Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 570 (ORI)

STATE OF ORISSA v. PRAVAT KUMAR PANDA

2009-07-29

I.M.QUDDUSI, PRADIP MOHANTY

body2009
JUDGMENT : I.M. Quddusi,A.C. J. 1. All these Writ Petitions have been filed by the State. While all the Writ Petitions except O.J.C. No. 10462 of 1999, the challenge is to the common Order Dated 23.10.1998 passed by the Orissa Administrative Tribunal in O.A. Nos. 1339, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1344, 1345 & 1362(C) of 1998, O.J.C. No. 10462 of 1999 has been filed challenging the Order Dated 23.1.1999 of the Tribunal passed in O.A. No. 941 of 1998 following the ratio decided in the aforesaid common Order Dated 23.10.1998. Since common questions of fact & law are involved in all the Writ Petitions, they were taken up together & are being disposed of by this common Judgment. 2. The facts of the case are that pursuant to the requisition sent by the State Government in the Home Department for Special recruitment examination for the year 1980-81 & General recruitment examination for the years 1982-83 & 1983-84 to the posts of Junior Assistants in the Orissa Secretariat, the Orissa Public Service Commission issued advertisement No. 3 of 1985-86 inviting applications in the prescribed form from prospective candidates for admission into the competitive examination for 514 posts of Junior Assistants. Out of the 514 vacancies, 128 were reserved for Scheduled Castes, 207 for Scheduled Tribes & 9 for Physically Handicapped candidates. The written examinations were conducted on 28.2.1987 & 1.3.1987 & after the examination merit list of 1984 candidates was sent to the Government which was approved on 1.5.1988. According to Rule 8 of the Orissa Ministerial Service (Method of Recruitment & Conditions of Service of Jr. Assistants of the Office of the Secretariat) Rules, 1951 the result of examination shall be communicated to the Government in the Home Department by the Secretary to the Commission ordinarily before the end of February in the form of a list of successful candidates arranged in order of merit. The list so prepared shall be followed till the result of the next examination is communicated to Government & not thereafter except as provided in Rule 11. It is averred that the Government extended the validity of the merit list from time to time upto 30.6.1993. In the meantime, advertisement No. 18 of 1990-91 for another recruitment for the self-same post was published in the Samaj dated 7.1.1991. It is averred that the Government extended the validity of the merit list from time to time upto 30.6.1993. In the meantime, advertisement No. 18 of 1990-91 for another recruitment for the self-same post was published in the Samaj dated 7.1.1991. In the meantime, 47 candidates included in the merit list prepared pursuant to advertisement No. 3 of 1985-86 challenged the advertisement No. 18 of 1990-91 inviting applications for the post of Junior Assistants in the State Secretariat by filing 12 Original Applications (O.A. Nos. 898 (C)/ 92, 591(C)/92, 105 (C)/92, 2566 (C)/93, 741(C)/93, 571(C)/92, 835(C)/93, 2398(C)/93, 199(C)/92, 1205/92, 2308/93, 1848/92 & 1276/93) before the Tribunal on the ground that the merit list of the last recruitment had not been exhausted. The competitive examination pursuant to the second advertisement was to be held by the Commission in June, 1992. By interim order, the Tribunal directed that the merit list be prepared by the Commission after holding competitive examination as scheduled but no appointment from the said merit list should be given till disposal of the O. As. It is worthwhile to note that the merit list of the competitive examination pursuant to the second advertisement was approved by the State Government on 21.10.1993 & government filled up the vacancies in the post of Junior Assistant up to 1.7.1993 by candidates from the first merit list. Considering the provisions in the O.M.S. Rules which provided that a select list prepared by the P.S.C. for recruitment to the posts of Junior Assistants in the Secretariat shall remain valid till the next merit list is approved by the Government, the Tribunal finally disposed of the O. As. on 25.7.1994 by directing the Secretary to Government, Home Department to fill up the vacancies in the post of Junior Assistants arising during the period 1.7.1993 to 21.10.1993 by appointing the candidates from the first merit list. 3. on 25.7.1994 by directing the Secretary to Government, Home Department to fill up the vacancies in the post of Junior Assistants arising during the period 1.7.1993 to 21.10.1993 by appointing the candidates from the first merit list. 3. On a clarification being sought in one of the aforesaid O. As., i.e. O.A. No. 898 of 1992, on the ground that the direction of the Tribunal in para-16 of its judgment dated 25.7.1994 directing Respondent No. 2 therein to determine the number of vacancies of Junior Assistants which were available in the department of the government during the period 1.7.1993 to 21.10.1993 is being interpreted to mean only vacancies which occurred during the period 