Aggrieved by the judgment dated 2. 8. 1999 of the Honble Single Judge, in Writ Petition No. 16646 of 1993, the respondent-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the "appellant") has preferred this intra Court appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. 2. We have heard Sri P. S. Baghel, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri R. B. Singhal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred as the petitioner) and the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 5. 3. The brief relevant facts, as emerged from the record are that the petitioner was appointed as a teacher in Ram Pyari Arya Kanya College, Chandausi, Moradabad (hereinafter referred to as the college), in the year 1976. For acts/omission constituting misconduct, the management of the College imposed punishment of stoppage of two increments on 3. 8. 1981 upon the petitioner with the approval of Regional Inspectress of Schools and the said order attained finality since it was not challenged by the petitioner. She made a complaint to the Principal on 5. 10. 1991 that four students have obtained fictitious pass certificates of Class XI examination from the College though they were not students of the College. She alleged that the said forgery was committed with connivance of teaching and non-teaching staff of the College. Out of the four students one Km. Chhabi, was daughter of Smt. Savita Rastogi, a teacher working in the College. It is further alleged that Smt. Savita annoyed with that complaint, quarrelled with the petitioner on 10. 10. 1991 in the College premises. The incident was so ugly that in full public view and in presence of teaching and non-teaching staff of the College, clothes of Smt. Savita Rastogi were torn. A FIR was lodged by the petitioner against Smt. Savita Rastogi on 10. 10. 1991. The Management (appellant) by resolution dated 14. 10. 1991 suspended both the teachers and appointed one Sri D. C. Agarwal as Inquiry officer. A charge sheet was issued on 8. 11. 1991. It was replied by the petitioner by letter dated 28. 11. 1991. The Inquiry officer issued notice on 6. 12. 1991 fixing 10. 12. 1991 for oral enquiry, but the petitioner did not participate and instead vide letter dated 28. 11. 1991 she requested for supply of copies of the statements of the witnesses. 11. 1991. It was replied by the petitioner by letter dated 28. 11. 1991. The Inquiry officer issued notice on 6. 12. 1991 fixing 10. 12. 1991 for oral enquiry, but the petitioner did not participate and instead vide letter dated 28. 11. 1991 she requested for supply of copies of the statements of the witnesses. The Inquiry officer concluded inquiry and submitted report dated 16. 12. 1991 (Annexure-l to the Supplementary Rejoinder Affidavit) holding charges proved. The Committee of Management issued notice dated 21. 12. 1991 directing petitioner to appear before it on 24. 12. 1991 but she did not avail the said opportunity. Again, the Management issued notice dated 1. 1. 1992 fixing 4. 1. 1992. The said notice was received by the petitioner on 8. 1. 1992 and therefore she had no occasion to appear before the Management. The Management thereafter passed resolution on 25. 1. 1992 for imposing punishment of dismissal and sent copy thereof to U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission (hereinafter referred as the Commission) for its approval as required under Section 21 of the U. P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 (in short "1982 Act" ). The petitioner was issued notice by the Commission pursuant thereto she submitted reply and also appeared before the Commission on 4. 1. 1993 and gave her statement. The Commission granted approval vide order dated 21/24. 4. 1993. Assailing Commissions order dated 21/ 24. 4. 1993, the aforesaid writ petition was filed. 4. The petitioner mainly challenged the impugned order on the ground that the enquiry report was unreasoned, non-speaking, she was not supplied copies of relevant documents which were relied upon by the Management in the enquiry proceeding in support of the charges levelled against her, adequate opportunity of hearing was not afforded to her, the entire enquiry proceeding was in collusion between Smt. Savita Rastogi and the Manager of the institution and has been conducted in hot haste, the Commission did not give adequate opportunity inasmuch as the petitioner was required to appear on 4. 1. 1993 and the Management-respondents were heard on 30. 1. 1993, therefore, she had no opportunity to rebut the submissions advanced by the Management before the Commission, the order of the Commission is in violation of principles of natural justice and is also vitiated for the various other irregularity pointed out by the petitioner. 5. 1. 1993 and the Management-respondents were heard on 30. 1. 1993, therefore, she had no opportunity to rebut the submissions advanced by the Management before the Commission, the order of the Commission is in violation of principles of natural justice and is also vitiated for the various other irregularity pointed out by the petitioner. 5. The Management (appellant) which was arrayed as respondent No. 5 filed a detailed counter affidavit in the writ petition stating that the work and conduct of the petitioner throughout was highly unsatisfactory but with the hope that with the passage of time she may improve, the Management took a lenient view by administering only warnings for her acts and omission, and, even her increment was stopped, but ultimately the Management was compelled to pass resolution dismissing her from service. 6. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder affidavit wherein denial of opportunity of hearing is reiterated. In reply to the averments made" in paras 28 and 29 of the Counter affidavit, it is said that the petitioner has wrongly been dismissed from service. 7. After hearing the parties, the Honble Single Judge has allowed the writ petition mainly on the ground that the enquiry report is not speaking and therefore, the Management in accepting the same and the Commission in approving the same have erred in law. The Honble Single Judge has directed to reinstate the petitioner in service and to pay entire arrears of salary after deducting the amount already paid to her within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of the order before the respondents. 8. It is contended by Sri Baghel that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity of hearing from time to time, but she failed to avail the same, therefore, it cannot be said that the proceedings were ex parte and the petitioner was denied adequate opportunity of hearing. It is also said that pursuant to the order of approval conveyed by the Commission, the Management issued a formal order of dismissal dated 1. 5. 1993 which was sent to the petitioner by post (Registered A. D.) on 1. 5. 1993 as well as personally on 11. 5. 1993 and also published in Daily Newspaper "aaj"on 3. 5. 1993. 9. 5. 1993 which was sent to the petitioner by post (Registered A. D.) on 1. 5. 1993 as well as personally on 11. 5. 1993 and also published in Daily Newspaper "aaj"on 3. 5. 1993. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that repeated opportunity afforded to the petitioner were not availed by her and therefore it was not open to her to assail the proceedings on the ground of denial of adequate opportunity. Further he submitted that the inquiry officer recorded statement of 13 witnesses who all supported various charges levelled against the petitioner. Thereafter on the basis of material on record he submitted inquiry report holding charges proved. Instead of reproducing the entire charge-sheet and the statements deposed by the various witnesses, the inquiry officer on the analysis thereof has recorded his finding holding charges proved and it cannot be said that the inquiry report is non-speaking. The inquiry officer not being a judicial person is not expected to write a detailed and well discussed judgment. In judicial review, the Court is required to consider as to whether the inquiry report shows due application of mind on the part of inquiry officer and give sufficient indication of the allegations and evidence as also discussion thereof before holding the charge proved and this is there in the inquiry report bift the Honble single Judge has erred in law in observing otherwise. He further pointed out that the petitioner was allowed opportunity of defence even by the Management but she refused to avail the same. Even before the commission where she appeared and made her statement, it does appear that she did not give any explanation regarding the allegations contained in the charge-sheet but makes otherwise submissions as is apparent from a bare perusal of the order of the Commission. The findings recorded by the Commission regarding the explanation furnished by the petitioner before it have not been disputed by the petitioner and therefore the same has to be taken correct. That being so, it is evident that even before the Commission the petitioners entire endeavour was to malign the reputation and image of the college Management and the entire staff instead of giving explanation in her defence. That being so, it is evident that even before the Commission the petitioners entire endeavour was to malign the reputation and image of the college Management and the entire staff instead of giving explanation in her defence. He therefore contended that in the entirety of the facts and circumstances and considering the conduct of the petitioner, it was not a case where this Court would have interfered in exercise of equitable extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore the Honble Single Judge has erred in law in allowing the writ petition. 10. Sri R. B. Singhal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner however contended that not only the inquiry report submitted by the inquiry officer is not speaking but the inquiry proceeding is ex parte hence vitiated in law. Even before the Commission, the petitioner did not have any effective opportunity of defence inasmuch as it was incumbent upon the Commission to give opportunity to both the sides at the same time and the procedure followed by the Commission by hearing the parties on different dates is vitiated in law as held in Awadh Narain Tripathi v. U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission and others, 1995 (3) UPLBEC 1891 and Dharamveer Gupta v. U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission Allahabad and others, 2001 (1) LBESR 551 (All ). 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of this appeal as well as the writ petition. 12. It is not disputed that she i. e. the petitioner made a complaint on 5. 10. 1991 to the Principal, pursuant whereto a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Principal but she did not find any substance in the alleged complaint. On 10. 10. 