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2009 DIGILAW 58 (PAT)

State Of Bihar v. Suresh Prasad Sinha

2009-01-19

SHEEMA ALI KHAN

body2009
JUDGEMENT SHEEMA ALI KHAN, J. 1. This appeal arises out of judgment and order, dated 18.5.1972 passed by the 1st Subordinate Judge, Patna in T.S. No. 185 of 1966. 2. The suit has been filed by one Devi Lall for declaring the acquisition of the suit property as described in Schedule-1 I of the plaint as illegal, null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff and also for a declaration that the defendants 1 to 3 should be restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs possession and ownership of the suit property. In the alternative the plaintiff prayed that there should be an adjudication with respect to the plaintiffs title and ownership over the properties with respect to plot nos. 1027 and 1030 and after adjudication the plaintiff should be paid the compensation with respect to the acquisition of land which is lying in deposit before the Sub-Judge, Patna in Land Acquisition Nos. 11/1965 and 12/1965. 3. The case of the plaintiff is that municipal survey plot nos. 1025, 1027, 1030, 1255 and 1023 in Circle No. 144, Ward No. 23, situate in Village-Mahori of Mohalla-Khajekalan, Patna City was owned and possessed by one Gopal Lal Maharaj as his Milkiyat property. The name of Gopal Lal Maharaj was recorded in municipal survey khesra during survey operations. In the year 1934 Gopal Lal Maharaj settled the said land permanently with the plaintiff after receiving a sum of Rs. 180/- as Salami and the plaintiff is in possession as absolute owner of the lands so settled. Gopal Lal Maharaj executed a deed of Patta Diwani with respect to the aforesaid property in the name of the plaintiff. 4. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that survey plot no. 1027 was a ditch and the plaintiff intended to construct a residential house on plot nos. 1025 and 1027 and filled up the western portion of the plot and submitted a plan before the Patna City Municipality for construction of a pucca house. The plan was duly sanctioned by the then Patna City Municipality on 16.6.1934 and the plaintiff constructed residential house on plot no. 1025 and certain portion of plot no. 1027 and on the rest of plot no. 1027 plaintiff planted several fruit bearing trees and also maintained a tank on part of it. It is the plaintiffs case that he also grew vegetables on the plots aforesaid. 1025 and certain portion of plot no. 1027 and on the rest of plot no. 1027 plaintiff planted several fruit bearing trees and also maintained a tank on part of it. It is the plaintiffs case that he also grew vegetables on the plots aforesaid. The plaintiff sold portion of survey plot no. 1255 to Sona Ram and he came in possession thereof. The entire plot mentioned aforesaid except the portion that was sold to Sona Ram was amalgamated into one block and bounded by a boundary wall. lt is the case of the plaintiff that Gopal Lal Maharaj ceased to have any concern with the plots aforesaid and the plaintiff was in possession of the plots to the knowledge of all including the Patna City Municipality. According to the plaintiff, Gopal Lal Maharaj died on 20.12.1966. 5. With respect to the case and the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, the plaintiffs pleadings begin from paragraph no. 7 onward. In short the plaintiffs case is that he came to know about the land acquisition proceeding some time in October, 1964 when some persons, allegedly the employee of defendant no. 1, Patna Municipal Corporation, came on the land of the plaintiff and tried to fix pillars after taking measurement. The plaintiff objected and the employees of the Corporation left without fixing the pillars. On 7.12.1964 vide memo no. 987C, the plaintiff was informed by the Executive Officer, Patna City Circle of the Corporation that plot nos. 1027, 1030 and 1255 were acquired by the Corporation. The plaintiff refuted the claim of the Corporation and sent a reply. The plaintiff also visited the office of the Executive Officer and objected to the entire proceedings. It has been alleged that the plaintiff is the supporter of opponent of Mr. Golwara and as such Mr. Golwara went against him and opposed him on different occasions. The plaintiff has stated accordingly that the entire land acquisition proceedings are non est on the ground that notices were never served to the plaintiff who is in possession of the land which has been acquired and the entire proceeding are fraudulent and inoperative. 6. The plaintiffs case is that defendant no. 4 Bithal Nathji Maharaj who claims to be the son of Gopal Lal Maharaj is, in fact, not the son of Gopal Lal. The claim of Bithal Nathji is with respect to plot no. 6. The plaintiffs case is that defendant no. 4 Bithal Nathji Maharaj who claims to be the son of Gopal Lal Maharaj is, in fact, not the son of Gopal Lal. The claim of Bithal Nathji is with respect to plot no. 1255 and the matter is pending under Section 30 before the Addl. Sub-Judge, 1st Court, Patna in Land Acquisition Case No. 12/1965. 