JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. This revision application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 3.4.2009 passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 2, Kamrup at Guwahati in Title Appeal No. 66 of 2007 dismissing the appeal and affirming the decree passed by the learned Munsiff No. 3, Kamrup at Guwahati in Title Suit No. 696 of 2006 (new). By the impugned judgment both the Courts below have passed a decree of eviction of the defendants/petitioners from the suit premises with ancillary decrees like recovery of possession and realization of arrear rent etc. Being aggrieved with the ejectment decree the defendants/tenants have preferred this revision application. 2. I have heard oral argument of Shri C.K. Sarma Barua, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.K. Das, learned Counsel for the respondents. Also gone through the impugned judgment and the records. 3. The facts, necessary for deciding the revision application are as follows: The suit premise was initially owned by a joint Hindu family in the name of its firm known as M/s Mahalchand Dugar and others. The suit premises is one RCC room with an area of 475 square feet situated in the heart of Guwahati city and it was let out to the petitioners nearly 30 years ago for commercial purpose. Around 15 years ago sometime in the year 1991, there was a family settlement and the suit premises fell in the share of the plaintiffs/respondents. Accordingly petitioners started paying rent to the respondents without any change in the terms and conditions of the tenancy. It may be mentioned here that there was no written tenancy agreement between the parties and as per oral agreement the rent was payable in the first week of succeeding month as per English Calendar. According to the plaintiffs monthly rent was paid upto March, 1993 and thereafter the defendants failed to pay the rent from the month of April, 1993 despite raising bills and verbal demand. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that apart from default in payment of rent the suit premises is also required for their own purpose and on these two grounds the ejectment suit was filed in the year 2001. 4. The defendants/petitioners contested the suit denying any default in the payment of the rent. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that apart from default in payment of rent the suit premises is also required for their own purpose and on these two grounds the ejectment suit was filed in the year 2001. 4. The defendants/petitioners contested the suit denying any default in the payment of the rent. It is the case of the petitioners that when they did not receive rent bill for the month of April, 1993 they approached the plaintiffs to accept the rent and on refusal they started depositing rent in the Court. It is the further case of the petitioners that on 1.9.1979 two of the co-owners of the suit premises took a sum of Rs. 70,000/- with a stipulation that the person who shall have the ownership of the godown/property shall be entitled to evict the defendants after refunding the sum of Rs. 70,000/- with interest at the rate of 1.5% per month and on such receipt of money the defendant shall be liable to vacate the god own unconditionally. This document has been proved as Ext. 'Ka'. The suit was also contested on various grounds like its maintainability, cause of action, non-joinder/mis-joinder of parties, valuation etc. Besides this, the defendants also disputed the claim of the plaintiffs that the suit premise was bona fide required for their own purpose. 5. On the basis of the rival pleadings various issues were framed by the Courts below, inter alia, the question of bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiffs, default in payment of rent; implication of letter dated 1.9.1979 whereby a sum of Rs. 70,000/- was paid by the defendants to the co-owners etc. 6. Both the Courts below have answered the issues in favour of the plaintiffs with identical reasoning. 7. While assailing the judgment of the trial Court and the first appellate Court Shri Sarma Barua, learned senior counsel for the petitioners basically raised the following issues: (i) Non-maintainability of the suit by an unregistered firm; (ii) Non-maintainability of the suit without first redeeming the sum of Rs. 70,000/-, paid to the co-owners of the suit premises vide Ext. 'Ka'; (iii) Perverse findings regarding default in payment of rent; and (iv) Claim of the plaintiffs regarding bona fide requirement of the suit premises being without sufficient evidence. 8. 70,000/-, paid to the co-owners of the suit premises vide Ext. 'Ka'; (iii) Perverse findings regarding default in payment of rent; and (iv) Claim of the plaintiffs regarding bona fide requirement of the suit premises being without sufficient evidence. 8. The tenancy of the suit premises is governed by the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (hereinafter in short the 'Rent Control Act')-Section 5 of the Act authorizes landlords to obtain decree for recovery of possession of tenanted premises on fulfilment of certain conditions. Section 5 begins with non-obstante language against passing of eviction decrees, albeit, laying down certain exceptions for such decrees on certain happenings. For ready reference relevant provisions of Section 5 are reproduced below: 5. Bar against passing and execution of decree and orders for ejection.