Judgment :- (1) This is an appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Paschim Midnapore passed on 12th May, .2006 in Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 2005 reversing therein the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 4th October, 2005 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 6th Court, Paschim Midnapore in C.R. Case No. 558 of 2004 corresponding to TR Case No.487 of 2004 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act whereby the learned Magistrate sentenced the O.P. herein to suffer S.I. for one month and to pay Rs. 64,000/- to the complainant by way of compensation. Be it stated in the outset that the respondent has been served with notice on 12th April, 2007 as per the report of the process server but the respondent did not turn up to contest the appeal. (2) On 20th September, 2004 the respondent issued, towards discharge of debt or liability, a cheque bearing No. SB-00/97 531848 for Rs.3,000/-and another cheque being No. SB. 00797 531853 for Rs. 60,000/-dated 15th August, 2004 drawn on State Bank of India, Midnapore Branch. The appellant deposited the two cheques with his banker, Punjab National Bank, Midnapore Branch on 16th August, 2004 which got bounced on 17th August, 2004 on account of insufficiency of fund. A statutory notice demanding payment followed on 24th August, 2004, which the respondent allegedly received on 30th August, 2004. Payment having not been made the complaint was lodged on 20th September, 2004. (3) Learned Magistrate took cognizance of offence, issued process, and held trial by examination and cross-examination of the complainant and at the end of the trial recorded conviction against the respondent under Section 138 of the Nl Act and passed an order of sentence as above. (4) An appeal was preferred being Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 2005 wherein the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Paschim Midnapore by allowing the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence rendered by the learned Magistrate and thereby acquitted the respondent of the charge. (4) An appeal was preferred being Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 2005 wherein the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Paschim Midnapore by allowing the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence rendered by the learned Magistrate and thereby acquitted the respondent of the charge. (5) Before the learned Appellate Court three points amongst other points were principally advanced, namely, (1) the statutory demand notice under clause (b) to the proviso of Section 138 of the Nl Act did not bear the signature of the lawyer of the complainant thus the notice becoming a defective one, (2) the cheque numbers have not been mentioned in the notice and (3) the default stipulation to serve S.I. for six months on account of non-payment of the compensation amount was illegal. The first two grounds were accepted by the learned Appellate Court as a result of which appeal came to be allowed. (6) How to interpret the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act have been laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in C. C. Alaui Hazi v. Palapetty Muhammed and Anr., reported in (2007)3 SCC (Cr) 236 : (2008) 1 C Cr LR (SC) 69, in these terms : "Chapter 17 of the Act originally containing sections 138 to 142 was inserted in the Act by the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 with the object of promoting and inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking system and its operations and giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business transaction. The introduction of the said Chapter was intended to create an atmosphere of faith and reliance on banking system by discouraging people from not honouring their commitments by way of payment through cheques. Section 138 of the Act was enacted to punish those unscrupulous persons who purported to discharge their liability by issuing cheques without really intending to do so. To make the provisions contained in the said Chapter more effective, some, more sections were inserted in the Chapter and some amendments in the existing provisions were made. Though, in this reference we are not directly concerned with these amendments but they do indicate the anxiety of the legislature to make the provisions more result oriented. To make the provisions contained in the said Chapter more effective, some, more sections were inserted in the Chapter and some amendments in the existing provisions were made. Though, in this reference we are not directly concerned with these amendments but they do indicate the anxiety of the legislature to make the provisions more result oriented. Therefore, while construing the provision, the object of the legislation has to be borne in mind." (7) The commercial community makes frequent use of Negotiable Instruments Act which are the very basis and fibre not only of the entire commercial world but of the public in general. In order to instill confidence in the use of N.I. Act of the efficacy of the banking transactions the provision has been engrafted in