7. According to the plaintiff, defendant no. 5 is claiming compensation on the basis of an inoperative and collusive document and it is stated by the plaintiff that defendant no. 5 has no right, title or interest in plot no. 1255. 8. On the basis of the claims aforesaid plaintiff claims the reliefs as mentioned above. 9. Three sets of written statements have been filed in the case. Defendant No. 1 i.e. Patna Municipal Corporation, apart from the common objection, has stated in the written statement that the so-called sanctioned plan does not have particulars with respect to the constructed portion and as such the Corporation cannot assert as to who was the assessee of the whole land. It is the case of the Corporation that the plaintiffs name is not recorded as owner in the Khatiyan nor defendant no. 1 has any knowledge regarding the ownership or the manner in which the lands have been put to use by the plaintiff. It has also been submitted on behalf of the Corporation that the plaintiff has full knowledge of the land acquisition proceeding. It has been stated that once the land acquisition proceeding had come to an end, the Corporation does not have any right to entertain any objection filed by the plaintiff of any matter concerned with the acquisition and as a result of the land acquisition proceeding. The officers of the Corporation had gone to take possession of the land acquired on behalf of the Corporation. 10. Defendant No. 1 has denied the allegations made on behalf of the plaintiff regarding the land acquisition proceeding and on the basis of his pleadings had prayed that the suit should be dismissed. 11. The case of the State, defendants 2 and 3 is that the suit is barred by limitation. 10. Defendant No. 1 has denied the allegations made on behalf of the plaintiff regarding the land acquisition proceeding and on the basis of his pleadings had prayed that the suit should be dismissed. 11. The case of the State, defendants 2 and 3 is that the suit is barred by limitation. Much emphasis in fact has been placed by the State on the point of limitation inasmuch it has been the attempt on behalf of the State to demonstrate before the court that the entire suit should be dismissed on this score alone. With respect to title of defendant, the State has stated that the plaintiff had to prove his title, as the State is not bound to prove title at the time of acquisition proceeding. The States case was that the land was required for the Municipal Corporation for construction of building staff quarters and as such requisition was made for acquisition of plot nos. 1027, 1030 and 1255 in Ward No. 23 in the district of Patna. The land acquired measures .869 acres. Defendants 2 and 3 state that the requisition was issued under the Land Acquisition Act and the land was acquired by declaration no. 50, dated 20.11.1961. It is also averred that the Corporation took possession of the land on 5.11.1964. At paragraph 11 of the written statement the defendants 2 and 3 state that if the plaintiff had any grievance against Bithal Nathji or Mahadeo Pd. Golwara, defendants 4 and 5, the plaintiff may file a separate suit but the plaintiff cannot get any declaration or relief in this suit. On the basis of these facts, the State had prayed that the suit may be dismissed. 12. Defendant No. 4 has not filed any written statement and in fact has not appeared in this case. 13. The main contestant, apart from the State, is defendant no. 5 i.e. Madho Prasad Golwara. Defendant No. 5 has set up a serious challenge with respect to title and possession of the plaintiff. According to him the plaintiff was not in possession of the said land and he has also stated that Gopal Lal Maharaj had in fact not settled any land with the plaintiff after receiving Salami of Rs. 180/- and had also not executed a Patta Diwani in favour of the plaintiff. According to him the plaintiff was not in possession of the said land and he has also stated that Gopal Lal Maharaj had in fact not settled any land with the plaintiff after receiving Salami of Rs. 180/- and had also not executed a Patta Diwani in favour of the plaintiff. This defendant has also stated that the plaintiff has not constructed any house on the western portion of plot no. 1027 and the plan sanction by the Municipality has been disputed by the State as the same does not indicate the plot number on which the house was sought to be constructed. In fact the entire pleadings with respect to title and possession of the plaintiff has been controverted by this defendant and it has been stated that there was no boundary wall on the amalgamated plots no. 1023, 1025, 