JUDGMENT K.N. BASHA, J. The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge (Protection of Civil Rights), Thanjavur, dated 12.7.2000 made in S. C. No. 37 of 2000 con­victing the sole accused Raman alias Ramu for the offence under Section 376, I.P.C; and sentencing him to undergo seven years rigorous imprisonment and also convicting him under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and sentencing him to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and the sentences are ordered to run concurrently. 2. The sole accused faced trial under the following backdrop: (i) The accused and the alleged victim, P.W.1 in this case were the residents of the same village, called Vandal. P.W.2 is the brother of P.W.1. P.W.3 is the father of P.W.1. It is the version of P.W.1 that six months prior to 18.6.1994, i.e., the date of complaint, at about 6.00 p.m. while she was feeding her cattle in the cattle-shed, the accused came to the cattle-shed and caught-hold on her from behind and gagged her mouth with a cloth and committed the sexual assault on her. Thereafter, the accused continuously had sexual relationship with her and she became pregnant. But P.W.1 has not disclosed the pregnancy to anyone and informed only the accused. The accused promised her to marry but thereafter, stopped his relationship with the victim. P.W.1 went and informed about the conduct of the accused to important per­sons of the village, namely, one Anbalagan one Muthusamy, Govindasamy, one Karunanithi P.W.8 and one Sivaraj. P.W.8 one of the panchayatdars, has turned hos­tile and P.W.9, who is also claimed to have participated in the panchayat has spoken to about convening panchayat and the ac­cused admitting his relationship with the victim. But they did not listen P.W.1. There­after, she went to Thalaignayiru Police Sta­tion to give a complaint to the police. (ii) P.W.1 went to Thalaignayiru Police Station and gave a written report, Exhibit P-1 on 18.6.1994 to the Sub-Inspector of Police and the same was registered in Crime No. 279 of 1994 under Section 417 and under Section 376, I.P.C. at 8.00 p.m. (iii) P.W.10, the Inspector of Police, Thalaignayiru Police Station, took up inves­tigation on receipt of the First Information Report, Exhibit P-6. He went to the scene of occurrence and prepared rough sketch, Exhibit P-7. He examined P.W.1 and P.Ws.2 and 3, brother and father of P.W.1 and other witnesses and recorded their statements. On 19.6.1994 at 4.30 a.m., he arrested the accused at the Bazaar of Thalaignayiru village. He gave requisition through the Magistrate for medical examination of the accused and the accused was remanded to judicial custody. (iv) The Doctor, P.W.6, attached to the Government Hospital, Nagapattinam, exam­ined the victim/P.W.1, aged about 20 years on 19.6.1994. P.W.1 stated to the Doctor, P.W.6 that she was sexually assaulted by a known person six months prior to the date of medical examination. The Doctor, P.W.6, issued Exhibit P-3, Accident Register, stating that the victim, P.W.1 was pregnant and she is eligible for intercourse. It is also noted in the Accident Register that vaginal smear taken and sent for miscroscopic examina­tion and on examination of vaginal smear, no spermatozoa seen. (v) The Doctor, P.W.5, examined the ac­cused on 19.6.1994, aged about 20 years. He issued the Accident Register, Exhibit P-2. In Exhibit P-2, it is stated that the accused was capable of performing sexual act and no external injuries around to genitalia (sic) stain not present. (vi) The Doctor, P.W.7 examined the ac­cused on 24.6.1994. He issued Exhibit P-5, Accident Register. It is stated in Exhibit P-5 that semen could not be collected from Ramu (the accused) due to anxiety. (vii) P.W.10, in continuation of his in­vestigation, examined the Doctors, P.Ws.5, 6 and 7 and recorded their statements and received the Accident Registers. On 28.11.1994 a female child was born to the victim P.W.1. (viii) P.W.11 took up further investiga­tion. He has taken steps to send the accused for D.N.A. Test to find out the paternity of the child and received Exhibit P-8, Chemical Analyst Report. In the report, Exhibit P-8, it is stated that the accused was found to be the biological father of the child, Anjali. After completion of investigation, P.W.1 filed the charge-sheet against the accused on 2.12.1997. 3. The prosecution in order to bring home the charges levelled against the accused examined P.Ws.1 to 11 and filed Exhibits-P-1 to P-8. 4. In the report, Exhibit P-8, it is stated that the accused was found to be the biological father of the child, Anjali. After completion of investigation, P.W.1 filed the charge-sheet against the accused on 2.12.1997. 3. The prosecution in order to bring home the charges levelled against the accused examined P.Ws.1 to 11 and filed Exhibits-P-1 to P-8. 4. When the accused was questioned under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in respect of the incriminating materials appearing against him through the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the accused has come forward with the version of total denial and he has not chosen to examine any witness on his side. 5. Mr. S. Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant put for­ward the following contentions: (i) The evidence adduced by the prosecution do not constitute the offence under Section 376, I.P.C. and under Section 3(1)(xii) of the Act. The victim, P.W.1, is a major and her evidence coupled with the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3/brother and father of P.W.1 clearly shows that there was love affair be­tween P.W.1 and the accused and the vic­tim is willingly consented for the sexual re­lationship and as such the offence of rape not at all made out; (ii) P.W.1, the victim has not disclosed about the alleged sexual assault on her by the accused for a period of more than six months and even till such time, she has not made any complaint, against the accused, either to the police or to her parents; (iii) P.W.1 categorically admitted in her cross-examination that she was in love with the accused and six months prior to the date of complaint, she happily had sexual inter­course with the accused at the cattle-shed at 6.00 p.m. and as such P.W.1 had sexual relationship with the accused willingly without any resistance and therefore, it is a clear case of consent and the victim P.W.1, be­ing a major, the offence of rape is not at all made out. (iv) The categorical version of P.Ws.2 and 3, brother and father of the victim, P.W.1, is to the effect that while they were making arrangements for the marriage of the vic­tim, P.W.1, P.W.1 interfered and stated that she was in love with the accused and as such requested P.W.3 not to make any arrangements for marriage and even during such time, P.W.1, the victim has not stated any alleged forcible sexual assault commit­ted by the accused; (v) P.W.3 stated even in his chief-exami­nation that the accused told him that P.W.1 was in love with him and he is also like to marry her later and not immediately; (vi) In the event of disbelieving the prosecution case for the offence under Section 376, I.P.C, the charge under Section 3(1)(xii) of the Act automatically falls into the ground. 6. Per contra, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) contended that there is no infirmity in the prosecution case. It is sub­mitted that the evidence of P.W.1 discloses that the accused forcibly committed the sexual assault on her. The learned Govern­ment Advocate (Crl. Side) further submitted that D.N.A. Test was also proved positive to the effect that the accused is the biologi­cal father of the child Anjali as per Exhibit P-8. Therefore, it is contended that the prosecution has proved its case in all aspects. 7. I have given my careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions put forward by either side and also perused the entire materials available on record includ­ing the impugned judgment of conviction. 8. The prosecution, heavily placed reli­ance on the evidence of the prosecutrix, P.W.1 as the prosecution version in respect of the actual commission of the offence of sexual assault by the accused on the victim girl entirely rests on the sole and solitary testimony of P.W.1. Therefore, the evidence of the prosecutrix, P.W.1, should be scanned carefully. 9. Before proceeding to consider the re­liability of the evidence of the prosecutrix, P.W.1, let me now refer the settled position of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex court in AIR 1990 SC 658 : (1990) 1 SCC 550 : (1990) SCC (Cr) 210 : 1990 Cri LJ 889 : (1990) 1 MLJ (Crl) 63 and in AIR 1996 SC 1393 : (1996) 2 SCC 384 : (1996) SCC (Cr) 316 : (1996) Cri LJ 1728. 10. 10. The Hon'ble Apex court in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain (supra), has held that (1990) 1 MLJ (Crl) 63 at p. 67: "A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. She is undoubt­edly a competent witness under Section 118. Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there is independent evidence lending as­surance to her accusation, If the Court keeps it in mind that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her and feels satis­fied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or prac­tice incorporated in the Evidence Act simi­lar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full un­derstanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong mo­tive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesita­tion in accepting her evidence. Therefore, ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be ac­cepted. To insist corroboration except in the rarest of rare case is to equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a Crime and thereby insult womanhood. Therefore, ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be ac­cepted. To insist corroboration except in the rarest of rare case is to equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a Crime and thereby insult womanhood. The standard of proof to be expected by the Court in such cases must take into account the fact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is available." 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court is State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (supra), has held that: "The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling rea­sons which necessitate looking for corrobo­ration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seek­ing corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury." 12. Therefore, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment to place reliance on the sole testimony of the evidence of the prosecutrix provided such evidence inspires the confidence of the Court and such evi­dence is free from infirmities, inconsisten­cies and improbabilities. 