1991 the petitioner quarrelled with Smt. Savita Rastogi, another teacher of the College, in a very ugly manner, tearing her blouse in full public view of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the College as well as the girl students. The clothes of Smt. Savita Rastogi were torn to such an extent that another teacher of the college had to provide her shawl to protect her privacy. The petitioner, thereafter left institution on the pretext that she was going to lodge a first information report, but returned after sometime with her husband Sri Prakash Chandra Jauhari who also beat Smt. Savita Rastogi with cane in the College premises. The petitioner, thereafter left institution on the pretext that she was going to lodge a first information report, but returned after sometime with her husband Sri Prakash Chandra Jauhari who also beat Smt. Savita Rastogi with cane in the College premises. The incident caused such a nuisance that the Management had to close down the institution for two days and the incident was widely publicized in media damaging reputation of the college as a result whereof several parents and guardians of students expressed their apprehension in respect to safety of the girl students and threatened to withdraw their wards from the College. Consequently, the Management suspended both the teachers and appointed Inquiry officer. A charge-sheet dated 3/8. 11. 1991 was issued to the petitioner containing six charges under the signature of the Inquiry officer. The petitioner submitted reply to the charge-sheet vide letter dated 28. 11. 1991 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) denying allegations that she and her husband beat Smt. Savita Rastogi and stated that she herself was beaten by Smt. Savita Rastogi. The Inquiry Officer issued notice on 6. 12. 1991 fixing 10. 12. 1991 for oral enquiry and required the petitioner to adduce evidence in her defence. She was also required to produce documents, if any, in her defence before the Inquiry officer. It was also mentioned in the letter dated 6. 12. 1991 that she would be entitled to examine witnesses to be produced on behalf of the Management in support of the charges and names of 15 witnesses who were likely to be examined, also mentioned in the said notice. It is claimed that the said notice was served and received by the petitioner on 7. 12. 1991 but she sent a letter dated 8. 12. 1991 stating that she had already objected against the Inquiry Officer in her reply that he is guided by the Manager of the College and would not conduct an impartial enquiry. She also made allegations against all the witnesses named and said that unless the statements of the said witnesses are made available to her she will not be in a position to cross-examine them. She also stated in the said reply that she should be allowed two assistants who shall appear before the Inquiry officer. She further said that after receiving reply to her objections, she may appear in the enquiry proceedings. She also stated in the said reply that she should be allowed two assistants who shall appear before the Inquiry officer. She further said that after receiving reply to her objections, she may appear in the enquiry proceedings. Ultimately the petitioner did not appear on 10. 12. 1991 though she was permitted assistants as requested by her. The Inquiry officer examined witnesses on 10. 12. 1991 and submitted his report dated 16. 12. 1991. Thereafter, the Manager of the College gave an opportunity to the petitioner to appear on 24. 12. 1991 which she did not avail. Again another opportunity was given to appear on 4. 1. 1992. She sent letter dated 26. 12. 1991 (Annexure-C. A. 4 to the Counter affidavit) stating that there is no justification to give any explanation to the Management since the enquiry has not been conducted in a fair manner. The Management thereafter fixed 14. 1. 1992 and sent a notice to the petitioner on 6. 1. 1992. The said notice sent by Special messenger, Smt. Chhedda lal, peon of the college who reported that the contents of the notice were read by the petitioner and she also kept the same with her but refused to sign on the carbon copy acknowledging its receipt. She also did not appear on 14. 1. 1992. Consequently the Management after considering the entire material on record resolved to impose punishment of dismissal and the said resolution was referred to the Commission for according its approval. The Commission after hearing the petitioner and Management passed order dated 2. 4. 1993 approved the resolution and communicated the same vide letter dated 21/24. 4. 1993. 13. The first question needs consideration is whether the Honble Single Judge was justified in setting aside the decision of the commission mainly on the ground that the inquiry report is non-speaking and vitiates the entire proceeding. 14. It is no doubt true that a disciplinary inquiry being quasi judicial proceeding has to be conducted consistent with the principles of natural justice and the inquiry officer has a duty to act judiciously. The report submitted by the inquiry officer must show application of mind and must contain reasons for his conclusion. Obviously, an inquiry officer is not expected to write its report like an order sheet or mere reproduction of charge and one line conclusion that the charge stands proved. The report submitted by the inquiry officer must show application of mind and must contain reasons for his conclusion. Obviously, an inquiry officer is not expected to write its report like an order sheet or mere reproduction of charge and one line conclusion that the charge stands proved. However we also cannot loose sight of the fact that an inquiry officer not being a judicial officer is not expected to write his report like a judgment discussing each and every aspect in great detail. The basic idea is that the report of the inquiry officer must show objectivity and any person who is supposed