Judgment ( 1. ) THE respondent no. 1 raised a preliminary objection that this appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree of Single Bench in First Appeal no. 50/ 96 ( Laxmi Narayan Vs. Shivlal Gujar and others) dated 19. 6. 2000 by which the judgment and decree passed by the 1st Additional Judge to the Court of District judge, Hoshangabad at Harda in Civil Suit No. 13-A/1978 dated 8. 1. 1996 was partly modified, but in view of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters patent Appeals Samapti)Adhiniyam, 1981 (29 of 1981), this appeal is not maintainable. He places reliance to a judgment of the Apex Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra Judgments Today 2005 (1)SC 370, a full bench judgment of this Court in Shashi Bai vs. Revav Bai [ 2008 (1)MPLJ 92 and submitted that this appeal may be dismissed. ( 2. ) SHRI Bhowmik, appearing for the appellant, submitted that against the order passed by this Court on 19. 6. 2000, the appellant preferred an S. L. P. before the apex Court which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 3547/2006 and decided finally on 18th August, 2006 by which the Apex Court directed the appellant for restoration of LPA by filing an application before the High Court and to decide the LPA on merits. Thereafter as per the order of this Court dated 27. 8. 08, the appellant herein again approached to the apex Court by filing interlocutory application no. 5/2009 in Civil Appeal No. 3547/2006, but the Apex Court in view of the earlier order dated 18th August, 2006 directed appellant to press his appeal before this Court. So this matter deserves to be heard on merits. ( 3. ) TO appreciate the aforesaid contention, some factual part of the case deserves to be stated. The appellant Laxminarayan was defendant in the trial court. The trial Court decreed the suit of plaintiff respondent Shivlal Gujar by declaring the share of the plaintiff and defendant and for partition of the suit property. Against the judgment of the Additional Judge to the Court of District judge, Hoshangabad at Harda in Civil Suit No. 13-A/78 dated 8. 1. 1996, the appellant laxmi Narayan filed First Appeal no. 50/1996 before this Court and the Single judge of this Court allowed the appeal partly against which the appellant herein filed an LPA. Against the judgment of the Additional Judge to the Court of District judge, Hoshangabad at Harda in Civil Suit No. 13-A/78 dated 8. 1. 1996, the appellant laxmi Narayan filed First Appeal no. 50/1996 before this Court and the Single judge of this Court allowed the appeal partly against which the appellant herein filed an LPA. under clause 10 of Letter Patent on 30th October, 2000. ( 4. ) BEFORE the learned Single Judge in the First Appeal No. 50/96, the plaintiff respondent also preferred cross objection. The learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendant, but allowed cross objection in appeal and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was partially modified. ( 5. ) BEFORE filing of this Letter Patent Appeal, the State Govt. had enacted an act namely, the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters Patent Appeal samapti) Adhiniyam, 1981) by which the State Legislature abolished an appeal from the judgment and order of one judge of the High Court to the Division Bench under clause 10 of the letters patent. The vires of the aforesaid enactment were considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Balkrishna Das and others vs. Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. Jabalpur [ air 1985 MP 42 ] and the aforesaid act was declared as ultra vires. The State Govt, filed an SLP before the Apex Court against the judgment of the Full Bench in Balkrishna Das (supra) which was registered as Civil Appeal no. 1222-24 of 1985 in the Apex Court. The Apex Court considered the case of Balkrishna Das along with another case of Maharashtra namely; Jamshed N. Guzdar vs. State of Maharashtra Civil Appeal No. 2452/29 and by a pronouncement, the Apex Court upheld the validity of the aforesaid sampati Adhiniyam. The result of which was that the provisions of Sampati adhiniyam came into force and the letterss patent appeal filed against the judgment of the Single Bench was not maintainable before the Division Bench of the High court. After the pronouncement in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra, the present Letter Patent Appeal No. 461/2000 came into hearing on 9. 9. 2005 and the Division Bench of this Court by the order dated 9. 9. After the pronouncement in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra, the present Letter Patent Appeal No. 461/2000 came into hearing on 9. 9. 2005 and the Division Bench of this Court by the order dated 9. 9. 2005 disposed of the matter thus: the Supreme Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar vs. State of maharashtra JT 2005 (1) SC 370 upheld the validity of Madhya pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters Patent Appeal Sampati)Adhiniyam, 1981. As a result, LPAs are not maintainable. Immediately thereafter, a request was made on behalf of the State government not to dismiss any LPAs filed during the period of stay of the said enactment on the ground of maintainability, as it is proposing to enact an appropriate law repealing the said Samapti adhiniyam of 1981 in view of the changed circumstances so as to continue the provisions for LPAs. In deference to the request by the State, we postponed the dismissal of the LPAs, However, respondents in several appeals have been seeking dismissal of the appeals. As nearly eight months have elapsed, it will not be proper to retain the LPAs any further. In view of the above, we dismiss this appeal as not maintainable. If the. State repeals the Samapti Adhiniyam, 1981 and restores the provisions for LPAs retrospectively (and if in the meanwhile the appeal does not approach the Supreme Court, it is open to the appellant to seek restoration of this appeal. The appellant requests for return of certified copy of the order of the learned Single Judge. The Registry is directed to return the same against acknowledgement, subject to the appellant (s)furnishing a photo copy of the order. ( 6. ) THEREAFTER, the appellant herein filed an SLP No. 13858 CC6014/2006 before the Apex Court which was subsequently registered as Civil Appeal No. 3547/2006 and by the order dated 18th August, 2006, the apex Court decided the matter thus: "delay condoned. Leave granted. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The High Court dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the petitioner herein in view of the judgment of this Court in Jamshed n. Guzdar vers. State of Maharashtra, reported in J. T. 2005 (1)SC 370, and the High Court also reserved liberty to the petitioner to approach the High Court and seek restoration of the appeal if the State repeals the Samapati Adhiriiyam, 1981 and restores the provisions for LPAs restrospectively. State of Maharashtra, reported in J. T. 2005 (1)SC 370, and the High Court also reserved liberty to the petitioner to approach the High Court and seek restoration of the appeal if the State repeals the Samapati Adhiriiyam, 1981 and restores the provisions for LPAs restrospectively. The State of Madhya Pradesh has recently enacted Madhya pradesh Act No. 14 of 2006 reviving the LPAs. This Act was promulgated by His Excellency President of India on 25th March, 2006 which deemed to have come into force on the first day of july, 1981. In view of the provisions of Act no. 14/2006, we set aside the order passed in LPA no. 461 of 2000 and restore the said appeal to the file of the High Court with the request to the High court to dispose of the same on merits after affording opportunity to both the parties. The appeal is disposed of with no orders as to costs. " ( 7. ) THEREAFTER the appellant herein filed an application for restoration of LPA which registered as MCC No. 2254/2006 and a Division bench of this Court directed restoration of LPA No. 461/2000. ( 8. ) ON 27. 8. 2008, the matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench of this Court and an objection was raised in respect of maintainability of the appeal and on this objection, appellant sought time. Thereafter on 23rd Sept. 2006, this court after hearing both the parties passed an order thus: "23. 09. 2008 shri N. S. Kale, learned senior counsel with Shri Abhijeet Bhowmik, learned counsel for appellant. Shri Devesh Jain, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1. Respondent no. 2 is reported to be dead. None for the respondents no. 3 to 6. Shri Rakesh Jain, learned Govt. Advocate for respondent no. 7. The present appeal on the question of maintainability has a chequered history. The appeal was filed in the year 2000 and it was thought that such appeal would be maintainable under Clause-10 of the Letters Patent. It is to be noted that somewhere in the year 1981 Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters Patent appeal Samapti) Adhiniyam, 1981 (for short smapti Adhiniyam, 1981) was enacted by the State Government thereby closing right of all concerned to file L. P. As in the High Court. The constitutional validity of the said Act was challenged before this. It is to be noted that somewhere in the year 1981 Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters Patent appeal Samapti) Adhiniyam, 1981 (for short smapti Adhiniyam, 1981) was enacted by the State Government thereby closing right of all concerned to file L. P. As in the High Court. The constitutional validity of the said Act was challenged before this. Court and this court held that the Samapti Adhiniyam, 1981 was ultra vires the constitution. It appears that the present writ petition came to be heard before a Division Bench and the Division Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench. The larger Bench vide its order dated 3. 10. 2002 reported in 2003 (1) MPLJ 10 observed that enforcement of Section 100-A would not adversely affect the maintainability of the appeal/appeals which were filed or preferred prior to 1. 7. 2002. After the said judgment, in the matter of Jamshed N. Guzdar Vs. State of Maharashtra (J. T. 2005[1] SC 370), the Supreme Court held that provisions of Samapti Adhiniyam, 1981 were not ultra vires the constitution. As a result of said judgment all Letters Patent appeals which were pending before this Court were dismissed by concerned Division Benches. This matter also came up before a division Bench which by its order dated 9. 9. 