13. In the light of the above settled prin­ciple of law, let me now scrutinize and analyse the evidence of the prosecutrix, P.W.1 in the case on hand. 14. At the outset, it is to be stated that it is the version of P.W.1 that the occurrence said to have taken place six months prior to 18.6.1994 i.e., the date of complaint, at 6.00 p.m. at her cattle-shed adjacent to her house. P.W.1 stated in her chief-examina­tion that at the time of occurrence, the ac­cused came to her cattle-shed and gagged her mouth with a cloth and thereafter com­mitted the sexual assault on her. It is pertinent to be noted that P.W.1 has not stated that she has resisted or struggled with the accused preventing him from committing the sexual assault on her. It is also stated by P.W.1 in the chief-examination that both of them were having continuous sexual rela­tionship and she became pregnant, but she has hot disclosed to anyone. It is pertinent to be noted that P.W.1 has not stated that she has resisted or struggled with the accused preventing him from committing the sexual assault on her. It is also stated by P.W.1 in the chief-examination that both of them were having continuous sexual rela­tionship and she became pregnant, but she has hot disclosed to anyone. It is seen that she has informed to P.W.8 and others only after a period of six months. P.W.1 also categorically stated in the chief-examination itself that after the complaint, on enquiry by the police, the accused agreed to marry her. But P.Ws.4 and 8, the panchayatdars prevented the accused from marrying her. P.Ws.4 and 8 have given a total go-by to their earlier statements given to the police and they have completely turned hostile. It is pertinent to be noted that P.W.1 has cat­egorically admitted in the cross-examination that both the accused and herself fell in love with each other and they are happily hav­ing sexual intercourse for a period of six months and added to that, she has also cat­egorically stated that even on the first day, i.e., six months prior to her complaint at 6.00 p.m. at her cattle-shed, both herself and the accused had sexual intercourse happily and thereafter, they continued the same. It is further stated by her that after she became pregnant she informed the ac­cused and the accused agreed to marry her. Therefore, it is crystal clear that P.W.1, the prosecutrix, freely, voluntarily, willingly and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the accused and her consent was not in consequence of misconception of fact. 15. The fact remains that both the ac­cused and P.W.1 belong to different com­munities and according to P.W.1 even as per her chief examination only the panchayatdars prevented the marriage of P.W.1 with the accused. It is to be borne in mind that the prosecutrix, P.W.1, has not whispered a word about the alleged forcible sexual assault on her by the accused to any­one much less to her own brother, P.W.2 and father, P.W.3. It is the categorical version of P.W.2 and P.W.3 that only while they were making arrangements for the marriage of P.W.1, P.W.1 informed them that she was in love with the accused and both of them were moving together and she became pregnant. It is the categorical version of P.W.2 and P.W.3 that only while they were making arrangements for the marriage of P.W.1, P.W.1 informed them that she was in love with the accused and both of them were moving together and she became pregnant. At the risk of repetition, it is to be reiterated that even at that time P.W.1 has not whispered a word about the alleged forc­ible sexual assault on her by the accused. P.W.3, father of P.W.1, categorically stated that the accused also admitted before the panchayatdars that he and P.W.1 were fell in love with each other and he has also agreed to marry the prosecutrix, P.W.1 and he only sought time for fixing marriage. 16. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer a landmark decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex court in AIR 2003 SC 1639 : (2003) SCC (Cri) 775 : (2003) Cri LJ 1539. In that decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that: "There is no straitjacket formula for de­termining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is volun­tary, or whether it is given under a miscon­ception of fact. The tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance to the judi­cial mind while considering a question of consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. The Court must also weigh the evi­dence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them. (emphasis supplied by this Court) The consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a per­son with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was, however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She ad­mits having told so to the appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the sig­nificance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the ap­pellant, and in fact succumbed to them. She thus freely exercised a choice between re­sistance and assent. The circumstances show that she freely, voluntarily and consciously consented to having sexual inter­course with the appellant; and her consent was not in consequence of any misconcep­tion of fact. Further, there is no evidence to prove conclusively that the appellant never in­tended to marry her. Perhaps he wanted to, but was not able to gather enough courage to disclose his intention to his family mem­bers for fear of strong opposition from them. Even the prosecutrix stated that she had full faith in him. It appears that the matter got complicated on account of the prosecutrix becoming pregnant. Therefore, on account of the resultant pressure of the prosecutrix and her brother the appellant distanced him­self from her. That apart, in a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the applica­tion of Section 90, IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. But in the instant case, there is no doubt that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to hav­ing sexual intercourse with the appellant because the prosecutrix knew that her mar­riage with the appellant was difficult on ac­count caste considerations. But in the instant case, there is no doubt that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to hav­ing sexual intercourse with the appellant because the prosecutrix knew that her mar­riage with the appellant was difficult on ac­count caste considerations. Further, there is no evidence to prove that the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the