the statute with the avowed object of protecting an innocent drawer and to punish the dishonest one. The person holding an instrument generally makes further commercial commitments on the strength of that instrument which if dishonoured would render in upsetting the financial circle. Therefore, the statute has to be applied and interpreted in furtherance of the objective of the statute, not to defeat the purpose for which it was enacted. (8) With this prolegomena, I enter into the merit of the case with reference to evidence. The learned Lower Appellate Court interpreted the notice to mean that the notice was intended to demand payment of Rs. 17,000/-but the case was not instituted for dishonour of cheques for Rs. 17,000/-. Such an interpretion of the notice is wholly erroneous. The notice has to be interpreted according to the plain meaning as it appears from the notice. It has been clearly stated that the total amount of debt was Rs. 80,000/- and towards liquidation of that debt of Rs. 80,000/-two cheques were issued on 15th August, 2004 for a total sum of Rs. 63,000/- leaving a balance of Rs. 17,000/-which allegedly the responded promised to pay by first of September, 2004. It has further been stated that the cheques were presented to the bank and they got dishonoured which indicates according to the appellant a mala fide intention in order to cheat him and by this notice demand was made to pay Rs. 63,000/- and also Rs. 17,000/-. This also Rs. 17,000/- is an additional demand by which the notice does not become illegal. 63,000/- and also Rs. 17,000/-. This also Rs. 17,000/- is an additional demand by which the notice does not become illegal. It is a clear statutory notice under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Nl Act and barring the points on which the notice is challenged which we shall come presently it cannot be said that simply on the ground of demand of further payment of Rs. 17,000/- in addition to the amount of Rs.63,000/-on account of bouncing of the cheques the notice is not vitiated by illegality. Any other construction of the notice on this score would be an act of perversity. (9) The cheque No. 531848 dated 16th August, 2004 is for Rs.3,000/- and the other cheque No. 531853 dated 16th August, 2004 is for Rs.60,000/-As P.W.1 the appellant produced and proved the said original cheques (Exts. 1 and 2) and during the cross-examination there was no denial by the respondent of issuing the said two cheques Exts. 1 and 2 respectively. Much was argued by the defence before the learned Court of Appeal below that the cheque numbers were wrongly entered in the notice. But I fail to find any wrongness therein. As said above, cheque No. 531848 dated 16.8.2004 is for Rs. 3,000/- and cheque No. 531853 dated 16.8.2004 is for Rs. 60,000/-. These two cheques make a total of Rs. 63,000/-. In the notice the two cheques have been correctly put in by incorporating correct number but without specifying the amount drawn on each of the two cheques it has been stated in the notice that the two cheques amounted to Rs. 63,000/- against a total outstanding due of Rs. 80,000/-thus leaving a balance of Rs. 17,000/-. As said earlier, through out the length and breadth of cross-examination there was no denial of drawing of the two cheques as aforesaid by the respondent in favour of the appellant. In the petition of complaint also the cheque numbers have been correctly written. (10) The question of validity of notice is a point which we shall presently adhere to but a point has to be thrashed here on the question whether notice sent to the accused/respondent (Ext. A) is the same notice as the one (said to be a copy thereof) produced before the Trial Court by the appellant and which has been marked Ext. 7. Learned Additional Sessions Judge observed in his judgment that Ext. A) is the same notice as the one (said to be a copy thereof) produced before the Trial Court by the appellant and which has been marked Ext. 7. Learned Additional Sessions Judge observed in his judgment that Ext. 7 which is a copy produced before the learned Trial Court by the appellant and Ext. A which was received by the accused/respondent are not identical on the ground that the cheque numbers mentioned in the Ext. 7 are not the same as mentioned in Ext. A which was received by the respondent. I have minutely and thoroughly compared Ext.7 with Ext. A. I have again minutely compared Ext. 7 and the Ext. A with the original cheques in question. I have again minutely compared Ext. A with the original cheques in question, but I fail to find out how the learned Appellate Court could say that the Ext. 7 and Ext. A are not identical with respect to the cheque number in question. At the cost of repetition, it has to be said that the cheque for Rs. 3,000/-is number 531848 dated 16.8.2004, and the cheque for Rs. 60,000/- is number 531853 dated 16,8.2004. These two cheque numbers have been correctly written in Ext. 7 as also in Ext.A. The words and digits SB-00/97 are not the cheque numbers. They are serial numbers of the cheque books printed by the State Bank of India in one cluster. There has been no mistake whatsoever in writing the