shri Mathur, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that this Court may entertain this petition since the petitioner resides within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. There is no merit in this submission since it is settled law that the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India depends not on the residence or location of the person affected by the order but of the person or authority passing the order and the place where the order has the effect, but on whether the cause of action wholly or in part has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court, even if it be a small part of the cause of action. 11} The Supreme Court in M/s. Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and another reported in AIR 2004 S.C. 2321 ), however, observed as follows: FORUM CONVENIENS: “30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. (See Bhagat Singh Bagga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhany, AIR 1941 Cal. 670, Mandal Jalal v. Madanlal, (1945) 49 CWN 357; Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. M/s. Jharia Talkies and Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (1997) CWN 122; S.S. Jain and Co. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. (See Bhagat Singh Bagga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhany, AIR 1941 Cal. 670, Mandal Jalal v. Madanlal, (1945) 49 CWN 357; Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. M/s. Jharia Talkies and Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (1997) CWN 122; S.S. Jain and Co. and another v. Union of India and others (1994) CHN 445; M/s. New Horizon Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1994 Delhi 126.” In the circumstances of this case, we are of the view that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and the petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to any relief from this Court. 12} The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule stands discharged. There will be no order as to costs.