1027, 1030 and 1255. Defendant No. 5 claimed that he has right, title and possession over plot no. 1255 and the suit has been filed only to harass defendant no. 5 and put him to loss. 14. The trial court has framed several issues. With respect to issue no. 3 i.e. whether the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 508 of the Patna Municipal Corporation Act, the court has found that no notice was required under Section 508 of the said Act which in fact has not been challenged by any of the parties before this court. Similarly the issue whether there was a valid service of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been decided in favour of the plaintiff and the parties before this court have not seriously challenged this finding. Apart from the aforesaid issues, the main issue in this appeal is that (i) whether the plaintiff has any title over the lands under acquisition? (ii) whether the suit for setting aside the entire land acquisition proceeding is maintainable? (iii) whether the suit is barred by limitation? 15. The trial court has held that the plaintiff has title and possession over the suit land. With respect to the Land Acquisition Proceeding, the trial court has held that there is a gross violation of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and as such has set aside the entire proceeding. 16. 15. The trial court has held that the plaintiff has title and possession over the suit land. With respect to the Land Acquisition Proceeding, the trial court has held that there is a gross violation of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and as such has set aside the entire proceeding. 16. This is a States appeal and the State has raised serious objection with respect to maintainability of the suit and the question of limitation. However, these issues cannot be decided without answering the question as to whether the plaintiff has title to the suit lands, therefore, this Court will proceed to examine the title of the plaintiffs and deal with contentions raised by the defendants thereafter. 17. In this context, I shall deal with the case of the plaintiff-respondent in this appeal. Mr. Parbat appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has argued that in fact defendant no. 5 has no right to challenge the title and possession of the plaintiff, as the defendant no. 5 has not set up any case to show his title or possession over the suit lands. It has also been submitted that Gopal Lal Maharaj who was the settler and was recorded in the municipal survey khesra during the municipal survey operation as owner of the suit lands has not challenged the title or settlement of the plaintiff on any ground whatsoever. It may be relevant to mention here that the Trial Court has not found that defendant no. 5 had any title to the lands in dispute. The argument on behalf of the plaintiff is that defendant nos. 4 and 6 who are allegedly the heirs of Gopal Lal Maharaj claim title and possession over plot nos. 1027 and 1030, have not appeared in the Court below or filed any written statement and as such these defendants have not been able to prove that they have title or possession over the suit lands. It has also been argued that defendant no. 5 has challenged the title of the plaintiff only on the ground that the patta in question was not registered and whole case is based on this argument. Nevertheless, this Court will have to examine the findings of the Trial Court with respect to declaration of title of the plaintiff. It has also been argued that defendant no. 5 has challenged the title of the plaintiff only on the ground that the patta in question was not registered and whole case is based on this argument. Nevertheless, this Court will have to examine the findings of the Trial Court with respect to declaration of title of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also argued, rightly, that the question of adverse possession can only be challenged by the person to whom the title and possession is adverse i.e. the settler Gopal Lal Maharaj or his heirs. Thus, according to the plaintiff-respondent the arguments forwarded by the defendant no. 5 and the State with respect to the title of the plaintiff should be rejected outright. 18. The case of the plaintiff as explained earlier is that he had taken permanent oral settlement from Gopal Lal Maharaj in 1934 after receiving a sum of Rs. 181/- as Salami and thereafter the plaintiff came in possession of the land. It is also stated that for the purpose of remembrance, Gopal Lal Maharaj executed a deed of patta diwani. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that plot no. 1027 consisted of a ditch and the plaintiff filled the ditch and constructed a house on plot no. 1025 and plot no. 1027 after getting the map approved by the municipality. The remaining plots which were settled to the plaintiff i.e. 1023, 1030 and 1255 were amalgamated and are being used for cultivating and growing vegetables. From the pleadings aforesaid it appears that it is quite clear that the lands in question are agricultural lands. It has also been asserted that the plaintiff paid rent to the ex-landlord and thereafter also pays rent to the municipal corporation and as such it is argued that the plaintiff is in possession and has title over the lands in question. On the basis of the aforesaid facts it is also asserted that the entire land acquisition proceedings are not est on the ground that no notice was ever served on the plaintiff under Sections 4, 5, 6 and 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. 19. This court will examine the witnesses to show that the plaintiff was in possession of the lands. P.W. 2 is the witness with respect to possession. 19. This court will examine the witnesses to show that the plaintiff was in possession of the lands. P.W. 2 is the witness with respect to possession. It appears that P.W. 3 is the Advocate Commissioner who was appointed because there was a dispute between one Sona Rai and the plaintiff. The Advocate Commissioners report indicates that the plaintiff was in possession of plot nos. 1027, 1030, 1255, 1023 and 1035. P.W. 8 supports the plaintiffs case with respect to possession on the disputed plots and there is nothing in the cross-examination which would cause this Court to disbelieve statement made in Court. P.W. 10 is the plaintiff himself. He has been examined at some length. However, his evidence is consistent with respect to both the possession and title of the lands in dispute. The plaintiff has been cross-examined not only on the question of his title and possession but also with respect to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, particularly with respect to an argument made by on behalf of the State that Devi Prasad and Devi Lal are one and the same person. Regarding the nature of the land he stated that he has a tank on plot no. 1027 and that he has several fruit trees on the rest of the plots of land. In fact the evidence led by P.W. 10 supports the case made out in the plaint. 20. The plaintiff has also brought on record the municipal map Ext. 5 which has been jointly passed in the name of Banvari Lal and Devi Prasad to show his possession over the plot in question. Ext. 6 series are the rent receipts granted by the ex-landlord for plot nos. 1023, 1025, 1027, 1030 and 1255. Ext. 7 is the sale deed with respect to plot no. 1024 (not suit properties) which shows that Devi Lal and Banvari Lal are boundaries of plot no. 1024. This document dated 18.7.1942 has been brought on record to show that the plaintiffs were in possession since 1942 itself. Ext. 13 series are the municipal receipts granted by the Corporation from 1966. The Municipal khesra, survey khesra has been brought on record to show that Gopal Lal Maharaj was earlier recorded in the municipal khesra and the plaintiff has thereafter been recorded in the said municipal khesra. 21. Lastly it would be relevant to refer to Ext. Ext. 13 series are the municipal receipts granted by the Corporation from 1966. The Municipal khesra, survey khesra has been brought on record to show that Gopal Lal Maharaj was earlier recorded in the municipal khesra and the plaintiff has thereafter been recorded in the said municipal khesra. 21. Lastly it would be relevant to refer to Ext. 2 which is the patta diwani. It has been described as "Bandobasti Raiyati Bemiyadi and the lands have been described as Talab va Bagh. These exhibits aforesaid undoubtedly indicates that the lands that were settled were agricultural lands. From the oral evidence it is clear that the nature of the lands at the time of settlement were agricultural and the plaintiff continues to use major part of the lands settled in his favour for agricultural purposes inasmuch as the plaintiff has a tank and orchard on the lands. Therefore, the contentions of the appellants and defendant no. 5 in this appeal that the lands in dispute that were settled in favour of plaintiff-respondent were meant for residential purpose has to be rejected by this court. 22. Having established that the lands is question were used for agricultural purposes, the learned counsel for the plaintiff refers to several judgments, namely, Lok Nath Singh Vs. Chhotan Bahri reported in 1946 Patna 22, a Full Bench judgment in the case of Mt. Ugni & Anr. Vs. Chowa Mahto & Ors. reported in A.I.R. 1968 Patna 302 and the case of Sardamoni Debi Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in A.I.R. 1979 Patna 106. 