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2009 DIGILAW 566 (PNJ)

Ram Singh And Another v. Hardip Singh And Others

2009-03-24

RAJIVE BHALLA

body2009
Judgment Rajive Bhalla, J. 1. The appellants challenge the judgment and decree dated 08.10.1979, passed by the Additional District Judge, Barnala accepting the appeal filed by the respondents, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Barnala, dated 30.08.1979 and as a result, dismissing the suit filed by the appellants. 2. The plaintiff-appellants, Ram Singh and Hamir Kaur filed a suit praying for grant of a declaration that the collusive decree dated 09.02.1972, and the mutation No. 4353 dated 08.04.1976 sanctioned thereon be declared null and void. The appellants pleaded that Hamir Kaur, appellant No. 2 is the legally wedded wife of Attal Singh. As they were issueless, they adopted Ram Singh (appellant No. 1) by a registered adoption deed dated 06.04.1960, duly signed by Ram Singhs natural parents and by Attal Singh and Hamir Kaur. Attal Singh however abandoned Hamir Kaur and Ram Singh and began living with Amarjit Kaur who gave birth to five children. Attal Singh, in order to deprive Ram Singh of his share in ancestral property suffered an illegal and collusive decree dated 09.02.1972, transferring the suit land in favour of Hardip Singh, Devinder Singh and Karamjit Singh sons of Amarjit Kaur. 3. In opposition, the respondents denied the adoption and averred that Amarjit Kaur is the legally wedded wife of Attal Singh. The decree passed in their favour, on the basis of the compromise, is legal and valid and as Attal Singh, is a Sikh Jat, he is not governed by Hindu Law in matters of alienation, succession and adoption. It was also averred that as the suit land is neither ancestral nor coparcenary property, Attal Singh was free to alienate the property in any such manner as he deemed appropriate. 4. It would be necessary to mention here that Attal ingh, who was arraigned as a defendant in the suit, put in appearance before the trial court, but did not file a written statement. He was eventually proceeded against ex parte on 16.05.1976, but subsequently appeared as a witness to depose in favour of the respondents. 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned trial court framed the following issues : "1. Whether Ram Singh plaintiff is adopted son of Attal Singh defendant ? OPP 2. Whether Ram Singh plaintiff and Attal Singh defendant constitute joint Hindu family? OPP 3. Whether the suit property is coparcenary property? 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned trial court framed the following issues : "1. Whether Ram Singh plaintiff is adopted son of Attal Singh defendant ? OPP 2. Whether Ram Singh plaintiff and Attal Singh defendant constitute joint Hindu family? OPP 3. Whether the suit property is coparcenary property? OPP 4. Whether the impugned decree dated 09.02.1972 is collusive between defendant No. 1 and defendants Nos. 3, 4, 5 and is not binding on the plaintiffs ? OPP 5. Whether Amar Kaur is not legally wedded wife of Attal Singh defendant and defendant Nos. 3,4, 5 are not the issues of Attal Singh defendant and Amar Kaur ? OPP 6. Whether defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have not been correctly described ? OPD 6-A) Whether the suit is within time ? OPP 6-B Whether the plaintiff is governed by the Hindu Succession Act in the matters of alienation? OPP 7. Relief." 6. After considering the pleadings, the evidence adduced and the arguments addressed, the (trial court) decreed the suit and held that the judgment and decree dated 09.02.1972 and mutation No.4353 sanctioned on 08.04.1976 are illegal and void. It was held that Ram Singh was validly adopted by Attal Singh and Hamir Kaur by a registered adoption deed dated 06.04.1960. It was also held that as the suit land is ancestral coparcenary property, the judgment and decree dated 09.02.1972, suffered by Attal Singh, would not deprive Ram Singh of his rights in coparcenary property. The learned trial court also held that as Attal Singhs first wife namely Hamir Kaur is alive, his marriage with Amarjit Kaur is void and their progeny would have no right, title or interst in the suit property. Aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment and decree, the respondents filed an appeal. The first appellate court accepted the appeal, reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and dismissed the suit. 7. The first appellate court held that though the adoption deed dated 06.04.1960 reflects Ram Singhs adoption by Attal Singh and Hamir Kaur, but as his witnesses have deposed that the actual adoption took place when Ram Singh was 2 years old i.e. before the coming into force of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), its legality would have to be adjudged on the basis of customary law prevalent prior to the Act. It was, therefore, held that as Ram Singh has failed to prove the ceremonies of adoption, his claim as the adopted son of Attal singh has to be rejected. It was also held that even if it is to be presumed that adoption took place after the coming into force of the Act, as Ram Singh has failed to establish ceremonies of adoption, he could not be held to be the adopted son of Attal Singh. The first appellate Court also proceeded to hold that the suit property is not ancestral, coparcenary or Hindu Joint family property and, therefore, upheld the right of Attal Singh to deal with the property in any such manner as he deemed appropriate. The first appellate Court also held the suit to be barred by limitation. 