2005 observed that in " light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of jamshed. N. Guzdar (supra), the appeal would not be maintainable. The appeal was accordingly dismissed but, however, with the liberty that if the State repeals the Samapti Adhiniyam, 1981 and restores the provisions for LPAs retrospectively (and if in the meanwhile the appellant does not approach the Supreme Court), it is open to the appellant to seek restoration of this appeal. It appears that subsequent to the dismissal, the State Government enacted Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 ( Act No. 14 of 2006 ). It appears that subsequent to the dismissal, the State Government enacted Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 ( Act No. 14 of 2006 ). Though the act did not provide for restoration of the appeals as the provisions -of Act No. 14 of 2006 was not adding retrospective operation but number of applications were filed for restoration of the matters and in number of the matters when the litigant travelled to Supreme court, the Supreme Court either restores the matters or in the alternative disposes of the SLPs/appeals with liberty in favour of the said appellants to file an application for restoration of the LPA. In the present matter, the appellant had filed Civil Appeal No. 3547/2006. The Supreme Court observed that State of Madhya pradesh had enacted Madhya Pradesh Act No. 14 of 2006 reviving the LPAs and the Act was promulgated by His Excellency president of India on 25th March 2006. In view of the provisions of Act No. 14 of 2006, the order dismissing the LPA No. 461 of 2000 (the present matter) and restore the appeal to the file of the high Court with a request to dispose of the same on merits after affording opportunity to both the parties. In light of the said order of the Supreme Court and as MCC No. 2254 of 2006 was also allowed by Division Bench, the LPA was restored and it was re-registered as Writ Appeal No. 537/2008. When the present Writ Appeal No. 537/2008 (earlier registered as LPA No. 461/2000) came up for hearing, Shri Devesh Jain, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the present appeal is not maintainable in view of the language employed in Act No. 14 of 2006. Act No. 14 of 2006 provides that an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment or order of one Judge of the high Court made in exercise of original jurisdiction. Section 2 provides that an appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges"of the same High Court. Section 2 provides that an appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges"of the same High Court. However, Subsection 2 further provides that no such appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order or against an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of india. A fair reading and understanding of Section 2 of the Act 14 of 2006 would make it clear that an appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by a Single Judge of this Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench Comprising of two Judge of this Court. If Section 2 is understood in its proper perspective, the same would make it clear that except an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India no further order, judgment or decree can be challenged under section 2 of the Act, before a Division Bench of this Court. According to Shri Devesh Jain, as a Writ Appeal under Act No. 14 of 2006 would not be maintainable, this appeal should again be dismissed as not maintainable. Shri Kale, learned senior counsel on the other hand submitted that once the Supreme Court has set aside the order of dismissal and has restored the appeal to the File of the High Court in light of the provisions contained in Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 ( Act No. 14 of 2006), this Court should decide the matter on merits. A five Judges of this Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Vs. Board of Revenue, has held that a Writ Appeal from an order of. Single Judge would depend upon many aspects and cannot be put to a straight jacket formula. The Full Bench has observed that except an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of india no other matter can been challenged. Board of Revenue, has held that a Writ Appeal from an order of. Single Judge would depend upon many aspects and cannot be put to a straight jacket formula. The Full Bench has observed that except an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of india no other matter can been challenged. Being in the horns of dilemma that whether he is required to observe the judgment delivered by the five Judges of this Court or by the order of the supreme Court directing restoration of the appeal, we hereby direct the appellant to make an application for clarification before the supreme Court that despite there being a ban on an appeal against any order or judgment and decree except against an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are re-required to decide the appeal on merits. The appellant may make an application to the Apex Court and seek clarification. The matter be listed for hearing after three months". ( 9. ) THEREAFTER the appellant herein filed I. A. No. 5/2008 before the Apex Court the Apex Court considered the aforesaid application on 27. 3. 2009 and passed; order which reads thus: "there is no need to clarify the order already passed by this Court. However, it would be open to the appellant to challenge the order passed by the High Court. Interlocutory application of the appellants is accordingly dismissed. " Thereafter this matter has been listed for hearing today. ( 10. ) TO appreciate rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate if clause 10 of the Letters Patent is reproduced which reads thus: "10. Interlocutory application of the appellants is accordingly dismissed. " Thereafter this matter has been listed for hearing today. ( 10. ) TO appreciate rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate if clause 10 of the Letters Patent is reproduced which reads thus: "10. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Courts.-And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High court of Judicature at Nagpur from the Judgment (not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the powers of superintendence under the provisions of section one hundred and seven of the Government of India act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of one judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section one hundred and eight of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one of the said high Court in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal, but that the right of appeal from other judgment of Judge of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our heirs and successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided. " By Act 29 of 1981, the State Govt, enacted M. P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters patent Appeal Samapti) Adhiniyam, 1981 section 2 of the aforesaid Act reads as under: 2. Abolition of appeal from judgment or order of one judge of the High Court made in exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction. " By Act 29 of 1981, the State Govt, enacted M. P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters patent Appeal Samapti) Adhiniyam, 1981 section 2 of the aforesaid Act reads as under: 2. Abolition of appeal from judgment or order of one judge of the High Court made in exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction. (1) No appeal, arising from a suit or proceeding which includes a writ petition under Article 220 and/or article 227 of the Constitution of India, instituted or commenced, whether prior or subsequent to the commencement of this Act, shall lie to the high Court from a judgment, order or decree of one Judge of the high Court, made in exercise of original jurisdiction or in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, in respect of a judgment, order or decree made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in clause 10 of the Letters Patent of His Majesty dated the 2nd day of January, 1936 constituting High Court of Judicature at Nagpur, or any other law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), all appeals pending before the High Court on the date immediately preceding the date of commencement of this Act shall continue to 1be and be heard and disposed of as hereto before, as if this Act had not been enacted. " ( 11. ) THE vires of this enactment were challenged before the High Court and a full Bench of this Court in Balkrishna Das and others vs. Perfect Pottery co. Ltd. (supra), found that the enactment of Act 29 of 81 was beyond the competence of the State Legislature as it does not fall within the ambit of entry 11. 31 Schedule 7 of the Constitution and in view of the pronouncement of the full bench in Balkrishna Das , the letters patent jurisdiction continued with the High court. ( 12. ) THE State Govt, challenged the judgment of Balkrishna Das in Civil appeal nos. 1222-24 of 1985 before the Apex. Court, the question was considered by the apex in Jamshed N. Guzdar (supra), the Apex Court held thus: 93. In view of the discussion made and reasons recorded above, we uphold the constitutional validity of 1987 Act, 1986 Act and the Adhiniyam. The Notification dated 20. 1222-24 of 1985 before the Apex. Court, the question was considered by the apex in Jamshed N. Guzdar (supra), the Apex Court held thus: 93. In view of the discussion made and reasons recorded above, we uphold the constitutional validity of 1987 Act, 1986 Act and the Adhiniyam. The Notification dated 20. 8 J991 issued by the state of Maharashtra shall not be implemented without further orders from the Court in the light of what is stated in para 85. 94. In the result, civil appeal no. 2452 of 1992 is dismissed subject to above observations as to the implementation of the impugned notification. Civil appeal nos. 2529 of 1992 and 2530 of 1992 are dismissed in terms of this judgment. Transfer case Nos. 8-11/89 (i. e. writ petition nos. 1953/87 and 1960, 1974 and 2054/87) are dismissed. Civil appeal nos. 1222-1224 of 1985 are allowed, the impugned judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya pradesh is set aside and the writ petitions stand dismissed. " ( 13. ) IN view of the aforesaid pronouncement, the Division Bench dismissed the letters patent appeal by the aforesaid order. Thereafter matter traveled to the Apex court which has been referred hereinabove, ( 14. ) THE similar question arose before the Full Bench of this Court in Shashi bai vs. Revavbai Agrawal [ 2008 (1) MPLJ 92 ] and the full Bench considering the question held thus: "in the absence of any express or implicit provision in the 2005 adhiniyam providing for appeal from a judgment, decree or order passed by the learned single Judge under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a Division Bench, we hold-that by virtue of the repeal of the 1981 Adhiniyam under section 4 of the 2005 adhiniyam, appeals under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent from a judgment and decree passed by learned single Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under section 96 of the Code or Civil procedure are not revived. " Since we have answered the reference, the application will now be placed before the appropriate Bench for disposal in accordance with law. " ( 15. " Since we have answered the reference, the application will now be placed before the appropriate Bench for disposal in accordance with law. " ( 15. ) THE Full bench held that Section 2 of M. P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand nyaypeeth Ko Appeal)Adhiniyam, 2005 provides that appeal filed from a judgment and order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to a Division Bench of the High Court and it does not provide for any appeal against any other judgment or decree or order passed by the Single Judge in exercise of any other jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 16. ) IN view of the aforesaid pronouncement of full Bench, it is clear that such appeal cannot be entertained by this Court. ( 17. ) THE Parliament has also inserted Section 100-A in the C. P. C. 1908 which reads as under: "100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge. " ( 18. ) THE aforesaid provision specifically provides that no appeal will be heard by a Single Judge of High Court in appellate jurisdiction, and no further appeal was allowed from the judgment and decree of Single Judge in the High Court notwithstanding anything contained in any letters patent of the "high Court. ( 19. ) IN view of the aforesaid enactment, in Section 100 A with effect from 1. 