Judgment Akil Kureshi, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 4.4.07 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 900 of 200. 2. Brief facts may be noted at this stage. 2.1 Land bearing survey No. 302 of village Manjalpur, Vadodara admeasuring 10117 sq. mtrs. was owned by one Devabhai Sardarbhai Baria. Apparently declaring that said Shri Devabhai Sardarbhai expired on 14.7.76, entries in the revenue records of the said land came to be mutated in favour of his widow Chanchalben Devabhai, son Melabhai Devabhai and one daughter Shantaben Devabhai. We may notice that though Devabhai had in all three daughters, namely, Shantaben, Dahiben and Maniben, name of only one daughter, viz. Shantaben was entered in the revenue records. What is significant however is that before the revenue authorities, it was declared that Devabhai expired on 14.7.76. 2.2 The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (‘ULC Act’ for short) was brought into force from 17.2.76. Devabhai during his life time had not made any declaration under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act. After his death, his widow Chanchalben filed form under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act on 12.8.76. This declaration was processed by the Land Ceiling Authorities. Draft statement was prepared showing the retainable land as well as excess land. Out of total land of 10117 sq. mtrs., 1500 sq. mtrs. was allowed to be retained as per the ceiling limit and remaining 8617 sq. mtrs. was shown as excess vacant land. Significantly, the draft statement clearly indicated that it pertained to the land held by Devabhai Sardarbhai and name of Chanchalben was shown as person who filed the form. At two places, Devabhai Sardarbhai is shown as the land owner. 2.3 In response to the said draft statement, Chanchalben wrote a letter dated 23.5.80 and stated that in the land in question, her son Melabhai, who is aged 45 years, also has a share and his name was not mentioned in the draft statement. Therefore, she prayed that instead of allowing only 1500 sq. mtrs. of land to be retained as per the draft statement, they should be allowed to retain 4350 sq. meters of land. How she claimed area of 4350 sq. meters is however not clear. Therefore, she prayed that instead of allowing only 1500 sq. mtrs. of land to be retained as per the draft statement, they should be allowed to retain 4350 sq. meters of land. How she claimed area of 4350 sq. meters is however not clear. 2.4 Melabhai son of Devabhai Sardarbhai remained present before the competent authority on 25.6.80 and gave a statement stating, inter alia, that he is aged about 40 years and that his father Devabhai expired on 14.7.76 and his name was therefore entered in the revenue records. On the basis of the said representation, the competent authority passed an order on 20.9.80 recording that applicant Devabhai Sardarbhai has expired on 14.7.76, necessary documents were produced in this regard and therefore, share is required to be given to his widow Chanchalben and his major son Melabhai Devabhai. Therefore, in addition to one unit of 1500 sq. mtrs. of land already allowed to be retained, he further allowed 1500 sq. mtrs. of land in favour of Melabhai. Rest of the land would be excess land. 2.5 Chanchalben and Melabhai appealed against the said decision of the Competent Authority. However, by the judgment dated 31st December, 1980, Urband Land Ceiling Tribunal dismissed that appeal. They thereupon approached this Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 1515 of 1981, which also came to be dismissed by a judgment and order dated 16.9.81. 2.6 It is the case of the State Government that on conclusion of the proceedings under the ULC Act, after following due process of issuing notices and notifications under Section 10 of the ULC Act, possession was taken over by the Government on 19.3.1986 by drawing panchnama and entries in the revenue records were also made on 20th July 1988 showing the possession of the Government. It is thus the case of the Government that the land vested in the Government free from all encumbrances and actual possession was also taken over long back in the year 1988. 2.7 On one hand, the declaration initially filed by Chanchalben and thereafter in which her son Melabhai also joined, was being finalised and the proceedings under the ULC Act were being completed, on the other hand, efforts were undertaken by the daughters of deceased Devabhai to salvage the family land. 2.7 On one hand, the declaration initially filed by Chanchalben and thereafter in which her son Melabhai also joined, was being finalised and the proceedings under the ULC Act were being completed, on the other hand, efforts were undertaken by the daughters of deceased Devabhai to salvage the family land. By notice under Section 10(5) dated 30.5.84, Chanchalben was called upon to hand over the possession of excess vacant land which had vested in the State Government vide notification dated 17.3.83 issued under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act. Against the notice issued by the competent authority under Section 10(5) of the Act, original petitioners i.e. Shantaben, Maniben and Dahiben, three daughters of Devabhai preferred appeal in the year 1984 before ULC Tribunal. The appellants before the ULC Tribunal, three daughters of deceased Devabhai, contended that their father had expired on 14.1.76. It was primarily on this basis that they had opposed the authorities taking possession of the excess vacant land. It was their case that their father had expired prior to bringing into force the ULC Act. This contention was negatived by the Tribunal in its order dated 31.3.1987 in the following manner. “6. The case papers show that the suit land was originally held by Shri Devabhai Sardarbhai. Shri Devabhai died on 14.7.1976 as per mutation entry No. 1725 dated 7.2.77. After his death his widow Smt.Chanchalben filed declaration in Form No. 1 on 12.8.1976. After due inquiry, CA passed an order dated 20.7/9.80 allowing therein two ceiling units as retainable land i.e. one for widow Smt.Chanchalben and the second unit for major son. As aforesaid the appeal against the above said order and writ petition against the appellate order failed. 