8. Counsel for the appellants submits that the first appellate court has committed serious errors of law. Ram Singh was adopted by a registered adoption deed dated 06.04.1960, duly signed by his natural parents Norang Singh and Chitan Kaur and the adoptive parents Attal Singh and Hamir Kaur. The adoption deed contains recitals, by Attal Singh himself, that the child has been placed in his lap by the natural parents and all customary ceremonies have been performed. The ingredients of a valid adoption, as set out under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) namely the giving in and the taking of a child in adoption having been established, the presumption attached to the registered adoption deed, by Section 16 of Act came into play. The first appellate court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to reject the adoption deed. The first appellate court placed reliance upon inconsequential and irrelevant contradictions in the oral deposition of the appellants witnesses, to hold that the adoption took place prior to the coming into force of the Act, and its validity therefore, would have to be determined on the anvil of custom prevalent prior to the Act. It is submitted that recitals in the registered adoption deed could not be discarded by relying upon oral contradictions in the cross-examination, even by the appellants witnesses, as no amount of oral evidence can be pressed into service to discredit a written document. It is further argued that when Attal Singh stepped into the witness box he could not deny his signature on the adoption deed. It is further argued that when Attal Singh stepped into the witness box he could not deny his signature on the adoption deed. The ingredients of a valid adoption having been established, the onus, to rebut the presumption attached to the registered adoption deed, under Section 16 of the Act, lay upon the respondents. In the absence of any averment in the written statement or evidence, adduced by the respondents to rebut this presumption the first appellate court committed an error in rejecting the validly proved adoption deed. 9. It is further canvassed that in view of his adoption, Ram Singh was conferred the status of a natural born son. He, therefore, along with Attal Singh constituted a joint Hindu family and became a coparcener in the ancestral property. The findings to the contrary, returned by the first appellate court, are unsustainable in fact and in law. The first appellate courts finding that only a nominal part of the property is ancestral is factually incorrect as is not based upon pleadings or evidence and should therefore, be set aside. 10. As. regards the finding that the suit is barred by limitation, it is submitted that the appellants were not privy to the collusive decree. They derived knowledge when the mutation of ownership was sanctioned. The suit was filed within three years of the mutation and was, therefore, within time. As regards the first appellate courts finding that even if the property is joint and Ram Singh is the adopted son, Attal Singh being the Karta was entitled to alienate the property in any manner he deemed appropriate. It is submitted that a Karta may alienate coparcenary property but for legal necessity and then also for the benefit of the joint family. A Karta cannot alienate property so as to fraudulently deprive a coparcener or a co-sharer of his share in the property held jointly with the Karta. It is, therefore, prayed that the appeal be accepted and the impugned judgment and decree be set aside. 11. Counsel for the respondents on the other hand submits that the correctness of the adoption deed stands rebutted by the oral depositions of the appellants witnesses as they have deposed that Ram Singh was adopted when he was 2 years old. It is, therefore, prayed that the appeal be accepted and the impugned judgment and decree be set aside. 11. Counsel for the respondents on the other hand submits that the correctness of the adoption deed stands rebutted by the oral depositions of the appellants witnesses as they have deposed that Ram Singh was adopted when he was 2 years old. The appellants witnesses are discrepant as to the age of Ram Singh at the time of his alleged adoption i.e. the year, the date and the time of adoption and have failed to depose in unison with respect to the ceremonies of adoption, the first appellate Court was justified in concluding that the alleged adoption predates the Act and, therefore, in the absence of any proof of customary ceremonies of adoption cannot be accepted. It is further submitted that even if it is presumed that Ram Singh was adopted by Attal Singh, the latter being a Jat agriculturist is not barred, by any law whether statutory or customary from alienating the property or suffering the impugned decree. The first appellate court rightly held that the suit was barred by limitation as the decree dated 09.02.1972 was impugned on 17.07.1976 i.e. after a period of three years. It is also argued that as no question of law much less a substantial question of law arises for consideration the appeal be dismissed. 12. The following questions of law arise for consideration :- 1. Whether limitation, to challenge a decree commences from the date of the decree or from the date of its knowledge ? 2. Whether in view of Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 , written recitals in the registered adoption deed dated 6.4.1960 could be discarded by relying upon oral depositions to the contrary ? 3. Whether after the coming into force of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a registered adoption deed can be held to be invalid for want of customary ceremonies of adoption or failure to prove the ceremonies ? 4. Whether the presumption of truth attached to a registered adoption deed, under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 can be said to be discharged by failure to prove ceremonies of adoption ? 5. 4. Whether the presumption of truth attached to a registered adoption deed, under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 can be said to be discharged by failure to prove ceremonies of adoption ? 5. Whether the First Appellate Court committed an error of jurisdiction in ignoring the pleadings and the absence of any evidence while holding that the suit land is not ancestral ? 6. Whether a Karta can suffer a collusive decree, alienating ancestral property, without legal necessity, thereby depriving coparceners of their share ? 