-(1) No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to this full extent allowable under this Act performs the conditions of the tenancy; Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house: (a) Where the tenant has done anything contrary to the provision of Clause (m), Clause (o) or Clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central Act 4 of 1882) or to the spirit of the aforesaid clauses in areas where the said Act does not apply; or (b) where the tenant has been guilty of conduct who is a nuisance or an annoyance to the occupiers of the adjoining or neighbouring houses; or (c) where the house is bona fide required by the landlord either for purposes of repairs or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court; or (d) where the tenant sublets the house or any part thereof or otherwise transfers his interest in the house or any part thereof without permission in writing from the landlord; or (e) where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within a fortnight of its falling due; or (f) where the tenant has built, acquired or been allotted a suitable residence. (2) x x x (3) x x x (4) Where the landlord refuses to accept the lawful rent offered by his tenant, the tenant may within a fortnight of its becoming due, deposit in Court the amount of such rent together with process fees for service of notice upon the landlord, and on receiving such deposit, the Court shall cause notice of the receipt of such deposit to served on the landlord, and the amount of the deposit may thereafter be withdrawn by the landlord of application made by him to the Court in that behalf. A tenant who has made by him to the Court in that behalf. A tenant who has made such deposit shall not be treated as a defaulter under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of this section. 9. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 protects the tenancy right provided the tenant pays the rent allowable under this Act to the transferee. Sub-section (3) postulates post decree conditions on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises. Sub-section (4) empowers the tenant to deposit; rent in the Court within a fortnight of its becoming due in the event of refusal of rent by the landlords. 10. Before adverting to the tenability of the ejectment decrees and merit of the case of either side, I would like to restate that the Rent Control Act is a beneficial piece of legislation. It was enacted to protect the tenants from greedy and grasping landlords and to prevent them from resorting eviction proceedings without reasonable grounds. In the case of Mantos Ali Borbhuyan v. Mahamood Hassaon Laskar; reported in : (1985) 1 GLR (NOC) 1 , this Court has held that protection of weaker section of society is undoubtedly a part of social justice and generally speaking the tenant form a part of the weaker section. Their Lordships went on to observe that excluding affluent tenants the remaining tenants takes shelter in the premises of others, either to reside therein or to run their business and such tenant need protection from the whims, wrath, wrangling and wriggling of the greedy landlords. Similar view has been echoed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass reported in (2005) 5 SCC 375 . In this case their Lordships have observed as below: 25... Similar view has been echoed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass reported in (2005) 5 SCC 375 . In this case their Lordships have observed as below: 25... The rent control legislations generally aim at preventing rack-renting and resorting to evictions by unscrupulous and greedy landlords, who take advantage of the shortage in availability of accommodations in cities and dictate their terms to the tenants and if they do not follow the dictates, subject them to eviction. The rent control legislations are generally heavily loaded in favour of the tenants and the provision dealing with which the Courts at times lean in favour of the landlords is the one which permits the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for his own occupation, residential or non-residential.... 11. FINDINGS : DEFAULTER: As noted earlier it is the case of the respondents that as per the oral agreement the tenants were to pay the monthly rent in the first week of the succeeding month. However, no rent has been paid from the month of April, 1993 and as such the Courts below have rightly held that the defendants were defaulter within the meaning of proviso (e) to Section 5(1) of the Rent Control Act. 12. Shri Sarma Barua, learned Counsel for the tenants/petitioners submitted that the findings of both the Courts below regarding default in payment of rent are perverse inasmuch as the Courts below have failed to take into consideration the fact that rents were deposited in the Court within a fortnight of its becoming due on refusal by the landlord. It was also contended that it was the standing practice for the landlords to issue/raise bills for every month and on receipt of the bills rents used to be paid. However, since the month of April, 1993 the plaintiffs failed to issue any bill for the rent and as such rents were deposited in the Court. The learned Counsel also submitted that on many occasions the landlords were in the habit of receiving rents either in advance or for a cumulative period and this fact has also not been given due weight by lower Courts. 13. Per contra, Shri Das, learned Counsel appearing for the landlords/respondents argued that the High Court should be slow in interfering with the concurrent decrees. With regard to the document (Ext. 13. Per contra, Shri Das, learned Counsel appearing for the landlords/respondents argued that the High Court should be slow in interfering with the concurrent decrees. With regard to the document (Ext. 'Ka') regarding payment of Rs. 70,000/- Sri Das submitted that this payment cannot be directly connected with the rent of the suit premises nor the tenants can take benefit of Ext. 'Ka' since the said document was executed before the family settlement. In other words, it was the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents that after the change of the ownership of the suit premises Ext. 'Ka' lost its significance. At any rate, according to the learned Counsel Rs. 70,000/- was paid in relation to a 'godown' whereas the suit premise is a 'shop' and as such the Courts below have rightly ignored this document. 14. From the averments made in the plaint it appears to me that there was a practice to raise bills for monthly rent and there is no averment or evidence that from the month of April, 1993 onwards bills were raised and despite that rents were not paid. For convenience the relevant part of the pleading is reproduced below: 4. That the defendants paid the monthly rent at the above said rate of Rs. 625/- per month to this plaintiff up to the month of March 1993, and thereafter they did not pay the monthly rent to the plaintiffs in spite of demands made by raising bills and repeated verbal demands. The defendants have neither paid the monthly rents to the plaintiffs nor have they validly deposited the same in the Court. (Emphasis supplied) 15. To establish their case the plaintiffs examined only one witness namely Shri Bhanwarlal Dugar as PW 1. This witness has also admitted in the cross-examination that there was a system to send the bills and thereafter the defendants vised to pay the rent. In the case of S.P. Deshmukh v. Shah Nihal reported in (1977) 3 SCC 515 : AIR 1977 SC 185 it has been held as below: Normally, a monthly tenant is under an obligation to pay rent from month to month. But this obligation is subject to a contract to the contrary. Such contract need not be reflected in a formal document and can be spelt out from the conduct of the parties spread over fairly long period of time. 16. But this obligation is subject to a contract to the contrary. Such contract need not be reflected in a formal document and can be spelt out from the conduct of the parties spread over fairly long period of time. 16. As noted earlier the petitioners were occupying the suit premises on the basis of oral agreement. The defendants have brought on record a series of bills/rent receipts under Ext. 'B' to Ext. 'K' which show that there was a practice to issue bills and also receiving rents for more than one month together. These aspects have been practically overlooked by the lower Courts. 17. Even if it is presumed that the system of raising bills was discontinued then also it appears to me that the plaintiffs did not make out a strong case to prove that the defendants were clear defaulters. Under Section 5(4) of the Rent Control Act, the tenants have been permitted to deposit rents in the Court on refusal by the landlords to accept the same within a fortnight of its becoming due. In the case before me the first default was allegedly made in the month of April, 1993 and the rent for the said month was deposited in the Court on 11.5.1993. This fact is evident from the record of Misc. N.J. Case No. 1449/93 marked as Ext. 'U'. There is no dispute by the landlords that the monthly rents fell due in the first week of succeeding English Calendar month. Hence the rent for the month of April fell due on 7.5.1993 and the same was deposited in the Court within the next four days, which was well within a fortnight of its becoming due. 18. In addition to the aforesaid evidence, indicating that the defendants were indeed did not default in the payment of rent. Ext. 'Ka' is another document which also comes to the rescue of the tenants/petitioners. This is a document executed on 1.9.1979 by two co-owners of the suit premises, namely, Shri Bhanwarlal Dugar (PW 1) and Shri Kanhayalal Dugar acknowledging receipt of Rs. 70,000/- from the father of the defendants with a stipulation that the said amount would be refunded with interest @ 1.50% per month by the persons who would be holding the ownership of the godown/property to get it vacated. 