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Rajasthan High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 570 (RAJ)

Jitendra Sharma v. State of Rajasthan

2009-02-20

GOPAL KRISHAN VYAS

body2009
Hon ble VYAS, J.—By these writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the impugned order dated 21.01.2009 (Annex.- 6), so also, fard (memo) prepared by the respondents dated 21.01.2009 (Annex.-6A). The petitioners have further sought direction to the respondents to allow the petitioners to conduct their business in pursuance of the licences. In the alternative, it is prayed that proportionately exclusive privileged amount may be reduced by passing appropriate and necessary order and respondents may be directed to pay cost of liquor lying in the shop in question under the seal of the respondents. 2. For deciding the controversy raised in these writ petitions, for the sake of convenience, the facts narrated in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.682/2009 are taken into consideration and discussed. 3. According to brief facts of the case, for the purpose of regulating import, transport, manufacture, sale and possession of intoxicating liquor and of intoxicating drugs, the State legislature enacted the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 (in short, to be called hereinafter as “the Act of 1950”); and, further, in exercise of the power conferred under Section 41 of the Act, rules were framed known as the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 (in short, to be called hereinafter as “the Rules of 1956”). 4. The Excise Commissioner issued notice dated 21.01.2008 inviting applications for renewal of licence for sale of country liquor for the year 2008-2009, in which, it was made clear that the minimum exclusive privileged amount will be 8% higher than the exclusive privileged amount of the concerned shop for the year 2007-2008. In pursuance of the said notice for the various shops, however, no application was received from any of the parties, therefore, the shops remained unlifted; and, again notice dated 18.03.2008 was issued inviting applications for grant of licence. In the advertisement, it was made clear that the minimum amount should be at least 80% of the amount fixed originally and certain other conditions were also incorporated. 5. In the Barmer town, there are 9 shops for country liquor and, for those shops, the minimum exclusive privileged amount is fixed for each shop. In the present case, the controversy is in relation to the shop located in Ward No.24, Barmer. Despite notice dated 18.03.2008, no application was submitted by any person for lifting the said shop, so also, various other shops and they were lying unlifted. In the present case, the controversy is in relation to the shop located in Ward No.24, Barmer. Despite notice dated 18.03.2008, no application was submitted by any person for lifting the said shop, so also, various other shops and they were lying unlifted. Therefore, again, the respondent No.2 issued a public notice on 28.03.2008 and efforts were made for granting licence for those shops for which nobody applied. 6. Originally the minimum exclusive privilege amount fixed for the shop in question was Rs.14,64,774/- but it was not possible to lift the shop on such high amount. However, the petitioner applied for having licence for sale of country liquor at the shop sanctioned in Ward No.24 of Barmer town for a sum of Rs.10,41,111/- and the Excise Commissioner sanctioned the same in favour of the petitioner vide sanction dated 01.04.2008. In pursuance of the said sanction, the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs.1,30,139/- as security amount and further deposited like amount in respect of basic licence fees and the remaining amount was to be paid in 12 monthly installments. 7. As per provisions of law, the shop in question was to be opened in Ward No.24 of the municipal area Barmer only after getting the location of the shop approved. The petitioner submitted site-plan showing location of the shop and the same was approved by the respondent authorities vide Annex.-5 after granting relaxa-tion as provided under sub-rule (2) of Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956. According to the petitioner, as per Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956, the shop for sale of liquor shall not be located within a distance of 200 mtr from the collegiate educational institutions, Senior Secondary Schools, Girl Schools, hospitals or place of worship. However, a Gurudwara is situated at a distance of about 85 mtr from the shop in question. But, the respon-dents granted relaxation for opening the said shop and relaxation was granted in the year 1993-94 in relation to location of the shop as per Rule 75(2) of the Rules of 1956. 8. The petitioner s contention in the writ petition is that without any notice or information, the shop situated in Ward No.24 of the municipal area Barmer has been ordered to be closed by the Circle Inspector, Excise Department, Barmer on 22.01.2009. 8. The petitioner s contention in the writ petition is that without any notice or information, the shop situated in Ward No.24 of the municipal area Barmer has been ordered to be closed by the Circle Inspector, Excise Department, Barmer on 22.01.2009. It is very strange that since the shop of liquor was having valid licence and due approval of location, it was legally running and huge liquor was lying in the shop in question, therefore, the order for closure of the shop was illegally made and, upon enquiry, it is informed that the State Government has withdrawn the relaxation which was granted by the competent authority under Rule 75(2); but, it is very strange that no notice or order has been served upon the petitioner prior to closure of the shop. The petitioner has placed on record communication dated 21.01.2009 addressed to the Excise Commissioner, whereby, relaxation granted under Rule 75(2) up to 2003-04 have been withdrawn and consequently, the Excise Commissioner has directed the Additional Excise Commissioner and all the District Excise Officers for taking further action in the matter for closure of the shops. 9. The petitioner contends that against the above illegal action of the respondents for closing the shop after withdrawing the relaxation, the petitioner sent notice for demand of justice on 24.01.2009 telegraphically to the District Excise Officer, Barmer who had granted the licence and approved the location of the shop in question; but, no reply whatsoever was given by the authority and, on account of closure of the shop, the petitioner s contention is that he is facing recurring day to day loss whereas he has to pay the exclusive privilege amount every month, therefore, if any action has been taken on the basis of direction given by the State Government, then, at least the petitioner was to be given an opportunity of hearing before closing the shop. As per the petitioner, when licence has been granted for sale of country liquor in particular area which is Ward No.24 of the municipal area of Barmer, then, obviously sale can be effected at the location approved by the competent authority. It is pleaded that the petitioner was only knowing that if no other shop will be available then also he will be able to conduct his business in the shop in question and, therefore, he had moved the application. It is pleaded that the petitioner was only knowing that if no other shop will be available then also he will be able to conduct his business in the shop in question and, therefore, he had moved the application. Approval of the location of the shop for conducting business was sanctioned by the authority concerned and upon this assurance he purchased the liquor and was pursuing business regularly. In these circumstances, a right accrued to the petitioner to conduct business at the approved site but due to illegal action of the respondents whereby the petitioner s shop situated at Ward No.24 has been closed, therefore, the petitioner has filed this writ petition for quashing orders Annex.-6 and Annex.-6A. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, upon the aforesaid facts, vehemently argued that the State action in directing the Excise Commissioner to close the shops without any notice is in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner is licensee and licence has been issued by the statutory authority which is District Excise Officer and the shop in question was approved by the competent authority which is evident from Annex.-5, sanction of location and this sanction was given after granting relaxation provided under Rule 75(2) of the Rules of 1956. It is contended that at the very location the shop for sale of country liquor is going on for last 14 to 15 years, therefore, taking of such drastic action is illegal because before taking the said action no opportunity of hearing was afforded and, in that view of the matter, the action of the respondents is against the principles of natural justice. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that action of the respondents is against the legitimate expectation so also once the relaxation was granted to the petitioner to pursue the business after granting relaxation under Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956, then, there is no question of passing order of closure of the shop for which the petitioner is having valid licence. The said licence was granted by the District Excise Officer with due approval of the department, therefore, it is clear that action has been taken by the competent authority not on the basis of its application of mind but under the direction issued by the Government. The said licence was granted by the District Excise Officer with due approval of the department, therefore, it is clear that action has been taken by the competent authority not on the basis of its application of mind but under the direction issued by the Government. It is contended that the competent authority who has granted the relaxation cannot act upon the direction issued by the Government and, that too, without providing opportunity of hearing. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the State Government and the Excise Department made a discrimination because relaxations made up to 2003-04 have been withdrawn and relaxations granted after 2003- 04 have not been withdrawn and, on that basis, the shops were ordered to be closed, therefore, such discrimination is not permissible under the law. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that bare perusal of the communication which is required to be considered as the basic order clearly shows that relaxation has been withdrawn en masse. It is contended that once relaxation has been granted and business is going on then the same cannot be withdrawn en masse because withdrawal can be made by the competent authority only after application of mind on individual matter because relaxations in different conditions and for different reasons were allowed in individual cases looking to different circumstances. However, if en masse withdrawal is made then it is clear that individual matter has not been considered and withdrawal order has been passed without any application of mind by the competent authority at the instance of the State Government. Therefore, the withdrawal order has been passed in contravention of the settled principles of law without any application of mind for which no reasons have been given. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner has purchased the liquor for sale at the shop having its location in Ward No.24 and liquor is lying in the shop which has been purchased by the petitioner after paying the value of the liquor, therefore, now it is the property of the petitioner and if the petitioner is not allowed to sell the liquor, after expiry of the licence period, the liquor will be forfeited by the department and the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss. In such circumstances, virtually on account of the action of the respondents, the property of the petitioner has been taken away by the respondents and the petitioner has been deprived from his property without any fault on his part, therefore, the fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a right accrued to the petitioner after granting relaxation and approval to pursue the business, therefore, the accrued right has been taken away and, that too, without any fault on the part of the licensee. So also, no reason has been disclosed for so called withdrawal in arbitrary manner. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that without granting any reasonable opportunity for alternative location the shop has been sealed and the petitioner has been deprived from conducting the business which is causing recurring loss to the petitioner. The action of the respondents is not only unjust but also arbitrary and illegal and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has lifted the shop for sale, then, now new hurdle has been created by the respondents restraining him from pursuing his business, therefore, the petitioner cannot be blamed for any lapse. More so, the respondents action is arbitrary and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and orders impugned may be quashed. 14. It is pointed out that on the one hand, order for closure has been passed en masse for the retail shops, and, on the other hand, in the hotels which are situated in the prohibited areas, as per Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956, they are still allowed to serve liquor in those hotels, therefore, action of the respondents is discriminatory. 15. In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.712/2009 filed by petitioner Ghanshyam Sharda whose shop is situated near Lal Bahadur Shastri School in Zone No.5 of the Nagar Nigam Jodhpur, while adopting the arguments advanced by Mr. N.M. Lodha, it is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Ramesh Purohit that respondents action is totally discriminatory because the petitioner has been granted licence for running the liquor shop in the year 2005-06 and the said liquor shop is being run for last 25 years. N.M. Lodha, it is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Ramesh Purohit that respondents action is totally discriminatory because the petitioner has been granted licence for running the liquor shop in the year 2005-06 and the said liquor shop is being run for last 25 years. It is submitted that earlier there was a school in front of the shop in question viz., Lal Bahadur Shastri School, but, in place of the said school, now a hotel-cum- Bar has been constructed, therefore, the restriction for opening the shop in front of the school is not in existence. It is stated by Mr. Purohit that the hotel which is constructed upon the land where earlier Lal Bahadur Shastri School was in existence is only 15 mtr from the shop in question. In between the said hotel known as Maple Abhay and petitioner s shop, there is only one divider and main gate of the school is more than 200 mtr distant from the petitioner s shop. Therefore, if the Government is allowing the hotel which is situated near the petitioner s shop to sell and serve liquor, then, how the petitioner s shop can be ordered to be closed. It is contended that in the said hotel there is Bar where the hotel management is selling and serving liquor to the customers in the hotel but no order of closure has been made against the hotel situated near the petitioner s shop, therefore, it is total discrimination and the action is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 16. In the reply to this ground, it is submitted by the respondents that under Section 41 of the Excise Act 1950, there is power left to the Government to frame rules and while exercising those powers Excise Rules, 1956 have been promulgated. But, in due course of time, as and when there were certain developments in the trade of liquor necessitating promulgation of different set of rules, it became necessary to frame separate independent rules; and, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 41 of the Act of 1950, the State Government framed rules known as Rajasthan Excise (Grant of Hotel Bar/Club Bar Licenses) Rules, 1973. These are special set of rules and they operate independently. These are special set of rules and they operate independently. It is pointed out that in the aforesaid rules, there are certain special terms which are not otherwise defined in general Rules of 1956 and, more so, it is settled law that special rules always prevail over the general rules. There are certain terms which are not defined anywhere else such as hotel, hotel/bar club license, club, club bar license, therefore, the general rules are not applicable to the hotels. As such grant of license to hotels is governed under the Rules of 1973 and the same is altogether different than the Rules of 1956. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. N.M. Lodha while substantiating his arguments, first of all, invited my attention towards recent judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court reported in (2008) 4 SCC 111 , State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Manoj Kumar. While citing the said judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that almost in identical case, the Hon ble Supreme Court held that the action of the respondents cannot be approved in passing the order of closure of the shops without issuing notice to the affected parties and further held that licensee shall be granted permission to pursue the business till completion of the currency of the lincence. It is further held that all the shops owners or sub-shop owners shall close their shops on or before 31.03.2008; meaning thereby, as per the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is held that no order of closure shall be made without providing opportunity of hearing or assigning reasons to the licensee in between the period of tenure of the licence. 18. Large number of judgments are cited by learned counsel for the petitioner showing that once relaxation has been granted at the time of issuing licence in favour of the petitioner in accordance with Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956, that cannot be rescinded without affording opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the petitioner was having legitimate expectation from the respondents because he was granted licence after due relaxation as provided under Rules of 1956. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the petitioner was having legitimate expectation from the respondents because he was granted licence after due relaxation as provided under Rules of 1956. In some of the judgments, learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to persuade this Court, that once location is approved after due relaxation for conducting business by the competent authority, then, the right of the competent authority cannot be snatched by the State Government which has been done in this case. 19. Per contra, by way of filing interim reply to the writ petition, following grounds were taken for rejection of the writ petition : (A) In the reply, the respondents contend that the petitioner has not come with clean hands and is guilty of suppressing, concealing and withholding important facts from the knowledge of this Court. It is pointed out that order has been passed by the Commissioner dated 21.01.2009 by which the Commissioner has withdrawn the relaxation which was conferred in exercise of power under proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 75. The respondents have placed on record Annex.-R/1 to prove this fact. (B) It is contended that the petitioner has also committed illegality while not pointing out the conditions of licence. For the same, it is pointed out that in condition No.5.3 of the licence, there is specific stipulation with regard to District Excise Officer who is competent to get the shop closed for good and sufficient reasons. Further, the District Excise Officer also enjoys the power so as to ask the licensee to transfer from one place to another and, on account of such closure, the licensee is not entitled to claim any compensation, damages or rebate in the monthly installments; but, the petitioner has deliberately not placed on record the terms and conditions of the licence. Further, the District Excise Officer also enjoys the power so as to ask the licensee to transfer from one place to another and, on account of such closure, the licensee is not entitled to claim any compensation, damages or rebate in the monthly installments; but, the petitioner has deliberately not placed on record the terms and conditions of the licence. (C) As per the respondents, condition No.7.3 there is specific stipulation that in the event of the period of licence being over or in the event of licence being cancelled, the stock of country liquor along with the record is required to be furnished to the Excise Inspector and the same is required to be deposited in the office of the Excise Inspector and remaining stock is to be disposed of by the District Excise Officer and, till the same is disposed of, the stock shall remain in joint custody of the Excise Inspector and the erstwhile licensee. The respondents have placed on record Annex.-R/2. (D) It is contended by the respondents in the reply that the petitioner has raised the ground of discrimination. The petitioner has attempted to raise the plea that, “.......but the relaxations, which have been granted after 2003-04 have not been withdrawn.”; but, this plea is factually incorrect because relaxation which was granted after 2003-04 has already been withdrawn by the Government vide order dated 27.02.2008 and the same was given effect to by the Commissioner which was conveyed by communication dated 05.03.2008. Thus, it is clear that relaxations granted to the licensees subsequent to 2003-04 have also been withdrawn. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the petitioner. (E) The respondents have pleaded the ground for rejection of the writ petition stating that the petitioner has wrongly raised the ground on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As a matter of fact, in the matter of trading in liquor, Article 14 of the Constitution does not apply. As per the respondents, Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not attracted in the matter nor can one make it a basis to point out infringement of Article 14. As a matter of fact, in the matter of trading in liquor, Article 14 of the Constitution does not apply. As per the respondents, Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not attracted in the matter nor can one make it a basis to point out infringement of Article 14. (F) The respondents have in specific words raised the ground for rejection of the writ petition that as a matter of fact a policy decision was taken by the sensitive, answerable and responsible Government after giving serious though over the problem and having come to the conclusion that the liquor trade should be restricted and strictly regulated in accordance with law. It is pointed out that as per the scheme of the rules, Rule 75 prescribes certain distances from respective places within which no shop can be located, however, in exceptional cases and, that too, by recording reasons, the powers have been given to relax the prescription of rule, therefore, this power is to be exercised in rarest of rare cases, in extraordinary circumstances and not in routine manner. But, in this case, relaxations were granted in routine manner and while taking shelter of the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956, large number of shops were opened, therefore, it was felt necessary by the Government that the entire matter of granting relaxation by the Government should be reconsidered and reviewed. This decision has the underlying idea that the Government wanted to protect the sanctity of Colleges, educational institutions, Girls Schools, Hospitals and places of worship, place of public entertainment. Therefore, the shops which were running against the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 75 under the relaxation power have now been withdrawn and Government is now strictly adhering to the text of sub-rule (2) of Rule 75. Therefore, the impugned decision was taken and, in this sequence, Annex.- 6 was initially issued by the Government, in which, the decision of the Government was conveyed to the Commissioner, Excise Department, Udaipur vide communication dated 21.01.2009, in which, it is specifically mentioned that after 2003-04 as many as 156 liquor shops are running under relaxation provided under Rule 75(2) of the Rules of 1956; but, in this connection, the decision has been taken that relaxation so granted should be withdrawn and the shops situated in the area enumerated under Rule 75 should be closed. However, if the licensee is ready to shift his shop to a proper location in accordance with Rule 75 (2) and is willing to pursue his business, then, the case may be considered in accordance with rules. The said communication was transmitted to all the Additional Commissioners and District Excise Officers. Therefore, in the interest of justice and to follow the rules in strict sense, the Government took the decision to withdraw the relaxation so granted to large number of shops after 2003-04 and it is ordered that those shops shall be closed which are running in the prohibited areas and may be shifted after taking consent of the licensee at a proper place in accordance with Rule 75(2). Therefore, decision taken by the State Government is not bad or illegal nor does it suffer from any infirmity. More so, it is in public interest. It is contended by the respondents that the contention of the petitioner is totally incorrect that basic order clearly shows that relaxation has been withdrawn en masse; more so, it is a case in which the Government took decision to implement the law in its strict sense and the so called relaxation granted earlier should be withdrawn. (I) The respondents have also raised a ground that the petitioner has tried to mislead the Hon ble Court while raising the plea that he has been deprived of his property and further has made attempt while submitting that liquor has been forfeited by the Department as the petitioner cannot use even for sale subsequently. According to the respondents, this plea has been raised while making a definite attempt to mislead this Hon ble Court because the Government has never intended to close the shop even for the remainder period which is obvious from the order passed by the Government under Annex.-6 and, so also, in the order of the Commissioner, in which, it is clearly stipulated that licensee should be given an option to point out other location so that the shop may be shifted provided it fulfills the requirement of Rule 75; meaning thereby, in fact, it is not a case of closure of the shop but it is only a case of location of the shop. After taking decision, therefore, innocuous decision has been taken by the Government which is in the interest of public at large and as such the same does not require interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. It is further contended in the reply by the respondents that the petitioner has not suggested any other location for the shop in question, therefore, seizure was rightly exercised by the Excise Department and petitioner can still point out other location for shifting and if it is found feasible in accordance with law, then, he will be permitted to run the shop for the remainder period. 21. As per the respondents, relaxation was granted in casual manner and large number of shops as many as 156 were allowed to pursue business at places prohibited after granting relaxation. The petitioner was also granted relaxation on temporary basis, therefore, at any time, the Government and Excise Department have jurisdiction to ask the petitioner for shifting his shop at a place which is not prohibited area as per Rule 75, therefore, the decision taken by the Government for not allowing any shop under any relaxation is absolutely proper. The order has been passed by the competent authority as per decision taken by the Government which is in consonance with the provisions of law. More so, the Government has performed the obligatory duty as provided under the Constitution under Article 47. Likewise, in liquor business no person can claim to pursue business as a matter of right as per his choice. It is true that under sub-rule (2) of Rule 75 there is provision for relaxation but before that liquor shop should not be within distance of 200 mtr from collegiate institutions, schools, hospitals and place of worship. Not only petitioner but 156 shops are running within the distance of 200 mtr from colleges, educational institutions, senior secondary schools, girls schools, hospitals or places of worship, therefore, the decision was taken to withdraw the relaxation. However, specific relaxation has been granted to the shop owners to point out other place at which the shop could be shifted, therefore, a conscientious decision has been taken and the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. 22. However, specific relaxation has been granted to the shop owners to point out other place at which the shop could be shifted, therefore, a conscientious decision has been taken and the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that upon perusal of the whole of the writ petition it is revealed that there is no substance in any of the grounds raised by the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner s shop is situated in prohibited area and he was granted temporary relaxation which is obvious from the site plan approved for opening the shop which is Annex.-5. So also, the petitioner s contention with regard to legitimate expectation is also totally baseless because at the cost of young generation and public at large no such relaxation can be granted but it was granted earlier by the previous Government in large number of cases without recording reasons. Therefore, it was felt necessary by the present Government to follow the rules in strict sense. The petitioner is raising voice that he was not heard prior to issuing the order impugned. But, in fact, this is totally unfounded and if such decision is taken by the Government, then, it cannot be questioned because still the petitioner has right to pursue the business but not in the prohibited area. 23. With regard to the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, reported in (2008) 4 SCC 111 , learned counsel for the respondents submits that it cannot be treated precedent; more so, the facts of the reported case are entirely different because in that case the High Court suo motu passed order for the closure of the liquor shops which were situated in close proximity to a place of public resort, schools, hospitals, places of worship, or at the entry of a bazaar or a residential colony. That order was passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow Bench in a public interest litigation making grievance that liquor shops are opened purely in residential area in breach of the U.P. Excise Rules. That order was passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow Bench in a public interest litigation making grievance that liquor shops are opened purely in residential area in breach of the U.P. Excise Rules. As per learned counsel for the respondents, the Supreme Court, however, has not adjudicated the matter but while disapproving the approach of the High Court in closing the shops without issuing notice to the affected parties passed order ad interim on 28.04.2006, therefore, on the date of judgment dated 25.02.2008, while deciding the matter finally, it is observed that these shops are running under the interim orders of the Supreme Court, therefore, they shall continue to operate till 31.03.2008. That order has been passed on the basis of equity. However, ratio of that judgment emerges from the conclusion that no liquor shop shall be opened within the prescribed distance from place of public resort, educational institution, girls schools, hospitals, places of worship. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim parity of his case with the judgment of the apex Court in the reported judgment and cannot claim that as per the verdict of the Supreme Court he is entitled to pursue business during the currency of the licence at the very place. 24. In this case, as per learned counsel for the respondents, no case is made out for interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. More so, the action of the Government is required to be taken in public interest and may be appreciated not only for the petitioner s shop but 156 other shops as well. The decision is not for the closure of the shop but only for shifting the shops which are running under the prohibited area. Learned counsel for the respondents invited my attention towards so many judgments of the Supreme Court for various points like policy decision, precedent and non-availability of the ground of fundamental right in respect of liquor business. 25. In the rejoinder, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner has not suppressed or concealed or withheld any fact. He has approached this Court with clean hands and, for this purpose, it is pointed out that the State Government issued direction dated 21.01.2009 in relation to withdrawal of relaxation granted under Rule 75 of the Rules. In the rejoinder, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner has not suppressed or concealed or withheld any fact. He has approached this Court with clean hands and, for this purpose, it is pointed out that the State Government issued direction dated 21.01.2009 in relation to withdrawal of relaxation granted under Rule 75 of the Rules. In this communication, endorsement has been made by the Commissioner with regard to order passed by the State Government on 21.01.2009, therefore, it seems that the Excise Commissioner has also passed order on 21.01.2009 which has been placed on record as Annex.-1 and, upon perusal of said Annex.-R/1, it is clear that the Excise Commissioner has passed the said order in pursuance of the communication issued by the Government vide Annex.-6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in a very hasty manner the action has been taken by the State Government and three authorities have passed order only on the same day i.e., 21.01.2009. But, before taking such action no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. These facts were narrated by the petitioner in the writ petition but, at the time of filing the writ petition, communication dated 21.01.2009 passed by the Excise Commissioner was not within the knowledge of the petitioner; but, it is obvious from the facts that Annex.-R/1 was issued in pursuance of the Government order dated 21.01.2009, therefore, it can very well be said that the competent authority has not applied its mind and only followed the direction issued by the Government. Such an action is not permissible under the law. With regard to condition No.5.3 of the licence, the District Excise Officer enjoys the power to ask the licensee to transfer duly approved shop from one place to another and he can pass order for closure of the shop if he has reasonable and satisfactory reasons. But, no reason has been given except that the State Government has passed order or direction whereby relaxation has been withdrawn en masse. Therefore, it is obvious that the competent authority has not applied its mind for withdrawal of relaxation granted under Rule 75 (2) of the Rules of 1956. 26. But, no reason has been given except that the State Government has passed order or direction whereby relaxation has been withdrawn en masse. Therefore, it is obvious that the competent authority has not applied its mind for withdrawal of relaxation granted under Rule 75 (2) of the Rules of 1956. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated all his grounds taken in the writ petition which need not be repeated here; but, only point with regard to pursuing business of liquor being claimed as a fundamental right requires to be observed. In para 5 of the rejoinder, it is stated by the petitioner that conducting liquor business is not a fundamental right but the case of the petitioner is altogether different that once the licence has been granted and place for conducting the business has been approved, then, no such arbitrary action can be taken against the petitioner, therefore, the action of the respondents amounts to arbitrariness and such action is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As per the petitioner, once relaxation has been granted after considering all aspects of the matter that cannot be withdrawn in an arbitrary manner so as to punish the licensee in an illegal manner. The way in which the order was issued and executed is highly questionable because earlier the competent authority has granted relaxation as provided under Rule 75 (2) of the Rules of 1956 and that cannot be withdrawn during the currency of the licence even if a policy decision is taken and, therefore, illegality has been committed by the respondents while withdrawing the relaxation by the impugned order. 27. In their counter to the rejoinder, the respondents submit that the petitioner has again raised baseless grounds in the rejoinder. It is contended by the respondents that in the trade of liquor and specially in the matter of location of shop where the public at large is involved on the one hand, and, on the other hand, there is mercantile person like the petitioner licensee, in that situation, there is no scope for applying the principles of natural justice. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the one proceeded against, the form and features of such essential procedural propriety, the same being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained against. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the one proceeded against, the form and features of such essential procedural propriety, the same being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained against. It is vehemently contended in the counter to the rejoinder by the respondents that unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. The facts of the present case speak that no breach of principles of natural justice can be complained of and, on no grounds, the petitioner can be permitted to pursue business at the place where there is complete ban under the rules. Though relaxation was granted but the same was required to be withdrawn having been granted without assigning reasons which is necessary ingredient for granting relaxation. The petitioner cannot claim to pursue the business of liquor as a matter of right and, therefore, the State Government is required to scan the factors in which relaxation has been granted and have the complete jurisdiction to direct the subordinate authorities to apply the rules in strict sense. Therefore, there is no illegality in the State action. 28. After completion of the arguments, again some additional submissions were made by the petitioner, in which, it was pointed out that the plea of granting temporary relaxation is a new point which cannot be raised at the time of arguments; but, it is argued during the course of arguments. According to the petitioner, in the Excise Department, the Excise Department has granted approval of location on temporary basis irrespective of the fact as to whether location is granted after grant of relaxation or for the location which requires no relaxation and this practice is in existence in the entire State of Rajasthan and, so also, is going on for last so many years. For the shop in question also, in the past, approval was granted by using the word temporary and shop was allowed to run without any interruption. The petitioner has submitted Annex.-8 another lincence, in which, identical sanction was granted on temporary basis. Further, in para 2 of the additional submissions, it is submitted that approval of location was granted to run the business of India Made Foreign Liquor to some of the shops in Jodhpur city on temporary basis. The petitioner has submitted Annex.-8 another lincence, in which, identical sanction was granted on temporary basis. Further, in para 2 of the additional submissions, it is submitted that approval of location was granted to run the business of India Made Foreign Liquor to some of the shops in Jodhpur city on temporary basis. Therefore, the argument of learned counsel for the respondents has no force of law that temporary relaxation was granted to the petitioner for pursuing the liquor business, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed because, all of a sudden, the impugned order Annex.-6 was passed by the State Government and, in execution of that order, the proceedings was undertaken by the Excise Department and the petitioner was stopped from pursuing his business at the shop situated in Ward No.24 of the municipal area of Barmer town. Therefore, such action taken by the State Government can be defined as arbitrary and illegal action and the petitioner is entitled to get the relief sought for in this writ petition for quashing order Annex.-6 issued by the Government. 29. After hearing both the parties at length, I have also perused the judgments cited by learned counsel for the parties and, so also, perused the entire proceedings of the case. 30. In this case, following points require to be considered and adjudicated upon : (1) Whether in liquor business fundamental rights accrue to the licensee; (2) Whether any breach of the principles of natural justice is committed by the respondents and the judgment reported in (2008) 4 SCC 111 is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case; (3) Whether policy decision taken by the Government in public interest can be subjected to judicial review; (4) Whether any relief can be granted to the petitioner on the basis of legitimate expectation from the State; and, (5) Whether the decision taken by the Government is a conscientious decision and taken by the competent authority. 31. First of all, for adjudicating the above points, duties of the State may be seen. 31. First of all, for adjudicating the above points, duties of the State may be seen. Under Article 47 of the Constitution of India, there is duty cast upon the State that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. In this Article, the framers of the Constitution have specifically cast duty upon the State for maintaining the standard of living of the people and for improvement of public health. Obviously, the consumption of liquor or business of liquor cannot be termed as business for promoting the living standard and health of the people, therefore, purposefully no specific fundamental right to pursue the business of liquor is enumerated in the Constitution. 32. It is true that under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, there is fundamental right to pursue business. As per Article 19 (1) (g), there is freedom of profession, trade and business and it is provided that this freedom means that every citizen has right to choose his own employment or to take up any trade or calling subject only to the limits as may be imposed by the State in the interest of public welfare and the grounds mentioned in column 6. Article 19(1)(g) enshrines the right of the citizens to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business; meaning thereby, if any business is initiated by the State, then, every citizen has right to procure the said business and can choose that business for his livelihood. In this case, obviously offer has been made by the State Government for granting licence to sell liquor, therefore, the State has granted an opportunity to the citizens to participate in the liquor business. There is thus freedom left with the citizens to participate in any tender for operating liquor business. No restriction can be imposed by the State for participation of the citizens in the liquor business. The question, however, arises whether a citizen can pursue the liquor business in his own manner and style. The plain answer is in the negative. 33. There is thus freedom left with the citizens to participate in any tender for operating liquor business. No restriction can be imposed by the State for participation of the citizens in the liquor business. The question, however, arises whether a citizen can pursue the liquor business in his own manner and style. The plain answer is in the negative. 33. Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of Har Shanker & Others vs. Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner & Others, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1121 , in para 53, 54 and 55 held that there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. The State, under its regulatory powers, has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants – its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants. The wider right to prohibit absolutely would include the narrower right to permit dealings in intoxicants on such terms of general application as the State deems expedient. Since rights in regard to intoxicants belong to the State, it is open to the Government to part with those rights for a consideration. 34. The above principle was reiterated in latter decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 SC 1550 , M/s Sat Pal & Co. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Others. The Supreme Court, in para 17 of the judgment held that there is no fundamental right to trade or business in nauseous drinks which include liquor. If there is no fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor, there is no question of its abridgment by any restriction which can be styled as unreasonable. The Supreme Court followed the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench in Har Shanker s case (supra). 35. The same view has been reiterated in AIR 2006 SC 2652 . The Supreme Court further held that expectation has to be legitimate and for determining the said expectation, the larger public interest has to be kept in view. The Supreme Court followed the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench in Har Shanker s case (supra). 35. The same view has been reiterated in AIR 2006 SC 2652 . The Supreme Court further held that expectation has to be legitimate and for determining the said expectation, the larger public interest has to be kept in view. The State rescinding its earlier excise policy to grant liquor licence, in larger public interest, change in policy decision is valid in law; meaning thereby, the Supreme Court, time and again, reiterated that liquor licence is not a fundamental right and policy decision taken by the State cannot be questioned in the liquor business. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that though liquor business is not fundamental right but any decision which taken by the State Government earlier for granting relaxation and, subsequently, withdrawn, then, for the same the petitioner can raise voice that it is against his fundamental rights, therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 36. In my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance because the Constitution Bench of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Har Shanker s case (supra) has specifically held that liquor business is not fundamental right. In this view of the matter, therefore, the question regarding breach of fundamental right requires to be answered in the negative. The petitioner cannot claim any entitlement on the ground that liquor business is fundamental right. 37. It is true that if any order is passed against any person by the State, then, at least principles of natural justice require to be followed and persons concerned are required to be given opportunity of being heard. There is no quarrel for the above principle. But, whether in the present circumstances, any breach of the principles of natural justice has been committed by the respondents or not can be gathered from the facts of the case. In this regard, first of all, the order impugned Annex.-6 is required to be perused. There is no quarrel for the above principle. But, whether in the present circumstances, any breach of the principles of natural justice has been committed by the respondents or not can be gathered from the facts of the case. In this regard, first of all, the order impugned Annex.-6 is required to be perused. Annex.-6 issued by the Government on 21.01.2009 is as follows : ^^fo"k; % f kfFkyrk ds vUrxZr lapkfyr eafnjk dh nqdkuksa dks cUn fd;s tkus ds lEcU/k esa egksn;] fo"k;kUrxZr ys[k gS fd vkils izkIr tkudkjh ds vuqlkj o"kZ 2003-04 rd jktLFkku vkcdkjh fu;e] 1956 ds fu;e 75¼2½ ds vUrxZr f kfFkyrk izkIr dj jkT; Hkj esa 156 efnjk dh nqdkusa lapkfyr gks jgh gSA bl Øe esa funsZ kkuqlkj ys[k gS d orZeku esa lapkfyr mä nqdkuksa dh f kfFkyrk rRdky izHkko ls izR;kgfjr ¼Withdraw½ dj bu nqdkuksa dks can fd;k tkosA bl can nqdkuksa ls lEcfU/kr dksbZ vuqKk/kkjh ;fn fdlh oSdfYid yksds ku ij LFkkukUrj.k djuk pkgs rks fu;ekuqlkj vko ;d dk;Zokgh dh tkosA Hkonh;] ,lMh@& ¼jtr dqekj feJ½ dk;kZy; vkcdkjh vk;qä] jktLFkku Øekad i-32¼ch½¼42½vkc@,y@2006@2611 fnukad 21-01-2009 izfrfyfi fuEu dks izsf"kr dj ys[k gS fd vkids ftys esa o"kZ 2003-04 rd iznÙk dh xbZ f kfFkyrk esa lapkfyr nqdkuksa dks vkt gh cUn djk ikyuk fjiksVZ izsf"kr djsa ,oa cUn djkus ds i pkr~ ;fn dksbZ vuqKk/kkjh vU; fu;ekuqdwy yksds ku ij LFkkukUrfjr djuk pkgsa rks ml vuq:i dk;Zokgh djyh tk;s %& 1- vfrfjä vk;qä] vkcdkjh] t;iqj@tks/kiqj@mn;iqj@dksVk@chdkusj@ vtesj 2- ftyk vkcdkjh vf/kdkjh] ¼leLr½A ¼v kksd Hk.Mkjh½ vfrfjä vk;qä ¼iz kklu½ jktLFkku] mn;iqj** upon perusal of the above Annex.-6 dated 21.01.2009, it is revealed that directions were issued to the Commissioner, Excise Department, Rajasthan, Udaipur, in which, it was ordered that in all 156 shops are running under the Relaxations granted under Rule 75 (2) of the Rules of 1956 and a decision has been taken by the State Government to withdraw the said relaxation and to close those shops. Further, it is mentioned that if any licensee gives option for transfer of his shop, then, necessary action shall be taken for the grant of said permission of transfer. Further, it is mentioned that if any licensee gives option for transfer of his shop, then, necessary action shall be taken for the grant of said permission of transfer. In pursuance of above direction issued by the Secretary, the Excise Commissioner issued Annex.-R/1 which is produced along with the reply filed by the respondents at page 50; meaning thereby, a decision was taken by the State Government while performing duty towards public at large provided under Article 47 of the Constitution and communicated to the Excise Commissioner and, thereafter, the Excise Commissioner issued Annex.-R/1 on the same day i.e., 21.01.2009 and passed order that relaxation granted under Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956 till 2003-04 is hereby withdrawn which is reviewed after 2003-04. Thus, after receiving the communication from the State, a specific order was made by the competent authority Excise Commissioner vide Annex.-R/1 on 21.01.2009 itself and, in pursuance of that, closure of the shop of petitioner situated in Ward No.24 of Barmer town under relaxation was ordered. The petitioner having placed on record Annex.-6 dated 21.01.2009 was having knowledge for giving option for transfer of the shop because in the panchnama Annex.-6A, it is observed that the petitioner can give his option for transfer of location to pursue the liquor business; meaning thereby, there is no complete restriction imposed by the Government for pursuing the liquor business. In the order of the State Government as well as order issued by the competent authority which is the Excise Commissioner on 21.01.2009, it was specifically mentioned that relaxation so granted has been withdrawn by the Government after taking a conscientious decision and, if any licensee is desirous to pursue his business at a place which is not prohibited under Rule 75, then, he can give his option; meaning thereby, opportunity has been granted by the Department to pursue the business; but, only restriction has been made not to pursue the business in the prohibited areas, that too, while taking a conscientious decision by the Government. The policy decision which is taken by the State Government cannot be question in view of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in (1996) 5 SCC 268 , P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. & Others vs. Union of India & Others, in which, the apex Court has held that change in Government policy in public interest for grant of export licence depends upon the legitimate policy prevailing at the time of the grant. The Government or legislature has the power to evolve its new fiscal policy in the public interest which includes its power to withdraw the old policy; meaning thereby the policy decision taken by the Government cannot be questioned in view of the aforesaid judgment. 38. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in (2005) 4 SCC 456 , in which, it has been held that any decision based on doctrine of fairness does not convert writ courts into appellate forums over the administrative authorities. Even a wrong decision is not open to challenge unless it is mala fide. The fairness is required to be seen, so also, it does not come within the judicial review of the Court if any decision is taken by the Government on the basis of doctrine of fairness. 39. The same view has been taken in the case of Jitendra Kumar & Others vs. State of Haryana & Another, reported in 2008 AIR SCW 322. In para 39, it has been held that decision taken by the Government in public interest cannot be reviewed at the hands of successor Government if good work has been done by the previous Government solely on the basis of change of regime. However, the successor Government cannot blink over the illegalities committed by the previous Government; meaning thereby, if any wrong decision was taken by the previous Government, then, it can be reviewed and can be changed by the successor Government. 40. However, the successor Government cannot blink over the illegalities committed by the previous Government; meaning thereby, if any wrong decision was taken by the previous Government, then, it can be reviewed and can be changed by the successor Government. 40. In this case, Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956 speaks that only in exceptional circumstances relaxation can be granted; but, upon perusal of the licence of the petitioner, it is shown that the relaxation was granted vide Annex.-5 without assigning any reason not only to the petitioner but in respect of 156 shops in all, therefore, a conscientious decision has been taken by the State Government that en masse relaxations granted require to be reviewed but, while doing so, the present Government has not shut its eyes and passed a blanket order for closure. It passed order that shops situated in the prohibited area after granting relaxation shall be closed, however, the licensee may be granted opportunity to give his option for transferring the said shop in the area which is permissible under Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956. In my opinion, such decision is in public interest and, so also, after taking care of the licensee also and public at large. Such decision of the Government cannot be question in any manner and cannot be subject-matter of judicial review. Therefore, the action taken by the respondent cannot be termed in violation of the principles of natural justice. More so, it is in the interest of public at large because upon perusal of Annex.-5 it is obvious that without recording any special reasons the relaxation was granted in a very casual manner and, that too, on temporary basis. 41. In this matter, something is required to be said with regard to the obligatory duty of the State. Admittedly, the legislature is framing Acts and Rules for regulating the liquor business. In the society, for maintaining law and order, there are directive principles of State policy enumerated in the Constitution of India. Under Article 47 of the Constitution of India, there is duty cast upon the State to endeavour for upliftment of the citizens and if the State Government is performing its duty, then, it must be appreciated and it is not required to be interfered with by the Courts while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Under Article 47 of the Constitution of India, there is duty cast upon the State to endeavour for upliftment of the citizens and if the State Government is performing its duty, then, it must be appreciated and it is not required to be interfered with by the Courts while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. More so, when the Government is performing its duty in the public interest without malice, then, it should be presumed that the State is acting towards principles of natural justice. No person can claim any benefit while raising voice that the State Government has committed violation of the principles of natural justice and order has been passed without hearing him. Admittedly, in this case, the petitioner are not producers of the liquor and they are only marketing the liquor under licence issued by the Government. Therefore, it is Government who can direct the retailers to sell the goods at proper place which is not creating any problem for the public at large and, in that view of the matter, relaxation as a matter of right cannot be claimed. 42. The contention of the petitioner with regard to the judgment reported in (2008) 4 SCC 111 is required to be discussed. 43. I have perused the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Manoj Kumar Dwivedi & Others, reported in (2008) 4 SCC 111 . The facts of that case indicate that a public interest litigation was filed before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow Bench. The Division Bench took the view that the words “close proximity” used in sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 of the U.P. Excise Rules shall be meant to be 100 m or 300 ft (approx.), therefore, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that all the licensed shops which were operating in close proximity to a place of public resort, school, hospital, place of worship or factory, or to the entrance to a bazar or a residential colony shall be closed with immediate effect. Against that judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow Bench, SLP was filed before the Supreme Court, in which, the above-said judgment was rendered. Against that judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow Bench, SLP was filed before the Supreme Court, in which, the above-said judgment was rendered. The apex Court while taking note of the facts of the judgment rendered by the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court in public interest litigation, observed that they (their Lordships of the Supreme Court) did not approve the approach of the High Court in closing the shops without issuing notice to the affected parties. This should not have been done. Since the operation of the impugned judgment was stayed by the Supreme Court, the shops in question continued to operate. Therefore, the Supreme Court directed that the interim order dated 28.04.2006 passed by the Court under which these shops are operating shall continue to operate till 31.03.2008. The said judgment was rendered on 25.02.2008 and only one month and three days remained for the currency of the licences; meaning thereby, although the apex Court observed that at least notice was to be given before issuing direction for the closure of the shops and stay was granted, therefore, the apex Court allowed those shops to continue to operate till 31.03.2008 and the said judgment was passed on 25.02.2008. Obviously, a judicial order was made by the Division Bench without issuing notice to the affected parties. 44. Herein, in this case, the position is entirely different. A conscientious decision has been taken by the Government after considering entire facts and circumstances of the case under which relaxations were granted by the previous Government; and, thereafter, the decision has been taken for closure of the shops in the prohibited areas in which relaxations were granted without assigning any reason not only to the petitioner but to large number of persons in casual manner. Therefore, in view of the judgment reported in 2008 AIR SCW 322 (supra), it was well within the competence of the successor Government to rectify the mistake committed by the previous Government. In the circumstances, therefore, while passing the impugned order by the Government, it was clarified that the shops running in the prohibited areas under the relaxation shall be closed and option may be obtained from the licensee to transfer the shop in the said locality where there is no prohibition in view of Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956. In the circumstances, therefore, while passing the impugned order by the Government, it was clarified that the shops running in the prohibited areas under the relaxation shall be closed and option may be obtained from the licensee to transfer the shop in the said locality where there is no prohibition in view of Rule 75 of the Rules of 1956. In this view of the matter, the facts of the case cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in (2008) 4 SCC 111 are altogether different than the facts of the present case. Therefore, the points with regard to breach of principles of natural justice and applicability of the aforesaid judgment also stand adjudicated against the claim staked by the petitioner in the writ petition and are answered in negative. 45. In this case, the petitioners cannot be termed as free businessmen engaged in liquor business. They are only licensees and the licences are issued by the State under the four corners of the provisions of the rules framed by the legislature. The petitioners claim that they are pursuing business of selling liquor cannot be accepted because while subserving the affair actually controlled by the State, the petitioners are only getting commission for the sale of liquor at their shops. The entire affair is in complete control of the State and, for the same, the State can allow none else to sell liquor because under Article 47 of the Constitution of India the State has to consider all aspects of the matter in larger public interest with open eyes. The legislature has imposed reasonable restrictions which cannot be subject-matter of judicial review because the same are well within the domain of the State Government to allow the sale of liquor in the area where public at large may not suffer. Obviously while taking such decision, the State Government has issued Annex.-6 which cannot be subject-matter of judicial review under writ jurisdiction. 46. With regard to the additional plea taken by the petitioner Ghanshyam Shard in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.712/2009, admittedly, the shop which is granted to the petitioner for opening of liquor shop was for retail sale of liquor. Obviously while taking such decision, the State Government has issued Annex.-6 which cannot be subject-matter of judicial review under writ jurisdiction. 46. With regard to the additional plea taken by the petitioner Ghanshyam Shard in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.712/2009, admittedly, the shop which is granted to the petitioner for opening of liquor shop was for retail sale of liquor. For the same, the petitioner s license is required to be governed by the Rules of 1956, whereas licences to the hotels are governed under the Rules of 1973 which is special set of rules framed by the legislature and which is altogether different than the Rules of 1956. Therefore, the petitioner cannot raise his voice on the ground of discrimination because retail liquor shops are required to be governed under the Rules of 1956 whereas licences of the hotels are to be governed under the Rules of 1973. In these circumstances, the additional ground taken by the petitioner Ghanshyam Sharda is totally baseless and has no foundation to stand in the eye of law. 47. It is obvious on the basis of the above discussion that when decision of the State Government cannot be questioned which is taken by the Government in larger public interest for following the rules in strict sense, then, obviously no relief can be granted to the petitioner for allowing the petitioner to sell the liquor in the prohibited areas in which relaxation was granted without assigning any reason. 48. In this view of the matter, I hold that the conscientious decision taken by the State Government vide Annex.-6 is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the State Government and, so also, it is in the interest of public at large because earlier en masse relaxations were granted for opening liquor shops even in prohibited areas and, for the same, relaxations were granted in very casual manner without assigning any reasons. Therefore, the present decision taken by the Government for closure of the shops running under relaxations cannot be subject-matter of judicial review. So also, the decision requires to be accepted because the same is perfectly in consonance with fundamental duties of the State as provided under Article 47 of the Constitution of India. 49. In this view of the matter, both these writ petitions are dismissed for the reasons indicated hereinabove. No order as to costs.