pros­ecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. The prosecutrix and the appellant were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the ap­pellant to a lonely place at 12 O'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant also made such a promise on more than one occasion. In such circumstances the prom­ise loses all significance, particularly when they are overcome with emotions and pas­sion and find themselves in situations and circumstances where they, in a weak mo­ment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. This is what appears to have happened in this case as well, and the prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not because he promised to marry her, but because she also desired it." 17. The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court Uday v. State of Karnataka (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of the Instant case. In this case, the undisputed fact remains that the pros­ecutrix/P.W.1 is a major. The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court Uday v. State of Karnataka (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of the Instant case. In this case, the undisputed fact remains that the pros­ecutrix/P.W.1 is a major. As in the decision cited supra, in this case also the accused and P.W.1 were fell in love with each other and hail from different communities and the accused even admitted his relationship with the prosecutrix/P.W.1 and agreed to marry her even in the presence of P.W.3, father of the prosecutrix/P.W 1 and as such the over­all circumstances available on record through the evidence adduced by the pros­ecution makes it crystal clear that the pros­ecutrix/ P.W.1 was freely, voluntarily, willingly and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the accused and her consent was not in consequence of any mis­conception of fact. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the prosecution version of the accused forcibly committed the sexual as­sault on the prosecutrix/ P.W.1 is collapsed and crumbled down by the evidence of the prosecutrix/P.W.1 coupled with the evi­dence of her brother and father, namely, P.Ws.2 and 3 and as such the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the offence under Section 376, IPC against the accused/appellant as the prosecutrix/P.W.1 is the consenting party for sexual intercourse with the accused. 18. It is needless to say that once the charge for the offence under Section 376, IPC is not proved by the prosecution, the charge under Section 3(1)(xii) of the Act au­tomatically falls into the ground. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed on the appellant herein by the learned II Additional District and Ses­sions Judge, (Protection of Civil Rights). Thanjavur, in S.C. No. 37 of 2000 dated 7.12.2000 is unsustainable and accordingly the same is set aside. Bail bonds executed by the appellant shall stand cancelled. 19. In view of the abovesaid verdict of this Court, the appellant has been relieved from the clutches of the penal law as the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charges against the accused. However, this Court cannot ignore and brush aside yet another important aspect in this case, namely a child was born out of the intimacy and sexual relationship between the appellant/accused and the prosecutrix/ P.W.1. The prosecu­tion has also satisfactorily established the paternity of the child as that of the accused as per the Chemical Examiner's report, Exhibit P-8, which reads hereunder: (Mr. The prosecu­tion has also satisfactorily established the paternity of the child as that of the accused as per the Chemical Examiner's report, Exhibit P-8, which reads hereunder: (Mr. Raman alias Ramu) alleged father (Selvi Anjali) child (Ms. Jaya) mother (Accused) (P.W.1) Report: The blood and saliva samples of Tr. Raman alias Ramu, Child Anjali and Ms. Jaya were individually tested for the vari­ous genetic systems shown in the compre­hensive report (enclosed) and found that the likelihood of paternity of Tr. Raman alias Ramu is 99.9861% The verbal assertion for 99.9861% of likelihood of paternity is 'Practically proved'. Hence, Thiru Raman alias Ramu is found to be the biological father of child Anjali." 20. It is brought to the notice of this Court that the child by name, Anjali, is now brought up by P.W.1 and the child, Anjali, is now aged about 14 years. 21. In a similar situation after acquitting the accused for the offence under Section 376, IPC, the Hon'ble Apex court in AIR 2005 SC 203 : (2005) 1 SCC 88 : (2005) SCC (Cr) 253 has held that: "38. With this verdict, the appellant no doubt extricates himself from the clutches of the penal law by getting the benefit of doubt on charge levelled against him. But, we cannot ignore the reprehensible conduct of the appellant, who by promising to marry the victim woman, persuaded her to have sexual relations and caused pregnancy. The act of the accused left behind her a trail of misery, ignominy and trauma. The only so­lace is that she married subsequently. We are informed that the female child born out of the illicit relationship is now living with her married mother and she is about 14 years old now. Though there is no evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant made a false or fraudulent promise to marry, there can be no denial of the fact that the appellant did commit breach of the promise to marry, for which the ac­cused is prima facie accountable for dam­ages under civil law. When we apprised the appellant's counsel of our prima facie view­point on this aspect and elicited his response on passing a suitable order in exercise of power vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, the learned counsel took time to get instructions. We are now in­formed that the appellants prepared to pay a sum of