Judgment :- Basant, J. In the light of Section 7(3) of the Kerala Anti-social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the `KAAPA'), is the omission to furnish translated copies of some of the documents relied on by the Detaining Authority to be reckoned as fatal warranting invalidation of detention on that ground ? (ii) Is the omission to specify any period of detention in the order of detention passed under Section 3(1) and approved under Section 3(3) to be reckoned as evidence of fatal non application of mind by the detaining authority warranting invalidation of the order of detention ? (iii) Can the detaining authority place reliance on any confidential and secret information not revealed to him specifically which the sponsoring authority or his subordinates may have in their possession to entertain the requisite subjective satisfaction under Section 3 on the need to detain a known goonda or known rowdy ? 2. These questions of relevance and significance arise in this Writ Petition filed by the petitioner, who is the mother of Reji @ Annachi Reji who has been ordered to be detained by the 3rd respondent under Section 3(1) of KAAPA. The petitioner has come to this Court with the prayer that a writ of habeas corpus may be issued to produce the son of the petitioner before Court, to set aside the order of detention Ext.P3 and to set him at liberty. 3. The petitioner's son Reji hereinafter called `the detenu' was admittedly an accused in 12 earlier criminal cases at various points of time and he has secured acquittal in all the said 12 cases. Against him 5 cases are pending now, the relevant details of which are given below: (i) Crime No.172 of 2003 (date of incident 25.03.2003); (ii) Crime No.76 of 2004 (date of incident 25.03.04); (iii) Crime No.37 of 2005 (date of incident 28.01.2005); (iv) Crime No.445 of 2005 (date of incident 04.12.2005); (v) Crime No.172 of 2008 (date of incident 29.03.2008 and final report filed on 08.01.2009). 4. The last of the crimes allegedly committed by him was on 29.03.2008. In all the 5 cases referred above, final reports have already been filed. Trial is not complete. 5. The detenu appears to have entertained an apprehension that he may be proceeded against under the KAAPA. He therefore submitted Ext.P1 representation dt.24.10.08 to the 3rd respondent with a copy to the Government. In all the 5 cases referred above, final reports have already been filed. Trial is not complete. 5. The detenu appears to have entertained an apprehension that he may be proceeded against under the KAAPA. He therefore submitted Ext.P1 representation dt.24.10.08 to the 3rd respondent with a copy to the Government. He received Ext.P4 reply dt.07.04.2009 from the Government to say, that proceedings under the KAAPA were not being contemplated against him. It is at this juncture that the detenu was detained on the basis of Ext.P3 order of detention dt.02.05.2009. The detenu was arrested on 21.05.09. Requisite approval under Section 3(3) of the KAAPA was given by the Government within 12 days. The detenu has submitted a representation to the Advisory Board. That is in the process of consideration. Orders by the Government under Section 10 of the KAAPA has not been passed yet. Advisory Board has not given its opinion, it is submitted. 6. Detailed arguments have been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Director General of Prosecutions. The learned counsel for the petitioner assails the impugned order on various grounds. Broadly the grounds of challenge can be divided into 2. They are: (A) In not having granted Malayalam translation of the relevant documents under Section 7(2) of the KAAPA, there has been fatal infraction of the rights of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 7(2) of the KAAPA. (B) There has been total absence of alert application of mind to the relevant facts before the 3rd respondent passed Ext.P3 order of detention. 7. Ground (A): Factual details on this aspect are not in dispute. The order of detention as also the grounds of detention have been furnished to the detenu in Malayalam. Copies of certain documents have been furnished along with such order of detention and grounds. Some of those documents including the report of the Superintendent of Police under Section 3(1) KAAPA as also the report of the C.I on the basis of which the Superintendent of Police (R4) commenced proceedings, have not been furnished to the detenu in Malayalam. They have been furnished in English. Some of those documents including the report of the Superintendent of Police under Section 3(1) KAAPA as also the report of the C.I on the basis of which the Superintendent of Police (R4) commenced proceedings, have not been furnished to the detenu in Malayalam. They have been furnished in English. The crux of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in not having furnished these documents in Malayalam language which the detenu understands and in having furnished these documents to the detenu in English language in which he is not proficient, there has been breach of the obligation to communicate the grounds under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and to furnish him the grounds and documents under Section 7 (2) of the KAAPA. 8. For the sake of convenience we extract Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 7 (1) and (2) of the KAAPA. Article 22(5) "When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." Section 7. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed:-(1) When a person is arrested in pursuance of a detention order, the officer arresting him shall read out the detention order to him and give him a copy of such order. (2) The grounds of detention, specifying the instances of offences, with copies of relevant documents, as far as practicable, on the basis of which he is considered as a "known goonda" or "known rowdy" and giving such materials relating to his activities on the basis of which his detention has been found necessary, shall be furnished to him as soon possible, nevertheless, in any case, within five days of detention and he shall also be informed in writing, under acknowledgment, of his right to represent to the Government and before the Advisory Board against the arrest and detention. (emphasis supplied) 9. (emphasis supplied) 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on precedents to contend that the obligation to communicate under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and the obligation to furnish under Section 7(2) of the KAAPA cannot be said to be discharged if the documents are furnished to the detenu in a language which he is not able to understand. The learned counsel for the petitioner in this context places reliance on the decision in Riswana Begam v. State of Kerala [2009(2) KLT 646]. 10. There is dispute between the parties as to whether the detenu is proficient in English or not. We see that he has affixed his signature in English. But it is not in serious dispute that his education was only upto S.S.L.C. A person who has studied upto S.S.L.C may be able to sign his name in English or understand the basics of the language. But at any rate we are not persuaded to agree that such knowledge of English is sufficient to conclude that furnishing of a document in English is by itself sufficient communication or furnishing under Article 22(5) and Section 7 (2). We agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is nothing to show that he was sufficiently proficient in the English language as to read and understand for himself the contents of those documents furnished in English. 