7. The first plea of Shri Chauhan is that the three appellants who are the daughters of deceased Shri Devabhai should be allowed shares in the suit land and that they are entitled to holdl one ceiling unit of vacant land each out of the suit land. The said plea is unacceptable. The suit land was held at the commencement of the Act on 17.2.76 by Shri Devabhai Sardarbhai and therefore, Shri Devabhai (or his widow) and his major son are entitled to their shares and to hold one ceiling unit of land each but the daughters have no claim under the provisions of the Act. 8. The said plea is unacceptable. The suit land was held at the commencement of the Act on 17.2.76 by Shri Devabhai Sardarbhai and therefore, Shri Devabhai (or his widow) and his major son are entitled to their shares and to hold one ceiling unit of land each but the daughters have no claim under the provisions of the Act. 8. Shri Chauhan further argued that Shri Devabhai died on 14th January 1976 and not on 14th July 1976. When the mutation entry No. 1725 dated 7.2.1977 was shown wherein the date of death was recorded as 14th July 1976, Shri Chauhan produced order of CA under Section 8(4) wherein the date of death was typed as 14/1/1976. The claim that Shri Devabhai died on 14.1.76 on the basis of CA’s typed order dated 20-7/9-80 is frivolous because the original order in manuscript at p.75 of the case papers shows that the date was 14.7.76 but due to typographical error date was shown as 14.1.76 in the typed copy. In any case, he date of Shri Devabhai’s death is not relevant and of retainable land has been allowed to his widow. 9. It is clear beyond doubt that this appeal cannot succeed, it is fit to be rejected as time barred and it is also to be dismissed on merits. The order under Sections 8(4) and 9 of the Act was challenged in 1981 before the Appellate Authority and the High Court without any success. Challenge to a notice issued under Section 10(5) in pursuance of an order under Section 8(4) which is upheld, must necessarily fail.” 2.8 After this order was passed on 31st January 1987, no further steps appear to have been taken by the petitioners to challenge the various orders passed by the ULC Authorities and subsequent orders passed in appeal and writ petitions. Long thereafter, in the year 2002, they preferred Special Civil Application No. 9000 of 2002 and prayed for the following substantial reliefs: “31. The petitioners having no other adequate remedy, approach Your Lordships and pray that, a writ of mandamus and/or certiorari or an other appropriate writ, order or direction be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; (A) to declare that the petitioners are in possession and entitled to retain the possession of the suit land bearing Old Survey No. 302, now Final Plot Nos.456 admeasuring 3741 sq. yards and Final Plot No. 477 admeasuring 3714 sq. yards and remaining land of original survey No. 302 situated in the sim of village Manjalpur, Vadodara and covered under the Town Planning Scheme No. 19 of Manjalpur, Vadodara; (B) to direct the State Government not to take or disturb or to allot the suit land bearing old survey No. 302, now Final Plot Nos.456 admeasuring 3741 sq. yards and Final Plot No. 477 admeasuring 3714 sq. yards and remaining land of original survey No. 302 situated in the sim of village Manjalpur, Vadodara and covered under the Town Planning Scheme No. 19 of Manjalpur, Vadodara in favour of any other person or institution as the suit land belonged to the petitioners; (C) Such other and further relief that is just, fit and expedient in the facts and circumstances of the case may be granted.” They in the meantime approached the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Vadodara by filing Regular Civil Suit No. 17 of 2000 and prayed for an injunction against the Government taking over possession of the suit land under the ULC Act. They also prayed for interim injunction. Ex-parte injunction was granted by the Civil Court on 8.1.2000. The learned Judge also granted prayer for appointment of Court Commissioner who gave a report that the possession is still with land-owners. The Government has filed reply contending that the suit is not maintainable since the proceedings under the ULC Act have already been culminated. 