7. 2002 such appeal is not maintainable. However, as this appeal was preferred before coming into the force of such amendment inserted Section 100a in the c. P. C. question of maintainability of such appeals was also referred to a Full bench and the Full Bench in Laxmi Narayan Vs. Shiv Lal : [ 2003 (1) MPLJ 10 ] held that substitution of Section 100 A of the Code, shall not effect the letter patent appeals filed prior to 1. 7. 2000 and pending for adjudication. However, after the cut off date 1. 7. Shiv Lal : [ 2003 (1) MPLJ 10 ] held that substitution of Section 100 A of the Code, shall not effect the letter patent appeals filed prior to 1. 7. 2000 and pending for adjudication. However, after the cut off date 1. 7. 2002, no appeal shall lie to the High Court under Letter Patent jurisdiction. The aforesaid pronouncement came when the provisions of Act 29 of 1981 were declared ultra vires and the L. P. A. was maintainable in view of the pronouncement of full Bench in Balkrishna Das (supra), though after 1. 7. 2002 no such appeal was maintainable against the judgment and the Single Judge of the high Court in appellate jurisdiction. After the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar reversing the judgment of Balkrishan Das and upholding the constitutional validity of Act 29 of 81, it is apparent that no such appeal was maintainable before the High Court. ( 20. ) NOW the State legislature has enacted M. P, Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 Act 14 of2006 which provides an appeal from a judgment or order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction to a Division Bench of the same High Court. Section 2 of the said Act is relevant and is referred thus: 2. (1) An appeal shall lies from a Judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two judges of the same High Court. Provided that no such appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order or against an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within 45 days. from the date of order passed by a single Judge. Provided that any appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period of 45 days,if the petitioner satisfies the Division Bench that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. Explanation-The fact that the petitioner was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient -cause within the meaning of this sub section. Explanation-The fact that the petitioner was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient -cause within the meaning of this sub section. (3) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed, heard and decided in accordance with the procedure as may be prescribed by the High Court. " ( 21. ) THE aforesaid provisions specifically provides that a writ appeal can be filed against the judgment or order by a Single judge, in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to a Division Bench comprising two judges of the same High Court, but no provision has been made in the Act 14 of 2006 for filing a writ appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the single Bench in appellate jurisdiction. In absence of any specific provision permitting such an appeal in the Act 14 of 2006, the present appeal cannot be entertained and decided by this Court as this Court has no jurisdiction to- hear and decide the LPA or writ appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the single Bench of this Court in appellate jurisdiction. ( 22. ) IN view of the aforesaid, we find that this writ appeal which was filed earlier as LPA 461/2002 is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to cost. ( 23. ) AT this stage, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that some limitation be provided to the appellant for filing SLP before the Apex Court and for a reasonable period, execution of judgment and decree passed by the trial court may be stayed as this Court after restoration of LPA as writ appeal on 26. 4. 2008, granted interim stay till the disposal of this appeal. ( 24. ) SO far as first prayer of the appellant is concerned, this Court has no jurisdiction to grant limitation to the appellant for filing an SLP before the Apex court. He is free to move to the Supreme Court seeking condonation of the delay in filing the SLP which shall be considered by the Apex Court. ( 25. ( 24. ) SO far as first prayer of the appellant is concerned, this Court has no jurisdiction to grant limitation to the appellant for filing an SLP before the Apex court. He is free to move to the Supreme Court seeking condonation of the delay in filing the SLP which shall be considered by the Apex Court. ( 25. ) SO far as second prayer is concerned, looking to the peculiar facts of the case, we direct that for a period of 120 days, the execution of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court shall remain stayed so that appellant may approach to the Apex Court for seeking appropriate direction in this regard. Accordingly, we allow the prayer of appellant because of the ensuing summer vacation in the apex Court. Order accordingly.