Rs. When we apprised the appellant's counsel of our prima facie view­point on this aspect and elicited his response on passing a suitable order in exercise of power vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, the learned counsel took time to get instructions. We are now in­formed that the appellants prepared to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000 by way of monetary compensation irrespective of acquittal. Though the said amount is not an adequate compensation, we are not inclined to call upon the appellant to pay more for more than one reason : firstly, the appellant has been in jail for about two years by now; sec­ondly, we are informed that the accused belongs to a backward class and his family is not affluent though they have some agri­cultural lands; lastly, the incident took place about 15 years back and in the superven­ing period, the prosecutrix as well as the appellant married and we are told that he had two children. In these circumstances, we accept the offer of the appellant." 22. The principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case also there was admittedly love affair between the appellant/accused with the prosecutrix/P.W.1 and as per the categori­cal version of P.W.3, father of the prosecu­trix/P.W.1, the accused was willing to marry the prosecutrix/P.W.1 but not at that stage due to other circumstances coupled with the fact that a female child was born out of the intimacy and sexual relationship between the accused and the prosecutrix/P.W.1. Therefore, this Court, in order to secure the ends of justice, considering the paramount interest and welfare of the child born out of the intimacy and sexual relationship of P.W.1 and the accused, suggested the learned senior counsel for the appellant to verify whether the appellant is willing to offer any monetary compensation to protect the in­terest of the child as well as P.W.1, who has not yet married 23. On verification and on instructions, the learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted before this Court today, i.e., on 17.12.2008, that the appellant/accused has undertaken to pay an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- namely, Rs. 50,000/- to each P.W.1 and the child, Anjali, respectively. On verification and on instructions, the learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted before this Court today, i.e., on 17.12.2008, that the appellant/accused has undertaken to pay an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- namely, Rs. 50,000/- to each P.W.1 and the child, Anjali, respectively. This Court is of the considered view that considering the financial position of the ap­pellant/accused the amount offered is a rea­sonable one and, therefore, this Court, in order to secure the ends of justice, is con­strained to accept the voluntary undertak­ing and offer of compensation made by the appellant/accused to pay an amount of Rs. 50,000/- in favour of the prosecutrix/P.W.1 and another amount of Rs. 50,000/- in favour of the child, Anjali. 24. As per the abovesaid undertaking, the appellant/accused shall deposit an amount of Rs. 50,000/- by way of Demand Draft in favour of the prosecutrix/P.W.1 and another amount of Rs. 50,000/- by way of Demand Draft in favour of the child, Anjali, before the learned II Additional District and Ses­sions Judge (Protection of Civil Rights), Thanjavur, in S.C. No. 37 of 2000 within a period of eight weeks from the date of re­ceipt of a copy of this Judgment. On such deposit, the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge (Protection of Civil Rights), Thanjavur, shall take immediate steps to summon the prosecutrix whose name and address shall be furnished by the learned counsel for the appellant while depositing the Demand Drafts and the learned Judge shall hand over the Demand Draft of Rs. 50,000/- deposited in favour of the prosecutrix/ P.W. 1 to her and the prosecutrix/ P.W.1 is entitled to withdraw the amount of Rs. 50,000/-. The amount of Rs. 50,000/-deposited in favour of the child, Anjali, shall be kept by the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge (Protection of Civil Rights), Thanjavur, in a fixed deposit in a nationalised bank in the name of the minor child, namely, Anjali with the prosecutrix as her guardian. The accrued interest shall be paid to the prosecutrix once in two years. The said amount of Rs. 50,000/- with re­maining interest thereon shall be disbursed to the girl after she attains majority by get­ting an account opened in a bank in her name. The accrued interest shall be paid to the prosecutrix once in two years. The said amount of Rs. 50,000/- with re­maining interest thereon shall be disbursed to the girl after she attains majority by get­ting an account opened in a bank in her name. However, for the purpose of meeting the imminent needs of the minor child, Anjali, the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge (Protection of Civil Rights), Thanjavur, can permit the amount to be paid over to the guardian (prosecutrix/P.W.1) either partly or in whole depending on the genuine and reasonable requirements con­cerning the maintenance of the child. The learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge (Protection of Civil Rights), Thanjavur, shall submit a report to the Reg­istrar (Judicial), Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, on the action taken in this regard within two months from the date of deposit of the Demand Drafts. 25. It is made clear that it is the duty and responsibility of the Inspector of Police, Thalaignayiru Police Station, to take all nec­essary steps to assist P.W.1 for the imple­mentation of the judgment of this Court in respect of the payment of compensation vol­untarily offered by the appellant/accused, as stated above. Order accordingly.