Judgment H.K. Rathod, J.—Heard learned Advocate Mr. Sunil B. Parikh for learned Advocate Mr. Rajni H. Mehta for appellant insurance company and learned Advocate Mr. Haresh J. Trivedi, learned Advocate Mr. Mehul Shah, learned Advocate Ms. Mandavia, learned Advocate Mr. A.J. Shastri, Mr. Kamdar etc. for respective respondents in these appeals. 2. In this group of appeals, appellant insurance company is challenging award made by different claims Tribunals in different claim petitions as mentioned in respective memo of appeal. 3. Learned Advocate Mr. Sunil B. Parikh appearing for appellant insurance company has raised contention that in respect of persons those who were travelling in goods vehicle prior to 1.7.1989 means prior to Amendment made in MV Act, insurance company is not liable to pay amount of compensation in case of negligence of driver of goods vehicle as risk of such passenger is not covered in insurance policy issued by insurance company. He also submitted that in case if passenger travelled in goods vehicle prior to amendment with owner of goods or as authorized representative, then also, their risk is not covered under insurance policy issued by insurance company. He submits that amendment made in section 147 on 14th November, 1994 and as per said amendment, ‘any person’ includes owner of goods and authorized representative of owner but prior to that risk of such persons those who traveled in goods vehicle even as owner of goods/representative of owner of goods, were not covered and such specific contention was raised by appellant before claims Tribunal but same have not been properly considered by respective claims Tribunal and claims Tribunal decided that even in case, prior to amendment made in MV Act, if any person traveled in goods vehicle as owner of goods, then also risk of such person is covered under policy of insurance and insurance company is liable to pay compensation to claimants. He submits that this finding of claims Tribunal is contrary to law. He relied upon decision of this Court dated 14.3.2008 in First Appeal No. 924 of 1989, decision of Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 888 of 1986 decided on 22.2.2000 in case of New Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jagdishchandra Kanchanlal Parikh reported in 2001 (1) GLR 634 . He relied upon decision of this Court dated 14.3.2008 in First Appeal No. 924 of 1989, decision of Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 888 of 1986 decided on 22.2.2000 in case of New Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jagdishchandra Kanchanlal Parikh reported in 2001 (1) GLR 634 . He also relied upon decision of larger bench of Apex Court in case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Asha Rani & Others and submitted that these appeals are required to be allowed by exonerating appellant insurance company from liability to pay compensation to claimants. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. Mehul Shah, Ms. Mandavia, Mr. Haresh J. Trivedi for respective respondents claimants jointly submitted that claims Tribunal have not committed any error in passing award in favour of claimants by directing appellant insurance company to pay compensation to claimants and, therefore, these appeals are required to be dismissed. 5. As regards First Appeal No. 69 of 1991 (MACP No. 711/84) and First Appeal No. 70 of 1991 (MACP No. 842/84), three claim petitions arose namely MACP No. 711, 718 and 842 of 1984 when driver lost control, went off the road and turned turtle in the ditch and causing fatal injury to Javarbhai Bhanabhai whose heirs filed MACP No. 718/1984. Heirs of deceased Punabhai Popatbhai filed claim Petition No. 711/84 and claimants (claim Petition No. 718/84) were traveling with their goods in truck No. GTW 3364 driven by Gordhanbhai Bachubhai Koli, respondent No. 4 in FA No. 69/91 (MACP No. 711/84) and respondent No. 2 in FA No. 70/1991 (MACP No. 718/84) owned by Virjibhai Bhikhabhai, who could not be served as he died and his heirs shifted to other unknown place. Appellant insurance company is not liable in view of Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment in case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Ved vati, AIR 2007 SC 1334 . In said appeals, though served, respondents have not filed any appearance. 6. I have considered submissions made by learned advocates for respective parties. I have also perused respective awards made by respective claims tribunal. It is undisputed fact between parties that accident occurred prior to amendment made in MV Act means prior to 1st July, 1989 in all cases before hand. It is also an undisputed fact in all cases before hand, goods vehicle is involved. I have also perused respective awards made by respective claims tribunal. It is undisputed fact between parties that accident occurred prior to amendment made in MV Act means prior to 1st July, 1989 in all cases before hand. It is also an undisputed fact in all cases before hand, goods vehicle is involved. In goods vehicle, persons were travelling either as passenger or as owner or goods or as authorized representative of owner of goods prior to amendment made in MV Act. In light of these facts which are not indispute between parties, I have considered legal position prior to amendment made in MV Act and legal position subsequent to amendment made in MV Act and has considered question whether appellant insurance company is liable to pay compensation to claimants or not who travelled in goods vehicle in different capacity prior to amendment made in MV Act. In light of these undisputed facts and legal position prior to amendment made in MV Act, I have considered decisions as aforesaid referred to and relied upon by learned Advocate Mr. SB Parikh for appellant insurance company. 