11. The learned Additional Director General of Prosecutions points out relying on the decision in Devji Vallabhbhai v. Administrator, Goa, Daman & Diu [1982 S.C 1029] that even in a case where the very order of detention is furnished not in the language of the detenu but in English, the Supreme Court had held that that would be sufficient communication/furnishing. In para.8 of the said decision we find a detailed discussion on this aspect. It is held in that decision that notwithstanding the fact that the translated copy of the order of detention is not furnished to him in a language which the detenu understands, the fact that the grounds are furnished in a language which he knows, is sufficient to hold that the omission to furnish the order of detention in his language is not fatal to the detention. The rationale is that the order only reiterates those details which are already furnished in the grounds which have been properly translated and served on him. The rationale is that the order only reiterates those details which are already furnished in the grounds which have been properly translated and served on him. The learned Addl.D.G.P contends that the question is whether the order, grounds and documents have been furnished in such a manner as not to affect the detenu's right to know the grounds of detention and the materials on which such order of detention is passed. So long as he has such knowledge and his right to make a representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 7(2) of the KAAPA is not affected, the alleged omission/inadequacy cannot be reckoned as crucial or vital, sufficient to justify invalidation. We agree with the learned Addl.D.G.P. The question to be considered is whether the crucial and vital right of a detenu to know the grounds of detention and the right to make a representation against such detention is infringed or not. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner immediately points out the decision in Kamla v. State of Maharashtra [A.I.R 1981 S.C 814] to contend that the factual inferences narrated and relied on in the grounds are by themselves insufficient to enable the detenu to make an effective representation. The materials on the basis of which those factual inferences are drawn must also be communicated/furnished and to be an effective communication/furnishing, it is essential that the same must be furnished in a language known to the detenu. The learned counsel relies on the following crucial observation in para.3 of Kamla (supra). Para.3:........................................................................ ........................................................... "The matter may also be looked at ................................... Whatever angle from which the question is looked at, it is clear that `grounds' in Article 22(5) do not mean mere factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences. The `grounds' must be self- sufficient and self-explanatory. In our view copies of documents to which reference is made in the `grounds' must be supplied to the detenu as part of the `grounds'. (emphasis supplied) 13. We are undoubtedly in agreement that there must be an effective communication/furnishing not only of the order of detention or the grounds of detention, but also the documents/materials on which reliance is placed to formulate the grounds. 14. (emphasis supplied) 13. We are undoubtedly in agreement that there must be an effective communication/furnishing not only of the order of detention or the grounds of detention, but also the documents/materials on which reliance is placed to formulate the grounds. 14. The learned Addl.D.G.P submits that even if it be assumed that furnishing of the copies in English of the relevant materials is not sufficient for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of detention under other analogous laws relating to preventive detention, a different view must be taken by this Court in so far as the KAAPA is concerned because the KAAPA contains provisions which ensure unmistakably that the detenu does not suffer on account of such alleged defective communication/furnishing of documents. The learned Addl.D.G.P in this context places reliance on Section 7(3) of the KAAPA which we extract below: "Section 7(3): The Superintendent of the Jail where such person is detained shall afford him reasonable opportunity to consult a lawyer and reasonable assistance in making a representation against the detention order to the Government or to the Advisory Board." 15. The learned Addl.D.G.P submits that precedents under other enactments cannot be blindly imported when the court considers the validity of detention under the KAAPA because in none of those enactments, there is a stipulation like the one in Section 7(3) of the KAAPA. The legislature in its anxiety to ensure that the right of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to know the grounds of his detention and to make an effective representation against his detention are not affected or infringed has enacted a provision under which the detenu under the KAAPA is afforded opportunity to consult a lawyer and is assured reasonable assistance in making a representation against the detention order. The duty is statutorily imposed on the Superintendent of the Jail where the detenu is detained to afford opportunity to the detenu to consult a lawyer. He is also obliged to render reasonable assistance to the detenu in making a representation against the order of detention. The duty is statutorily imposed on the Superintendent of the Jail where the detenu is detained to afford opportunity to the detenu to consult a lawyer. He is also obliged to render reasonable assistance to the detenu in making a representation against the order of detention. In the light of the provisions under Section 7(3) no detenu can be heard to contend, in the absence of specific assertions contra, that he did not know the grounds of detention or that he was disabled from making an effective representation in exercise of his right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution -on the mere ground that copies were not furnished in his language. 16. The learned Addl.D.G.P points out that a detenu under the preventive detention law is not ordinarily entitled to rights under Article 22(1) and (2) in the light of Article 22(3) of the Constitution which expressly stipulates that the rights under Article 22(1) and (2) shall not be available to a person arrested or detained under any law relating to preventive detention. 