cheque numbers either in Ext. 7 or in Ext. A. In fact, Ext. A is the carbon copy of Ext. 7. There has been no basis of the observation of the learned Judge that the cheque numbers mentioned in Ext. 7 and Ext. A are not identical. This is truly speaking not only a wrong application of fact but a reckless one, a wrong glaringly appearing on the face of the record. As already pointed out, notice cannot be said to be illegal merely because of the fact that in the concluding part of the notice request has been made to pay also Rs.17,000/-. This is a notice under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act to all intents and purposes and all the ingredients of what shall constitute a valid notice under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act are there in the notice. This is a notice under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act to all intents and purposes and all the ingredients of what shall constitute a valid notice under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act are there in the notice. The object of sending a notice is to give a chance to the drawer to rectify his omission so as to protect a honest drawer [See Central Bank of India v. Saxon Farms, reported in (1999)4 Crimes 221 SC : 2000 C Cr LR (SC) 308]. The object of a notice indicating the factum of dishonour of the cheque which is in Ext. 7 or in Ext.A is to give an opportunity to the drawer to make the payment within 15 days in order that it may not be necessary for the payee to proceed against him in any criminal action [See Rajneesh Aggarwala v. AmitJ. Bhalla, reported in (2001)104 Comp Case 332 SC : 2001 C Cr LR (SC) 235. Keeping in view of the object sought to be achieved and in terms of the well settled principles of law the notice has to be read as a whole and an interpretation of its validity should be preferred. Reference in this case may be had to Suman Sethi v. Ajoy Kumar Churiwal, reported in (2000)1 Crimes 207 : 2000 C Cr LR (SC) 257. (11) Learned Judge further observed that dates in the cheques appeared to have been written by separate person and the name of the respondent No. 1 in Ext.2, cheque for Rs. 60,000/- were written by a person other than the appellant. It is not clear what the learned Judge intended to convey by this observation. The matter of the fact is that issuance of cheques on the date mentioned in the cheque by the respondent has not been denied. (12) Evidence was led to show that the accused-respondent took loan of Rs. 30,000/-but cheques were issued for Rs. 63,000/-. Trial was conducted in such a manner as if it was a money suit where the plaintiff has to establish the money claim against the defendant. (12) Evidence was led to show that the accused-respondent took loan of Rs. 30,000/-but cheques were issued for Rs. 63,000/-. Trial was conducted in such a manner as if it was a money suit where the plaintiff has to establish the money claim against the defendant. The learned Judge in the Court of Appeal was oblivious of the provision of Section 139 of the Act which provides that, "it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability". Evidence was adduced by the appellant in his examination-in-chief that the respondent took from him a loan of Rs. 80,000/-in cash for his urgent need with a promise to pay it back by June 2004. This piece of evidence of the appellant could not be demolished in cross-examination. It was only suggested by way of cross-examination that a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was advanced and a cheque for Rs. 60,000/-was issued in favour of the complainant by the accused/respondent. There could not be any rebuttal of the presumption arising out of Section 139 of the Act. The appellant proved Ext. 10 showing advancement of loan to the respondent in the sum of Rs. 80,000/-on 14.12.2003 and it could not be demolished that the signature appearing in the receipt (Ext. 10) is not the signature of the respondent. Instead of rebuttal of presumption by the respondent it is the appellant who has been successful in establishing the existence of debt towards discharge of which two cheques for Rs. 63,000/-were issued. Therefore, the observation of the learned Judge that it is unlikely that on the very date of payment of loan, whichever may the amount both the cheques were handed over to the complainant. Such an observation is uncalled for because no evidence was adduced to rebut the presumption by the respondent herein. 