Judgment :- Kurian Joseph, J. This is a classic example of an ingenious litigant engaging in litigious acrobatics, successfully delaying the implementation of an order dated 21.03.91 passed under Section 7 read with Section 9 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as SAFEMA). Before dealing with the contentions taken by the writ petitioner it is necessary to refer to the almost three decades long exercises undertaken by the petitioner which shock the judicial conscience as well. 2. The petitioner is the brother-in-law of one Mr.M.Abubacker. He was a detenu under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as COFEPOSA Act). The detention order was not pursued by the detenu and thus he was detained for the full term. The said Abubacker was proceeded against under the provisions of SAFEMA in respect of certain items of property, which stood in his name. Accordingly, the competent authority under the SAFEMA passed an order dated 20.02.1991, where it was found that there was unexplained investment to the tune of Rs.25,260/-in his name. However, option was also given to him to pay the said amount in lieu of forfeiture Section 9 of the Act. Accordingly, Abubacker exercised his option and paid the fine and thus redeemed the 8 cents of land in Survey No.1631 and 1562 in Madathuvilakam Village, Pattom, Thiruvananthapuram and 5 cents of land with two storied terraced building in Survey No.2934/G1 at vanchiyoor Village, palayam, Thiruvanathapuram. There was also a business enterprise of purchase and sale of Sewing Machines etc. under the name of M/s. Rasiya Enterprises, Palayam, Thiruvananthapuram. It may be noted at this juncture that the property of the writ petitioner is not an item included in the proceeding dated 20.02.91 against Abubacker. The letter permitting Abubacker to redeem his property referred to in the order dated 21.03.91 is marked as Ext.P4 in the writ petition. It is the contention of the writ petitioner that since Abubacker has been thus relieved of the consequences of his offensive conduct, there cannot be any proceedings against the petitioner. There are other contentions as well which we shall advert to later. 3. It is the contention of the writ petitioner that since Abubacker has been thus relieved of the consequences of his offensive conduct, there cannot be any proceedings against the petitioner. There are other contentions as well which we shall advert to later. 3. While so, the petitioner herein was issued notice under Section 6(1) of the SAFEMA, dated 25.03.81 directing the petitioner to explain why his 11 cents of land with a building known as Savera Tourist Home situated in Survey No.1212/16, Door No.TC 2560 in Vanchiyoor Village, Thiruvananthapuram should not be declared as illegally acquired properties and forfeited to the Central Government, and Savings Bank account No.8202 with Syndicate Bank, Thiruvananthapuram, shall not be proceeded against. The petitioner was also issued a notice for hearing For about six years there was no meaningful response from the petitioner. In the meanwhile the old Savera Tourist Home was reconstructed and thereafter it was known as Raaz Tourist Home. Hence, a supplementary notice under Section 6(1) dated 13.03.92, furnishing details of the items of property, was issued to the petitioner. The competent authority thereafter duly passed an order dated 30.12.92 under Section 7 of SAFEMA forfeiting the above mentioned items of property. Link between the petitioner and the COFEPOSA detenu Abubacker is that he is the brother of the wife of the convict/detenu and that the detenu had purchased the property in the name of the petitioner and had made investments for the construction. Even from the reply of the writ petitioner before the competent authority it is revealed that there was a loan transaction between the petitioner with one Mr.R.S. Nair who had availed the loan from the COFEPOSA detenu. The petitioner was also informed that he was free to file an appeal under Section 12(4) of SAFEMA before the Appellate Authority. Instead, petitioner filed a writ petition as OP No. 1520 of 1993 challenging the said order datd 30.12.92 and the dependent orders for surrender. It is necessary to extract the prayers in the writ petition. The petitioner was also informed that he was free to file an appeal under Section 12(4) of SAFEMA before the Appellate Authority. Instead, petitioner filed a writ petition as OP No. 1520 of 1993 challenging the said order datd 30.12.92 and the dependent orders for surrender. It is necessary to extract the prayers in the writ petition. The main four prayers in OP No. 1520 of 1993 read as follows: "A) A Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ, order or direction calling up all the records and files leading to the formation of Ext.P11 (Dated 30.12.1992 and received on 4.1.1993) order under Sec.7 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act 1976 of the 2nd respondent, forefeiting the properties of the petitioners namely (1) 11 cents of land with a building at survey No,1212/16 - Door No.T.C.23/60 (New T.C.No.26/328) in Vanchiyoor Village now known as Raaz Tourist Home and (2) Deposits in Saving Bank Account No.8202 with interest accrued thereon with Syndicate Bank, Statue Junction Branch, Trivandrum and Ext.P11A order under Section 19(1) of the SAFEM POP Act, 1976 of the 2nd respondent bearing F.No.OCA/MDS/2277/91 dated 30.12.1992 directing the petitioner to surrender the 11 cents of land with a building at survey No.1212/16 Door No.T.C.23/60 New T.C.No.26/328 in