to act upon such a report must be in a position to understand the reasons as to "why inquiry officer has recorded a particular finding in his report. The report may be submitted in brief but must disclose reasons for his conclusions. In other words, it must disclose his application of mind. 15. In the case in hand, though the petitioner did not participate in oral proceedings and neither cross- examined witnesses produced by the Management in support of the charges nor produced any witness in her defence but the fact remains that 13 witnesses namely Kumari Kushal Kanta, Principal of the College, Smt. Mithlesh Kumari, Smt. Amrit Arora, Smt. Usha Devi, Smt. Savita Rastogi, Smt. Sushila Shastri, Smt. Ranjana Agarwal and Smt. Usha Agarwal, Teachers of the College, Sri Chhedi lal, Daftari, Sri Swaroop Ram Laboratory Boy, Sri Hari Singh, Head Clerk, Sri Sohanlal and Smt. Kalawati Peons of the College were examined before the inquiry officer. It is true, if there would have been evidence otherwise available on record, then the inquiry officer would have to weigh both the sets of evidence, has to discuss both sets of evidence and thereafter has to record his reasons as to why he has accepted one set of evidence and discarded the other. But where the evidence available on record is only in one set and nothing contrary thereto is available, the approach of the inquiry officer in writing the report would obviously be different. Each case therefore has to be considered in the light of the material available before the inquiry officer which is required to be considered by him for submission of his report. Each case therefore has to be considered in the light of the material available before the inquiry officer which is required to be considered by him for submission of his report. But in any case, the inquiry report must have some discussion about the evidence as also the manner in which he finds the charges proved. 16. From a perusal of the inquiry report it is evident that the inquiry officer has only quoted the charges and then has given conclusion that the same is proved. In one or two charges he has just given one line observation that the charge is proved. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be a reasoned and speaking report showing application of mind on the part of the inquiry officer. 17. The legal position as laid down by the Apex Court in Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and others, AIR 1985 SC 1121 and Special Appeal No. 515 of 1995, Dharamveer Gupta v. U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission Allahabad and others, relied upon by the Honble Single Judge in judgment under appeal is well accepted exposition of law and no exception can be taken thereof though the application of the said legal principle in each case has to be considered separately in the facts and circumstances of that case. In Anil Kumar (supra) two sets of evidences were available but without discussing the same, inquiry officer reproduced charge and held the same proved. This was rightly deprecated by the Apex Court holding that the inquiry officer cannot record finding on his ipse dixit without assigning a single reason as to why the evidence produced by the employee did not appeal to him or why he considered it non creditworthy and why Managements evidence appealed to him in preference to another. However, this shall not mitigate his obligation of discussion where only one set evidence is produced. 18. Here also, the reply of the petitioner was there which had to be considered. It is true that the petitioner did not participate in the oral proceeding before the inquiry officer but her reply to the charge-sheet denying all the charges was available and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to discuss the I matter at least to show that he has applied his mind to the Managements evidence and petitioners reply and thereafter has recorded his findings. This defect, in our view, is so serious that it goes to the root of the matter, inasmuch as in the absence of any valid and legal inquiry report neither the Management could have resolved to take a decision against the petitioner nor their could have any occasion to seek approval from the Commission. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the petitioner was given opportunity by the Commission when the papers were sent thereto for its approval as required under Section 21 of 1982 Act, that opportunity would cure the defect, if any, in the inquiry report. But we are not inclined to accept it for the reason that the requirement of inquiry report being speaking and reasoned one is a totally different thing at a different stage and cannot be militated by a subsequent stage proceeding. 20. A delinquent employee has a right to place his defence at every stage of the proceeding as and when it is permissible and provided in law (See Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 300 ). The opportunity provided by the Commission at the time of considering the matter for approval under Section 21 of 1982 Act would not ratify or cure the illegality committed during the course of inquiry particularly qua the inquiry report. If the inquiry report is wholly unreasoned and non speaking, the disciplinary authority when communicate the same to the delinquent employee, he would have no real opportunity to make his submission in the absence of any reasons and findings recorded by the inquiry officer and this opportunity would be illusory. Similarly, since the finding of the inquiry officer is not binding upon the disciplinary authority, in the absence of any reasons