63,000/-were issued. Therefore, the observation of the learned Judge that it is unlikely that on the very date of payment of loan, whichever may the amount both the cheques were handed over to the complainant. Such an observation is uncalled for because no evidence was adduced to rebut the presumption by the respondent herein. Reference in this connection may be had to the decision in MMTC Limited v. Medchi Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd., reported in 2002 Criminal 251 : 2002 C Cr LR (SC) 249, wherein it has been observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the burden of proving that there is no existence of debt or liability was on the respondents and this can be discharged by them in the trial. (13) Now we come to the core of the issue. The statutory notice under Section 138(b) of the Act is otherwise legal and valid. As observed earlier it contains all the ingredients of a requisite notice under Section 138(b) of the Act. The learned Judge demolished the case of the appellant on the ground that in the notice there is no signature of the Advocate issuing the notice. It is fair enough to say at the moment that Ext. A is the carbon copy of Ext. 7. Receipt of notice is not denied, for Ext. 8 is the AD card showing service of notice upon the respondent on 30th August, 2004. It is the respondent who got the notice admitted in evidence as Ext. A in his anxiety to prove the fact that it does not bear the signature of the Advocate, Ext. 7 is the other copy, wherein there is signature of the Advocate with date. In fact what appears to me is that instead of sending Ext. 7, Ext. A without the signature of the Advocate and the date was posted and sent to the respondent. The question, therefore, is whether in such circumstances, the notice can be said to be a proper notice. Learned Magistrate observed that since the notice contains the cheque numbers, the amount, the fact of dishonourment and demand of payment and it was received by the respondent and that from the notice Ext. The question, therefore, is whether in such circumstances, the notice can be said to be a proper notice. Learned Magistrate observed that since the notice contains the cheque numbers, the amount, the fact of dishonourment and demand of payment and it was received by the respondent and that from the notice Ext. A, it is clear that it was the lawyer of the appellant who issued the notice and the defence did not call the lawyer as a witness to deny the authorship of the notice it is valid in the eye of law. Learned Magistrate referred to the judgment of Sil Import v. Exim Aides, reported in 1999 Cr LJ 2276 : 1999 C Cr LR (SC) 277. On the contrary, the learned Court of Appeal below observed that since the notice is not signed by the lawyer it cannot be said to be a valid notice. (14) The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word notice is intimation or instruction to someone to do something. It is making someone aware of some fact. According to the common parlance a notice need not be in writing. If statute does not explicitly provide that the notice must be in writing then in such a situation verbal notice is sufficient, for example, notice under Section 93 of the N.I. Act may be oral. Now Section 138(b) of the N.I.Act provides clearly that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque has to make a demand for the payment of the amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, there is no scope to argue otherwise. The question is as to the manner of giving notice There are no rules to the Act providing for manner of giving of notice. Had there been any statutory rule framed under the Act concerning manner of giving notice then such a rule would have been mandatory to be followed. The statute does not demand anything more except saying that the notice has to be in writing asking the drawer to make payment. In such circumstances, the question therefore is what would be the legal consequence of a notice otherwise valid and since received by the drawer but not, signed by the agent of the party. The statute does not demand anything more except saying that the notice has to be in writing asking the drawer to make payment. In such circumstances, the question therefore is what would be the legal consequence of a notice otherwise valid and since received by the drawer but not, signed by the agent of the party. The law is very clear that the notice under Section 138(b) need not necessarily be signed by the payee or the holder in due course. An authorised representative or agent of the payee or the holder in due course may issue the notice and here the Advocate acting as agent df the payee issued the notice in his letterhead but without signature. As already observed, there is no statutory rule providing for mode of issuance of notice or of any form. A statute may provide that the notice in writing must be signed. The question whether a notice under Section 34 of the Income Tax Act issued by the Income Tax Officer but without his signature was valid or not came to be considered before a Division Bench of this Court in B. K. Gooyee v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in AIR 1966 Cal 438 . Here Their Lordships of the Division Bench surveyed a plethora of case laws and mentioned the necessary requirement of notice in some other statutes like Public Demands Recovery Act, Arbitration Act, 1940, Revenue Recovery Act, Transfer of Property Act, Gift Act and several such- statutes in order to consider whether unlike those Acts a statutory notice required to be issued by a statutory officer under Section 34 of the Income Tax Act was required to be signed or not by the Income Tax Officer. Their Lordships referred to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, Section 65(1), which provides that a notice under the said Act may be served on the person therein