13. Before proceedingto record any opinion with respect to the substantial questions of law it would be appropriate to examine the statutory provisions that govern adoptions. 14. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 was enacted so as to codify law relating to adoptions and maintenance, amongst Hindus and other religious denominations. Prior to its codification, adoptions were governed by Hindu Law and Custom, both tribal and local which varied from region to region and community to community. Each set of customary rules provided for different sets of ceremonies. Failure to adhere to these ceremonies or establish them by cogent evidence rendered, such an adoption invalid. 15. With the enactment of the Act a paradigm shift occurred in the law relating to adoptions. Section 2(a) of the Act provides that the Act would apply to any person who is a Hindu but sub-section 2(b) extends its applicability to any person who is a Buddhist, Jain or Sikh by religion. As parties to the present petition are Sikh by religion, the provisions of the Act would necessarily apply to them. Section 4 of the Act postulates that save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to operate with respect to any matter for which this Act provides. Section 5 of the Act provides that henceforth no adoption shall be made, except and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and any adoption to the contrary shall be void. Section 5 of the Act is a statement of legislative intent that after the enactment of the Act adoptions shall be carried out in terms thereof. 16. Section 5 of the Act provides that henceforth no adoption shall be made, except and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and any adoption to the contrary shall be void. Section 5 of the Act is a statement of legislative intent that after the enactment of the Act adoptions shall be carried out in terms thereof. 16. Sections 6 of the Act sets out the conditions required for a valid adoption, namely, the persons giving or taking in adoption have the capacity to do so, the person adopted is capable of being taken in adoption and the adoption is made in accordance with the other conditions mentioned in this chapter. Section 7 of the Act enables any male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor to take a son or a daughter in adoption, but not without the consent of his wife. Section 8 of the Act provides the circumstances in which a female Hindu may adopt a child. Section 9 of the Act sets out that no person other than the father, the mother or the guardian shall give a child in adoption. Section 10 of the Act enumerates the conditions under which a person is capable of being taken in adoption. Section 11 of the Act sets out conditions for a valid (MATTER OMITTED) or mother for all purposes from the date of the adoption and his ties with his natural family shall stand severed from the said date subject, however, to provisos (a), (b) and (c). Section 13 of the Act which empowers the adoptive parents to dispose of their property by transfer inter-vivos or by Will, subject, however, to any agreement to the contrary. Section 15 of the Act sets out that no adoption, which has been validly made can he cancelled by the adoptive father or mother or any other person nor can the adopted child renounce his or her status and return to the family of his or her birth. Section 16 of the Act requires a Court to raise a presumption of validity, whenever any document registered under law, purporting to record an adoption duly signed by the parents giving and taking in adoption is produced before it, subject, however, to its being disproved. 17. Section 16 of the Act requires a Court to raise a presumption of validity, whenever any document registered under law, purporting to record an adoption duly signed by the parents giving and taking in adoption is produced before it, subject, however, to its being disproved. 17. A perusal of these statutory provisions, clearly sets out that after the enforcement of the Act, adoptions are to be carried out, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and only such adoptions as fulfil statutory requirement as set out under the Act shall be legal and binding. The Act, does away with adoptions as prescribed by Hindu Law, custom or by usage and consequently with the need for ceremonies of adoption prescribed under Hindu Law or custom. The Act sets out a simplified procedure for adoption referred to as the "giving in" and "taking of in adoption. The use of the words, "giving in" and "taking of, in adoption lays emphasis on the act of the natural parents entrusting the person of their child to the adoptive parents and not on any religious, customary or tribal ceremony. Legitimacy is conferred by the act of giving in and taking of in adoption and not by the ceremonies. Reference in this regard may be made to ajudgment of Honble the Supreme Court titled as Kartar Singh (minor) v. Surjan Singh (dead) ana others, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 2161, where while considering the ambit of section 4 of the Act viz-a-viz the customary forms of adoption and ceremonies it has been held as follows :- "5. After the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 came into force there is no room for any customary adoption. Section 4 of the Act specifically provides that "any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as a part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of that Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in that Act." Therefore, the question of arty customary adoption, as was in force in Punjab before that Act came into force, does not any longer arise. 7. 