Judgment :- G.V. Seethapathy, J. This review petition is filed under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC seeking review of the judgment dated 07-09-2006 in W.A.No.936 of 2006. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel or the respondents and the learned Government Pleader representing the State. Perused the records. 3. Respondents 1 to 4 herein filed writ petition in W.P.No.22875 of 1999 against respondents 5 to 7 herein for quashing the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and published in the Gazette dated 30-08-1992 and the subsequent draft declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') published in the Gazette dated 02-03-1994 to the extent of Ac.15-22 cents of land in Sy.No.288 belonging to the writ petitioners situate at Jallaram Village, Kamanpur Mandal, Karimnagar District, on the ground that the award was passed after expiry of two years period specified in Section 11-A of the Act and as such the award is nullity and the land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have been lapsed. By order dated 04-07-2001, the said writ petition was allowed. Aggrieved by the same, respondents 5 to 7 herein filed W.A.No.1315 of 2001 and the petitioner herein filed W.A.No.936 of 2006. By common judgment dated 07-09-2006, both the writ appeals were dismissed. The whole issue that arose for determination in the writ appeals was whether the Land Acquisition Officer can pass an award after expiry of two years period specified in Section 11-A of the Act. In the impugned judgment, it was held as under: "We have given serious thought to the submissions of the learned counsel, but we have not felt persuaded to agree with them. Section 11-A of the Act, which mandates the making of an award within a period of two years, reads as under: "11-A.Period within which an award shall be made: The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, (68 of 1984), the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation: In computing the period of 2 years referred to in this Section, the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court, shall be excluded." A reading of the above reproduced provision makes it clear that the Collector is required to make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration. The consequence of not making an award within that period is that the acquisition proceedings automatically lapses. The use of the word 'shall' in the opening line of Section 11-A with a stipulation of consequence of not making an award within a period of two years is clearly indicative of the mandatory character of that section. Therefore, it must be held that the Collector does not have any option but to make an award within two years of the publication of declaration. The explanation appended to Section 11-A provides for exclusion of the period during which the award proceedings remain stayed by the Court. The effect of the explanation is that if the proceedings of acquisition are stayed during the period of two years specified in Section 11-A, then the entire period of stay is liable to be excluded while counting two years. However, there is nothing in the language of Section 11-A or the explanation from which it can be inferred that the time spent by a party in obtaining copy of order passed by the Court vacating the stay or dismissing the petition is liable to be excluded from the period of two years specified in the substantive part of Section 11-A. The Legislature has, in its wisdom, prescribed two years period from the date of publication of declaration within which an award is required to be made by the Collector. Provision has also been made for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by the Court. If the Legislature wanted to exclude the time spent in obtaining copy of the order, a specific provision to that effect would have been made. However, the fact of the matter is that the law making authority has thought it proper to exclude only that period during which the proceedings remain stayed by the competent court. If the Legislature wanted to exclude the time spent in obtaining copy of the order, a specific provision to that effect would have been made. However, the fact of the matter is that the law making authority has thought it proper to exclude only that period during which the proceedings remain stayed by the competent court. In our opinion, the omission of exclusionary clause qua the period spent in obtaining copy is deliberate. Therefore, this omission cannot be supplied by the Court by giving an over- stretched interpretation to the language of Section 11-A or its explanation. That would amount to indirectly amending Section 11-A and it is settled law that the Court is not entitled to undertake such an exercise. It can, therefore, be seen from the above that the question as to whether or not the award was passed within the prescribed period of two years from the date of publication of declaration and also as to whether the period during which the award proceedings remain stayed by the Court was to be excluded were specifically raised and considered by this Court and it was held that even after exclusion of the period during which the award proceedings remain stayed, still the award was passed beyond two years. It can also be seen that the question as to whether or not the period taken to obtain certified copy of the order passed by the Court vacating the stay or dismissing the petition is liable to be excluded was also considered and it was held that the law making authority has thought it proper to exclude only that period during which the proceedings remain stayed by the competent court and the omission of exclusionary clause qua the period spent in obtaining copy is deliberate and the said omission cannot be supplied by the Court by giving an over-stretched interpretation to the language of Section 11-A or its explanation. In the present review petition, it is once again urged by the petitioner that as the respondents/pattadars have obtained stay of the notification, they cannot question that the award passed was beyond the time and they cannot take advantage of Section 11-A of the Act. In the present review petition, it is once again urged by the petitioner that as the respondents/pattadars have obtained stay of the notification, they cannot question that the award passed was beyond the time and they cannot take advantage of Section 11-A of the Act. It is also once again contended that the period spent for obtaining copy of the order is liable to be excluded while computing the prescribed period of two years under Section 11-A. The above questions, having already been raised specifically in the writ petition and also the writ appeal and answered therein, do not arise for consideration by way of review. The parameters regarding the scope of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC are well settled. 4. In HARIDAS DAS VS. USHA RANI BANIK (SMT) AND OTHERS ( (2006) 4 SCC 78 ), the Apex Court held as follows: "In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this Section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit". The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purpose of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection." 5. In DOKKA SAMUEL V. DR.JACOB LAZARUS CHELLY ( 1997 (4) SCC 478 ), the Apex Court held that omission to cite an authority of law is not a ground for reviewing prior judgment. In the above case, the High Court at the first instance in the secondappeal confirmed the decree of the appellate Court and subsequently reviewed the judgment and re-considered the matter holding that relevant precedents were not cited. 6. In RAVI KHULLAR AND ANOTHER V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ( (2007) 5 SCC 231 ), the Apex Court held that in the absence of any provision in the Land Acquisition Act for exclusion of time taken to obtain the certified copy of the judgment of the High Court, the Land Acquisition Collector, ought to have proceeded to make the award having come to know the writ petition filed by the appellant was rejected by the High Court. In the above case, the judgment in the writ petition was pronounced on 13-02-2003 and an application was made for certified copy on 14-02-2003 and the certified copy was ready on 27-02-2003. It was contended on behalf of the State that the period between 14-02-2003 and 27-02-2003 must be excluded and if that period is excluded, time to make the award was available up to 04-03-2003 whereas the award was pronounced on 01-03-2003. After excluding the period of two years, the award should have been pronounced on or before 18-02-2003, but it was pronounced on 01-03-2003. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the petitioners that the award not having been made within the period prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land lapsed on 18-02-2003, the last date for pronouncement of the award. The State, therefore, contended that the period taken for obtaining certified copy also ought to have been excluded in which event the time for passing the award was available up to 04-03-2003. The State, therefore, contended that the period taken for obtaining certified copy also ought to have been excluded in which event the time for passing the award was available up to 04-03-2003. The Apex Court held as follows: "In the matter of computing the period of limitation three situations may be visualized, namely, (a) where the Limitation Act applies by its own force; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with or without modifications are made applicable to a special statute; and (c) where the special statute itself prescribes the period of limitation and provides for extension of time and/or condonation of delay. The instant case is not one which is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in making an award does not act as a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the matter of making an award under Section 11-A of the Act. However, Section 11-A of the Act does provide a period of limitation within which the Collector shall make his award. The Explanation thereto also provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of a Court. Such being the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the Act is also confined to matters enumerated therein. The time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required to be filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review, etc., challenging the impugned order. Thus, a court is not permitted to read into Section 11-A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain certified copy of the judgment and order. The Court has, therefore, no option but to compute the period of limitation for making an award in accordance with the provisions of Sections 11-A of the Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act. Our conclusion finds support from the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act itself. The Court has, therefore, no option but to compute the period of limitation for making an award in accordance with the provisions of Sections 11-A of the Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act. Our conclusion finds support from the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act itself. Section 11-A of the Act was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from 24-9-1984. Similarly, Section 28-A was also inserted by the Amendment Act of 1984 with effect from the same date. In Section 28-A the Act provides for a period of limitation within which an application should be made to the Collector for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 28-A reads as follows: "Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded." It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it considered necessary incorporated by express words the rule incorporated in Section 12 of the Act. It has done so expressly in Section 28-A of the Act while it has consciously not incorporated this rule in Section 11-A even while providing for exclusion of time under the Explanation. The intendment of the legislature is therefore unambiguous and does not permit the court to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the Limitation into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act." 7. In the present case, the writ petition in W.P.No.27483 of 1995 was filed initially challenging Section 4(1) Notification and this Court granted stay on 06-12-1995 and finally the writ petition was dismissed on 28-07-1999. Thereafter, the landholders filed writ appeal in W.A.No.1228 of 1999 and the same was also dismissed on 30-08-1999. The award was passed on 05-11-1999. In the present case, the writ petition in W.P.No.27483 of 1995 was filed initially challenging Section 4(1) Notification and this Court granted stay on 06-12-1995 and finally the writ petition was dismissed on 28-07-1999. Thereafter, the landholders filed writ appeal in W.A.No.1228 of 1999 and the same was also dismissed on 30-08-1999. The award was passed on 05-11-1999. Even after excluding the period during which the proceedings remain stayed, the award was passed beyond the period of two years prescribed under Section 11-A and, therefore, the land holders filed W.P.No.22875 of 1999 challenging the award on the ground that it got lapsed in view of Section 11-A, as it ought to have been passed on or before 10-10-1999 but, in fact, it was passed on 05-11-1999. The Land Acquisition Officer was also a party to the writ petition and dismissal of the writ petition on 28-07-1999 was to his knowledge. In view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the above decisions that the intention of legislature is unambiguous and does not permit the Court to read words into Section 11-A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the contention of the petitioners that the time taken for obtaining certified copy of the order is liable to be excluded while computing the period of two years under Section 11-A of the Act, is untenable. In view of the specific language employed in Section 11-A of the Act and the explanation thereto, the period during which the proceedings remain stayed by the Court alone is liable to be excluded and not the period taken for obtaining certified copy of the judgment. It is, therefore, impermissible for the Court to read into Section 11-A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain certified copy of the order. 8. Under these circumstances, it is held that there are absolutely no valid or sufficient grounds to review the judgment dated 07-09-2006 in W.A.No.936 of 2006. The present application seeking review does not fall within the ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. 9. In the result, the review petition is dismissed.