19. Both the learned Courts below have rejected the theory of adjustment of Rs. 70,000/- from the father of the defendants with a stipulation that the said amount would be refunded with interest @ 1.50% per month by the persons who would be holding the ownership of the godown/property to get it vacated. 19. Both the learned Courts below have rejected the theory of adjustment of Rs. 70,000/- against monthly rent at the time of evicting the tenants on the ground that the document referred to a 'godown', whereas the suit premises is a 'shop'. 20. I find from the record that at the initial stage of the trial itself the defendants had specifically taken the plea of advancing a sum of Rs. 70,000/- to the previous landlords as security with a condition that the said amount would be refunded at the time of termination of the tenant in their additional written statement. Despite this specific averment in the written statement, no subsequent pleading was filed by the plaintiff. Strangely, except challenging the document (Ext. 'Ka') on legal grounds the sole plaintiffs' witness did not dispute about the fact of payment of Rs. 70,000/-nor challenged the authenticity of this document. Only during oral argument the document was interpreted so as to relate it to a 'godown' and not to a 'shop'. I make it clear that it is not the case of the plaintiffs/respondents that the defendants have' been let out any other premises, in addition to the suit premises, to use as godown on rent basis to take a view that Rs. 70,000/- must have been paid against the godown and not against the suit premises. 21. Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 deals with rights and liabilities of the lessor vis-a-vis the lessee on the transfer of the leased property. Under this law the liabilities of the lessor do not cease on the transfer of the property, unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him. 22. In the case before me, there was no statutory transfer of the leased property. Only by way of mutual settlement the suit premise was given to one branch of the joint family members. Be that as it may one of the plaintiffs was the signatory to Ext. 'Ka', and as such, his liability to redeem the advance of Rs. 70,000/- continued within the provisions of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. Only by way of mutual settlement the suit premise was given to one branch of the joint family members. Be that as it may one of the plaintiffs was the signatory to Ext. 'Ka', and as such, his liability to redeem the advance of Rs. 70,000/- continued within the provisions of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, I hold that until and unless the said amount of Rs. 70,000/- is paid to the petitioners/defendants, neither the defendants can be said to be defaulter nor the tenancy can be determined. 23. BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT: The next ground to get the defendants evicted from the suit premises is that the same is required for bona fide use of the plaintiffs. The case for bona fide requirement as made out in paragraph 9 of the plaint is reproduced below in extenso: 9. That the plaintiffs further state that the schedule premises is also bona fide required by the plaintiffs for their own use as they and their sons have to do their own business from the schedule premises, and hence the defendants are liable to vacate the schedule premises for the own bona fide use and occupation by the plaintiffs. 24. Shri C.K. Sarma Baruah, learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that before evicting a tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement the landlord has to specify the nature of the purported use of the tenanted premises in its pleadings and the Court cannot entertain a vague plea in this regard. Referring to the judgment of the Gauhati High Court rendered in the case of Jatish Chandra Paul v. Manjurani Paul reported in (1992) 2 GLR 36 and the case of Kailash Singh v. Hiralal Dey reported in (1993) 1 GLR 434 , it was contended that onus is upon the plaintiffs to prove that the suit premises is urgently and bona fide required and such requirement should be genuine and honest. According to the learned senior counsel, the plaintiffs had casually pleaded about the bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises in their pleadings. However, in the affidavit evidence a new story was narrated as to why they have chosen only the defendants shop for the proposed new business, leaving aside other tenanted premises. According to the learned senior counsel, the plaintiffs had casually pleaded about the bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises in their pleadings. However, in the affidavit evidence a new story was narrated as to why they have chosen only the defendants shop for the proposed new business, leaving aside other tenanted premises. According to the learned senior counsel even the statement made in the affidavit evidence are not enough to decree the suit on this count. 