7. XX XX XX After the abolition of the customary law of adoption, whether of the formal or of the informal kind, there is no room for any argument about the validity of the adoption provided the formalities prescribed by law are complied with. The words in Section 11, clause (vi) of the Act with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its adoption" are merely indicative of the result of actual giving and taking by the parents or guardians concerned referred to in the earlier part of the clause. Where an adoption ceremony is gone through and the giving and taking takes place there cannot be any other intention. The parties did not intend to go through a play acting or to put up a show. They obviously intended to comply with the requirement of law that for a valid adoption there must be giving and taking." 18. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that customary forms of adoption and ceremonies attended thereto are no longer necessary for a valid adoption. The absence of ceremonies of adoption or the proof thereof would not invalidate an adoption, made after the coming into force of the Act, if it is otherwise valid. The validity of an adoption, made after the coming into force of the Act, must therefore be determined on the anvil of statutory requirements set out under the Act not on customary forms of adoption or ceremonies prescribed thereunder. By enactment of Section 16. the Act seeks to address controversies as to the validity of an adoption and in essence reduces the scope for challenge by providing that Court shall raise a presumption of truth to an adoption, reduced into writing and registered in accordance with law, preceded however by a giving in and a taking of in adoption and duly signed by both sets of parents. 19. A significant declaration of the adopted childs rights, relevant for the present controversy, is incorporated in Section 12 of the Act, which provides that the adopted child shall be a part of the adoptive family Section 12 confers the status of a natural born child on the adopted child, from the date of the adoption. 19. A significant declaration of the adopted childs rights, relevant for the present controversy, is incorporated in Section 12 of the Act, which provides that the adopted child shall be a part of the adoptive family Section 12 confers the status of a natural born child on the adopted child, from the date of the adoption. As a necessary corollary the adopted child would assume the status of a member of the Joint family and as a consequence the status of a coparcener with all rights in joint family or coparcenary property held by his adoptive father. 20. Before proceeding to decide the dispute on merits it would be necessary to examine a few ancillary questions that have been held against the appellants. 21. The first question of law that requires adjudication is whether limitation, commences from the date of the decree or from the date of its knowledge. The judgment and decree impugned in the suit was passed on 19.02.1972. Admittedly, the appellants were not parties to the decree. The mutation was sanctioned on 08.04.1976 and the suit was filed on 17.07.1976. Section 59 of (sic Article 59) the Limitation Act, 1963 postulates, that the limitation to cancel or set aside a decree is three years when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree cancelled or set aside first became known to him i.e. from the date of knowledge of the passing of such judgment and decree. It is apparent from the pleadings and the evidence that the appellants were unaware of the judgment and decree and only came to know about its existence after sanction of the mutation on 08.04.1976. The respondents have failed to place any evidence on record to establish that the appellants had knowledge of the judgment and decree dated 19.2.1972 before the sanction of the mutation. The first appellate court ignored Section 59 (sic Article 59) and by placing reliance upon Section 58 (sic Article 58) held that limitation would commence from the date of decree. Section 58 (sic Article 58) is a residuary provision that applies to situations where a specific period of limitation is not prescribed. The first appellate court ignored Section 59 and therefore, wrongly held that limitation would commence from the date of the decree. Section 58 (sic Article 58) is a residuary provision that applies to situations where a specific period of limitation is not prescribed. The first appellate court ignored Section 59 and therefore, wrongly held that limitation would commence from the date of the decree. The limitation therefore, to challenge the judgment and decree dated 19.2.1972 would commence from the date of knowledge i.e. from the date of sanction of the mutation and the suit was, therefore, necessarily within time. The finding of the first appellate court, that the suit is barred by limitation is, therefore, reversed and that of the trial court is restored 22. The second question of law is whether the first appellate court could have discarded the document reduced into writing i.e. the registered adoption deed dated 6.4.1960 by placing reliance upon alleged contradictions in the cross- examination or the appellants witnesses and thereby hold that as the adoption predates the enactment of the Act its legality would have to be determined on the basis of customary ceremonies of adoption prevalent before the Act came into force. Any answer to this question would necessarily involve an appraisal of the adoption deed, the evidentiary value to be attached to the recitals in a registered adoption deed and whether oral evidence i.e. these alleged contradictions can be pressed into service to discredit the date of adoption and as a result the adoption recorded in the registered adoption deed. The adoption deed Ex.P1 dated 6.4.1960, contains clear recitals, at the behest of Attal Singh, that (a) at the time of adoption, the child, Ram Singh is aged 10 years, (b) ceremonies of adoption have been performed (c) the child has been placed in the lap of Attal Singh by the natural parents Norang Singh and Chitan Kaur, (d) Ram Singh is being adopted by Attal Singh and (e) Hamir Kaur his wife has no objection to the adoption. The adoption was reduced into writing and registered as an adoption deed on 06.04.1960. It is duly signed/thumb marked by Attal Singh and Hamir Kaur, as the adoptive parents and by Norang Singh and Chitan Kaur, the natural parents. The adoption was reduced into writing and registered as an adoption deed on 06.04.1960. It is duly signed/thumb marked by Attal Singh and Hamir Kaur, as the adoptive parents and by Norang Singh and Chitan Kaur, the natural parents. The adoption deed has been duly proved by producing the scribe Mitter Sen PW2, and by the depositions of Norang Singh and Chitan Kaur PW3 and PW3/A, the natural parents and most significant of all the deposition of Hamir Kaur PW5 wife of Attal Singh, the adoptive mother. It would also be necessary to mention here that Attal Singh stepped into the witness box on behalf of the respondents but was unable to deny his signatures on the adoption deed. He, however, made an unsuccessful attempt to wriggle out of the adoption by deposing that the contents of the adoption deed were not read over to him, before he appended his signatures. The adoption deed Ex.P1 contains specific recitals, at the behest of Attal Singh that acknowledge the giving in and taking of in adoption on 06.04.1960 when Ram Singh was aged 10 years. In view of this overwhelming proof that the adoption took place on 06.04.1960, it belies comprehension as to how the first appellate court could have held, on the basis of contradictions, in the cross-examination of the appellants witnesses that the adoption predates the enforcement of the Act. 23. The first appellate court accepted that on 06.04.1960 Ram Singh was 10 years old. The execution and registration of the adoption deed on 06.04.1960 was also accepted. However, the first appellate court discarded the adoption deed on the ground that the appellants, mother, father and other witnesses had deposed during cross-examination that Ram Singh was given in adoption when he was 2 years old. From this part of the cross-examination an inference was drawn that the adoption predates the Act and would, therefore, be governed by the customary ceremonies of adoption. It was further held that as the appellants had failed to prove the customary ceremonies of adoption their plea that Ram Singh is the adopted son of Attal Singh has to be rejected. While returning this finding the first appellate court fell into error as it disregarded a fundamental and substantive principle of the law that no amount of oral evidence shall be looked into or given as proof for or against a document. While returning this finding the first appellate court fell into error as it disregarded a fundamental and substantive principle of the law that no amount of oral evidence shall be looked into or given as proof for or against a document. It also ignored the presumption of correctness attached to a registered adoption deed, by Section 16 of the Act. The principle that no amount of oral evidence shall, be looked into or given as proof for or against a document is incorporate in Chapter-VI of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and finds statutory voice in Sections 91, 92 and 93 thereof. In order to place the above principle in its right perspective a reference to a judgment of the Apex Court in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thandani, 2003(1) RCR(Rent) 614 (SC) : AIR 2003 SC 2418 would be necessary. 13. Section 91 relates to evidence of terms of contract, grants and other disposition of properties reduced to form of document. This section merely forbids proving the contents of a writing otherwise than by writing itself; it is covered by the ordinary rule of law of evidence, applicable not merely to solemn writings of (MATTER OMITTED) best evidence rule. It is in reality declaring a doctrine of the substantive law, namely, in the case of a written contract, that of all proceedings and contemporaneous oral expressions of the thing are merged in the writing or displaced by it. (See Thayers Preliminary Law on Evidence p.397 and p.398; Phipson Evidence 7th Edn. P.546; Wigmores Evidence p.2406.) It has been best described by Wigmore stating that the rule is in no sense a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive Law. It does not exclude certain data because they are for one or another reason untrustworthy or undesirable means of evidencing some fact to be proved." 16. The practical consequence of integration is that its scattered parts, in their former and inchoate shape, have no longer any jural effect; they are replaced by a single embodiment of the act. In other words, when a jural act is embodied in a single memorial all other utterances of the parties on the topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their act. In other words, when a jural act is embodied in a single memorial all other utterances of the parties on the topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their act. This rule is based upon an assumed intention on the part of the contracting parties evidenced by the existence of the written contract, place themselves above the uncertainties of oral evidence and on a disinclination of oral Courts to defeat this object. 17. It is likewise a general and most inflexible rule that wherever written instruments are appointed either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments or to contradict or alter them. This is a matter both of principle and policy. It is of principle because such instruments, are in their own nature and origin, entitled to a much higher degree of credit than parol evidence. It is of policy because it would be attended with great mischief if those instruments, upon which mens rights depended were liable to be impeached by loose collateral evidence. (See Starkie on Evidence p. 648). 