Vanchiyoor Village now known as Raaz, Tourist Home to the District collector, Thiruvananthapuram within 30 days of the service of the order and Ext.P11B order under Section 19(1) of the SAFEEM POP Act, 1976 of the 2nd respondent dated 30.12.1992 (and received on 4.1.1993) directing to credit the amount held by the petitioner in Savings Account No.8202 in the head of Account of "0047 - OTHER PHYSICAL SERVICES" and perusing Ext.P11, Ext.P11A and P11B quash all the three for being haunted with illegality, malafides,, arbitariness and for the deliberate malafide and illegal act of the 2nd respondent being contrary to the object of the SAFEMPOP Act 1976 and for violation of the Principles of Natural Justice and violation of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. B) To issue a Writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction directing the respondents to eschew all further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P11, Ext.P11A and Ext.P11B C) To issue a Writ of prohibition or appropriate writ order or direction prohibiting or injuncting the respondent from further proceeding with Ext.P11, P11A and P11B in any manner. B) To issue a Writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction directing the respondents to eschew all further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P11, Ext.P11A and Ext.P11B C) To issue a Writ of prohibition or appropriate writ order or direction prohibiting or injuncting the respondent from further proceeding with Ext.P11, P11A and P11B in any manner. D) To issue a Writ or order declaring that Section 2(2)© and Explanation II to that of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act 1976 as unconstitutional, illegal, null, void and inoperative for being given arbitrary, unguided and unlawful powers to the authorities under the Act (2nd respondent) to implicate those relatives even, who are not having any connection, involvement or proximity with the offence committed by the detenu or convicted person under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 or allied Acts since it infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art.14 and Art.21 of the Constitution of India of that person." 4. The said writ petition was disposed of by judgment dated 19.03.99 directing the petitioner to pursue his alternate and statutory remedy of appeal within 45 days. If the appeal was filed accordingly, If the appeal was filed accordingly, till orders were passed and communicated, status quo on possession was to continue. It is seen that the petitioner did not seriously pursue the remedy of appeal as directed in the judgment in Op No.1520 of 1993 referred to above. The petitioner only filed a effective appeal dated 13.05.99 and that too beyond time. Thought the petitioner was given sufficient time to cure the defects, the same were not cured and no competent person represented the petitioner before the appellate authority and hence by order dated 09.01.02 the appeal was dismissed. It was so communicated to the petitioner as per letter dated 25.01.92. That was challenged before this Court in another writ petition, OP No.39578 of 2002. The impugned order dated 09.01.2002 was marked as Ext.P2 in the writ Petition. The main ground taken in that writ petition was that the petitioner did not get sufficient opportunity before the appellate authority. That writ petition was hence disposed of by judgment dated 03.04.03, on the submission of the writ petition that he was prepared to rectify all the defects and prosecute the matter. The main ground taken in that writ petition was that the petitioner did not get sufficient opportunity before the appellate authority. That writ petition was hence disposed of by judgment dated 03.04.03, on the submission of the writ petition that he was prepared to rectify all the defects and prosecute the matter. That judgment in OP NO.39578 of 2002 reads as follows: "Challenge is against Exhibit P2 order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. As pointed out by the learned standing counsel for the respondents there are no defects which really warrant interference in the order. 2. However, petitioner submitted that he is prepared to rectify all the defects and prosecute the matter. Consequence otherwise as far as petitioner is concerned is pointed out to be very grave. 3. In the aforesaid circumstances, I set aside Exhibit P2, but on condition that the petitioner should act appropriately rectifying the defects noticed in Exhibit P2 and represent the appeal before the Tribunal within a period of one month from today. The interim orders presently passed will govern the parties for a period of two months. The original petition is disposed of as above." 