23. As far back as in 1946 the Patna High Court in Lok Nath Singhs case has held that once lease is created with respect to agricultural land by execution of a kabuliat it will not be affected by Transfer of Property Act. This view was reiterated in the case of Shardamoni Devi. The question that had fallen for consideration was whether the tank settled to the lessee would be considered a agricultural lease. This court answered in the affirmative and held that on the evidence, the defendants of that case had been unable to prove that the land was being utilized for no agricultural purposes. However, the leading judgment on this issue and which is followed till today is the law laid down in the case of Mt. Ugni (supra). This court answered in the affirmative and held that on the evidence, the defendants of that case had been unable to prove that the land was being utilized for no agricultural purposes. However, the leading judgment on this issue and which is followed till today is the law laid down in the case of Mt. Ugni (supra). This case has taken into consideration the judgment relied upon by the defendant no. 5 reported in A.I.R. 1960 Patna 344 in the case of Basta Colla Colliery Co. Ltd. Vs. Bandhu Beldar & Another. It appears that some of the observations of the decisions have been doubted by the Supreme Court in Atyam Veerraju Vs. P. Venkanna, reported in AIR 1966 SC 629 . The five bench Judges have all agreed to the proposition that a valid agricultural lease may be created by an unregistered document as pointed in the case of Jangal Singh Vs. Mukund Kumar, reported in AIR 1948 Patna 446 and if such unregistered document is executed, delivery of possession is not necessary to prove the title of the lessee. If however, the lease is not registered and is, therefore, in admissible as evidence of title, it will always be open to the tenant to show that he had obtained raiyati interest on the strength of actual possession and acceptance of rent by the landlord. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the claim of the plaintiffs will fall on the ground that the lease was not registered. In fact the settlement was made orally and it was only by way of precaution that a patta was executed to commensurate the existence of the oral lease. 24. Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 5 and the State have raised the question that oral settlement of the lands by the ex-landlord Gopal Lal Maharaj and the subsequent Patta Diwani executed by the landlord is hit by Sections 105, 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to the submissions made on behalf of the defendant no. 4, the patta is an unregistered document and is not admissible. It is further contended that the document cannot be used even for collateral purposes. According to the submissions made on behalf of the defendant no. 4, the patta is an unregistered document and is not admissible. It is further contended that the document cannot be used even for collateral purposes. Relying on averments at paragraphs 3 and 4, it is said that the lands in question have been used for residential purposes and the nature of the land is to be ascertained by the manner in which the lands are utilized. According to the defendant no. 5 the statement made at paragraph 3 of the plaint is "that at survey plot 1027 was a ditch and the plaintiff with the intention to construct a residential house on plot nos. 1025 and 1027 filled the western portion of the said plot 1027". It has also been stated that he submitted a plan to the Patna City Municipality for construction of pucca house. It is also stated by the plaintiff that the plot nos. 1023,1027,1030, 1025 and 1255 have all been amalgamated into one plot and surrounded by a boundary. Having made the aforesaid statement, according to defendant no. 4, the plaintiff cannot claim that the lands are agricultural in nature and as such the "Patta" is hit by Section 49 of the Registration Act. For the purpose of substantiating the submissions aforesaid Mr. Nath relied a decision in the case of Basta Colla Colliery Co. (supra). 25. Two suits were filed by Basta Colla for ejectment of the principal defendant from certain lands situated in village Basta Colla. The plaintiffs case is that Ganpat and Bandhu verbally took lease of lands in dispute for residential purpose (emphasis supplied) in the year 1920, and that subsequent execution of Kabuliyats by them did not legally create any permanent lease in their favour. Their names were wrongly mutated as raiyats Kaimi tenants. The defendants were in fact month to month tenants. 26. The points urged in that suit were-(i) that a kabuliat executed by lessee cannot legally create a valid tenancy even though pattas were not executed by the owner, (ii) that a person who enters into possession of land under the valid lease, is a trespasser and his possession being wrongful from the moment of entry, limitation begins to run against the landlord from the moment. This judgment deals with the question when a lease is created for a residential land and holds that Sections 105 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable and the court came to the conclusion that the kabuliat could not create a valid lease as the creation of such a lease required a registered instrument by the lesser who could alone transfer a right to enjoy a property within the meaning of Section 105. The basic difference between the case referred to above and the facts of the present case is that the lands in dispute in the present case were agricultural lands. 27. Learned counsel for the defendant also challenged the Trial Court judgment on the ground that the Court could not have looked into the patta for collateral purposes with respect to the nature and character of the possession. The Trial Court has examined the patta to show the nature of the tenancy which according to the defendant the Court could not have done. While substantiating this submission learned counsel for the defendant relied on the case of S. Amar Singh & Anr. Vs. Surinder Kaur, reported in A.I.R. 1975 M.P. 230. The Court while defining collateral purposes held:- "...........collateral purpose is that which is by the side or distinct from the main purpose." 28. Accordingly it has been held that an unregistered deed was admissible to prove the nature and character of possession. The Trial Court has only looked into this document to determine the nature of the possession, and as such the submission made by the learned counsel for the defendant no. 5 has to be rejected. On the basis of the aforesaid judgments it has been contended by the defendant no. 5 that there must be a assertion of a title, which must be alleged, and proved by the plaintiff and the title should be adverse to the interest of the landlord. According to the counsel for the defendant no. 5 the plaintiff must know that the lease is invalid and then only can it be asserted that his interest is adverse to the landlord. Accordingly it has been argued that there has to be something "more besides payment and acceptance of rent in regard to assertion title of the land in question". 5 the plaintiff must know that the lease is invalid and then only can it be asserted that his interest is adverse to the landlord. Accordingly it has been argued that there has to be something "more besides payment and acceptance of rent in regard to assertion title of the land in question". These arguments would well be considered, if it is held by this Court that the plaintiff has no title or that the nature of the land was used for purposes other than agriculture. In fact the submissions made by Mr. Nath, learned Senior Counsel have been dealt with in the case of Basta Colla Colliery Co. (supra). The Court below and I do not agree with the basic assertion on behalf of the defendant no. 5 that the lands settled were for residential purposes and as such the patta diwami was required to be registered and the execution of the lease will be governed by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 29. Having held on the basis of documents and evidence and the law in relation to the subject that the plaintiff has title over the suit lands, it would be proper to refer to the objection on this question by the appellant-State. The claim of the State is that the plaintiffs name does not appear on any documents belonging to the State. Such as the survey khatiyan etc. This argument cannot be sustained for the reason that it is admitted by all parties that Gopal Lal Maharaj was recorded in the Municipal Survey Khesra during the Municipal Survey Operations and as such since the predecessor in interest was recorded in the Municipal Survey one would not expect that the plaintiffs name would find place on any documents except the Municipal Survey Records. As stated earlier that the plaintiff has been paying rent to the Patna City Municipality and as such his name is on record with respect to the lands in question. 30. Moreover, it is obvious that when the Government exercises its power and acquire property, public funds are utilized for payment of compensation to the true owner, and not merely to any claimant who cares to appear on the scene. 30. Moreover, it is obvious that when the Government exercises its power and acquire property, public funds are utilized for payment of compensation to the true owner, and not merely to any claimant who cares to appear on the scene. The Government have special responsibility in this regard and cannot take refuge behind the pretext that the compensation was paid to the persons who actually appeared while others did not appear for some valid reason. In the present case it is obvious that appellants did not have any knowledge of the land acquisition proceeding till the time an attempt was made to take possession. 31. Mr. Jha appearing on behalf of the State then contended that after the issuance of notice under Section 4 in the Land Acquisition Proceeding, the plaintiff did not respond to the public notice. Although the lands have been described and all steps were taken in accordance with law. Notice under Section 4 is a general notice and not a personal notice and as such no adverse interference can be drawn from this fact. 32. Mr. Jha has further submitted that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the Land Acquisition Proceeding but he choose not to appear in the proceeding and the suit filed by him is barred by limitation. For the purpose of showing that the plaintiff had knowledge of the proceeding learned counsel referred to Ext.C(ii). Ext. C(ii) is a letter which has been written by one Devi Prasad to the Land Acquisition Officer on 9.6.1962 wherein Devi Prasad has raised an objection that the acquired land is south of the land of Devi Prasad and if any wall is constructed then the entry into his house would be blocked and requested the Land Acquisition Officer not to erect a boundary which enters into his house/plot of land. It has been stated that this Devi Prasad who is author of Ext. 2 is the same as Devi Lal i.e. the plaintiff and, therefore, it is submitted that he had knowledge of the acquisition proceeding and did not appear before the Land Acquisition Officer to file his objections. On the basis of this document it is also stated that the entire suit would be barred, as it will be hit by limitation as it is filed beyond three years since the date of knowledge. 33. On the basis of this document it is also stated that the entire suit would be barred, as it will be hit by limitation as it is filed beyond three years since the date of knowledge. 33. While countering the objections raised on behalf of the appellants, the plaintiff has referred to the map which is submitted by the Pleader Commissioner on 9.7.1968 in Title Suit No. 185 of 1996. The map indicates that the land of Devi Prasad is not the same as the land belonging to the plaintiff besides which, it has been submitted that the objection is with respect to entry into the house of the said Devi Prasad and not with respect to the Land Acquisition Proceeding which indicates that Devi Lal @ Devi Prasad plaintiff is different to Devi Prasad who had filed the objection before the Land Acquisition Officer. The Trial Court has considered this aspect and has come to the conclusion that Devi Prasad @ Devi Lal are not the same person as Devi Prasad. It is abundantly clear from this fact that the question of the suit being barred by limitation would not arise in this case in view of the aforesaid finding. 34. The next issue is whether the suit is maintainable for setting aside the Land Acquisition Proceeding. I may indicate that the Court below has come to the following findings with respect to the Land Acquisition Proceeding. (A) The Court has found that the procedure for service of notice as per Section 4 of the Bihar Amendment has not been followed. (B) That the Collector ought not to have signed a notification under Section 4 and ought to have been signed by the Secretary of the Revenue Department. (C) That the plot nos. has not been stated in the notification under Section 4. (D) That the procedure for compliance with Section 6 has not been followed. (E) Finally the Court has also held that no notice was ever served on the plaintiff. 35. Before going any further, I may point out that the defendant has categorically stated in the plaint and his evidence that possession of the acquired land was never taken by the authorities concerned. For this purpose the defendant has referred to Ext. B(i), A(ii) and E(ii) and the evidence of D.W. 4 Mathura Pandey. Ext. A(i) is the certificate of possession of land. For this purpose the defendant has referred to Ext. B(i), A(ii) and E(ii) and the evidence of D.W. 4 Mathura Pandey. Ext. A(i) is the certificate of possession of land. It has been stated in this document by Madan Mohan Prasad, the Surveyor of the Patna Municipal Corporation that he has "received possession at the hand of Mr. Mathura Pandey" on 5th November, 1964. Ext. B(i) has been signed by Mathura Pandey on 5.11.1964 wherein he states that he had delivered possession to Madan Mohan Prasad on 5.11.1964. The documents show that possession was handed over to the Patna Municipal Corporation on 5.11.1964. In this context therefore, the evidence of Mathura Pandey D.W. 4 becomes important. Mathura Pandey has stated at paragraph 6 that he had handed over possession in accordance with the site plan. The site plan is Ext. E(iV) which has been signed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the Collector and the Draftman on 11.8.1966. On the basis of this document and the evidence of D.W. 4 it has been submitted that in fact possession was not handed over on 15.11.1964, as the site map was not prepared till 11.8.1966. The case of the respondent is specifically that he came to know about the Land Acquisition Proceeding when the Officers came to his land and were trying to install pillars. It is said that the petitioner resisted and filed an objection before the Municipal Corporation and finally he filed the suit which is under consideration. 