18. In Section 92 the legislature has prevented oral evidence being adduced for the purpose of varying the contract as between the parties to the contract; but, no such limitations are imposed under Section 91. Having regard to the jural position of Sections 91 and 92 and the deliberation omission from Section 91 of such words of limitation, it must be taken note of that even a third party if he wants to establish a particular contract between certain others, either when such contract has been reduced to in a document or where under the law such contract has to be in writing, can only prove such contract by the production of such writing 19. Sections 91 and 92 apply only when the document on the face of it contains or appears to contain all the terms of the contract. Section 91 is concerned solely with the mode of proof of a document which limitation improved by Section 92 relates only to the parties to the document. Sections 91 and 92 apply only when the document on the face of it contains or appears to contain all the terms of the contract. Section 91 is concerned solely with the mode of proof of a document which limitation improved by Section 92 relates only to the parties to the document. If after the document has been produced to prove its terms under Section 91; provisions of Section 92 come into operation for the purpose of excluding evidence of any oral agreement or statement for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from its term. Sections 91 and 92 in effect supplement each other. Section 91 would be inoperative without the aid of Section 92, and similarly Section 92 would be inoperative without the aid of Section 91. 20. The two sections, all however, different in some material particulars. Section 91 applies to all documents, whether they purport to dispose of rights or not, whereas Section 92 applies to documents which can be described as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents which are both bilateral and unilateral, unlike Section 92 the application of which is confined only to bilateral documents. (See : Bai Hira Devi and Ors. v. Official Assignee of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 448). Both these provisions are based on "best evidence rule". In Bacons Maxim Regulation 23, Lord Bacon said "The law will not couple and mingle matters of speciality, which is of the higher account, with matter of averment which is of inferior account in law". It would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory. 21. The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are (i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law, (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory. of the cross-examination rejected the recitals in the registered adoption deed, a course impermissible in law. of the cross-examination rejected the recitals in the registered adoption deed, a course impermissible in law. The first appellate court disregarded the fact that parties had reduced their intention of giving in and taking of in adoption, into writing so as to avoid any future dispute, i.e.".....to place themselves above the uncertainties of oral evidence......." The first appellate court lost sight of the substantive principle of law that recitals in documents cannot be altered or varied by oral evidence and had no power to disregard the intention of the parties and proceed to hold that the adoption predates the Act. 2.6. The statements in the cross-examination, contrary to the recitals in the adoption deed could not have been pressed into service to return a finding at variance with the contents of registered adoption deed for another reason. Section 16 of the Act requires a Court to raise a presumption of validity, whenever any document registered under law, purporting to record an adoption duly signed by the parents giving and taking in adoption is produced before it, subject, however, to its being disproved. The onus therefore to disprove the adoption deed lay upon the respondents. It would require necessary mention that at no stage of the proceedings whether in their pleadings or in their evidence have the respondents pleaded or led any evidence to rebut the presumption attached to the adoption deed. Their positive assertion is a firm denial of the adoption. It was never their case that Ram Singh was adopted by Attal Singh, before the Act. In the absence of any plea by the respondents or the appellants that the adoption predates the Act, the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to hold that adoption took place when Ram Singh was 2 years old i.e. prior to the Act. The finding returned by the first appellate court, suffers from a misunderstanding of law, a misreading of the nature of the document Ex. P1, a failure to comprehend the presumption under Section 16 of the Act, an incorrect application of the principle that no amount of oral evidence shall be looked into to discredit or discard a document reduced into writing and an abject failure to appraise the written statement filed by the respondents. The second question of law is, therefore, answered accordingly. 27. The second question of law is, therefore, answered accordingly. 27. At this stage, it would be necessary to mention here that in view of the answer to the first two substantial questions of law, it would have to be held that Ram Singh was adopted pursuant to 22. This Court in Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chhabubai, AIR 1982 SC 20 and Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) thru LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs., 2000(1) RCR(Civil) 168 : 1999(2) RCR(Rent) 714 : AIR 2000 SC 426, with reference to Section 92(1) held that it is permissible to a party to a deed to contend that the deed was not intended to be acted upon, but was only a sham document. The bar arises only when the document is relied upon and its terms are sought to be varied and contradicted. Oral evidence is admissible to show that document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties. 24. The above reproduced extract succinctly sets out the basis for the rule that no amount of oral evidence shall be looked into so as to discredit or discard or alter the terms and conditions of an agreement reduced into writing. The principle that underlines this rule is based upon the intention of parties "..to place themselves above the uncertainties of oral evidence.. and is, therefore, a rule of substantive law as, opposed to a mere rule of evidentiary prudence. 