17. The learned Addl.D.G.P contends that all the earlier binding precedents which obliged the detaining authority/arresting authority to furnish translated copies of documents to a detenu must be understood in the context Article 22(3) of the Constitution and in the light of the statutory provisions in such statutes. When that obligation is understood and interpreted under the KAAPA, the provisions of Section 7 (3) must be borne in mind. Humane provisions, far beyond the stipulations in Article 22 of the Constitution, have been made in the KAAPA conferring rights on the detenu, contends the learned counsel. We find merit in that contention. 18. Under the Constitution and other preventive detention laws, the detenu has no right of legal consultation; whereas under the KAAPA he is expressly conferred right to have legal consultation. It is also insisted statutorily that the Superintendent of the Jail must make available to the detenu reasonable assistance to make representation against the order of preventive detention passed against him. 19. The learned Addl.D.G.P points out, and we find merit in that contention, that the obligation to furnish translated copies of the relevant documents/orders is not an empty ritual or formality. A detenu under the preventive detention law has no rights under Article 22(3) to consult a lawyer. 19. The learned Addl.D.G.P points out, and we find merit in that contention, that the obligation to furnish translated copies of the relevant documents/orders is not an empty ritual or formality. A detenu under the preventive detention law has no rights under Article 22(3) to consult a lawyer. If documents are furnished to him in a language not known to him, he cannot effectively understand the same. He has no means to know and understand the contents of the same. But not so under the KAAPA. The KAAPA expressly stipulates that he has a right for legal consultation. The KAAPA enjoins on the Superintendent of Prison a duty to help and assist the detenu to know and understand the order of detention and the grounds and the documents as also to assist him in the preparation of a representation. 20. The law zealously insists on compliance with procedural formalities when it comes to preventive detention. A right to make an effective and expeditious representation is a non negotiable, irreducible and essential one, which a detenu under the preventive detention law is entitled. If he is not given the right to consult a lawyer to make a proper representation, it will have to be zealously ensured that all circumstances and opportunities are made available to him to make an effective and expeditious representation. That is why while interpreting the provisions of other Preventive Detention laws, it has been zealously insisted that every breach of the obligation to literally comply with the provisions must entail invalidation. 21. We find force in the submission of the learned Addl.D.G.P. Precedents pronounced under other preventive detention law statutes cannot be blindly imported by this Court while interpreting the provisions of the KAAPA in view of the very specific provisions available in Section 7(3) by which the legislature has zealously ensured that the detenu gets assistance to understand the documents relied on against him and also to make an effective representation. That according to us makes a distinction between the KAAPA and other similar enactments in which the precedents have been laid down. That according to us makes a distinction between the KAAPA and other similar enactments in which the precedents have been laid down. The rationale behind zealous insistence on the literal compliance of the obligation to communicate the order of detention, grounds and documents in a language known to the detenu is that in the absence of the right to legal consultation, such furnishing/communication would affect his right to know the grounds of detention and to make a representation against the detention. Such an eventuality does not exist in view of Section 7(3) of the KAAPA. The right to legal consultation and the right to assistance from the Superintendent of the prison guaranteed under Section 7(3) ensure that the grievance of the detenu that he did not know the grounds or did not get an opportunity to make an effective representation on the ground that the documents are in the English language will be non existent under the KAAPA. There is no need for a doctrinaire or rigid approach any more in the light of Section 7 (3) of the KAAPA. It must be noted that the detenu has no specific grievance of non compliance with Section 7(3). The interpretation must cover a case where the detenu is illiterate. Such a detenu can only depend on someone else to read and explain the order, grounds and documents to him. If they are furnished to him and explained to him there can be no further grievance on the ground that they were in a language not known to him. 22. Coming to the facts of the case there is no complaint that the obligation under Section 3(3) has not been complied with. Nay, we have clinching indications in the acknowledgment given by the detenu at the time of his arrest that he was permitted to consult and take assistance from his lawyer who now appears for him. No one has a case that the Superintendent of prison did not discharge his obligation under Section 7 (3). In these circumstances we must hold that in a case of preventive detention under the KAAPA, the mere fact that the copies of some of the documents were not furnished, cannot ipso facto invalidate the detention. We agree with the learned Addl.D.G.P that the omission to furnish the documents relied on in Malayalam cannot affect the validity of the detention. In these circumstances we must hold that in a case of preventive detention under the KAAPA, the mere fact that the copies of some of the documents were not furnished, cannot ipso facto invalidate the detention. We agree with the learned Addl.D.G.P that the omission to furnish the documents relied on in Malayalam cannot affect the validity of the detention. We make it clear that we hold so as we are wholly satisfied that the right of the detenu to know the grounds of detention and to make an effective and expeditious representation has not in any way been affected or impaired by the omission to furnish the translated copies. If we were not so satisfied, our conclusion would have been different. 23. Ground (B): The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there has been no proper application of mind. Various contentions have been raised under this broad umbrella of criticism that there has been no proper application of mind. We shall now proceed to consider the various contentions raised. 24. First of all it is contended that there has been no proper application of mind as to whether the detenu is a known goonda or known rowdy. A valid order of detention can be passed against either a known goonda or a known rowdy, accepts counsel. The counsel contends that the grievance is that there has been no proper application of mind to find out whether the detenu is a known goonda or a known rowdy. The counsel argues that this amounts to fatal non application of mind which must entitle the detenu for invalidation of the detention. According to the counsel the detenu was initially referred to as a known goonda but later he is ordered to be detained as a known rowdy. 25. The learned Addl.D.G.P on the other hand contends that it is totally incorrect to say that the mind of the detaining authority has not been applied to this aspect. It is true that the Circle Inspector who initiated proceedings at the first instance had submitted a report to the 4th respondent Superintendent of Police indicating that the detenu is a known goonda. After perusing that report dt.16.02.2009, the Superintendent of Police had accepted the same and had directed registration of an F.I.R under Section 3 of the KAAPA describing the detenu to be a known goonda. After perusing that report dt.16.02.2009, the Superintendent of Police had accepted the same and had directed registration of an F.I.R under Section 3 of the KAAPA describing the detenu to be a known goonda. The report under Section 3(1) was submitted by the 4th respondent Superintendent of Police to the 3rd respondent after finalising the proposal. In such report under Section 3(1), the Superintendent of Police had only reported that the detenu was a known rowdy. The learned Addl.D.G.P further points out that the detaining authority had also accepted that the detenu is a known rowdy. He is not described in the report under Section 3(1) by the 4th respondent or in the order of detention by the 3rd respondent as a known goonda. He is reckoned only as a known rowdy. The learned Addl.D.G.P points out that application of mind is to be done by the detaining authority. Of course he applies his mind primarily on the basis of the report of the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police in this case had reported in Section 3(1) report that the detenu is a known rowdy. That was accepted by the District Magistrate. The mere fact that the C.I who initiated the proceedings described the detenu to be a known goonda or the fact that the F.I.R was registered on the basis of the instructions of the Superintendent of Police describing the detenu to be a known goonda cannot at all suggest that the sponsoring authority-the Superintendent of Police in the report under Section 3(1) or the District Magistrate in the order of detention had not applied their mind to the crucial aspect. 26. We find merit in the contention of the learned Addl.D.G.P. that even if the 4th respondent, the sponsoring authority had reported under Section 3(1) that the detenu is a known goonda and the 3rd respondent, the District Magistrate on application of mind had found that he was a known rowdy and not a known goonda, the order of detention of the detenu as a known rowdy cannot be held to be bad for the reason that the detenu was described as a known goonda by the sponsoring authority. In this case both the sponsoring authority under Section 3(1) report and the District Magistrate under Section 3 order have reckoned the detenu as a known rowdy. 27. In this case both the sponsoring authority under Section 3(1) report and the District Magistrate under Section 3 order have reckoned the detenu as a known rowdy. 27. It will not be inapposite in this context to note that going by the definition of a known rowdy, the detenu, who has 5 cases to his credit all coming under Chapter 6 of the I.P.C, satisfies and answers the definition of a known rowdy under Section 2(p) of the KAAPA. The contention laboriously raised that it must be held that there is no proper application of mind for this reason cannot be accepted. 28. It is next contended that there has been no proper application of mind either by the sponsoring authority or by the detaining authority for the reason that they had not adverted to Exts.P1 and P2. As stated earlier, Ext.P1 representation was made by the detenu to the 3rd respondent with a copy to the Government and it evoked Ext.P2 reply dt.07.04.2009 from the Government. In that it is said that there is no proposal to detain the detenu under the KAAPA. We see that proceedings under the KAAPA were initiated against the detenu by the report of the C.I dt.16.02.2009. The 4th respondent Superintendent of Police authorised the registration of F.I.R on 17.02.09. The F.I.R was registered on that day and the report under Section 3(1) was submitted by the 4th respondent on 28.02.2009. It is thereafter that Ext.P2 reply was given by the Government to the detenu. The learned senior counsel Sri.K.Ramkumar argues that when the Government on 07.04.09 gave a reply that there was no proposal to detain the detenu under the KAAPA, active efforts were actually going on to detain the detenu under the KAAPA. The District Magistrate to whom Ext.P1 was addressed had also not adverted to Ext.P1 or P2 in the order of detention Ext.P3. This reveals non application of mind to the relevant and crucial facts, contends the counsel. 29. The learned Addl.D.G.P answers this contention with the argument that Ext.P1 is not a representation which either the Government or the District Magistrate is bound to answer. No person is entitled to prior information as to whether the KAAPA is proposed to be invoked against him. 29. The learned Addl.D.G.P answers this contention with the argument that Ext.P1 is not a representation which either the Government or the District Magistrate is bound to answer. No person is entitled to prior information as to whether the KAAPA is proposed to be invoked against him. All those who may apprehend initiation of proceedings against them under the KAAPA are not entitled to solicit information from the authorities concerned as to whether there is any such proposal. That would be counter productive. It would defeat the very purpose of such preventive detention if the Government or the District Magistrate were obliged to part with such prior information. The learned Addl.D.G.P explains that in these circumstances even if Ext.P1 were not replied to, the detenu could not have made a grievance out of it. The learned Addl.D.G.P further submits that such a representation or the reply Ext.P2 given by the Government are not vital materials to which mind of the detaining authority, ie. the 3rd respondent ought to or must have been applied. The respondents have an explanation for the issue of Ext.P2 even when steps had commenced on 16.02.09 to detain the detenu under the KAAPA. According to them, Ext.P4 was given on the basis of a report of the C.I dt.30.01.2009 which was forwarded by the Superintendent of Police to the Government on 09.03.09. On the basis of such report dt.30.01.09 which was forwarded on 09.03.09, Ext.P2 reply was given on 07.04.09. We must say that the gap of time between 30.01.2009 and 09.03.09 does not convince us at all. But be that as it may, we are in agreement with the learned Addl.D.G.P that the fact that Ext.P2 reply was given to Ext.P1 on 07.04.09 or the fact that Ext.P1 and/or Ext.P2 were not referred to by the 3rd respondent in Ext.P3, the order of detention are not sufficient to conclude that there was no proper application of mind to the relevant materials when the 3rd respondent passed Ext.P3 order of detention on 02.05.09. The plea of non application of mind advanced on the basis of want of reference to Exts.P1 and P2 in Ext.P3 cannot, in these circumstances, be accepted. 30. The learned counsel for the petitioner has marshaled several facts to argue that there has been no proper application of mind. I have already referred to 2 contentions. The plea of non application of mind advanced on the basis of want of reference to Exts.P1 and P2 in Ext.P3 cannot, in these circumstances, be accepted. 30. The learned counsel for the petitioner has marshaled several facts to argue that there has been no proper application of mind. I have already referred to 2 contentions. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there has been absolute incompetence on the part of all who dealt with the matter which culminated in Ext.P3 order of detention. We shall deal with all these contentions as the third argument in support of the plea of non application of mind. The counsel submits that the authorities do not even appear to know even the terminology used for an indictee facing criminal proceedings. The expression "defendant" ( ) is seen used. An F.I.R is seen registered. Final report is shown to have been prepared by the 4th respondent and submitted to the 3rd respondent. There is no provision anywhere to register an F.I.R under Section 154 Cr.P.C in a matter like this where there is no allegation whatsoever of the commission of any cognizable offence. The report of the Superintendent of Police is not a Final Report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C after completion of investigation. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is not as though these are grave irregularities in themselves, but they must impress upon this Court the fact that there has been no proper processing and consideration of the proposal for arrest and detention. 31. The learned Addl.D.G.P replies that it is of course not correct absolutely or elegant that the expression "defendant" is employed to describe a person facing indictment. There is nothing in law which obliges or permits the registration of an F.I.R under Section 3 of the KAAPA. The report under Section 3 (1) is not to be treated as a final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. But the learned Addl.D.G.P contends that these inadequacies do not by themselves vitiate the proceedings or the order of detention. Procedure normally adopted while initiating security proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure is seen followed and by convention the proposal is reduced to writing in the F.I.R book. This is only to facilitate proper indexing of the documents. Procedure normally adopted while initiating security proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure is seen followed and by convention the proposal is reduced to writing in the F.I.R book. This is only to facilitate proper indexing of the documents. The mere fact that the indictee has been referred to as a defendant (which is the expression used in civil cases in this country to refer to the persons against whom proceedings are initiated, though under the American practice they refer to as an indictee in criminal proceedings also as a criminal defendant) does not affect the validity of proceedings. At any rate these are not inadequacies or events which can in any way lead to invalidation of proceedings. We agree with the learned Addl.D.G.P. The inelegance of language or the inelegance and want of perfection in the procedure adopted are not by themselves sufficient to conclude that there has been no proper application of mind as to invalidate the detention. 32. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contends that a reading of the order passed by the 3rd respondent under Section 3 of the KAAPA shows that there is not even a specific statement that the detenu is ordered to be detained. The only statement is that the detenu must be kept in a specified prison. The counsel hastens to submit that this circumstance again is being pressed into service not to contend that such absence invalidates the detention by itself but to show that there is no proper application of mind. A more elegantly worded order must definitely have mentioned that the act of detention is ordered under Section 3. But the mere fact that a composite expression/language is employed to direct detention in a prison is by itself certainly not sufficient to justify invalidation of proceedings by this Court on the alleged ground of non application of mind. 33. The counsel then points out that though the order of detention states that a list of documents is appended, there is no such list of documents at all. The file produced by the learned Addl.D.G.P and the acknowledgment obtained from the detenu show that there is no such list of documents appended to the order of detention at all. This contention again appears to be technically correct as factually there is no separate list of documents appended to the order of detention. The file produced by the learned Addl.D.G.P and the acknowledgment obtained from the detenu show that there is no such list of documents appended to the order of detention at all. This contention again appears to be technically correct as factually there is no separate list of documents appended to the order of detention. The learned Addl.D.G.P points out that there was a list. That is evident from the documents appended to the order of detention. Section 3(1) report of the Superintendent of Police has a list of documents which list of document is again available in the report of the C.I and all documents mentioned in such lists have been handed over and acknowledgment taken from the detenu at the time of his detention. The want of perfection notwithstanding, we are satisfied that this cannot also be a ground by itself to infer non application of mind and to invalidate the detention. 34. The learned counsel then submits that the detaining authority appears to have been in the dark as to whether the detenu was already under custody or not. This shows that mind has not been applied to the question whether the detenu was actually under custody or not. This contention is built on the basis of the memo for executing order of detention issued by the 3rd respondent in which it is stated "if the respondent is already in custody, you (the arresting official) may take appropriate action for the detainee be transferred to the Central prison, Trivandrum". It is argued that the detaining authority the 3rd respondent did not even consider whether the detenu was actually under custody or not. If he were actually in custody, there could have been no question of the need for a further detention under the preventive detention law, contends the counsel. 35. The learned Addl.D.G.P answers this contention by stating that the petitioner is involved in many cases and the possibility of his being involved in cases in future could not be ruled out by the detaining authority. The detaining authority was convinced at the time when he passed the order that the detenu was not under custody. But that is far from assuming that he will continue to enjoy his freedom by the time the order of detention is executed. The detaining authority was convinced at the time when he passed the order that the detenu was not under custody. But that is far from assuming that he will continue to enjoy his freedom by the time the order of detention is executed. That conditional direction was issued only to meet the eventuality of the detenu being arrested in some other cases before the order of detention was actually executed. It does not at all reveal that the detaining authority did not know or did not consider whether the detenu was under custody on the date of the order. The provision was made only to meet the eventuality of the accused who has many cases pending against him going into custody for some reason after the passing of the order and before the order of detention is executed. In any one of the cases where he was an accused and he was facing indictment, he can surrender and get his bail cancelled. The learned Addl.D.G.P argues that it is only to meet that contingency that such a direction was incorporated in the memo for executing the order of detention. We agree with the learned Addl.D.G.P. We are not able to accept that the said stipulation in the memo for executing the order of detention can in any way justify a contention of want of application of mind to the relevant facts. All the various contentions raised as the third ground to show non application of mind cannot therefore be accepted. 36. The learned counsel for the petitioner fourthly contends that the impugned order of detention is bad for the reason that the detaining authority has not applied his mind properly to the question as to the period for which the detenu must be detained. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that it is very essential that any authority who orders detention must also consider the period of detention. The mere fact that under Section 12 of the Act a maximum period of 6 months is prescribed as the period of detention, cannot absolve the detaining authority of his obligation to apply his mind on this aspect. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in not having applied his mind to the period of detention required, there has been serious want of application of mind on the part of the 3rd respondent. 37. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in not having applied his mind to the period of detention required, there has been serious want of application of mind on the part of the 3rd respondent. 37. That takes us to the larger question as to whether a detaining authority is obliged to fix the period of detention. From the first principles, we must say that, we are persuaded to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner. If a detaining authority does not apply his mind as to the period for which detention is to be effected, on first principles we would have readily agreed that there is no proper application of mind. The detention must be for a purpose and the length of detention must only be for such period for which such detention is necessary to serve the purpose. The maximum period of 6 months is prescribed under Section 12. But if the detaining authority were satisfied on proper application of mind that detention is sufficient only for a period of say one month, and if the detaining authority does not specify the period, necessarily the detenu will have to undergo preventive detention for a longer period than is necessary. In this view of the matter we readily agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner, that it is necessary for a proper application of mind that the detaining authority must consider the need of detention and in that consideration it inheres that the period of detention must also be considered. In the instant case the 3rd respondent, the District Magistrate has not prescribed the period of detention. The Government when it approved the order under Section 3(3) has also not prescribed the period of detention. Even today the detenu does not know and has no means to ascertain as to for what period he will have to be under detention. It is only an order under Section 10(4) by the Government after the receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board, that will convey to the detenu the period for which he will have to undergo detention though he can always be satisfied that in view of Section 12, the period of detention cannot exceed 6 months. It is only an order under Section 10(4) by the Government after the receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board, that will convey to the detenu the period for which he will have to undergo detention though he can always be satisfied that in view of Section 12, the period of detention cannot exceed 6 months. The learned counsel for the petitioner in these circumstances contends that the omission to specify the period of detention is fatal and that reveals want of application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. 38. The learned Addl.D.G.P repels this contention by placing reliance on the stipulations of the KAAPA. The learned Addl.D.G.P submits that there is no challenge against the constitutional validity of Section 3(1) in this Writ Petition. Under Section 3(1) from its plain language, it is crystal clear that the legislature does not expect the detaining authority to prescribe any period of detention. The learned Addl.D.G.P argues that this is not accidental or unintentional. The detaining authority is only to take a decision under the Act whether detention is necessary. It is not in his province to decide the period of detention. Such period of detention must be decided by others under the scheme of the KAAPA. The detaining authority under Sections 3(1) or the approving authority under Section 3(3) is not saddled under law with the duty/obligation to fix the period of detention. When the order of detention is passed, it has to be approved within a period of 12 days. Within a period of 3 weeks, reference is to be made to the Advisory Board under Section 9. Within a period of 9 weeks from the date of detention, the Advisory Board has to forward its opinion to the Government. Only thereupon under Section 10(4), the period is to be prescribed by the Government. The learned Addl.D.G.P takes us through the language of Section 3(1), 3(3) and 10(4) to contend that the legislature had not contemplated the fixing of any period of detention by any authority other than the Government under Section 10(4) after receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board. This contention does appear to be relevant to us. The scheme of the Act surprisingly does not indicate that the detaining authority under Section 3(1) or the approving authority under Section 3(3) is bound to fix a period of detention. This contention does appear to be relevant to us. The scheme of the Act surprisingly does not indicate that the detaining authority under Section 3(1) or the approving authority under Section 3(3) is bound to fix a period of detention. The said statutory provisions having not been challenged, we are unable to read into those provisions any obligation to fix any period of detention. The different language employed in Section 10(4) fortifies the conclusion that the detaining authority under Sections 3(1) or the approving authority under Section 3(3) is not obliged to fix the period of detention. As they are not duty bound under the Statute to fix the period of detention, the mere fact that they have not done so, cannot justify invalidation of the proceedings. 