recorded by inquiry officer, the disciplinary authority will also lack sufficient material to examine the logic and form its own opinion independently and objectively in one or the other way. A non-speaking and unreasoned inquiry report is no report in the eyes of law. In the absence of a valid inquiry report we fail to understand as to how and in what circumstances the disciplinary authority can pass a resolution or take action thereupon. Similarly, when the papers are sent to the Commission, in the absence of reasons assigned by the inquiry officer, the Commission would also lack appropriate and relevant material to scrutinize the logic of the inquiry officer. Similarly, when the papers are sent to the Commission, in the absence of reasons assigned by the inquiry officer, the Commission would also lack appropriate and relevant material to scrutinize the logic of the inquiry officer. Therefore, something done at the subsequent stage in the matter of disciplinary proceeding in our view would not validate and rectify the earlier omission which has a substantial bearing on the matter at subsequent stage. 21. There is another glaring illegality in the entire proceeding. Admittedly, the inquiry officer issued its first notice/letter on 6. 12. 1991 fixing 10. 12. 1991 for oral inquiry. This notice was served upon the petitioner on 7. 12. 1991. The petitioner fails to appear on 10. 12. 1991. It is pointed that lengthy statements of 13 witnesses were recorded on that very date and the inquiry officer submitted his report on 16. 12. 1991. Admittedly after close of the evidence of the Management, no further opportunity was afforded to petitioner to produce her defence. As we have already observed, a delinquent employee has a right of defence at different stages of inquiry. Failure to appear or respond on one date does not mean that he can be precluded of the opportunity of defence on subsequent dates also. It is not the case of the appellants that after close of evidence of the Management any opportunity was granted to petitioner by informing her about any other date for producing her defence. The fact that inquiry was completed within less than 10 days, apparently and is a glaring example of extraordinary hot haste infringing the well accepted notion of reasonable opportunity of defence. The ex parte proceeding against the petitioner thus cannot be sustained. 22. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order of Honble Single Judge in so far as it has held inquiry proceedings bad in law and has set aside the order impugned in the writ petition. However, in our view the order of Honble Single Judge to the extent he has directed for reinstatement of petitioner alongwith benefit of entire arrears of salary, cannot sustain and needs to be set aside/modified. 23. However, in our view the order of Honble Single Judge to the extent he has directed for reinstatement of petitioner alongwith benefit of entire arrears of salary, cannot sustain and needs to be set aside/modified. 23. In cases where the orders of punishment are to be set aside on account of denial of adequate opportunity or for violation of principles of natural justice, in such cases it is always open to the employer to hold the inquiry afresh or from the stage it has been found to be in violation of principles of natural justice after giving adequate and due opportunity to the delinquent employee. In such cases the order of reinstatement of employee with payment of arrears of the salary etc. should not be passed automatically. This Court has held that appropriate course in such matters would be to direct for treating the employee to be under suspension during the inquiry proceedings held afresh pursuant to the judgment of the Court and in the meantime the employee would be entitled for payment of only subsistence allowance. 24. In Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakaran, JT 1993 (6) SC 1: (1993) 4 SCC 727 it was held that the question whether an employee would be entitled for back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement should be left to be decided by the departmental authorities in accordance with Rules and in the light of the culmination of the proceedings and their outcome. 25. 25. In U. P. State Electricity Board, George Town, Allahabad v. V. J. Alexander, 1997 (3) UPLBEC 2036 , while setting aside the order of dismissal on the ground of denial of adequate opportunity, the Court in para 16 held as under: "on a conspectus of the decisions aforestated, we veer around the view that in cases where order of dismissal or removal of a delinquent employee is interfered with on the ground of some procedural lacuna or defect in the domestic enquiry and it is not examined independently by the Court whether the charges against the delinquent employee are established on the material on record which exercise is impermissible in Courts certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution except, perhaps, where such exercise is considered by the Court convenient and feasible on admitted facts brought before it, the Court should demolish the order of removal or dismissal passed by the departmental authority and remit the matter to the disciplinary authority to follow the procedure from the stage at which fault was committed and take action according to law. Pending such enquiry delinquent employee must be deemed to be under suspension entitled to such subsistence allowance as may be admissible subject, of course, to the fulfilment of the pre-requisite conditions, if any, laid down in the relevant Service Rules/regulations/executive Orders. In cases