1.7.1993 till 21.10.1993, the Tribunal clarified that the expression vacancies available during the period 1.7.1993 to 21.10.1993 was not intended to cover only vacancies arising during the period but would cover all vacancies of Junior Assistants including those which had occurred prior to 1.7.1993 & had not been filled up an the contention of the Learned Counsel for the State that it was not possible to absorb all the candidates in the old select list who had not been appointed by 1.7.1993 as there were only 11 vacancies, the Tribunal clarified that only candidates who were parties to the litigation would be covered by the Judgment. The Tribunal further clarified that candidates who were Petitioners in the aforesaid batch of O. As. should be appointed in the available vacancies according to their placement in the select list. Pursuant to the said order, 39 out of the 47 Petitioners in the aforesaid batch of O. As. were appointed as Junior Assistants. In the meantime, six O. As. bearing numbers O.A. Nos. 2400, 2445,2648, 2690, 2780 & 2807 of 1994 were filed by six Petitioners claiming that the Order Dated 25.7.1994 passed by the Tribunal in the batch of 12 O. As. were appointed as Junior Assistants. In the meantime, six O. As. bearing numbers O.A. Nos. 2400, 2445,2648, 2690, 2780 & 2807 of 1994 were filed by six Petitioners claiming that the Order Dated 25.7.1994 passed by the Tribunal in the batch of 12 O. As. & the clarificatory Order Dated 25.8.1994 passed therein are applicable to them & they were entitled to the benefit of the directions given therein on the ground that persons junior to them in the merit list got appointment by virtue of the aforesaid two orders & they have been deprived of the benefit only because they did not approach the Tribunal observing that subsequent to the judgment in the batch of 12 O. As., the Tribunal had given similar direction in two other O. As., i.e. O.A.2268 of 1994 & O.A. No. 2293 of 1993 & the position of the six applicants in the merit list being above the applicants in the aforesaid batch of 12 O. As. & the subsequent two O. As., disposed of the six O. As. on 13.3.1995 with a direction that the remaining vacancies available till 21.10.1993 be filled up by giving appointment to the said six applicants keeping in view their respective inter se seniority in the select list. The Tribunal made it clear that the said judgment would not be cited as a precedent & would not be pressed into service by those who were there in the merit list but had not approached the Tribunal by filing O. As. by that date. Thereafter one Arati Nanda filed O.A. No. 1973 of 1995 seeking direction to the State Government to appoint her as candidates placed below her in the merit list have been appointed pursuant to the earlier order of the Tribunal. In that case, the Single Bench with reference to the observation of the Tribunal dated 13.3.1995 in the batch of six O. As. that the said judgment would not be cited as a precedent & would not be pressed into service by persons whose names find place in the select list but who have not approached the Tribunal by filing original applications by that date held as under: 4. It is true that Tribunal confined the direction to appoint in respect of those who had approached the Tribunal. They were, however, admittedly lower in the merit list of selected candidate than the applicant. It is true that Tribunal confined the direction to appoint in respect of those who had approached the Tribunal. They were, however, admittedly lower in the merit list of selected candidate than the applicant. It is further true that no person has a right to be appointed, merely on the basis that he has been selected. Where, however, several candidates were selected & appointments are given on the basis of merit, a more meritorious candidate has a right for appointment before a person lesser in merit than him is appointed. The Tribunal could not have taken away right of such person without giving him opportunity of being heard to confine the direction for appointment if only those who filed application in the Tribunal defeating the rights of more meritorious only on the ground that they did not file application in the Tribunal. Therefore, a candidate who is in a higher position in the merit list can approach the Tribunal for a direction, if he finds that his junior has been given appointment. Cause of action would arise for him from the date of appointment of a candidate lower in the merit list. If a candidate did not approach the Tribunal in view of absence of right to be appointed even if selected, which is position of law, his right will arise when from out of the merit list persons having lesser merit are appointed. Selected candidates cannot be reasonably classified two categories, i.e, (i) those approaching the tribunal & (ii) those not approaching the Tribunal. 