7. In First Appeal No. 888 of 1986 decided by Division Bench of this Court on 22.2.2000 in case of New Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jagdishchandra Kanchanlal Parikh, reported in 2001 (1) GLR 634 , relevant observations made by this Court in Para 5 to 13 of said judgment are reproduced as under: “5. Shri Mehta has drawn our attention to the findings of the Tribunal on page 26, paragraph 28 and has assailed these findings on the ground that the vehicle insured with the appellant was goods vehicle, hence, within the ambit of the insurance policy as well as the motor permit, no liability can be fastened upon the appellant for payment of compensation. He also urged that in any case, the verdict of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Malava (Supra) would be enough to exonerate the appellant Co. from any liability to pay compensation. 6. The finding of the Tribunal has been that the driver of truck No. GTK 3727 is responsible to the extent of 75 per cent and the driver of the truck No. GTE 8109 is responsible to the extent of 25 per cent. from any liability to pay compensation. 6. The finding of the Tribunal has been that the driver of truck No. GTK 3727 is responsible to the extent of 75 per cent and the driver of the truck No. GTE 8109 is responsible to the extent of 25 per cent. So far as the apportionment of the liability for the negligence is concerned, it has not been challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant. His only contention has been that inspite of this assessment, there is no liability of the appellant to pay any compensation and the compensation so assessed can be recovered from the other opposite parties who have been held responsible to this extent. 7. We have gone through paragraph 28 of the award of the Tribunal. The Tribunal was of the view that the contention of opponent No. 7 was not acceptable. The said contention was that since the applicant was passenger for hire or reward and the truck in question was a goods vehicle, in view of the policy and permit brought on record, there can be no liability of the Oriental Insurance Co. to pay any compensation. Further contention was that there was breach of the terms and conditions of insurance policy and permit. The insurance policy was filed as Exhibit 127 and the permit was filed as Exhibit 98. This contention was negatived by the Tribunal on the ground that there is overwhelming evidence on record that the applicant has hired the truck for carriage of one bag of tuver pulse and he was travelling with it as owner of the said goods. The Tribunal admitted that this fact was not alleged in the claim petition but from the evidence of the driver of the truck GTE 8109 and its cleaner, the Tribunal clearly came to the conclusion that the applicant was travelling in the truck with goods and the truck was hired for carriage of the goods. Needless to say that the said fact was not pleaded in the claim petition. The tribunal, therefore, could not have permitted any evidence on the point in evidence at belated stage on a fact which is not pleaded in the claim petition and such evidence could not have been accepted by the tribunal. The Tribunal has given emphasis upon this evidence and has observed that the opponent No. 7 cannot get out of this evidence. The Tribunal has given emphasis upon this evidence and has observed that the opponent No. 7 cannot get out of this evidence. The Tribunal has also referred to the judgment of this Court reported in 23 GLR page 411 and has observed that it does not come to the aid of the Insurance Co. With these observations, the liability of the Insurance Company was upheld by the Tribunal. 8. The liability of the appellant has to be examined from three angles. The first is whether, under the terms of the insurance policy, the appellant is liable to pay any compensation. There is vague reference of the insurance policy in the judgment of the tribunal. The Tribunal has not carefully examined the terms of the insurance policy. We have gone through the insurance policy Exhibit 127. Initially, Clause (iii) about limitation as to use of the goods vehicle was that the policy does not cover the use for conveyance of passenger for hire or reward. This seems to have been substituted by rubber stamp Clause (iii) which provides as under: “item-3 of limitation as to use deleted and replaced by following words: use for carrying passengers in the vehicle except the employees and other than driver not exceeding six in number coming under the purview of the Workmens’ Compensation Act, 1923.” 