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2009 DIGILAW 573 (GAU)

Gas Authority of India Ltd. v. State of Tripura

2009-08-14

I.A.ANSARI

body2009
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The Gas Authority of India Limited, a Government of India undertaking, which is registered under the Companies Act, 1956, having its head office at New Delhi and several units throughout the country, including one at Agartala (hereinafter referred to as "the GAIL") purchases gas from respondent No. 4, namely, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as, "the ONGC"), which is also a Government of India undertaking and is registered under the Companies Act, 1956, having one of its project offices at Agartala. At the time of purchase of gas from the ONGC, the ONGC realises "sales tax" as chargeable under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, (in short, "the TST Act, 1976"). Upon so purchasing gas, GAIL, in turn, sells the gas to North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as, "the NEEPCO") a Government of India undertaking, and also to the Government of Tripura for the State Government's thermal power plants. According to the agreements executed between the parties, namely, GAIL, on the one hand, and the NEEPCO and the Government of Tripura, on the other, GAIL charges sale price for sale of gas and also raises transportation charges for transporting gas from the place, where it receives gas from the ONGC, to the place(s), where it delivers gas to the NEEPCO and/or to the State Government's thermal plant. For the purpose of transportation of gas from the place(s), where GAIL receives gas from ONGC, up to the place(s), where GAIL delivers gas to NEEPCO or the State Government, within the State of Tripura, GAIL has laid underground pipelines on the land purchased by GAIL. The pipelines belong to, and has been in exclusive possession of GAIL at all relevant point of time. According to the agreements aforementioned, on expiry of the period of contract of sale of gas by GAIL to NEEPCO and the State Government, GAIL would remain at liberty to dismantle the pipelines and sell the same to any person. Though the sale of gas by GAIL to NEEPCO and the State Government had been started long time back, the Government had not imposed any sales tax on the transportation charges raised by GAIL. Though the sale of gas by GAIL to NEEPCO and the State Government had been started long time back, the Government had not imposed any sales tax on the transportation charges raised by GAIL. By, however, a letter dated January 1, 1999, respondent No. 2, namely, Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-I, Agartala, West Tripura, issued a letter to the Assistant Manager (Finance), NEEPCO Ltd., directing the latter to deduct, at source, sales tax at the rate of four per cent towards transportation charges from the bills payable to GAIL. The basis for issuing the said letter dated January 1, 1999, was a decision of this Court, in Civil Rule No. 282 of 1990 See Mahabir Transport Agency v. Chairman, Food Corporation of India [1998] 109 STC 99 (Gau). Acting upon the letter, dated January 1, 1999, aforementioned, NEEPCO issued a letter, dated January 2, 1999, to GAIL that they were required to deduct sales tax at four per cent on the transportation charges, which GAIL raises in its bills against the NEEPCO. 2. Contending that the directions, which had been given by respondent No. 2, to respondent No. 3, namely, NEEPCO, to make deductions at source, as mentioned hereinbefore, as well as the attempts made by respondent No. 3, namely, NEEPCO, to make deductions, at source, from the bills of GAIL were illegal and without any authority of law, GAIL, as petitioner, has approached this Court with this writ petition, made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking to get the letters, dated January 1, 1999 and January 2, 1999, aforementioned, set aside and quashed. 3. Respondent Nos. 3. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, namely, State of Tripura and Superintendent of Taxes, Charge I, Agartala, have resisted the writ petition by contending, inter alia, that the transportation charges collected by GAIL, for transporting gas from ONGC to the NEEPCO, ;s a taxable event under the TST Act, 1976, and the Rules framed thereunder inasmuch as such transportation of gas, according to the contesting respondents, amounts to "transfer of the right to use" and shall, therefore, be deemed to be a "sale" within the meaning of "sale" as defined in Section 2(g) of the TST Act, 1976, and that such "'transfer of the right to use" is chargeable under Section 3 read with Section 3A of the TST Act, 1976, and, hence, the contesting respondents were within the ambit of their power, in insisting upon NEEPCO, to deduct sales tax from GAIL's bills in respect of transportation charges, which GAIL raises. This apart, according to the contesting respondents, Section 3AA of the TST Act, 1976, permits making of such deductions at source and, hence, the directions given by the contesting respondents to respondent No. 3, namely, NEEPCO, is legal and that it is the duty of NEEPCO to realise tax as required by the impugned letter, dated January 1, 1999, aforementioned, issued by respondent No. 2, namely, Superintendent of Taxes, Charge I, Agartala, West Tripura. 