25. The first appellate court, disregarded this principle, rejected the registered adoption deed, discarded the statutory presumption attached to a registered adoption deed and ignored the recitals in the adoption deed Ex. P-1 that Ram Singh was adopted on 06.04.1960 when he was 10 years old. The first appellate court placed a selective reliance upon a part of the cross-examination of Ram Singhs natural parents and Hamir Kaur where they allegedly stated that Ram Singh was adopted when he was 2 years old. On the basis of this finding it was held that as Ram Singh was adopted before the Act, the adoption was invalid for failure to prove the ceremonies of adoption. On the basis of this finding it was held that as Ram Singh was adopted before the Act, the adoption was invalid for failure to prove the ceremonies of adoption. The first appellate court was required to consider the depositions in their entirety, appraise the recitals in the adoption deed in accordance with the statutory presumption attached thereto, consider the failure of Attal Singh to deny his signatures on the adoption deed, examine the adoption deed as it clearly recites, at the behest of Attal Singh, that he is adopting Ram Singh aged 10 years, on 06.04.1960 and only thereafter consider the contradictions in the cross-examination. The first appellate court, however chose to disregard these facts and by a selective reliance upon parts the adoption deed Ex. P-l, dated 06.04.1960 when he was 10 years old i.e. after the coming into force of the Act and the finding, to the contrary, recorded by the first appellate court, based upon a failure to apply the correct position in law is set aside. 26. The third and fourth substantial questions of law shall be answered together. As referred to in the earlier part of the judgment, after the coming into force of the Act, ceremonies of adoption prescribed under Hindu Law and Custom are no longer essential. The absence of these ceremonies would, detract from the legality of an adoption, that is if otherwise valid, has been reduced into writing, is registered in accordance with law and does not suffer from any of the legal impediments set out by the Act. To such a registered adoption deed Section 16 of the Act attaches a presumption of truth. Section 16 of the Act reads as follows :- "16. Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved." 27 The presumption under Section 16 arises when (a) the document purports to record an adoption (b) the document is registered in accordance with law (c) the document is signed by both sets of parents i.e. parents giving in adoption and parents taking in adoption. It is, therefore manifest that where a party, produces, as evidence of adoption, a registered document that fulfils the conditions of a valid adoption and is duly signed by the natural and the adoptive parents, a court would be statutorily required to raise a presumptive proof as to its validity and like all presumptions may be disproved by the other party. The registered adoption deed, Ex.Pl satisfies the ingredients of Section 16 of the Act and, therefore, could not have been discarded by the first appellate court, in the absence of any evidence to rebut its correctness by relying upon selective portions of the oral depositions of the appellants witnesses. It would require mention that the adoption deed, executed at the behest of Attal Singh contains a clear recital that ceremonies of adoption have been performed before the child was placed in his lap. It would, therefore, necessarily have to be held that as the adoption deed Ex. P1 reflects a legal and valid adoption that fulfils the criteria of a legal and valid adoption as set out by the Act it could not have been rejected by the first appellate court. 28. As it has been held hereinbefore that recitals in a document cannot be rebutted by oral evidence, the mere fact that the appellants witnesses have not deposed with respect to the customary ceremonies of establish ceremonies of adoption, would not detract from its validity as it no longer necessary to establish ceremonies of adoption apart from the giving in and the taking of in adoption. 29. The third and fourth questions of law are, therefore, answered in the aforementioned terms. 30. Once it has been held that the document Ex.P1 is a legal and valid adoption deed reflecting the adoption of Ram Singh by Attal Singh the other findings returned by the first appellate court do not present any degree of difficulty. 31. The first appellate court proceeded to hold that the suit land was the personal property of Attal Singh and even if Ram Singh is proved to be the adopted son of Attal Singh, the appellants had no right to challenge the alleged consent decree suffered by Attal Singh in favour of the children of Amarjit Kaur. It would be necessary to mention here that there is no evidence on record whether oral or documentary to support this finding. It would be necessary to mention here that there is no evidence on record whether oral or documentary to support this finding. The first appellate court noticed that the share of Attal Singh in the ancestral property is 8 Bighas and 18 Biswas but thereafter for reasons, that are neither spelt out nor discernible, went on to hold that as this land had swelled to 98 kanals 9 marlas, Attal Singh must have acquired, property other than ancestral property. The first appellate court apparently disregarded the pre consolidation and post consolidation revenue record which clearly establishes that post consolidation, the land increased on account of its inferior quality. The first appellate court, also ignored the difference between bighas and biswas and kanal and marla. It would also be necessary to mention here that the respondents have not placed any evidence on record that would even remotely suggest that Attal Singh purchased any property or added to the estate received from his father. Consequently the finding by the first appellate court, based upon a misreading of the evidence would have to be set aside and it would have to be held that the suit property was received by Attal Singh from his ancestors it partakes the nature of ancestral property and therefore, Ram Singh his adopted son, is a coparcener therein. The fifth question of law is answered accordingly. 