named either by post as if it were summons issued by a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Order 5 Rule 8 C.P.C. every such summons shall be signed by the Judge or such other person as he appoints and shall be sealed with the seal of the Court. Under Order 5 Rule 8 C.P.C. every such summons shall be signed by the Judge or such other person as he appoints and shall be sealed with the seal of the Court. Since in the statute itself the manner of service of notice was laid down to be followed the Court observed that such a notice under Section 34 of the Act requires to be signed by the officer mentioned in the statute. Arguments were advanced in support of the proposition that since the notice was issued by the office of Income Tax Officer it was clear enough to indicate as to who issued the notice and this omission could be ignored. Since in the statute itself the manner and mode of issuance of notice was laid down and since there was more than one Income Tax Officer in a concerned office it was held that it could not be discernible as to which Income Tax Officer before whom the party has to submit to his jurisdiction for hearing of the matter issued the notice. It was observed by the Court that if the district is mentioned it may not be possible to identify the Income Tax Officer. If the district is mentioned along with the date it may be possible to identify the Income Tax Officer but then the Income Tax Officer may disown the responsibility of having given the notice. Though it was held that the notice under Section 34 of the Income Tax Act is required to be signed. Their Lordships went to the extent of considering as to whether even in absence of the signature of the officer the author of the notice could be identifiable or not. Therefore, mere expression in the statute that the notice has to be given in writing it does not invariably and necessarily follow that even in absence of any statutory rule or any provision in the statute as to the manner and mode of giving of notice the notice must be signed or that unsigned notice is of no consequence. Even in Sethani Chhoti Debi v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1964) 51 ITR 473 (Cal), which was referred to in B. K. Gooyee a Division Bench of this Court held that a facsimile signature was sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the Public Demands Recovery Act. Even in Sethani Chhoti Debi v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1964) 51 ITR 473 (Cal), which was referred to in B. K. Gooyee a Division Bench of this Court held that a facsimile signature was sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the Public Demands Recovery Act. Their Lordships in this case held that a signature can be made by facsimile and need not be in the hand writing of the officer issuing the notice. Thus a rubber stamp or facsimile indicating signature of the officer has been considered to be sufficient in a notice when requirement of signature is mandatory. When the statute does not provide expressly that the notice has to be in a certain manner or that it has to be signed the question would be as to the effect of absence of signature of the lawyer in the notice under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act. Thus the question is whether omission to put signature of the Advocate issuing notice on behalf of the payee would render the notice to be illegality. Proceeding on the footing that the statute does not lay down any specific form or manner by any rule as to issuance of notice it has to be held that omission to put signature of the agent of the party does not become fatal if the author of the notice is identifiable or the contents of the notice relate to the case, or the party served with notice has not been misled or has not suffered prejudice. The approach of the learned Magistrate appears to be more rational in this respect. Ext. A which has been admittedly received by the respondent on 30th August, 2004 is on the letterhead of the Advocate of the appellant/complainant with his residence at Library Road in the town of Midnapore practising law in Judges Court at Midnapore. Vokalatnama was signed by Suman Kr. Mondal for the appellant-complainant. Therefore, authorship of the notice could not be disputed. The lawyer who issued the notice did not disown the liability, nor it was the evidence that nobody in the name of Ashok Kr. Mondal or Suman Kr. Mondal is an Advocate in the Judges Court at Midnapore. One of the lawyers in the letterhead is the lawyer who accepted the vokalatnama. The lawyer who issued the notice did not disown the liability, nor it was the evidence that nobody in the name of Ashok Kr. Mondal or Suman Kr. Mondal is an Advocate in the Judges Court at Midnapore. One of the lawyers in the letterhead is the lawyer who accepted the vokalatnama. The learned Magistrate observed that if the respondent was disputing the authorship of the letter or identity of the author of the letter he could have prayed before the trial Court for summons to examine the person who signed the notice so as to deny the authorship. As held earlier, the notice contains all the ingredients of a