36. The next issue is whether Civil Court has any jurisdiction to look into the validity of the notice under Section 4, the validity with respect to the manner in which the land acquisition proceeding has been conducted? This question came up before the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Dhirendra Kumar, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1955 . The facts were that a miscellaneous appeal was filed in the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge, I, Patna by which he has stayed the Land Acquisition Proceedings by an order passed under Order 39 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. on the ground that the land sought to be acquired were not for a public purpose. The facts were that a miscellaneous appeal was filed in the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge, I, Patna by which he has stayed the Land Acquisition Proceedings by an order passed under Order 39 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. on the ground that the land sought to be acquired were not for a public purpose. The Supreme Court held that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete code in itself and thus there is bar of the Civil Court to take cognizance of such cases under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court held that the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 which can only be done by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 37. Similarly in the case of Laxmi Chand Vs. Gram Panchayat, Kararia reported in 1996 S.C. 523 the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was challenged. Validity of the Land Acquisition Proceeding was challenged in a writ application which was dismissed. Thereafter, the validity of the acquisition and the award was challenged by filing a suit. The Civil Court on a primary issue held that the suit was not maintainable. The Apex Court has held as in the case of palaurs that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete Code and the Civil Court cannot take cognizance of cases under the Land Acquisition Act. 38. The counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-defendant has on the other hand relied on a judgment in the case of Dhula Bhai Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78. This case has laid down certain conditions where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred. The facts of this particular case were that a suit was filed for declaration that the provisions of law relating to assessment under the M.B. Sales Tax Act were ultra vires and for refund of the amount of tax illegally collected. The Apex Court held on the facts of that particular case that there was no bar for filing a suit for the relief claimed by the plaintiff in that case. The Apex Court held on the facts of that particular case that there was no bar for filing a suit for the relief claimed by the plaintiff in that case. The main reason was that the Act did not contain any machinery for refund of the tax collected in excess of the constitutional limits and found that in such a situation a suit lies. In the facts of the present case it has already been held by later decisions that the Land Acquisition Act provides remedy and relief in all types of situations and as such a suit would be barred. Therefore, this court holds that the suit challenging the Land Acquisition Proceeding would be barred. 39. After the findings given aforesaid in this case I do feel that it has to be clarified as to how and in what manner the respondent-plaintiff can claim relief under the Land Acquisition Act in view of the findings of this Court that the plaintiff has title to the suit land. From the prayer in the plaint it is clear that the plaintiff has claimed that his title should be adjudicated and after adjudication the State of Bihar should be directed to pay the compensation money which is deposited in the Court below. To achieve this object, the plaintiff may appear before the Land Acquisition Judge and file an application for being added as party in the proceeding and pursue his claim before the Land Acquisition Judge. It has been argued on behalf of the respondent that this Court while dismissing his plea with respect to the propriety of the Land Acquisition Proceedings has left him remediless. I do not think that is the correct position. The correctness or otherwise of the Land Acquisition Proceeding would be open to challenge by the plaintiff-respondent before this High Court in its writ jurisdiction, of course, only in appropriate cases. 40. In the result the appeal is partly allowed with observations as aforesaid. No order as to costs.