4. I have heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, and Mr. N.C. Paul, learned Senior Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State respondent Nos. 1 and 2.1 have also heard Mr. S.C. Saha, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3, and Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4, namely, ONGC. 5. While considering the present writ petition, it needs to be borne in mind that before introduction of the 46th Amendment of the Constitution of India, composite contracts, such as, works contract, hire-purchase contract, catering contracts, etc., were not assessable as contracts for sale of goods inasmuch as the contracts, which were indivisible, could not have become subject to sales tax. 6. Before the Constitution (46th Amendment) Act, 1982, the word "sale", which occurred in the expression "sale", in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, had carried the same meaning as a "sale" defined in Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 6. Before the Constitution (46th Amendment) Act, 1982, the word "sale", which occurred in the expression "sale", in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, had carried the same meaning as a "sale" defined in Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Hence, prior to the 46th Amendment, sales tax could be imposed only upon transfer of property in goods from one person to another. Consequently, sales tax could not be imposed upon transactions, which might have resembled sale, but did not involve transfer of property in goods. Because of this judicial interpretation, States were losing revenue on account of sales tax in respect of transactions like transfer of the right to use goods, transfer of property in goods involved in execution of works contract, supply of food by a hotelier, etc. 7. With regard to the above, it may be pointed out that as far as back as in the year 1967, the Madras High Court, in A.V. Meiyappan v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Board of Revenue, Madras reported in [1967] 20 STC 115, was confronted with the question as to whether a given transaction of "lease" can ever amount to "sale". In A.V. Meiyappan [1967] 20 STC 115 (Mad), the court was examining an agreement entered into by an assessee, called lessor, with a limited company, called lessee, whereunder the assessee had made over to the lessee the outright lease of the world negative rights of the film, for a period of 49 years, for a consideration. The sales tax authorities were of the view that though the transaction was termed as "lease" for 49 years, the assessee had actually effected a "sale" of the negative print of the picture for a consideration and, therefore, the transaction was liable to sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The Madras High Court, however, turned down the imposition of sales tax by holding that even if a copyright is regarded as species of movable property, the transaction did not connote a "sale" at all inasmuch as there was no transfer of property in the goods in such a case and the transaction was, therefore, not liable to payment of sales tax. 8. 8. The decision of the Madras High Court, in A.V. Meiyappan [1967] 20 STC 115, created immense difficulty for the States for quite a long time, because novel device of leasing out of the films resulted into avoidance of huge amounts of sales tax. This apart, in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. reported in [1958] 9 STC 353, the Supreme Court gave a new approach to the definition of "sale" by prohibiting States from taxing transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of indivisible works contract. This decision also affected the revenue of the States. The State's revenue was further reduced to a great extent in view of the decision in K.L. Johar and Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer reported in [1965] 16 STC 213, wherein the apex court decided that the State can tax only the depreciated value of the goods. Yet another decision of the apex court, in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. reported in [1972] 29 STC 474, closed the door of a big revenue, earning area by the States, when the apex court held that supply of food by a hotelier was essentially one of services by the hotelier and that it is, as a part of the amenities incidental to the service, that a hotelier serves meals at specified hours. 9. Because of the traditional concept of "sale", which the courts adhered to, while interpreting as to whether a given transaction amounts, or does not amount, to "sale", the 46th Amendment Act of the Constitution brought changes in the definition of the word "sale" as given in Article 366 inasmuch as it widened, by inserting Clause (29A) to Article 366, the definition of "sale" by incorporating those transactions, which might have resembled "sale", but did not fall, within the traditional concept of "sale", and were judicially held not to be exigible to sales tax. The idea behind this amendment was to create a concept of "deemed sale" by treating, with the help of a legal fiction, such a transaction as a "sale" even if the same did not fall within the ambit of the definition of "sale" as defined in the Sale of Goods Act. The idea behind this amendment was to create a concept of "deemed sale" by treating, with the help of a legal fiction, such a transaction as a "sale" even if the same did not fall within the ambit of the definition of "sale" as defined in the Sale of Goods Act. In other words, by bringing various transactions within the purview of the definition of "sale", a transaction, which was, otherwise, not a "sale", has been "deemed" to be a "sale". This Clause (29A) of Article 366 states as under: (29A) 'tax on the sale or purchase of goods' includes-- (a) a tax on the transfer, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, of property in any goods for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration; (b) a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract; (c) a tax on the delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment by instalments; (d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration; (e) a tax on the supply of goods by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration; (f) a tax on the supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service, is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made; 10. The effect of the amendment, which has been introduced to Article 366, by inserting Clause (29A), is that a State Legislature has become