2.9 One more fact that needs to be noted at this stage is that subsequently, the land in question is covered under the Town Planning Scheme and original plot bearing Survey No. 302 has been divided into two final plots, namely, final plot No. 456 and 477 admeasuring 3741 sq. mtrs. each. 3. Learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order dated 4.4.07 allowed the petition and set aside the orders dated 20th August 1980 passed by the Competent Authority and Additional Collector, by which certain area of land was declared as surplus land. The learned Judge relied mainly on following factors to allow the petition and grant the said relief: i. That father of the petitioners Devabhai had expired on 14.1.76 i.e. prior to ULC Act coming into force on 17.2.76. As per the Hindu succession his daughters had equal share in his property. The learned Judge relied mainly on following factors to allow the petition and grant the said relief: i. That father of the petitioners Devabhai had expired on 14.1.76 i.e. prior to ULC Act coming into force on 17.2.76. As per the Hindu succession his daughters had equal share in his property. On the date of coming into operation of the ULC Act, there were five claimants, i.e. widow, son and three daughters of the deceased and therefore, the ULC Authorities erred in granting only two units of 1500 sq. meters each to the widow and son of the deceased ignoring the claims of the daughters. ii. That the Town Planning Scheme had reduced the area of the land from 10117 sq. meters to total of 7482 sq. meters. This was less than 7500 sq. meters of land which the five heirs of deceased Devabhai could be retained i.e. 1500 s. meters each. iii. That possession of land was still with the land-owners even after the ULC Act was repealed as could be seen from the panchnama drawn as per the directions of the Civil Court and the order of injunction granted in the civil suit. 4. Appearing for the State, learned AGP Shri Devang Vyas vehemently submitted that the respondents herein, original petitioners had not taken any steps to challenge the various orders passed by the ULC Authorities and in fact, the challenge to the order passed by the competent authority at the instance of the widow and son of the deceased had ended when the High Court dismissed the writ petition. 4.1 He further contended that after following all steps, possession was taken over way back in the year 1988 in presence of panchas drawing panchnana which cannot be disbelieved in exercise of writ jurisdiction. He relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 1608. 4.2 He further submitted that the original petitioners had never filed any declaration before the competent authority. He relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Government of A.P. vs. M. Krishnaveni, (2006) 7 SCC 365 . He specifically relied upon Para 23 of the judgment which reads as under: “23. Now, coming to the case of Smt. K. Pramila Rani, Mr. He relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Government of A.P. vs. M. Krishnaveni, (2006) 7 SCC 365 . He specifically relied upon Para 23 of the judgment which reads as under: “23. Now, coming to the case of Smt. K. Pramila Rani, Mr. Uday U. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel representing her, has contended that T. Chinna Seetharamaiah, father of Smt. K. Pramila Rani had given some area of land to her on the basis of the family arrangement dated 13.11.1970. According to the learned senior counsel, the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court impugned in the appeal upholding the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge directing the competent authority to receive fresh declaration of Smt. K. Pramila Rani in no circumstances is perverse or illegal calling for interference by this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. He also submitted that K. Pramila Rani was married on 21.08.1964 and she is also entitled to get equal opportunity and treatment as was given to her other two sisters by the High Court. We are not persuaded to accept the submissions of the learned senior Counsel on the ground of parity or equality principle. Admittedly, Smt. K. Pramila Rani did not file statement at all before the competent authority in the prescribed form furnishing the details of land held by her as envisaged under Section 6 of the Act and the competent authority was not obliged to prepare draft statement of her share in the land and serve on her to enable her to file objections under Section 8 of the Act. Therefore, Smt. K. Pramila Rani could not be allowed to contend that no inquiry under Section 8 of the Act was conducted by the competent authority and that the vestment of her surplus land in the State Government was bad and illegal. Therefore, Smt. K. Pramila Rani could not be allowed to contend that no inquiry under Section 8 of the Act was conducted by the competent authority and that the vestment of her surplus land in the State Government was bad and illegal. The claim of Smt. K. Pramila Rani to afford an opportunity to her after about two decades from the date of the vestment of her surplus land in the State Government, could in no circumstances be equated and treated at par with her two sisters, who had filed their independent declarations immediately after the enforcement of the Act, requesting the competent authority to hold an inquiry as per the law regarding their ownership of lands which they received from their father in family arrangement dated 13.11.1970, i.e. much before the Act came into force. In these peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, Smt. K. Pramila Rani is not entitled to the grant of the same and similar relief as would be available to her two sisters.” 5. On the other hand, learned advocate Shri J.M. Patel appearing for the original petitioners opposed the appeal. He submitted that the learned single Judge has passed order which calls for no interference. As per the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, daughters would have equal share of the property of their father. There were as many as five owners of the land on the date when the ULC Act was brought into operation. He relied on the following decisions to contend that the petitioners had share in the property of their father: 1. R.I. Sorathia vs. Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal, 1997 (1) GLR 439 . 2. State of Gujarat vs. M.B. Pathan, 1994 (1) GLH 276 . 3. D.B. Kansara vs. Revenue Department, Government of Gujarat, 1995 (2) GCD 239 (Guj). Reference was also made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Government of A.P. v. M. Krishnaveni, (2006) 7 SCC 365 in which it was observed that the term family has to be construed widely so as to include married daughters also. He has also relied upon a decision in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. B.E. Billimoria, (2003) 7 SCC 336 wherein it was observed that ULC Act being an expropriatory legislation should be construed strictly. He has also relied upon a decision in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. B.E. Billimoria, (2003) 7 SCC 336 wherein it was observed that ULC Act being an expropriatory legislation should be construed strictly. Reliance was also placed in the case in the case of Rajkot Municipal Corporation vs. L.M. Patel, 2000 (3) GLR 2293 in which a Division Bench of this Court observed that even though the competent authority had declared certain land as excess vacant land, if possession of the land is not taken by the Government on the date of enforcement of the repeal Act, the Government would not become owner of such land. 6. Having thus heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties at considerable length, we find that the learned Single Judge relied heavily on the date of death of original land owner Devabhai being 14.1.1976. It is the case of the original petitioners that Devabhai expired on 14.1.76. This is, however, not free from doubt. From the beginning, entries were made in the revenue records in favour of widow of Devabhai and others on a declaration made by the members of the family which included one of the petitioners, namely, Shantaben that Devabhai had expired on 14.7.76. Further, before the ULC Authorities, in response to the draft statement of excess vacant land also, son of Devabhai, namely, Melabhai appeared in person and stated that his father had expired on 14.7.76. Present petitioners had sought to oppose notice under Section 10(5) of the Act by filing appeal before the ULC Tribunal on the premise that their father having expired on 14.1.76, they have already inherited the property on the date when the ULC Act was brought into force. This contention was negatived by the Tribunal holding that the revenue record suggests that Devabhai expired on 14.7.76. It was on this basis that entry of mutation of his heirs was made on 7.2.77. The contention that the correct date of birth was 14.1.76 and not 14.7.76 was turned down. It was recorded that in the order passed by the competent authority also, in the original case papers, date of death was shown as 14.7.76. This order of ULC Tribunal dated 31.1.87 achieved finality and no further steps have been taken by the petitioners. They kept quiet for years together. The land vested in the Government. It was recorded that in the order passed by the competent authority also, in the original case papers, date of death was shown as 14.7.76. This order of ULC Tribunal dated 31.1.87 achieved finality and no further steps have been taken by the petitioners. They kept quiet for years together. The land vested in the Government. Revenue entries from 1988 onwards continued to show the Government as owner and occupant. Long after the said order was passed on 31.1.87 by the ULC Tribunal, the petitioners filed the present petition in the year 2002 contending that the correct date of death of Devabhai is 14.1.76 and the petitioners are equal owners of the land in question. Such highly disputed question of date of death of Devabhai at a highly belated stage, in our view, could not and should not have been examined under writ jurisdiction. Significantly, the heirs including petitioner No. 1 had approached the Talati seeking mutation in the revenue records on the death of Devabhai. Entry was made on 7.2.77. Date of death of Devabhai disclosed was 14.7.76. Had there been a mistake of a few days or weeks, we can understand. Surely, the family would not make such a major mistake in disclosing the date of death of the family member, that too, shortly after the death. Therefore, despite the petitioners producing the death certificate showing the date of death as 14.1.76, we are not prepared to reopen the issue which was once closed by the ULC Tribunal way back in the year 1987. Significantly, as per this certificate also, entry in the register was made in the year 1993. 7. With respect to the interim injunction granted by the Civil Court as well as panchnama drawn, we may record that way back in the year 1988, after following detailed procedure under Section 10 of the ULC Act, possession was taken over by the Government in presence of panchas. Such records cannot be lightly ignored particularly when from 1988 onwards continuously the Government is shown as owner and occupant of the land in the records. The petitioners raised no grievance against such entries for years together. In our view, the learned Judge erred in overruling the overwhelming records suggesting the detailed steps taken before taking over the possession of the land in question. The petitioners raised no grievance against such entries for years together. In our view, the learned Judge erred in overruling the overwhelming records suggesting the detailed