9. The first two conditions for limitation as to use remained in tact as originally inserted in the insurance policy. It is further clear from the policy that the vehicle was to be used only under the Public Carriers Permit within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act. Consequently in the insurance policy, there was specific prohibition for use of the goods vehicle for carriage or for conveyance of passengers for hire or reward. Only driver and excepting employees not exceeding six were permitted to be carried in such goods vehicle. The evidence is that the applicant was carrying bag of tuver pulse on the truck and it was held by the Tribunal that the truck was hired by the applicant for carrying his goods. It cannot be said that the applicant was not a passenger in the vehicle for hire or reward. The only vague statement of the driver and cleaner was relied upon by the Tribunal and there was no specific evidence that the applicant was permitted to travel in the truck as owner of the goods. It cannot be said that the applicant was not a passenger in the vehicle for hire or reward. The only vague statement of the driver and cleaner was relied upon by the Tribunal and there was no specific evidence that the applicant was permitted to travel in the truck as owner of the goods. Thus, there was obvious breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy on account of which there can be no liability of the insurance company. 10. The matter has to be examined from another angle namely with reference to permit Exhibit 98 This permit is issued by the transport authorities and there is a mention in the insurance policy also that the limit of the amount of compensation and the liability is only for use under public carriers permit within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Exhibit 98 is a permit issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 There is no mention in this permit that the passengers were also permitted to be carried in the goods vehicle. Consequently, on the basis of this permit also, it cannot be said that any passenger could be carried and if any injury was caused to the passenger in the accident or death was caused, the insurance company can be held liable. 11. The third angle for examination is the applicability of Smt. Malava’s case. Learned counsel Mr. K.C. Shah representing Mr. M.C. Shah has drawn our attention to the tests suggested and laid down by the Apex Court in this case and argued that the verdict of this case does not at all apply to the facts of the case before us and that the insurance company is liable to pay the compensation. 12. We have given our consideration to the arguments advanced by Mr. K.C. Shah and we are unable to accept his contention. In this case, the Apex Court has considered the conflicting views taken by various high courts as to when the goods vehicle is to be considered as vehicle for transport of goods only or vehicle for carriage of passenger for hire or reward. The Apex Court has approved the view taken by the Full Bench of the High Court of Orissa in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kanchan Bawa & Ors., 1994 ACJ 138. The Apex Court has approved the view taken by the Full Bench of the High Court of Orissa in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kanchan Bawa & Ors., 1994 ACJ 138. The Apex Court has laid down that the correct test to determine whether a passenger was carried for hire or reward would be whether there has been systematic carrying of passengers. Only if the vehicle is so used then that vehicle can be said to be vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward. It would not be proper to consider a goods vehicle as a passenger vehicle on the basis of single use or use on some stray occasions at that vehicle for carrying passengers for hire or reward. What has been observed by the Apex Court in this case is that if the goods vehicle is systematically used for carrying passengers regularly or on frequent occasions, then, such vehicle can be said to have been used for carrying passengers. However, if on goods vehicle, passengers are carried for hire or reward, once, twice or on stray occasions, it cannot be said that the goods vehicle was carrying the passengers for hire or reward. Thus, systematic carrying of passengers in goods vehicle will render such a vehicle as passenger vehicle and not otherwise. Shri Shah has drawn our attention to paragraph 10 of this judgment but we are unable to accept his contention that this verdict is distinguishable on facts of the case before us. Thus, we are of the opinion that the verdict of the Apex Court in Smt. Malava’s case (Supra) is applicable on all force to the facts of the case before us in as much as there is nothing on record to show that except on this occasion, other passengers were carried on the truck in question for hire or reward. 13. Thus, from all the above three angles, the liability of the appellant to pay compensation cannot be upheld. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in holding that the appellant is liable to the extent of 25%. The award has, therefore, to be modified against the appellant and the liability of the appellant has to be set aside. 13. Thus, from all the above three angles, the liability of the appellant to pay compensation cannot be upheld. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in holding that the appellant is liable to the extent of 25%. The award has, therefore, to be modified against the appellant and the liability of the appellant has to be set aside. However, the liability of the other respondents who have been assessed with the liability of 75% and 25% shall remain in tact and the claimant respondent No. 1 will be at liberty to recover the entire amount of award from the other respondents.” 8. In First Appeal No. 924 of 1989 decided by this Court on 14.3.2008, in case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sarsanben Wd/O Madhaji, this Court observed as under in Paras 3.0 to 5.0 : “3.0 Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. It is not in dispute that the vehicle involved in the accident is a Truck. Under Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, “Truck” has been defined as a vehicle not meant for carrying passengers. Otherwise also, it is a matter of common knowledge that Truck is not meant for carrying passengers and therefore, whosoever takes a ride on it shall be doing so at his own risk. If some unfortunate event takes place while travelling in such vehicle, then neither the driver of the Truck nor its owner could be held liable to pay compensation. Further, if the Truck is insured with the Insurance Company, then no liability could be fastened on the Insurance Company for the death or injuries sustained in the accident. 4.0 The aforesaid principle has been laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Manjulaben Purshottamdas Patel & Ors. reported in 1994 (1) GLR pg. 269 wherein, it has been held that if an accident takes place while travelling in a goods vehicle, the Insurance Company could not be made liable to pay compensation for the death or injuries sustained in the said accident. 4.1 Similar principle has been laid down by the Hon’ble the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Tarawati and Others reported in 1994 ACJ pg. 822, by the Apex Court in Mallawwa & Ors. vs. Oriental Insurance Co. 4.1 Similar principle has been laid down by the Hon’ble the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Tarawati and Others reported in 1994 ACJ pg. 822, by the Apex Court in Mallawwa & Ors. vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in 1999 ACJ 1, Ramashray Singh vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in J.T. 2003 (6) SC pg. 97 and in a recent decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. V. Chinnama and Others reported in AIR 2004 SC pg. 4338 cases. 5.0 In above view of the matter, it is amply clear that a “Truck” is a “goods vehicle” and, therefore, the appellant - Insurance Company could not be made liable to pay the compensation. Hence, it has to be concluded that the Tribunal has committed an error in holding the Insurance Company liable to pay compensation since the vehicle involved in the accident is a “goods vehicle”, i.e. Truck. Hence, the impugned award of the Tribunal deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 9. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Asha Rani & Others, 2003 ACJ 1 = 2002 AIR SCW 5259, larger bench of Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under in Paras 2, 9, 23 to 30: “2. The question that arises in this batch of appeals is whether the insurer is liable to pay compensation to the dependants of the deceased passenger, while the deceased passenger was travelling in a goods vehicle and that vehicle met with an accident, on account of which the passenger died or AIR 2000 SC 235 = 1999 AIR SCW 4337 suffered bodily injury. Originally, when the bunch of appeals was being heard, a Bench of this Court by order dated 27th March, 2001, came to the conclusion that all the appeals fall in three categories - category (i) being those cases which are covered by the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939; category (ii) are the cases which are covered by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, prior to the amendment of 1994; category (iii) are those cases which fall after the amendment of 1994. When the matters were finally heard, a Bench delivered judgment in respect of cases under category (i) and (iii) above on 17th August, 2001. When the matters were finally heard, a Bench delivered judgment in respect of cases under category (i) and (iii) above on 17th August, 2001. But so far as cases falling under category (ii) namely which are covered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, prior to its amendment in 1994, it