where the Court finds on consideration of the material on record, that the charges levelled against the delinquent employee are not sustainable and he is entitled to be exonerated then in that event, notwithstanding the delay that may have taken place, it may direct reinstatement of the employee with consequential benefits unless the case falls within any exceptional category and the Court finds that the reinstatement of delinquent employee would be prejudicial to the larger interest of the establishment. " 26. In Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi and others v. J. N. Tripathi, 1996 (3) UPLBEC 1976, it was held that "an order for payment of full back wages is not to be passed as a matter of course in every case in which the order of dismissal is set aside or quashed by the High Court. " 27. Same is the view taken in Writ Petition No. 44002 of 2005, Shiv Shanker Saxena v. State of U. P. and others, decided on 3. 3. 2006. 28. " 27. Same is the view taken in Writ Petition No. 44002 of 2005, Shiv Shanker Saxena v. State of U. P. and others, decided on 3. 3. 2006. 28. This Court has also taken the same view in General Manager, NTPC Ltd. v. Gurucharan Singh, 2007 (3) ESC 1533, wherein following above said the legal exposition, the special appeal was partly allowed and judgment of the Honble Single Judge was modified as under: "the writ petition is allowed in part. The order dated 28. 1. 2004 impugned therein is set aside. The management employer, however, is at liberty to hold disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner/employee afresh from the stage of charge-sheet after affording adequate opportunity of defence to the petitioner and in accordance with law. For the entire period, the petitioner/employee remained out of service pursuant to the dismissal order impugned in the writ petition, he shall be deemed under suspension, entitled for payment of subsistence allowance. In case the management decides to hold the disciplinary inquiry as permitted above, during that period also the petitioner shall 0 remain under suspension and shall be paid subsistence allowance in accordance with law. Payment of arrears of subsistence allowance under this order shall be made to the petitioner within two months. The decision with respect to entitlement of the petitioner for full back wages shall be taken by the management as a result of culmination of inquiry proceedings and its final outcome. Since this matter has already remained pending for almost nine years, we direct that in case, the management holds fresh inquiry, the same shall be concluded within six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. " 29. Thus, we are also of the view that the Honble Single Judge instead of directing for reinstatement of the petitioner with entitlement of entire arrears of salary, ought to have directed that during the course of fresh disciplinary inquiry the petitioner/employee shall be treated under suspension and be paid subsistence allowance. Further for the period, he had been wrongly dismissed and remained out of job for that period also, he shall be paid subsistence allowance. The entitlement of the petitioner for full wages shall depend on the outcome of the inquiry whereafter disciplinary authority shall pass appropriate orders in terms of the relevant statute and law. 30. Further for the period, he had been wrongly dismissed and remained out of job for that period also, he shall be paid subsistence allowance. The entitlement of the petitioner for full wages shall depend on the outcome of the inquiry whereafter disciplinary authority shall pass appropriate orders in terms of the relevant statute and law. 30. In view of the above, this special appeal deserves to be allowed partly. We modify the order of Honble Single Judge as contained in its last paragraph of the impugned judgment in the following manner: "in the result, writ petition partly succeeds and is allowed. The resolution of the Commission dated 2. 4. 1993 communicated on 24. 4. 1993 (Annexure-15 to the writ petition) is quashed. The inquiry proceedings from the stage of oral inquiry and onwards are also quashed. The Management, however, is at liberty to proceed afresh by holding disciplinary inquiry from the stage of oral inquiry. We make it clear that in case inquiry officer is required to be appointed again the same can be done. After submission of inquiry report in the light of law laid down above the Management may proceed in accordance with law. The entire exercise as aforesaid would be completed within a period of six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the competent authority. For the entire period the petitioner had been out of service and also for the period the Management may now take in completion of inquiry afresh, the petitioner shall be deemed under suspension and shall be continued to be so, but shall be entitled for payment of subsistence allowance. The arrears of subsistence allowance shall be paid to petitioner within a period of two months from today. The decision with respect to entitlement of petitioner for full back wages and reinstatement shall be taken by the Management in the light of result of inquiry proceedings and its final outcome. In case the Management decides not to proceed further against the petitioner and to drop the proceedings it shall take necessary steps for reinstatement of the petitioner without any further delay and shall also pass appropriate order in accordance with law with respect to her entitlement of arrears of salary etc. " 31. In view of the divided success, there shall be no order as to costs. 2 .