32. The only question that survives for adjudication is whether Attal Singh could suffer a consent decree in favour of the children of Amarjit Kaur depriving Ram Singh of his rights as a coparcener. It appears that after the adoption Attal Singh abandoned his wife Hamir Kaur and his adopted son Ram Singh. He began to reside with Amarjit Kaur. Five children, three daughters and two sons were born to Amarjit Kaur. Amarjit Kaur was apparently aware of the adoption and, therefore, with Attal Singh decided to protect the interest of her children. Amarjit Kaur filed a collusive suit, as guardian of the respondents claiming a right in the suit property. Attal Singh, promptly conceded the suit leading to the passing of the impugned decree. The trial court held thatthejudgmentand decree is void. Amarjit Kaur filed a collusive suit, as guardian of the respondents claiming a right in the suit property. Attal Singh, promptly conceded the suit leading to the passing of the impugned decree. The trial court held thatthejudgmentand decree is void. The first appellate court, however, rejected the challenge to this decree by firstly holding that the property was not ancestral or joint Hindu family property and then that even if it is held to be so Attal Singh as the karta is entitled to deal with the property in any such manner as he may deem appropriate. The nature of the property has already been dealt with in the preceding paragraph and does not require repetition. Undoubtedly a karta has an absolute right to deal with joint Hindu family property. He, however holds this property in a relationship akin to a trust for and on behalf of the body of co-sharers and coparceners. A karta may if deemed appropriate alienate this property, but for legal necessity or better management. A coparcener has proprietary interest in the joint property, by reason of birth or adoption and not by any reason of any right conferred by the Karta. Thus, where a karta makes a legitimate alienation, a co-sharer cannot lay challenge to its validity. Where however the alienation is effectuated with intent to deprive a co-sharer of his right by birth or adoption, by fraud or deceit, such an alienation would be void and cannot be conferred legitimacy, by reference to any theory of the nature of a coparcenary, the rights of coparceners or the nature of the office of a Karta. Depriving a coparcener, by fraud, of his rightful share in coparcenary property vitiates the act and even though perpetuated under the cloak of a Kartas right to alienate property would not be immune from challenge. Fraud is an anathema to the rule of justice and renders all acts void ab initio. Section 12 of the Act, prescribes that the adopted child shall be deemed to be child of his adopted father or mother for all purposes, with effect from the date of his adoption. An adopted son, therefore, becomes a member of the coparcenary or the holder in common of the joint property, with his adoptive parents. Section 12 of the Act, prescribes that the adopted child shall be deemed to be child of his adopted father or mother for all purposes, with effect from the date of his adoption. An adopted son, therefore, becomes a member of the coparcenary or the holder in common of the joint property, with his adoptive parents. The adoptive father would have no right to deprive the adopted child of his rights flowing from the adoption except by way of a legitimate exercise of his power as a Karta. Though Section 13 of the Act postulates that the adoption does not deprive the adoptive father or mother of their power to dispose of their property by a transfer inter vivos or by Will the said section would only apply to property capable of being so transferred. It would not affect the share of an adopted son received, as a result of a valid adoption. 33. Attal Singh transferred his entire property by a collusive and fraudulent decree in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 3, depriving appellant No.l of his rightful share in the property. An argument that alienation by a Karta cannot be challenged during his lifetime is no longer available as Attal Singh passed away during the pendency of these proceedings and even otherwise, the consent decree suffered by Attal Singh would be open to challenge on the ground of a fraud perpetuated to deprive a coparcener of his share in ancestral property. The last question of law is answered accordingly. 34. In view of the above answers to the questions of law it would follow as a natural corollary that the appellant No. 1 Ram Singh was adopted by Attal Singh and Hamir Kaur, by a registered adoption deed dated 06.04.1960.The property held by Attal Singh is ancestral in nature and on account of his adoption Ram Singh had become a coparcener in the suit property. Attal Singh had no right in law to suffer a fraudulent consent decree dated 09.02.1972 so as to undermine the rights of Ram Singh, flowing from his adoption and therefore the decree dated 09.02.1972 is null and void. As the appellants did not have any knowledge of the judgment and decree dated 09.02.1972, the suit filed within three years from the date of knowledge is within time. As the appellants did not have any knowledge of the judgment and decree dated 09.02.1972, the suit filed within three years from the date of knowledge is within time. As a consequence of the above findings, the appeal is allowed, judgment and decree passed by the order as to costs, first appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. No order as to costs. Appeal allowed.