5. The petitioner did not take any steps thereafter to cure the defects as undertaken by him before this court. Therefore steps were taken for taking possession of the property. In a related matter the District Collector had also issued an order of attachment pertaining to Income Tax. Both proceedings were challenged in another writ petition, WP© No.14037 of 2005 and the documents are marked as Ext.P2 under the SAFEMA for taking possession and Ext.P4 by the District Collector attaching the business. That writ petition was disposed of by judgment dated 25.01.05 wherein this court made it clear that Ext.P2 proceedings under the SAFEMA was only an inevitable consequence of the finality otherwise attained to the order dated 09.01.02 of the appellate authority under the SAFEMA dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner. Ext.P4 attachment was subsequently withdrawn and hence the challenge survived only in respect of Ext.P2. It is necessary to extract the relevant portion of the judgment for the purpose of clarity. Paragraph 3 of the said judgment reads as follows: "3. Heard the learned counsel on both sides. Ext.P4 attachment was subsequently withdrawn and hence the challenge survived only in respect of Ext.P2. It is necessary to extract the relevant portion of the judgment for the purpose of clarity. Paragraph 3 of the said judgment reads as follows: "3. Heard the learned counsel on both sides. The order of the Appellate Tribunal was set aside by this Court, by Ext.P1 judgment, subject to the condition that the petitioner will cure the defect within one month. He has failed to do that. He has his own explanation and justification in not curing the defect. But until Ext.P1 judgment is modified by seeking review of it, the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 25.1.2002, set aside by this Court, will revive after the period of one month stipulated therein. As long as the original forfeiture order Ext.R3 dated 30.12.1992 and the order of the Appellate Tribunal dismissing the appeal against it remain in force, there is nothing illegal with Ext.P2 communication." 6. Without properly disclosing any of the above mentioned crucial and relevant aspects, the petitioner filed the present writ petition, WP(C) No.32780 of 2005 challenging the original order passed by the competent authority dated 30.12.92 and the appellate order dated 09.01.02, marked as Exts.P1 and P2. It is shocking that despite the judgment regarding the finality attained to the appellate order dated 09.01.02, the same is attacked in the present writ petition on almost all the grounds taken earlier. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned orders and hence this appeal by the competent authority. The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows: "24. The enquiry should have been made in order to ascertain whether the property of the affected person had any link with the assets of the detenu and the enquiry report reveal no link, the forfeiture under Section 7 of the Act cannot be made. There is no justification in this case for ordering forfeiture. I am of the view that competent authority has passed Ext.P1 without taking into consideration the principles of law and without understanding the scope and ambit of the Act. The enquiry was misdirected and the competent authority confined the enquiry to the source of the affected person. 25. There is no justification in this case for ordering forfeiture. I am of the view that competent authority has passed Ext.P1 without taking into consideration the principles of law and without understanding the scope and ambit of the Act. The enquiry was misdirected and the competent authority confined the enquiry to the source of the affected person. 25. Going by the materials on record I find that the affected person succeeded in proving source of raising funds for the purchase of the property and for the construction of the building. The competent authority presumed wrongly that the affected person purchased the property with the funds supplied by the detenu even though there is positive evidence supporting the affected person's case that he is the owner of the property. Moreover the year of purchase in 1972 is long before the proceedings initiated against the detenu." 7. Heard Sri Sudhi Vasudevan, learned Central Government Standing Counsel for the appellant and Sri. Praveen, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Since many of the contentions of the appellant are also on factual matrix and since those aspects have been referred to above, we may straight away deal with the contentions taken by the first respondent/writ petitioner. Following are the main contentions: 1. The COFEPOSA detenu Abubacker having been permitted to pay fine and he thus having been permitted to pay fine and he thus having redeemed his property as per order dated 21.03.1991, there is no justification in proceeding against the writ petitioner, who is only a relative. 2. Even if any proceedings are to be initiated against the relative, it should be established that there is a connecting link to show that the purchase of the property by the petitioner is out of the funds of the detenu. 8. Section 2 of the SAFEMA indisputably applies to the petitioner, since under Clause (iii) of Explanation 2 to Section 2 (2) of the Act, the petitioner is the person being the brother of the spouse of convict/detenu Abubacker. It is to be noted that the property of the writ petitioner proceeded against had not been included in the proceedings intiated against the COFEPOSA detenu Abubacker. Independent proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under Section 6 of the SAGEMA since he is deemed to be a detenu as per the definition of the person defined under Section 2 of the SAFEMA. Independent proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under Section 6 of the SAGEMA since he is deemed to be a detenu as per the definition of the person defined under Section 2 of the SAFEMA. Though the petitioner submitted a reply that the property referred to in the proceedings was purchased out of his own funds and other sources, the same could not be established. It was found on enquiry that there were loan transactions between the COFEPOSA detenu Abubacker and the writ petitioner through one Mr.R.S. Nair and thus the competent authority passed the order dated 