4. The Tribunal in Arati Nanda's case directed the State Government to appoint her if a vacancy was available. If no vacancy was available, the same had to be created to give appointment to the applicant. The Tribunal directed to give appointment to the applicant within six months from the date of receipt of the order. The case of the Petitioners is that by 21.10.1993 there were only 65 vacancies & all those vacancies were filled up by applicants who had obtained orders from the Tribunal including Arati Nanda. The last vacancy was filled up on 26.2.1997 by appointing Hena Mohapatra Who had approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 100 of 1995 disposed of on 20.8.1996. The case of the Petitioners is that by 21.10.1993 there were only 65 vacancies & all those vacancies were filled up by applicants who had obtained orders from the Tribunal including Arati Nanda. The last vacancy was filled up on 26.2.1997 by appointing Hena Mohapatra Who had approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 100 of 1995 disposed of on 20.8.1996. Thereafter, by common Order Dated 16.1.1997, the Single Bench of the Tribunal disposed of nine O. As.bearing number O.A. No. 2091/96, 1837/1999, 1286/942830/1994, 2998/1994,3054/1994,615/1995,2088/1995 & O.A. No. 553 of 1996 filed by candidates securing higher position in the merit list, directing that the case of the Petitioners in the aforesaid O. As. should be considered following the principle decided in Arati Nanda (supra). Subsequently, the Tribunal passed orders on 8.1.1998 in O.A. Nos. 1709/97, 635/97, 636/97, 3014/96, 2146/96, 1595/97, 2234/97 & 2619/97 to consider the question of the appointment of the applicants in the aforesaid cases having regard to the ratio decided in Arati Nanda's case by 31.5.1998. To comply with such direction of the Tribunal, notice of termination was issued to the appointees whose position was lower in the merit list, Opposite Party No. 1 in each of the Writ Petitions, to make room for the candidates securing higher position in the merit list pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal. 5. Challenging the notice of termination, eight O. As bearing Nos. 1339 to 1345(C) & 1362 of 1998 were filed before the Cuttack Bench of the Tribunal whereas O.A. No. 941 of 1998 was filed before the Principal Bench of the Tribunal at Bhubaneswar. Initially the Tribunal stayed the order of termination. The Tribunal took note of the fact that the applicant in the aforesaid O. As. were appointed pursuant to the direction given by the Division Bench of the Tribunal in the earlier O. As. filed by them. In those cases the Division Bench confined the benefit of the judgment to those who were parties to the litigation. Holding that such a direction was countenanced by law & without entering into the question whether a Single Bench while exercising power u/s 6 (6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act can pass an order overriding the decision of the Division Bench & considering the further fact that the applicants in the aforesaid O. As. Holding that such a direction was countenanced by law & without entering into the question whether a Single Bench while exercising power u/s 6 (6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act can pass an order overriding the decision of the Division Bench & considering the further fact that the applicants in the aforesaid O. As. were validly appointed pursuant to the orders of the Tribunal & have been continuing as such & the State had not chosen either to appeal against or seek review of the orders of the Division Bench or Single Bench, the Tribunal disposed of O.A. Nos. 1339 to 1345 & 1362 of 1998 directing as under: Without going into the legal technicalities & complicating the matter further, we would prefer to solve this tangle & settle the issue once for all by adopting a practical approach which would not operate harshly either on the applicants or the private Respondents. Both the applicants & the Respondents base their claims on Judgments of the Tribunal. The applicants having approached the Tribunal first & got the benefit of the earlier Judgments should not be disturbed from the posts in which they are appointed. We, therefore, direct that the applicants shall be allowed to continue as Junior Assistants which posts now they are holding & the 9 persons who have got the benefit of the orders passed in subsequent orders of the Tribunal as per list at Annexure-C to the counter, shall be adjusted in existing or future vacancies ear-marked for their categories according to the model roster as & when such vacancies arise due to promotion & creation of new posts. While doing so, their inter se seniority according to their placement in the merit list in which all of them are included should be followed. If by the time a vacancy is available, the candidate concerned is over-aged for entry into service, his upper age should be relaxed. We further direct that the 9 vacancies in which the applicants in the cases listed in Annexure-C to the counter are to be appointed, shall be excluded from the number of vacancies that would be advertised for future recruitment. Since these appointments will be probably against vacancies subsequent to 21.10.1993 when the validity of the merit list expired, the O.M.S. Rules, 1951 shall be relaxed taking recourse to Rule 17-A to facilitate their appointments. Since these appointments will be probably against vacancies subsequent to 21.10.1993 when the validity of the merit list expired, the O.M.S. Rules, 1951 shall be relaxed taking recourse to Rule 17-A to facilitate their appointments. The other O.A., i.e. O.A. No. 941 of 1998 was disposed of by the Principal Bench of the Tribunal following the decision in the aforesaid eight O. As. quoted above. The State has filed the aforesaid nine Writ Petitions challenging the order of the Tribunal, referred to above. The contention of the State is that vacancies upto 21.10.1993, i.e. date of approval of the second merit list, were filled up pursuant to the judgment of the Tribunal by candidates of the first merit list. Any appointment from the first merit list against vacancies subsequent to 21.10.1993 would contravene Rule 8 of the OMS Rules. Since the first merit list had already spent its force, there was no other alternative than to terminate the services of the nine incumbents, whose position was lower in the merit list, to adjust the nine applicants in the O. As. whose position in the merit list was higher to implement the orders of the Tribunal. 6. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of Opposite Party No. 1 in each of the cases stating that they were selectees of the merit list of 1988 & were appointed pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal in the first batch of 12 cases against the vacancies that were available till 21.10.1993. It is their further case that the Division Bench of the Tribunal directed that no application of any person included in the merit list of 1988 even if his position was higher in the merit list would be entertained after 13.3.1995. Though Arati Nanda filed O.A. alleging that persons below her in the merit list have been appointed, she did not implead such junior persons as parties. Therefore, the O.A. filed by Arati Nanda was not maintainable & the Division Bench having fixed a cut off date to stop litigation, the Single Bench could not have passed orders contrary to the order of the Division Bench. The State having not filed appeal against the decision of the Division Bench nor sought review of the same, it became final & the Single Bench could not have passed any order contrary to the decision of the Division Bench. The State having not filed appeal against the decision of the Division Bench nor sought review of the same, it became final & the Single Bench could not have passed any order contrary to the decision of the Division Bench. The Single member decision being in conflict with the D.B. decision, the Tribunal should have held that the Division Bench decision should override the decision of the Single Bench. The State having neither appealed against the Single Bench nor sought review of the same, allowed the same to become final. To get over such anomalous position, the Tribunal by the impugned order adopting a practical approach directed that the nine applicants before the Tribunal should be allowed to continue as Junior Assistants & the nine persons who got the benefit of the orders passed by the Single Bench should be adjusted in existing or future vacancies ear-marked for their categories as & when such vacancies arise due to promotion & creation of new posts. The Tribunal further directed that the nine vacancies against which the beneficiaries of the order of the Single Bench would be appointed should be excluded from the number of vacancies that would be advertised for future recruitment. The Tribunal also directed to take recourse to the Rule 17-A of the O.M.S. Rules, 1951. 7. In the rejoinder filed by the Petitioner, it has been stated that as the vacancy upto 21.10.1993 was limited to 65, & since the Single Bench in the nine O. As. had directed to apply the principle decided in Arati Nanda's case, & Opposite Party No. 1 in each of the Writ Petitions being the junior, termination notices have been issued to them. 8. The Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash Vs. Union of India, held that it is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment & adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. It was further held therein that unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The Apex Court in Jatinder Kumar and Others Vs. It was further held therein that unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The Apex Court in Jatinder Kumar and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, ruled that a person cannot claim as of right that the Government must accept the recommendation of the Commission. If, however, the vacancy is to be filled up, the Government has to make appointment strictly adhering to the order of merit as recommended by the Public Service Commission. 9. The State Government had extended the validity of the merit list of 1988 till 30.6.1993. The second merit list was approved on 21.10.1993. Rule 8 of the OMS Rules provided that the list prepared by the Commission shall be followed till the result of the next examination is communicated. Holding that the 1988 merit list was valid & should have been utilized till 21.10.1993, the Tribunal in the first batch of 12 O. As. directed the Respondent to determine the number of vacancies that were available during the period 1.7.1993 to 21.10.1993 & to fill up these vacancies by the candidates in the first merit list subject to the conditions indicated in the Judgment. However, by Order Dated 25.8.1994, the Tribunal clarified that those who were Petitioners in the cases covered by the judgment shall be appointed in the available vacancies which had occurred prior to 1.7.1993 & not filled up & those which arose during the period 1.7.1993 to 21.10.1993. The State Government implemented the judgment notwithstanding the position of the applicants in the merit list. The State also did not choose to appeal against or seek review of the above Judgment. Thereafter six O. As. were filed by six candidates whose position in the merit list was above the persons appointed pursuant to the decision of the Tribunal, inter alia, on the ground that by virtue of the direction dated 25.7.1994 & clarificatory Order Dated 25.8.1994 passed in the batch of 12 O. As., persons junior to them in the merit list had got appointment & therefore, direction may be given for their appointment. Accordingly the Division Bench of the Tribunal disposed of the six O. As. Accordingly the Division Bench of the Tribunal disposed of the six O. As. directing that the remaining vacancies available till 21.10.1993 be filled up by giving appointment to the applicants therein keeping in view their respective inter se seniority in the select list. In the mean time one Arati Nanda whose position was higher in the merit list than those appointed pursuant to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Tribunal referred to earlier approached the Tribunal to give direction for her appointment. A plea was taken by the State in that case that the Tribunal had confined the direction to appoint those who had approached it by 13.3.1995 & since Arati Nanda approached the Tribunal on 18.10.1995 she cannot take advantage of the decision. Holding that a more meritorious candidate has a right for appointment before a person lesser in merit than him is appointed & by virtue of the decision of the Division Bench in the batch of 12 O. As. & the subsequent cases direction had been given to appoint the applicants therein whose positions were below Arati Nanda in the merit list, the Tribunal by Order Dated 12.8.1996 directed for appointment of Arati Nanda. In this batch of Writ Petitions, a plea has been taken by the State that in view of the decision of the Division Bench, the Single Bench could not have taken a decision contrary to the decision of the Division Bench. It may be mentioned here that the State neither appealed against the decision of the Single Bench nor sought review of the same. Rather, it implemented the same by appointing Arati Nanda. Therefore, the State cannot be allowed to challenge the correctness or otherwise of the said decision of the Single Bench after implementing the same. The trouble started when the Tribunal following the decision in Arati Nanda directed the State to appoint the nine Petitioners in the subsequent nine O. As. To implement the aforesaid decision termination notice was issued to Opposite Party No. 1 in each of the Writ Petitions who approached the Tribunal the decision of which is impugned in the present Writ Petitions. To implement the aforesaid decision termination notice was issued to Opposite Party No. 1 in each of the Writ Petitions who approached the Tribunal the decision of which is impugned in the present Writ Petitions. In the impugned judgment the Tribunal held that the earlier view taken by the Tribunal confining the benefit of the judgment to those who were parties to the litigation was in accordance with the law decided by the Apex Court & of this Court. Although the decision of the Single Bench in Arati Nanda's case was contrary to the decision of the Division Bench that O.A. filed by candidates after 13.3.1995 even if their position was higher in the merit list should not be entertained, the State did not appeal against the same & allowed it to become final. In order to implement the subsequent Single Bench decision the State issued termination notice to the Opposite Party No. 1 in each of the Writ Petitions against which they filed the instant O. As. The Tribunal disposed of the said O. As. with the direction quoted earlier. Such a direction was given by the Tribunal to overcome the anomalous position created due to the conflicting decisions of the Tribunal. 9.(SIC) No doubt, the Apex Court in Ashok alias Somanna Gowda and Another Vs. State of Karnataka by its Chief Secretary and Others, & by this Court in Prasanna Kumar Nayak and Ors. v. National Aluminium Company and Ors. 1992 (I) OLR 465, has held that law permits Courts to grant & confine relief to those who come before them & to observe that the same would not be available proprio vigore to those similarly selected who had slept over the matter for long, but the decision by the Single Bench having not been set aside or reviewed, has to be respected. But then the nine Junior Assistants served with notice of termination were appointed by virtue of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the Tribunal. The said judgment has not been set aside or reviewed. Therefore, it has attained finality & has been executed by appointing the 9 applicants therein. 10. In the case of The State of Haryana Vs. Subash Chander Marwaha and Others the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows: 8.....One fails to see how the existence of vacancies gives a legal right to a candidate to be selected for appointment. Therefore, it has attained finality & has been executed by appointing the 9 applicants therein. 10. In the case of The State of Haryana Vs. Subash Chander Marwaha and Others the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows: 8.....One fails to see how the existence of vacancies gives a legal right to a candidate to be selected for appointment. The examination is for the purpose of showing that a particular candidate is eligible for consideration. The selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the Government to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the rules in this respect..' In the Case of Jatinder Kumar and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court relying on the case of State of Haryana (supra) held as under: .... The selection has to be made by the Commission & the Government has to fill up the posts by appointing those selected & recommended by the Commission adhering to the order of merit in the list of candidates sent by the Public Service Commission. The selection by the Commission, however, is only a recommendation of the Commission & the final authority for appointment is the Government. The Government may accept the recommendation or may decline to accept the same. But if it chooses not to accept the recommendation of the Commission, the Constitution enjoins the Government to place on the table of the Legislative Assembly its reasons & report for doing so. Thus, the Government is made answerable to the House for any departure vide Article 323 of the Constitution. This, however, does not clothe the Appellants with any such right. They cannot claim as of right that the Government must accept the recommendation of the Commission. If, however, the vacancy is to be filled up, the Government has to make appointment strictly adhering to the order of merit as recommended by the Public Service Commission. This, however, does not clothe the Appellants with any such right. They cannot claim as of right that the Government must accept the recommendation of the Commission. If, however, the vacancy is to be filled up, the Government has to make appointment strictly adhering to the order of merit as recommended by the Public Service Commission. It cannot disturb the order of merit according to its own sweet will except for other good reasons viz., bad conduct or character. The Government also cannot appoint a person whose name does not appear in the list. But it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments will be made. The process for selection & selection for the purpose of recruitment against anticipated vacancies does not create a right to be appointed to the post which can be enforced by a mandamus. 11. Therefore, when the select list was taken up by the Government for appointment, it should have been done strictly on the basis of merit & the persons who approached the Tribunal must be knowing that there were candidates above them in the select list on the basis of merit & their turn for appointment would come only after candidates placed above them in the merit list are given appointment. Since no right accrued to those candidates for approaching the Court or the Tribunal seeking relief for a direction to the State Government to appoint them on the basis of recommendation sent by the Commission, it cannot be said that they committed any error in not approaching the Tribunal. However, when the Tribunal directed to appoint those candidates lower in the merit list by issuance of mandamus, the seniors in order of merit must have legitimate expectation that since they were more meritorious, their rights of appointment were superior in comparison to the rights of appointment of the candidates placed below them in the merit list. On record, there is no order of the higher Court setting aside the Judgments of the Tribunal. Therefore, those Judgments became final & were to be executed & this is a settled principle of law that once an order is executed, later on the action already taken in execution of that order cannot be reviewed by terminating the service of the persons who are already given appointment pursuant to the order of the Tribunal which had attained finality. In view of the above, we do not find any illegality or impropriety m the impugned Judgment & order passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the Writ Petitions are devoid of merit & are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Final Result : Dismissed