25. On the other hand, Shri A.K. Das, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents submitted that it is the prerogative of the landlord to choose any of several tenanted premises for their own purpose. Besides this, it was also contended that a tenant cannot challenge the requirement of the landlord nor can it question as to how the suit premises would be utilized. These submissions were made with the help of two judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan reported in (1996) 5 SCC 353 and in the case of Sait Nagjee Purushotham and Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal reported in (2005) 8 SCC 252 . In fact, these authorities of the Apex Court have also been referred and relied upon by the first appellate Court. 26. It has already been noted in this judgment that rent laws have been basically enacted to protect the tenants from being victimized by the landlords. In other words, like other rent legislations, the Rent Control Act of Assam has also sought to prevent the greedy landlords from resorting to eviction proceedings on flimsy and fabricated grounds. Only a few exceptions have been incorporated in proviso (a) to (f) in Section 5(1) of the Rent Control Act Clause (c) permits landlords to re-occupy the property leased out on rent if the same is bona fide required by them. Since Section 5 of the Rent Control Act is in the negative language for obtaining ejectment decree it can be safely construed that the entire statute is a beneficial legislation for the tenants. As observed by the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Chand (supra) the Courts at times lean in favour of landlords while considering prayer of the landlords for eviction decrees on the ground that the tenanted property is required by them for their own use and occupations. As observed by the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Chand (supra) the Courts at times lean in favour of landlords while considering prayer of the landlords for eviction decrees on the ground that the tenanted property is required by them for their own use and occupations. In my considered opinion, taking a lenient view in favour of the landlords for the aforesaid purpose does not mean that, while doing so, the Courts shall be altogether oblivious of the intention of the legislatures to protect the tenants from vexatious claims of landlords. 27. It is true that when a landlord seeks eviction decree primarily on the ground that the suit property is required for his own use the Courts are not permitted to take an initial presumption that the demand is mala fide nor the Courts are permitted to allow the tenants to advise the landlords to make alternative arrangements for their requirement. In the cases of Sait Nagjee Purushotham and Prativa Devi (supra) and in a catena of decisions the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that a landlord is the best judge of his requirement and choose any place for new business or for extension of the same. In the case of Kailash Chand (supra) the Apex Court has held that hardship of a weak amongst the landlords also need to be given due consideration. As a whole the Courts should be sensitive to the genuine demand of landlords and the issue relating to bona fide requirement of the suit premises should be treaded cautiously so that neither a genuine claim of a landlord is rejected superficially nor a decree on this ground is granted mechanically without meticulously examining the objection of the tenants. In my considered opinion the words bona fide need/requirement are relative terms and each case should be decided on its own facts, albeit, keeping in mind the intention of the legislation and observations of the Apex Court. 28. Before I proceed to give my findings on the issue of bona fide requirement, I make it clear that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as relied upon by the learned Counsel for the landlords as well as the Courts below, are distinguishable on facts and not applicable in the facts and situation of the present case. 28. Before I proceed to give my findings on the issue of bona fide requirement, I make it clear that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as relied upon by the learned Counsel for the landlords as well as the Courts below, are distinguishable on facts and not applicable in the facts and situation of the present case. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham (supra), the landlords had asked for eviction decree to expand the business and under such circumstances their Lordships held that it is always the prerogative of the landlords to seek eviction of tenants and there cannot be any ground to resist such decrees on the plea that landlords are already having their business at different places. Besides this, concurrent decrees of as many as three Courts were upheld on certain additional grounds. Similarly, in the case of Prativa Devi (supra) he Apex Court granted eviction decree since the landlady was 70 years old and she required the tenanted house for her own use. In this case, the eviction decree, granted by the Rent Controller was reversed by the High Court observing that it would be proper for the landlady (widow) to stay under the care of the tenant, as there was no other person to look after her. Overruling the High Court's view the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is the look out of the appellant and not of the High Court as to how an old lady would stay alone. However the facts and circumstances of the case before me are absolutely on different footing. 29. At this stage, I feel it profitable to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari reported in (1999) 7 SCC 275 . In this case, the landlords filed the eviction suit on the ground that they are desirous of living independently away from their father. The decree was passed by the trial Court and upheld by the appellate Court, but the decree was reversed by he High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also affirmed the view taken by the High Court in favour of the tenants by observing thus: 4. From the aforesaid decisions it is clear that mere desire of the landlord to live separately from his father cannot be attributed to his need for the premises occupied by the tenant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also affirmed the view taken by the High Court in favour of the tenants by observing thus: 4. From the aforesaid decisions it is clear that mere desire of the landlord to live separately from his father cannot be attributed to his need for the premises occupied by the tenant. It is often seen that a desire often takes its origin from what one likes and dislikes and necessarily it is not dependent upon his need. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that sometimes the desire may be the outcome of one's need. So when a landlord desires a premises, the requirement of law is that the landlord must set out his need for the premises in his petition and establish that such a need is bona fide. The need must be bona fide, genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. In the present case what we find is that, it was not pleaded by the landlord in his petition that he for certain compelling reasons desired to live separately from his father and for that reason he required the premises. We also do not find any evidence on record to show that the landlord required the premises and his need was bona fide. The only material on record for eviction of the tenants before the Rent Control Authority was mere desire of the landlord to live separately from his father. Such a desire is not a substitute of the need for the premises which a landlord is required to plead and establish. Thus, we are of the view that the landlord's desire to live separately was not a valid ground for eviction of the tenants from the premises. We, therefore, find no substance in the submission of learned Counsel for the appellants. 30. In view of the aforesaid authorities it can be said that the Courts role is not stretchable to examine as to whether the proposed business of the landlords would be profitable or viable one nor the Courts or tenants can advise the landlords to have better residential accommodations than the tenanted premises. However, Courts have a definite role to examine the genuineness in the claim of landlords and it cannot proceed with a presumption that whatever landlords are pleadings are the gospel truth. 31. However, Courts have a definite role to examine the genuineness in the claim of landlords and it cannot proceed with a presumption that whatever landlords are pleadings are the gospel truth. 31. Coming to the case at hand, I would like to remind myself the case of the plaintiffs with regard to bona fide requirement of the suit premises. The averments of the plaintiffs have already been extracted in this judgment. In other words, plaintiffs did not indicate in their pleading as to what is the existing business of the plaintiffs' firm, as well as about its partners i.e. plaintiffs and also as to how the need for additional accommodation arose. Strangely, the plaintiffs' evidence through PW 1 by way of affidavit evidence also remained vague and silent about the necessity of entire 475 sq. feet area under occupation of the defendants and also about the proposed business. 31.1 As could be gathered from the evidence of PW 1 (sole witness on behalf of the plaintiffs) the tenanted premise is situated in a RCC building which has been let out to different tenants. The plaintiffs did not disclose about other tenants and the area in occupation of each tenant in their plaint. Only in the affidavit evidence, PW 1 revealed about existence of two other tenants namely M/s Canara Bank and M/s Madan Electric and Trading Company. However, in the cross-examination PW 1 admitted that there are two more tenants namely M/s Tirpal House and Ravi Steels. PW 1 has deposed that the portion of the building let out to Canara Bank is not suitable for their business as it is situated in the first floor. This assertion of PW 1 could have been accepted at par had the witness indicated the nature of business the plaintiffs were proposing to start. Similarly the ground for not interfering with other tenant is also not convincing. Besides this, PW 1 not only suppressed the fact of having let out the building to several tenants namely M/s Tirpal House, Ravi Steels and L.N. Choudhary the witness also did not give any evidence, fragile or cogent, as to when these tenants were inducted and how much area they are occupying and as to why the space let out to the aforesaid firms are not suitable for the proposed business of the plaintiffs. Had it been a case of single tenant and also had it been a case of requirement of suit premises for residential purpose, the plaintiffs case could have been considered liberally. 32. On the other hand, DW 1 has asserted in the affidavit evidence that still there is sufficient vacant space in the building. Although this averment has been denied in the cross-examination but the denial appears to be a qualified one inasmuch as DW 1 has been given a suggestion that plaintiffs do not have vacant space in the 'ground floor' somehow indicating that some space is available in the first floor. If that be so, the initial attempt by the landlords would have been to request the defendants/petitioners to shift their business in the first floor in order to facilitate the plaintiffs to start a new business in the ground floor. One more fact has emerged from the deposition of DW 1 that the plaintiffs had also started a new business in the year 1997 in the same building under the name and style of M/s Oswal Tirpal Centre. In the cross-examination DW 1 has been given a suggestion that the aforesaid business is run in partnership wherein wife of plaintiff No. 4 is one of the partners. All these facts were suppressed in the pleadings as well as in the chief evidence of PW 1 and in this way the plaintiffs did not come to the Court with clean hands. 33. Somehow both the- Courts below have written identical judgments without meticulously scanning the material suppression of facts and admission of the plaintiffs and their witness. In my considered opinion, since the claim and counter claim of the landlords and tenants is broadly linked to their livelihood, it is desirable that the Courts, which render findings on facts, should exhaustively examine the entire evidence. If gross deficiency in appreciation of evidence is noticed the High Court would certainly step in its revisional jurisdiction. In the case of M/s. Bhoolchand v. Kay Pee Cee Investments AIR 1991 SC 2053 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that while examining eviction decrees under rent laws the High Court's power is not narrow as in Section115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of M/s. Bhoolchand v. Kay Pee Cee Investments AIR 1991 SC 2053 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that while examining eviction decrees under rent laws the High Court's power is not narrow as in Section115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the teeth of the aforesaid observations the Apex Court has also widened the scope of revisional jurisdiction on the ground of jurisdictional error in the case of Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan v. Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur reported in (2009) 5 SCC 162 , in the following words: 43. A civil revision application although must necessarily having regard to the terminologies used in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure involve the question of jurisdiction, the question which would arise is as to what are the jurisdictional questions. A jurisdictional question may arise not only when a Court acts wholly without jurisdiction but also in a case where jurisdictional errors are committed while exercising jurisdiction. There are various facets of "jurisdictional errors". Taking into consideration any irrelevant fact or non-consideration of a relevant fact would involve jurisdictional issue. 34. Having scanned the entire evidence on record, I have come to the conclusion that the eviction suit was basically filed on the ground of default in payment of rent and, as a matter of abundant precaution, the ground of bona fide requirement was also taken as a standby plea to obtain the eviction decree. In view of my findings alluded herein above, I find no hesitation to hold that the landlords/respondents failed to produce cogent and unimpeachable evidence that the tenants, petitioners were defaulters and also that the suit premise is bona fide required by them. 35. In view of my findings rendered on the issue of default in payment of rent and bona fide requirement in favour of the tenants/petitioners. I do not think it necessary to dwell upon the issue of maintainability of the suit by an unregistered firm. I am also not inclined to give any finding in this regard inasmuch as the said technical objection was not specifically raised in the trial Court nor any issue was framed during the trial of the suit. Hence the question is left open so far this case is concerned. 36. In the result, the eviction decree passed by the Courts below is hereby set aside. The revision application stands allowed with costs. Hence the question is left open so far this case is concerned. 36. In the result, the eviction decree passed by the Courts below is hereby set aside. The revision application stands allowed with costs. The lawyers fee for the petitioners is fixed at Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only). 37. Return the L.C. Records with a copy of this judgment forthwith. Application allowed