requisite notice under Section 138(b) of the Act. It contains the entire fact of the case of the complainant as presented in the petition of complaint. Existence of debt, liability of the respondent to discharge the debt, issuance of cheques, fact of dishonourment, demand to make payment were all given in the notice. Notice was properly addressed and stamped and it reached the sendee. The sendee accepts the notice and in the trial all these facts have been put in evidence-oral and documentary and have not been or could not be denied. The respondent did not deny the issuance of cheques of the amount given in the notice. What he denied is the amount of loan advanced which could not meet with success in the trial. In such circumstances, it could not be said that omission to put signature of the lawyer in the notice is vital and for that the notice has to be said invalid or illegal in the eye of law. I am emboldened by the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Sil Import v. Exim Aides, reported in 1999 Cr LJ 2276, where Their Lordships observed as follows : "The upshot of the discussion is, on the date when the notice sent by fax reached the drawer of the cheque the period of 15 days (without which he has to make the payment) has started running and on the expiry of that period the offence is complete unless the amount has been paid in the meanwhile." Thus notice by fax was considered sufficient. (15) The above decision of the Supreme Court which also has been referred to by the learned Magistrate gives rise to the reasoning that omission to put signature in the notice is not fatal though notice no doubt has to be in writing. It may be sent by, telegram, it may be sent through fax or E-mail or through modern devices. When the position is so, it entails that it need not be signed provided authorship is not disputed or identity of the person issuing the notice is established or the drawer of the cheque is not misled or misguided. None of the situations does arise here. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that omission to put an Advocates signature in the notice which has not been deliberate but mere accidental has been fatal to the case of the appellant. In this connection, I am to refer to three decisions of three High Courts exactly on this point one of which has already been referred to by the learned Magistrate. This is Satyanarayanan Gowdav. B. Rangappa, reported in 1996 Cr LJ 2264. Here the exact situation arose. A learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that the Advocate by mistake missed to sign the notice under Section 138 of the N.I. Act but that by itself would not lead to the conclusion that notice is invalid in the eye of law. Again the same question arose in a decision in Janaradhan v. Jayachandran, reported in (2005)2 Criminal Court Cases 590 (Kerala), here also the same situation arose and the Kerala High Court held that merely because the Counsel concerned had failed to put his signature it cannot be held inadmissible because no prejudice has been caused to the respondent. The Kerala High Court referred to an earlier decision of the said Court in Abdurehim Sailv. Sahul Hameed, reported in 1981 KLT 289 , where it was not in question that Ext.B 1 (notice) was issued by the landlord of the Advocate, the fact that it was not signed by the Advocate due to inadvertence it would not make the notice invalid in any way. Again this exact point came for consideration in Madras High Court in the decision in C. N. Hari Krishnan v. Kinetic Finance Ltd., reported in 2004(2) DCR 233 . Again this exact point came for consideration in Madras High Court in the decision in C. N. Hari Krishnan v. Kinetic Finance Ltd., reported in 2004(2) DCR 233 . Here also notice under Section 138(b) was not signed by the Counsel and it was observed that where notice could be sent by fax or telegram, as I observed earlier, the fact that notice was not signed by the Counsel would not be a ground for quashing of the proceeding. The point thus raised has to be answered in favour of the appellant. (16) As to the sentence in default of payment of compensation the law is very clear in view of the decision in Vijayan v. Sadanandan K and Anr., reported in JT (2009)7 SC 152 : (2009)2 C Cr LR (SC) 363, where it has been held that the Court may impose imprisonment in default of payment of compensation. (17) Accordingly, I am of the opinion that learned Court of Appeal below was not justified in allowing the appeal. (18) Appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Paschim Midnapore is set aside. The judgment and order of the learned Magistrate dated 4th October, 2005 is upheld. The respondent shall appear before the learned Magistrate to suffer the sentence and to pay the compensation in default to suffer the sentence of imprisonment within a month from this date, failing which the learned Magistrate will take steps for apprehension of the respondent so as to have the sentence executed in accordance with the law. (19) A copy of the judgment along with the Lower Court Record shall be transmitted to the learned Magistrate immediately for information and taking necessary action.