30.12.92(Ext.P1). It was also noted in the order that there was no material available to establish that he had purchased the property out of his own income or by the other loans as explained by the writ petitioner in the reply to the notice under Section 6 of the SAFEMA. Under Section 8 of the SAFEMA, "in any proceedings under this Act, the burden of proving that any property specified in the notice served under Sec.6 is not illegally acquired property shall be on the person affected". It will be profitable to refer to the operative portion of the appellate authority's order, Ext.P1, which reads as follows: "19. The above three items, claimed by the Affected Person to show the sources of funds for the construction, do not succeed. He has to be construed as having failed to discharge the burden of proving that the cost of construction was not met out of illegally acquired monies, as required under s.8 of the Act, Accordingly, the property constructed comes within the mischief of sec.3 of the Act, and hence, is liable for forfeiture." 9. In case the petitioner had any dispute with regard to the factual finding entered by the competent authority after complying with all the requirements under the SAFEMA, the same should have been established before the appellate authority. The appeal was dismissed by order dated 09.01.02 and thus the matter has attained finality as already held by judgment dated 25.10.02 in WP© No.14037 of 2005. It is to be noted specifically that it was made clear in the said judgment that unless the finality is appropriately attacked by taking recourse to review of the judgment in OP No.39578 of 2002, the order by the appellate authority would revive. It is to be noted specifically that it was made clear in the said judgment that unless the finality is appropriately attacked by taking recourse to review of the judgment in OP No.39578 of 2002, the order by the appellate authority would revive. Despite such an unambiguous clarification in the judgment , no steps were taken; instead, petitioner filed another writ petition attacking the very same order, almost on the same grounds. Having chosen not to file a review and having ventured for another writ petition, the petitioner cannot now pursue the remedy of review. Thus the order dated 30-12-1992 has become final as per the appellate order dated 09-01-2002 which has also become final. 10. The proceedings initiated against the detenu and the relative or associate are independent and not interdependent. Therefore, the proceedings against the petitioner cannot be dropped on the ground that the detenu was permitted to save his forfeited property by paying fine. That has no impact on the proceedings taken against the petitioner. Once a notice under section 6 is issued to a person, he has to independently establish that the property is not illegally acquired property as defined under Section3(1) (c) of the SAFEMA. 11. Fine in lieu of forfeiture is as prescribed under section 9 of the Act, which reads as follows:- "9. FINE IN LIEU OF FORFEITURE.-(1) Where the competent authority makes a declaration that any property stands forfeited to the Central Government under Sec.7 and it is a case where the source of only a part, being less than one-half of the income, earnings or assets with which such property was acquired has not been proved to the satisfaction of the competent authority, it shall make an order giving an option to the person affected to pay, in lieu of forfeiture, a fine equal to one and one-fifth times the value of such part. EXPLANATION.-For the purpose of this sub-section, the value of any part of income, earnings or assets, with which any property has been acquired, shall be,-- (a) in the case any part of income or earnings, the amount of such part of income or earnings; (b) in the case of any part of assets, the proportionate part of the full value of the consideration for the acquisition of such assets. (2) Before making an order imposing a fine under sub-section (1), the person affected shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (3) where the persons affected pays the fine due under sub-section (1) within such time as may be allowed in that behalf, the competent authority may, by order, revoke the declaration of forfeiture under Sec.7 and thereupon such property shall stand released." In view of the factual position on quantum only, the detenu was given the option to pay the fine for releasing the forfeited property. For that reason the proceedings independently taken against the petitioner cannot be dropped. Not only that, the petitioner is not entitled to the option also, since he has not satisfied the parameters of Section 9. 12. The principles of res judicata would apply to writ proceedings as well. The grounds which a petitioner might and ought to have taken, if not taken at the first opportunity, cannot be pursued afresh in another proceedings. An adjudication is final and conclusive not only in respect of the subject matter adjudicated and determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might, could and ought to have taken and invited decision as incidental to or essentially connected therewith, in view of Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC. This principle applies to both claim and defence also. In case a party had already taken up the contentions and if aggrieved by the judgment the remedy is to pursue the matter in appeal. If a party has a grievance that any of his contentions have not been adverted to in the judgment, the remedy is to pursue the matter in a review. According to Sir William Wade "One special variety of estoppel is res judicata. This results from the rule which prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again, even though the determination is demonstrably wrong. Except in proceedings by way of appeal, the parties bound by the judgment are estopped form questioning it." Referring to prerogative remedies, the author would hold the position that "…the court may refuse to entertain questions which were or could have been litigated in earlier proceedings, when this would be an abuse of legal process…" (Administrative Law by H.W.R.Wade & C.F.Forsyth, 9th Edition, page 243249). To obtain a second judgment by the same court on the same cause of action cannot also be permitted lest it should give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Once a judgment is delivered on a cause of action, the cause of action which resulted in the judgment must lose its identity, vitality and litigious relevance. The same cannot survive the judgment and give rise to another cause of action on the same set of facts, as held by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. V. Nawab Hussain, AIR 1977 SC 1680. To quote:- "The principle of estoppel per rem judicatum is a rule of evidence. It may be said to be "the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action." This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognize that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts ave therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. This is another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduling a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle." The principle of res judicata would apply to writ proceedings as well, being a general principle. Forward Construction Co. and others v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri, AIR 1986 SC 391 is a case where after the dismissal of an earlier writ petition on the same cause of action, another writ petition was filed, but on a different ground. Dismissing the same the Supreme Court held: "In view of S.11, Expln.IV could not be said that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the subsequent petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence." 13. We may also reiterate a well settled position that the writ court shall not re-appreciate the materials on which an authority functioning under the Statute has taken a decision, unless the decision is so unjust, unreasonable, arbitrary and perverse. The judicial review is not on the decision but on the decision making process. In this case it is to be noted that the petitioner has chosen not to pursue the statutory remedy of appeal, though instituted and though directed and permitted by this court thereafter also. The judicial review is not on the decision but on the decision making process. In this case it is to be noted that the petitioner has chosen not to pursue the statutory remedy of appeal, though instituted and though directed and permitted by this court thereafter also. It has also to be noted that though the petitioner had purchased the property in 1972, the construction is are later. The enquiry by the competent authority was not only on the funds used for the purchase of property, but on the cost of construction also in arriving at a conclusion that the property is an illegally acquired property as defined under Section 3(1)(C) of the SAFEMA. To that extent there is a factual error also in the judgment of the learned single judge. The petitioner has filed successive writ petitions, and he has been successful in delaying the inevitable forfeiture. That is nothing but a sheer abuse of the process of court. 14. In that view of the matter it is not necessary to consider the contention regarding link or nexus. We may incidentally note that the question of nexus is no more res integra, wholly covered by the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Attorney General For India v. Amratlal prajivandas, (1994) 5 SCC 54 and a later decision in P.P.Abdulla v. Competent Authority, (2007) 2 SCC 510. The SAFEMA has not intended to proceed against the illegal property acquired by whatever means. Section 6(1) notice under the Act takes in only the illegally acquired property as defined under Section 3(1) of the Act and in the proceedings a link has to be established to the illegally acquired property apart from the mere relation to the detenu. But as reiterated by the apex court in the Constitution Bench decision "it is equally necessary to reiterate that the burden of establishing that the properties mentioned in the show cause notice issued under Section 6 and which are held on that date by a relative or an associate of the convict/detenu, are not the illegally acquired properties of the convict/detenu, lies upon such relative/associate". As far as the facts of the present case are concerned, as we have already observed above, the link to the illegally acquired property of the petitioner has also been established in view of the indirect loan transaction by the detenu and the petitioner through one Mr.R.S.Nair. As far as the facts of the present case are concerned, as we have already observed above, the link to the illegally acquired property of the petitioner has also been established in view of the indirect loan transaction by the detenu and the petitioner through one Mr.R.S.Nair. Accordingly, we allow the writ appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and dismiss the writ petition with costs to the tune of Rs.10,000/-.