competent to impose sales tax, amongst others, on the transfer of the right to use any goods, which, before the amendment, so made, the State Legislature was not competent to do. The effect of the amendment, which has been introduced to Article 366, by inserting Clause (29A), is that a State Legislature has become competent to impose sales tax, amongst others, on the transfer of the right to use any goods, which, before the amendment, so made, the State Legislature was not competent to do. What the insertion of Clause (29A) has done is that various transactions, enumerated therein, which were, otherwise, not sales, have to be deemed, by a legal fiction, as sales. Such sales are commonly called "deemed sales". Under Clause (29A)(d), a transfer of the right to use goods" for any purpose and for any period, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, shall be deemed to be a sale of goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply, and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom transfer, delivery or supply is made. 11. Consequent upon the above amendments of the Constitution, almost all the States have amended their respective definitions of the word "sale", in the sales tax statutes, by incorporating identical language used by the Constitution. Indisputably, the expression "transfer of the right to use any goods" cannot be equated with the expression "transfer of property in goods", because the transfer of the "right to use any goods" is not the same as the "transfer of the goods" itself; but when the definition of "sale" is amended in consonance with the change introduced in the definition of "sale" by the 46th Amendment, a transfer of the right to use any goods would amount to "sale" within the meaning of the Sales Tax Laws empowering thereby the State Legislature impose tax, on such a transaction, as "sale". 12. Following the 46th Amendment of the Constitution of India, the TST Act, 1976, also underwent changes bringing, within the ambit of "sales tax", the "transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose". Thus, the definition of "sale" was enlarged to include "transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose". In order to levy "sales tax" on the transfer of the right to use any goods", changes were introduced in Section 3 of the TST Act, 1976. 13. A careful reading of the definition of "sale" and of the charging section, namely, Section 3 is, therefore, imperative. In order to levy "sales tax" on the transfer of the right to use any goods", changes were introduced in Section 3 of the TST Act, 1976. 13. A careful reading of the definition of "sale" and of the charging section, namely, Section 3 is, therefore, imperative. With this object in view, Section 2(g)(ii) of the TST Act, 1976, is reproduced hereinbelow: Section 2(g) 'Sale' means any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and includes-- (i) any delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment in instalments, (ii) any transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and such delivery or transfer of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the delivery or transfer and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such delivery or transfer is made, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge;.... 14. From a careful reading of Section 2(g)(ii), it becomes clear that "sale" includes transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period), for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration. 15. Bearing in mind that the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose amounts to "sale" within the meaning of Section 2(g)(ii), when I turn to Section 3, I notice that Section 3 reads as follows: 3. Liability to tax and exemption from tax.--(1) Every dealer in taxable goods shall pay a tax on his turnover at the rate specified in column (3) of the Schedule attached to this Act: Provided that subject to the provisions of Sections 14 and 15of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 the State Government may, from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette and subject to such conditions as it may impose, fix a higher rate of tax not exceeding forty per cent or any lower rate of tax payable under this Act on account of the sale of any taxable goods or class of taxable goods specified in such notification; and thereupon the Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. (2) If the State Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for increasing the production of goods or for protection or encouragement of industry within the State, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette subject to such restrictions and conditions, exempt from payment of tax, either in whole or in part, the sale of any taxable goods or class of taxable goods by any dealer or class of dealers for such period as may be specified therein. (3) Subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, the State Government may make an exemption, or reduction in rate, in respect of any tax payable under this Act on the sales of any taxable goods to such person or class of persons as may be prescribed. (4) Where exemption from the levy of tax under this Act on any sale of taxable goods is claimed by a dealer under the provisions of this Section the burden of proof shall lie on such dealer and the Commissioner may require the dealer to substantiate the claim in the manner prescribed. (5) If any dispute or question regarding payment of tax arises, the matter shall be referred to the Commissioner whose decision thereon shall be final. 16. From a bare reading of Section 3, it becomes clear that Section 3 provides that every "dealer", in taxable goods, shall pay tax at four per cent for transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period). 17. In the face of the definition of "sale" given in Section 2(g)(ii) and the second proviso to Section 3, there can be no doubt that the "transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose" is taxable at four per cent under the TST Act, 1976. What is, however, of utmost importance to note is that the liability to pay "sales tax" is of a "dealer". What, therefore, a "dealer" means, under the TST Act, 1976, is equally important to analyse. What is, however, of utmost importance to note is that the liability to pay "sales tax" is of a "dealer". What, therefore, a "dealer" means, under the TST Act, 1976, is equally important to analyse. For this purpose, the definition of "dealer", as given under Section 2(b), is reproduced hereinbelow: 'dealer' means any person who sells taxable goods manufactured, made or processed by him in Tripura or brought by him into Tripura from any place outside Tripura for the purpose of sale in Tripura and includes Government and any person making a sale under Section 3A. 18. From a careful reading of the definition of the word "dealer", what clearly emerges is that every person, who sells taxable goods in the State of Tripura, is not a "dealer", for, he becomes a "dealer" only when he sells taxable goods manufactured, made and processed by him in Tripura or brought by him into Tripura from any place outside Tripura for the purpose of sale in Tripura. This, in turn, shows that if a person purchases taxable goods in the State of Tripura and sells the same within the State of Tripura, he does not become a "dealer" and on such a sale, no sales tax can be imposed by invoking the provisions of Section 3. By amendment, which Tripura Sales Tax (Third Amendment) Act, 1984, has introduced, a person, making a sale, under Section 3A, has been included within the meaning of the expression "dealer". Section 3A is meant for a person, who executes a works contract, for, in the execution of works contract, whatever goods are used by him either as goods or in some other form, such utilisation of goods would, by legal fiction, be deemed to be a sale of those goods used in execution of the works contract. 19. What clearly surfaces from the above discussion is that unless a person is a "dealer", he cannot be made liable to pay sales tax on the "transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose". 20. 19. What clearly surfaces from the above discussion is that unless a person is a "dealer", he cannot be made liable to pay sales tax on the "transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose". 20. A minute scrutiny of Clause (b) of Section 2 of the TST Act, 1976, reveals that, by fiction of law, while a person, who executes a works contract, has been made, and shall be treated as, a "dealer" under the TST Act, a person, who "transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose", has not been included within the definition of "dealer". Considered in this light, it becomes clear that without broadening the definition of the word "dealer" and without including, within the expression "dealer", a person, "who transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose, in the present case, such a person could not have been subjected to levy of sales tax. 21. To put it a little differently, no one, who "transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose", can be treated as a "dealer" and made liable to pay sales tax. In short, thus, Section 3 has not created any charge or liability to pay sales tax on a person, who "transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose". In view of the fact that Section 2(b) makes an executor of a works contract a "dealer", it is possible to treat an executor of a works contract as a "dealer", within the scope of the charging section, i.e., Section 3. Logically, therefore, when a transferor of the right to use goods has not been included within the definition of "dealer", he does not fall within the ambit of the charging provisions, i.e., Section 3. 22. Let me, now, turn to the question as to whether Rule 3A(2) is ultra vires the TST Act. For this purpose, a careful reading of Sections 3, 3A and 3AA is necessary. Section 3 already stands quoted above. As far as Sections 3A and 3AA are concerned, these two sections read as under: 3A. 22. Let me, now, turn to the question as to whether Rule 3A(2) is ultra vires the TST Act. For this purpose, a careful reading of Sections 3, 3A and 3AA is necessary. Section 3 already stands quoted above. As far as Sections 3A and 3AA are concerned, these two sections read as under: 3A. Tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contract.--Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act, any transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract shall be deemed to be sale of those goods by the person making the transfer and shall be liable to be taxed at the rate specified in column 3 of the Schedule: Provided that in respect of any such transfer only so much value of the goods involved in the works contract which has actually been paid to the dealer during the period, shall be taken into account for determining the turnover for that period. 3AA. Deduction of tax at the time of payments.--Any person responsible for paying any sum to any person liable to pay tax under Section 3A of the Act, shall at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the person or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or any other mode, deduct such amount towards sales tax as may be prescribed. 23. In the backdrop of the definition of "dealer" given in Section 2(b), when Sections 3A and 3AA of the TST Act are carefully analysed, it becomes abundantly clear that a person, who executes a works contract, shall, by a legal fiction, which Section 2(b) creates, be treated as a "dealer" and such a person, on being treated as a "dealer", becomes, under Section 3A, liable to pay sales tax for transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contract, for, such transfer of property in goods would be deemed to be a "sale" of the goods by the person making the transfer. Section 3AAmakes it obligatory for a person, responsible for making payment of any sum to any person, who is liable to pay sales tax under Section 3A, to deduct, at the time of credit of such sum, to the account of the person or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or any other mode, such amount towards "sales tax" as may be prescribed. 24. Thus, Section 3AA permits deduction, at source, only in respect of transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works "contract" and not in respect of "transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose". This apart, from the fact that the TST Act does not create a charge on any person, who transfers his right to use any goods for any purpose, Section 3AA cannot be invoked for the purpose of deducting, at source, any amount, as sales tax, from such a person. 25. I, now, turn to Rule 3A(2), which reads as under: Rule 3A(2) Every person responsible for making payment to any person for discharge of any liability on account of valuable consideration payable for any transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash or in any manner, shall at the time of making such payment, deduct an amount equal to four percentum of such towards part or, as the case may be, full satisfaction of the tax payable under the Act, on account of such transfer of right: Provided no such deduction shall be made from the bill(s) or invoice (s) of the transferor-- (a) On account of such transfer where the transfer of right to use goods was agreed to before the first day of January, 1989; (b) the amounts received as penalty for defaults in payment or as damages for any loss or damage caused to the goods by the person to whom such transfer was made; and (c) The amount representing the valuable consideration received for such transfer in respect of goods exempt from tax under Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3 of the Act. 26. 26. While considering the validity of Rule 3A(2), what needs to be noted is that when the statute itself, in the present case, has not imposed any liability to pay tax on a person, who transfers his right to use any goods for any purpose, the rule-making authorities, by taking recourse to the rule making power in the statute, could not have made such a rule. 24. A Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Namita Paul v. Food Corporation of India reported in [2009] 20 VST 799 : [2008] 1 GLT 49, had the occasion to consider the vires of Rule 3A(2). Having examined the scheme of the TST Act, 1976, and considering the fact that Section 3, which is the charging section, imposes liability to pay "sales tax" on a "dealer" and the definition of the "dealer" does not include a person, who "transfer the right to use any goods for any purpose", concluded that when the statute itself, i.e., the TST Act, 1976, has not imposed any liability to pay tax on a person, who transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose, the rule-making authorities, by taking recourse to its rule-making power, could not have made such a rule as Rule 3A(2) was Rule 3A(2) was, therefore, held, in Smt. Namita Paul [2009] 20 VST 799 (Gauhati) : [2008] 1 GLT 49, as ultra vires making it clear that no provision, in the statute exists providing for compulsory deduction at the time of making payment for transfer of the right to use goods. Hence, in such circumstances, the rule-making authority could not have, by taking recourse to Sub-section (1) of Section 44, enacted Rule 3A(2) and impose thereby an obligation to make deduction, at source, from the bills of the transferor of the right to use goods. The relevant observations, made in Smt. Namita Paul [2009] 20 VST 799 (Gau) : [2008] 1 GLT 49, read as under (at pages 818-819 of VST): 35. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that unless the TST Act is suitably amended by either expanding the definition of 'dealer' or by making appropriate changes in the provisions of Section 3, which is the charging section, no person, who transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose, can be held liable to pay sales tax under the TST Act. What also crystallizes from the above discussion is that Rule 3A(2) is, in the light of the discussion held above, ultra vires the TST Act. 36. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, while the appeals, preferred by the State Government, fail and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed, the appeals, preferred by the writ petitioners, are hereby allowed. 37. In view of the fact that Rule 3A(2) has been held to be ultra vires, no authority vests in the Department of Revenue, Government of Tripura, to either direct payment of, or deduction at source for the purpose of payment of sales tax from the bills of any person, who transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose. 28. In the light of the position of law as indicated above, it becomes clear that this Court need not determine the question as to whether in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case there is any transfer of the right by the GAIL to use any goods for any purpose in favour of NEEPCO or the State Government inasmuch as the statute, in the light of the decision in Smt. Namita Paul [2009] 20 VST 799 (Gauhati) : [2008] 1 GLT 49, has not imposed any liability to pay "sales tax" on a transferor of the right to use goods for any purpose. The impugned letter, dated January 1, 1999, issued by respondent No. 2 and also the letter, dated January 2, 1999, issued by respondent No. 3, are, thus, clearly without any authority of law and cannot, therefore, be sustained. 29. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition succeeds. The directions and/or information, contained in the impugned letters, dated January 1, 1999 and January 2, 1999, are hereby set aside and quashed. 30. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition shall stand disposed of. 31. No order as to costs.