was felt that the decision of the Court in Satpal Singh’s case ( 2000 (1) SCC 237 ), requires reconsideration by a larger Bench and that is how this bunch of appeals had been placed before a three-Judge Bench. This, in turn, necessitates interpretation of the provisions in Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) as it stood prior to its amendment in 1994. It may be stated that the provisions of Section 147 of the Act correspond to Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 9. In Satpal’s case (Supra), the Court assumed that the provisions of Section 95(1) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are identical with Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994 it was necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. If the Motor Vehicles Amended Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46 of Act 6 of 1991 by which expression ‘injury to any person’ in the original Act stood substituted by the expression ‘injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle’ the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid Amendment Act of 1994, even if widest interpretation is given to the expression ‘to any person’ it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of Clause 46 also states that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the Insurance Policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression ‘including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle which was added to the pre-existed expression ‘injury to any person’ is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. The judgment of this Court in Satpal’s case, therefore must be held to have not been correctly decided and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal as well as that of the High Court accordingly are set aside and these appeals are allowed. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury. 23. The applicability of decision of this Court in Mallawwa (Smt.) and Ors. vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors., ( (1999) 1 SCC 403 ) in this case must be considered keeping that aspect in view. Section 2(35) of 1988 Act does not include passengers in goods carriage whereas Section 2(25) of 1939 Act did as even passengers could be carried in a goods vehicle. vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors., ( (1999) 1 SCC 403 ) in this case must be considered keeping that aspect in view. Section 2(35) of 1988 Act does not include passengers in goods carriage whereas Section 2(25) of 1939 Act did as even passengers could be carried in a goods vehicle. difference in the definitions of the “goods vehicle” in 1939 Act and “goods carriage” in 1988 Act is significant. By reason of the change in the definitions of the terminology, the Legislature intended that a goods vehicle could not carry any passenger, as the words “in addition to passengers” occurring in the definition of goods vehicle in 1939 Act were omitted. Furthermore, it categorically states that ‘goods carriage’ would mean a motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use “solely for the carriage of goods”. Carrying of passengers in a ‘goods carriage’, thus, is not contemplated under 1988 Act. 24. We have further noticed that Section 147 of 1988 Act prescribing the requirements of an insurance policy does not contain a provision similar to Clause (ii) of the proviso appended to Section 95 of 1939 Act. The decisions of this Court in Mallawwa’s case (Supra) must be held to have been rendered having regard to the aforementioned provisions. 25. Section 147 of 1988 Act, inter alia, prescribes compulsory coverage against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of “public service vehicle”. Proviso appended thereto categorically states that compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in a goods vehicle would be limited to the liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. It does not speak of any passenger in a ‘goods carriage’. 26. In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in 1988 Act vis-a-vis 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words “any person” must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used i.e. ‘a third party’. Keeping in view the provisions of 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor. 27. Keeping in view the provisions of 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor. 27. Furthermore, Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, whereas sub-Clause (ii) thereof deals with liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. 28. An owner of a passenger carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risks of the passengers. If a liability other than the limited liability provided for under the Act is to be enhanced under an insurance policy, additional premium is required to be paid. But if the ratio of this Court’s decision in New India Assurance Company vs. Satpal Singh and Ors., (2000) 1 SCC 237 is taken to its logical conclusion, although for such passengers, the owner of a goods carriage need not take out an insurance policy, they would be deemed to have been covered under the policy wherefor even no premium is required to be paid. AIR 2000 SC 235 = 1999 AIR SCW 4337 29. We may consider the matter for another angle. Section 149(2) of the 1988 Act enables the insurers to raise defences against the claim of the claimants. In terms of Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act one of the defences which is available to the insurer is that the vehicle in question has been used for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle was used. Such a statutory defence available to the insurer would be obliterated in view of the decision of this Court in Satpal Singh’s case (Supra). 30. Such a statutory defence available to the insurer would be obliterated in view of the decision of this Court in Satpal Singh’s case (Supra). 30. For the foregoing reasons, I am in respectful agreement with My Lord the Chief Justice of India that the decision of this Court in New India Assurance Company vs. Satpal Singh and Ors., (2000) 1 SCC 237 , has not laid down the law correctly and should be overruled. AIR 2000 SC 235 = 1999 AIR SCW 4337" 10. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Vedwati & Ors., AIR 2007 1334, Apex Court observed as under: “The difference in the language of ‘goods vehicle’ as appear in the old Act and ‘goods carriage’ in the Act is of significance. A bare reading of the provisions makes it clear that the legislative intent was to prohibit goods vehicle from carrying any passenger. This is clear from the expression ‘in addition to passengers’ as contained in definition of ‘goods vehicle’ in the old Act. The position becomes further clear because the expression used is ‘goods carriage’ is solely for the carriage of goods. Carrying of passengers in a goods carriage is not contemplated in the Act. There is no provision similar to Clause (ii) of the proviso appended to Section 95 of the old Act prescribing requirement of insurance policy. Even Section 147 of the Act mandates compulsory coverage against death of or bodily injury to any passenger of ‘public service vehicle’. The proviso makes it further clear that compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicles and employees carried in goods vehicle would be limited to liability under W.C. Act 1923. There is no reference to passengers. Thus, provisions of the Act do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in goods carriage and the insurer would have no liability, therefor. F.A.F.O. No. 1773 of 2001, D/- 29.11.2001 (All.) Reversed. (Paras 13, 14, 15)” 11. There is no reference to passengers. Thus, provisions of the Act do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in goods carriage and the insurer would have no liability, therefor. F.A.F.O. No. 1773 of 2001, D/- 29.11.2001 (All.) Reversed. (Paras 13, 14, 15)” 11. In view of aforesaid decisions of this Court and Apex Court and view taken that in case if accident has occurred prior to amendment made in Motor Vehicles Act dated 1st July, 1989 and vehicle involved in accident is goods vehicle and passengers those who were travelling in goods vehicle, their risk is not covered under policy as no additional premium is paid by owner of vehicle, according to my opinion, appellant insurance company is not liable to pay compensation to claimants and insurance company is not liable to indemnify owner of vehicle involved in accident in such case but claimants are entitled to recover amount of compensation from driver and owner of vehicle involved in accident. However, it is made clear that at the time of passing order on stay application by this Court, whatever amount is deposited by appellant insurance company and whatever therefrom is disbursed to claimants and received by claimants, appellant insurance company shall not recover such amount from claimants which is received by claimants but whatever amount is lying before claims tribunal/invested in fixed deposit pursuant to directions issued by this Court, that has to be refunded back by respective claims Tribunal to appellant insurance company by way of an account payee cheque drawn in favour of appellant insurance company and as regards amount disbursed to claimants by claims tribunal, it is open for appellant insurance company to recover that amount from owner of vehicle without following any separate independent proceedings and, therefore, in view of aforesaid observations made by this Court, award made by claims Tribunal which are under challenge in these appeals stand modified to the extent that appellant insurance company is exonerated from liability to pay compensation to claimants by indemnifying owner of vehicle involved in accident and rest of directions issued by claims Tribunal in impugned awards are remaining in tact and it can be enforced by claimants against owner and driver of respective vehicle for recovering amount of compensation awarded by respective claim tribunals. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed to extent indicated herein above with no order as to costs.