steps taken before taking over the possession of the land in question. The Apex Court in the case of Larsen & Toubra (Supra) has observed as follows:— “The petitioners filed affidavits of the Panchas who had signed the panchanama. In these affidavits they stated that they were called to the office of the Panchayat and that their signatures were obtained on blank papers and that they had not gone to the site and that neither the landlord was present nor the actual possession was delivered to the acquiring body. Read with these affidavits High Court noticed from the recitation in the Panchanama that it was nowhere mentioned that the panchas had gone to the site from the office of the Panchayat. It was not disputed that in the revenue records it was L and T Ltd. who was shown in possession of the land. Affidavits of the Panchas filed in the High Court which contained statements contrary to what was recorded in the Panchanama and against the revenue entries are quite meaningless and in our opinion High Court unnecessarily put undue reliance on the same. High Court could not convert itself into a revenue Court and hold that in spite of the Panchanama and the revenue records actual physical possession of the acquired land had not been handed over to the acquiring body. High Court, in our opinion, has not correctly analysed the two judgments of this Court in Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar vs. State of Punjab, [1996] 4 SCC 212 : (1996 AIR SCW 1296) and Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D. Bhagwat, [1976] 1 SCC 700 = ( AIR 1975 SC 1767 ) to come to the conclusion that actual physical possession of the land was not taken over by the State.” 8. It is extremely doubtful if Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the petitioners in view of ULC Act. Learned single Judge gave undue importance to orders passed by the Civil Court. 9. In any case, repeal of the ULC Act would not affect the present proceedings since on the date of the repeal Act, no proceedings were pending before any Court. Learned single Judge gave undue importance to orders passed by the Civil Court. 9. In any case, repeal of the ULC Act would not affect the present proceedings since on the date of the repeal Act, no proceedings were pending before any Court. As already noted, ULC proceedings had achieved its finality when the writ petition filed by the widow and son of Devabhai came to be dismissed by this Court. The present petitioners preferred appeal against the notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act seeking to take over possession. That appeal also came to be dismissed by the ULC Tribunal on 31.1.87. The issue ended there. Therefore, after the Government took over the possession of the land in the year 1988, no proceedings were pending before any Court, Authority or Tribunal. Repeal of the ULC Act, therefore is of no consequence in the present case. 10. The last factor, namely, reduction of plot size upon sanction of the town planning scheme also pales into insignificance in the background of the above conclusion that we have reached. Additionally, it is nobody’s case that till possession was taken over by the Government in the year 1988, the Town Planning Scheme was sanctioned. In fact, it was much later that the Town Planning Scheme came into operation. The reduction in the measurement of the land subsequently by virtue of assignment of another final plot cannot disturb the ULC proceedings already concluded. In any case, the authorities had allowed the widow and son of the deceased Devabhai one unit each of 1500 sq. meters. We do not find that the daughters had any independent share on the date when the ULC Act was introduced since it is not established on record that Devabhai expired on 17.1.76. Additionally, admittedly, the petitioners did not file any declaration before the ULC Authorities. 11. Last but not least, we also find that the learned single Judge committed a grave error in setting aside the order passed by the Competent Authority under the ULC Act when there was no prayer to that effect. The order dated 30th August 1980 passed by the Competent Authority was not even challenged and advisedly so, after such a long period of time. The learned Single Judge has committed a serious error in granting a prayer which has not been made. 12. The order dated 30th August 1980 passed by the Competent Authority was not even challenged and advisedly so, after such a long period of time. The learned Single Judge has committed a serious error in granting a prayer which has not been made. 12. Quite apart from the above conclusion that the petitioners on merits had not made out any case for interference, only on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence the petition should have been dismissed. The petitioners were all along aware about the ULC proceedings. They had filed no declaration under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act. They, however, opposed the move of the Government to take possession by issuing notice under Section 10(5). This appeal was rejected by the Tribunal on 31.1.1987. After keeping silence for years together, without challenging the order of the Tribunal, they filed writ petition before the High Court in the year 2002 on the same grounds. Such petition was not maintainable at all particularly at the hands of the petitioners who had not filed any declaration under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act. 13. In the result appeal is allowed. Judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside.