JUDGMENT Arali Nagaraj, J.— This appeal is by accused No. 1 in Sessions Case No. 68/2003 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court II, Mandya (hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court for short). This appellant was one of the four accused in the said case. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 29.06.2006 passed by the Trial Court in the said case convicting this appellant (accused No. 1) for the offences under Sections 498A & 304-B of I.P.C. and also under Sections 3, 4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘DP Act' for short) is challenged by him in this appeal. 2. Accused No. 2 namely, Venkatashetty, the father of accused No. 1, died during the pendency of the trial and therefore, the case against him came to be abated. Accused Nos.3 & 4 in the said case came to be acquitted of all the said offences, though they were tried for the same offences along with this appellant accused. Sri A.V. Ramakrishna, learned High Court Government. Pleader submitted that no appeal is filed by the complainant-State against the impugned judgment and order insofar as it relates to acquittal of accused Nos.3 & 4 in the said case. 3. I have heard the arguments of Sri N.V. Prakash, learned Counsel for the appellant-accused and also Sri A.V. Ramakrishna, learned High Court Government Pleader and perused the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence and also the entire material found in the original records obtained from the Trial Court. 4. At the outset, Sri N.V. Prakash, learned Counsel for the appellant-accused fairly conceded that though this appellant-accused has challenged correctness of the impugned judgment and order of conviction for all the offences under Sections 498-A & 304-B of I.P.C. and under Sections 3, 4 & 6 of the DP Act charged against him, in view of the consistent evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 in respect of ill-treatment meted out to the deceased by accused No. 1, being her husband, and also file consistent evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 in respect of ill-treatment meted out to the deceased by accused No. 1, being her husband, and also file consistent evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4 as to demand for and receipt of dowry by accused No. 1 from the parents of the deceased, he does not challenge the findings recorded by the Trial Court in the impugned judgment that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against accused No. 1 for the offences under Section 498-A of I.P.C. and under Sections 3, 4 & 6 of the DP Act and he would submit his arguments challenging the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C. Sri N.V. Prakash further submitted that the Trial Court committed serious error in holding that the said ill-treatment, spoken to by P.Ws. 1 to 3 in their evidence, was given by the accused-appellant to the deceased 'soon before her death'. He further submitted that absolutely there is no evidence on record to show that the said ill-treatment was given to the deceased by accused No. 1 ‘soon before death' of the deceased inasmuch as the deceased committed suicide fifteen to twenty days after she was left in the house of the accused by her eider brother namely, P.W. 1 K. Ravikumar, and no incident amounting to ill-treatment is shown to have occurred in the residence of the accused during the said period. In the alternative, he submitted that the cruelty which is proved against the accused No. 1 would attract, at the most, Section 306 of I.P.C. but not Section 304-B of I.P.C. 5. In the alternative, he submitted that the cruelty which is proved against the accused No. 1 would attract, at the most, Section 306 of I.P.C. but not Section 304-B of I.P.C. 5. Per contra, Sri A.V. Ramakrishna, learned High Court Government Pleader strongly contended that the period of fifteen or twenty days after the deceased was left by her said elder brother in her matrimonial house cannot be said to be outside the expression 'soon before death’ as found in Section 304-B of I.P.C. and therefore, the Trial Court rightly held that the ill-treatment that was given to the deceased by accused No. 1 was 'soon before her death' and hence the Trial Court, was quite justified in convicting this accused for the offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C. He further submitted that there is evidence of P.W.9 Horikarigowda, who is none other than the owner of the agricultural land situate adjacent; to that of the accused, to the effect that just about two or three hours earlier to committing suicide, the deceased was going to her parental house and at that time, while she was passing by his land, accused No. 4 Venkatesha, the brother-in-law of the deceased, forcibly took her to his house and thereafter, she committed suicide and this circumstance also clearly establishes that the deceased was subjected to cruel treatment just within few hours before her suicide. 6. Though Sri N.V. Prakash, learned Counsel for the appellant-accused conceded that he does not dispute the findings recorded by the Trial Court that the prosecution proved its case against accused No. 1 beyond reasonable doubt for the offences under Section 498-A and under Sections 3, 4 & 6 of the DP Act, I carefully read the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3, who are respectively the elder brother, mother and younger sister of the deceased and who have spoken as to the demand for and receipt of dowry by the accused No. 1 and also ill-treatment given by him to the deceased. I have also carefully read the evidence of P.W. 4 K. Ananta, who has spoken as to the demand for dowry by the accused in the marriage talks and receiving of the dowry by him from the parents of the deceased at the time of marriage. 7. P.Ws. I have also carefully read the evidence of P.W. 4 K. Ananta, who has spoken as to the demand for dowry by the accused in the marriage talks and receiving of the dowry by him from the parents of the deceased at the time of marriage. 7. P.Ws. 1 to 3 have consistently stated in their evidence that during the marriage talks, accused No. 1 demanded from the parents of the deceased Rs. 50,000/- cash, 100 gms. gold and also 15 guntas of land as dowry and ultimately, it was agreed between the parties that cash of Rs. 20,000/- and 40 gms. gold should be given by the parents of the deceased to accused No. 1 as dowry and 15 guntas of land should also be given to him as dowry after the marriage. They have consistently stated further that the said amount of cash and gold was given to accused No. 1 as dowry at the time of marriage, but 15 guntas of land could not be given to him and therefore, he started treating the deceased demanding transfer of the said land in his favour by the parents of the deceased. In view of this evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3, I accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused that he does not dispute the conviction of accused No. 1 for the offences under Section 498-A of I.P.C. and also under Sections 3, 4 & 6 of the DP Act 8. As to conviction of the appellant (accused No. 1) for the offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C, it is not in dispute that the deceased Smt. Rathnamma died within one and half year of her marriage with him inasmuch as her marriage with him was performed on 18.02.2001 and she died on 06.08.2002. It is also not in dispute that the death of the deceased was not natural or under normal circumstances but it was due to hanging. Further, it is proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by accused No. 1 in connection with his demand for 15 guntas of land, which was agreed to be given to him by the parents of the deceased as dowry. Further, it is proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by accused No. 1 in connection with his demand for 15 guntas of land, which was agreed to be given to him by the parents of the deceased as dowry. Therefore, the question that requires to be answered is: whether the cruelty to which the deceased was subjected by accused No. 1 in connection with his demand for land as dowry was 'soon before her death' so as to attract the penal provisions of Section 304-B of I.P.C.? 9. There is no definition of the expression 'soon before death which occurs in Section 304-B of I. P. C. and also in Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before death’ appeals to have been left to be determined by the Courts depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the prosecution has to establish some proximity between the factum of cruelty to which the deceased was subjected and her unnatural death. 10. As to the expression 'soon before death', Sri N.V. Prakash, the learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on two decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court. First of them is in the case of Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 2324 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed at para 14 therein as under: 14. It is further contended on behalf of the respondents that the statements of the deceased referred to the instances could not be termed to be cruelty or harassment by the husband soon before her death “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straight-jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term "soon before” is not synonymous with the term "immediately before” and is opposite of the expression "soon after" as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act, These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be soon before death if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before the alleged such treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough. (Emphasis supplied) 11. In second of the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant i.e., in the case of Hira Lal and Ors. v. State (Govt. Of NCT), Delhi reported in 2003 Scc (Cri) 2016, Hon’ble Supreme Court has made similar observations as in the first decision referred to supra. In Hira Lal's case, the evidence of four of the prosecution witnesses was that at the time of marriage there was no demand for dowry and, in respect of the grievance of the deceased against, her husband and in-laws, there was a settlement on 30.11.1998 and the said settlement was essentially for separate residence and the deceased died on 14.04.1999 i.e., after nearly four and half months of the said settlement and there was no evidence placed on record by the prosecution to show that the deceased was subjected to cruel treatment during the intervening period between the said settlement and the death of the deceased. On those facts, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there was no specific evidence about ill-treatment to the deceased at any time having immediate proximity to the date of death of the deceased which occurred on 14.04.1999 and therefore, an offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C. could not be made out against the accused. 12. On those facts, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there was no specific evidence about ill-treatment to the deceased at any time having immediate proximity to the date of death of the deceased which occurred on 14.04.1999 and therefore, an offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C. could not be made out against the accused. 12. On a careful reading of para 16 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kans Raj's case, i.e., first of the above said decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused, it could be seen that the deceased therein had come to her brother's house on 21.09.1988 complaining ill-treatment by her husband and his relatives in connection with their demand for dowry and that till she died on 23.10.1988 i.e., exactly one month thereafter, there was no intervening circumstance showing that the said demand was met with by her parents. On those facts, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that 'the ill-treatment given to the deceased by the accused therein was soon before her death’ and holding so, it reversed the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High Court as against the husband of the deceased and convicted him for the offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C. 13. In the instant case, P.Ws. 1 to 3 have consistently stated in their evidence that the deceased was treated properly by the accused for a period of about six months after her marriage and thereafter, they started ill-treating her in connection with their demand for transfer of 15 guntas of land in favour of accused No. 1 as dowry, as agreed by the parents of the deceased during the marriage talks. They have consistently stated further in their evidence that on the last occasion during her life time, the deceased was sent to her parental house by the accused by beating her and telling her that she should not return to their house without getting the said land transferred in favour of accused No. 1 and, on that occasion the deceased remained in her parental house for a period of one month and thereafter, P.W. 1, the elder brother of the deceased, took her to her matrimonial house and left her there assuring the accused that he would transfer the said land in favour of accused No. 1 within three days and accused No. 1 should meet him (P.W. 1) in that regard. They have further stated consistently in their evidence that the accused did not approach them for getting the said land transferred as assured by P.W. 1 and that about 15 or 20 days after P.W. 1 left the deceased in the house of the accused, she committed suicide by handing herself in their house. 14. Thus, it is clear from the above evidence that during the intervening period of fifteen to twenty days from the date of P.W. 1 leaving the deceased in the house of the accused and the date of her death, the demand of the accused for land was not met with by the mother and the brother of the deceased. This being so, following the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kans Raj's case referred to supra, it has to be held that the demand for land by the accused and the consequent ill-treatment by him to the deceased persisted 'soon before’ her death. 15. Further, P.W. 9 Horikarigowda, who is the owner of the land adjacent to that of the accused, has stated in his evidence that on the very day of the incident of suicide, at about 12 noon while he was in his land, he saw the deceased going towards her parental house and at that time, she informed him that the accused had quarreled with her on that day morning in connection with their demand for land as dowry and therefore, she was going to her parental house. He has further deposed that while the deceased was so going towards her parental house, accused No. 4 Venkatesha came there, beat the deceased and took her back to his house and that thereafter, by about 4.00 p.m. while he (P.W. 9) was in a meeting at the school in the village, he came to know that the deceased died by hanging herself in the house of the accused. He has further deposed that immediately on coming to know of the same, he went to the house of the accused and saw that accused No. 4 Venkatesha laid the dead body of the deceased near the door in the house and went away. He has further deposed that immediately on coming to know of the same, he went to the house of the accused and saw that accused No. 4 Venkatesha laid the dead body of the deceased near the door in the house and went away. On a careful reading of the statements of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., it could be seen that this circumstance was put by the Trial Court to the present appellant and also to the other accused arid, though they have answered the question saying that it is false, they have not chosen to say anything more by way of explanation as to why the deceased committed suicide in their house. 16. The above evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 coupled with the evidence of P.W. 9 clearly goes to show that the deceased was subjected to cruelty even on the morning of the day of the incident of hanging and, when she was going to her parental house, accused No. 4 Venkatesha brought her back to his house by beating her and thereafter, within four hours, she committed suicide by hanging herself. Following the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kans Raj's case referred to supra, I have no hesitation to hold that the cruelty to which the deceased was subjected by the appellant-accused No. 1 was 'soon before her death' so as to attract the penal provisions of Section 304-B of I.P.C. Therefore, presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, has to be drawn against the accused-appellant, and it shall have to be held that lie caused the 'dowry death' of the deceased. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the Trial Court did not commit any error or illegality in convicting accused No. 1, who is appellant herein, for the offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C. This being so, the present appeal filed by accused No. 1 deserves to be dismissed. 17. In the result, the present appeal is dismissed as being devoid of merits. The impugned judgment and order, convicting and sentencing the appellant-accused for the offences under Sections 498-A & 304-B of I.P.C. and also for the offences under Sections 3, 4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, is hereby confirmed.