39. The learned Addl.D.G.P in this context relies on the decision of another Division Bench of this Court in Anitha Bruse v. State of Kerala [2008(2) KLT 857]. That was a case where the detaining authority had fixed the period of 6 months. Relying on the decision in Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [A.I.R 1952 S.C 27] it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the detaining authority is not expected to fix the period of detention. In the light of that clear pronouncement in Anitha Bruse (supra), this Court may not now hold that the detention is invalid for the reason that the period of detention has not been fixed, contends the learned Addl.D.G.P. 40. The learned counsel for the petitioner immediately meets this contention by urging the argument that the Division Bench in Anitha Bruse held so not because any period of detention need not be fixed, but only because 6 months' detention was ordered by the District Magistrate. Anitha Bruse cannot be reckoned as authority for the proposition that the detaining authority need not or cannot consider the period of detention. If the period of detention did not exceed 3 months and opinion of the Advisory Board is not necessary for such detention under Article 22(4) of the Constitution, such a conclusion would not have been reached, contends the counsel. In short according to the counsel it was the fixing of the period of detention as 6 months contrary to the stipulation of Article 22 (4) that persuaded the Division bench to so hold in Anitha Bruse. 41. In short according to the counsel it was the fixing of the period of detention as 6 months contrary to the stipulation of Article 22 (4) that persuaded the Division bench to so hold in Anitha Bruse. 41. The contention appears to be impressive at the first blush. But the learned Addl.D.G.P relies on the decision in T.Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu [1990 S.C 1086]. The learned Addl.D.G.P points out that a very identical situation arose in that case and in para.10 and 11 the very same questionhas been considered and it has been answered that as the statute does not require the detaining authority to specify the period, the order of detention is not rendered invalid for the absence of such specification. For the purpose of clarity we extract para.10 of the said decision below: Para.10: Provisions of the aforesaid sections are in built safeguards against the delays that may be caused in considering the representation. If the time frame, as prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is not adhered, the detention order is liable to be struck down and the detenu is entitled to freedom. Once the order of detention is confirmed by the State Government, maximum period for which a detenu shall be detained cannot exceed 12 months from the date of detention. The Act nowhere requires the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained. The expression "the State Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order" occurring in sub section (2) of Section 3 relates to the period for which the order of delegation issued by the State Government is to remain in force and it has no relevance to the period of detention. The Legislature has taken care to entrust the power of detention to the State Government, as the detention without trial is a serious encroachment on the fundamental right of a citizen, it has taken further care to avoid a blanket delegation of power, to subordinate authorities for an indefinite period by providing that the delegation in the initial instance will not exceed for a period of three months and it shall be specified in the order of delegation. But if the State Government on consideration of the situation finds it necessary, it may again delegate the power of detention to the aforesaid authorities from time to time but at no time the delegation shall be for a period of more than three months. The period as mentioned in Section 3 (2) of the Act refers to the period of delegation and it has no relevance at all to the period for which a person may be detained. Since the Act does not require the detaining authority to specify the period for which a detenu is required to be detained, order of detention is not rendered invalid or illegal in the absence of such specification. (emphasis supplied) Under the KAAPA also only the Government under Section 10(4) and not the Detaining Authority under Section 3(1) [or the Government under Section 3(3)] is bound to fix the period of detention. Section 3(2) does not oblige the Detaining Authority to fix any period of detention as that subsection only deals with the period during which the District Magistrate can exercise the delegated powers. 42. The learned Addl.D.G.P points out that this conclusion has been reached by the Supreme Court overruling an earlier decision in Commissioner of Police v. Gurbux A.Bhiryani [1988 (Supp.) S.C.C 568], wherein it was held that the omission to prescribe a period of detention affects the validity of the order of detention. This is what the Supreme Court said in para.11 of Devaki (supra) while overruling the decision in Gurbux Bhiryani's Case. We extract para.11 below: Para.11: Mr.R.K.Garg placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court in Gurbux Biryani's case (1988 (supp) SCC 568) (supra) to support his submission. In that case the detenu had been detained under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act 55 of 1981. The High Court quashed the detention order on the ground that the detenu had been released in criminal prosecution under Section 8(c) read with Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and he had been released on bail, but that fact had not been placed before the detaining authority. The High Court quashed the detention order on the ground that the detenu had been released in criminal prosecution under Section 8(c) read with Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and he had been released on bail, but that fact had not been placed before the detaining authority. On appeal by special leave a Division Bench of this Court consisting of two Judges, dismissed the appeal without going into the merits of the case on the sole ground that the detention order was bad as the period of detention was not specified in the detention order. The Court observed as under: "The order is bad on another ground, namely, the period of detention has not been indicated by the detaining authority. The scheme of this Act differs from the provisions contained in similar Acts by not prescribing a period of detention but as Section 3 of the Act indicates, there is an initial period of detention which can extend upto three months and that can be extended for periods of three months at a time. It was open to the detaining authority to detain the detenu even for a period of lesser duration than three months. That necessitated the period of detention to be specified and unless that was indicated in the order, the order would also be vitiated. In score of decisions this Court has been emphasising the necessity of strict compliance with the requirements of the preventive detention law; yet authorities on whom the power is conferred have not been complying with the requirements and even if there be merit to support the order of detention, the procedural defects lead to quashing thereof as a result of which the purpose of the Act if frustrated and the suffering in the community does not abate." With great respect we do not agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges." (emphasis supplied) 43. In the light of the above precedents it appears prima facie that it is not possible for this Court now to hold that the omission to specify the period of detention must lead to invalidation of the order of detention. In the light of the above precedents it appears prima facie that it is not possible for this Court now to hold that the omission to specify the period of detention must lead to invalidation of the order of detention. It does disturb us to note that even when a detaining authority is satisfied that the detention need not go on for a period of 9 weeks (by which time alone the opinion of the Advisory Board will ordinarily be obtained and the order specifying the period of detention under Section 10(4) will ordinarily be passed), the authority must or can order detention without specifying any period of detention. The clock starts ticking when the order of detention is executed. Within 12 days approval under Section 3(3), within 3 weeks the reference to the Advisory Board and within 9 weeks the opinion of the Advisory Board to the Government and thereafter the order of detention under Section 10(4) is contemplated. The view which we have taken, we do note, would mean that whether the detaining authority is satisfied about the need for detention for such period or not, the detenu may continue to be detained until an order of confirmation is passed under Section 10(4). But in the light of the very clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Devaki (supra) and another Division Bench in Anitha Bruse, we are unable to hold that such non specification of the period of detention must entail invalidation of the order of detention. 44. In situations like that, it will not be too much for the Court to at least expect the detaining authority to apply its mind to the question and take a view that detention till an order is passed by the Government under Section 10(4) is necessary. We are of opinion that it will be safe to insist that only after entertaining such satisfaction an order without specifying the period under Section 3(1) should be passed. 45. We do feel that the law on this aspect deserves to be considered by a larger Bench in an appropriate case. We are of opinion that it will be safe to insist that only after entertaining such satisfaction an order without specifying the period under Section 3(1) should be passed. 45. We do feel that the law on this aspect deserves to be considered by a larger Bench in an appropriate case. The mere fact that the Government on receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board shall have to pass an order prescribing the period of detention under Section 10(4) of the KAAPA at any rate within a period of 9 weeks plus a few days is according to us too inadequate a reason to justify the preventive detention of the detenu for such period unless the detaining authority on application of mind is so satisfied and expresses such satisfaction in such order of detention that detention for such period till an order is passed under Section 10(4) is necessary. If after application of mind detention only for a lesser period alone is necessary, it would be idle, improper and violation of the cherished right of personal liberty and freedom of the citizen to permit non specification of the period in the order of detention and oblige the detenu to continue in preventive detention until an order under Section 10(4) is passed. Makhan Singh, Anitha Bruse, Devaki or Bhiryani do not appear to have considered this aspect specifically. We requested both sides to research and enlighten us as to whether any other binding precedents are there on this aspect. Suffice it to say that our attention has not been drawn to any other precedents -binding or persuasive on this specific aspect. We would have referred the matter to a Full Bench for consideration of this specific aspect, but in the view which we propose to take on other aspects later we are satisfied that such reference need not be made in this case hazarding the prospect of further delay in the disposal. In an appropriate case where the question is raised, such a reference can be made in future. 46. The learned counsel for the petitioner fifthly contends that there has been contumacious suppression of relevant materials not only from the detenu but also from the District Magistrate (R3). Nay, counsel points out that the relevant materials were not placed even before the sponsoring authority, ie. the 4th respondent. 46. The learned counsel for the petitioner fifthly contends that there has been contumacious suppression of relevant materials not only from the detenu but also from the District Magistrate (R3). Nay, counsel points out that the relevant materials were not placed even before the sponsoring authority, ie. the 4th respondent. This contention is built on the circumstance that the confidential information which the C.I had, which he reported to Superintendent of Police and which vague and non specific information the Superintendent of Police in turn reported to the District Magistrate have not been revealed to the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate or the detenu. The counsel contends that this is a contumacious omission to apply mind to relevant circumstances. 47. We start with the report of the C.I dt.16.02.2009. It states that the C.I has "received credible information" not only that the detenu is a known goonda but also "that the said person is currently involved in anti social activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public tranquility". The C.I appears to have evaluated the said information. The details or source of that information is not revealed to the Superintendent of Police in that report dt.16.02.09. At least there is nothing in the report to show that such information was parted with by the C.I in favour of the Superintendent of Police. The result of his evaluation of the information (without revealing the information) alone is available in that report. What that specific information is, what is the nature of the objectionable activities of the detenu or on what dates such activities had taken place are not at all recorded. 48. We then come to the report under Section 3(1) submitted by the 4th respondent, Superintendent of Police to the 3rd respondent-District Magistrate. The history of 5 crimes referred above is narrated. It is reported that the detenu is involved in 6 criminal cases from 2003 to 2008. It is further conveyed in that report dt.28.02.09 that "confidential information from the area suggests that he is very active and is likely to commit serious offences in the immediate future which would hamper the public peace and tranquility of the area and would be threat to the public". What this confidential information is, is not reported in that report dt.28.02.09. Details of the confidential information are not recorded or conveyed in that report dt.28.02.09. 49. What this confidential information is, is not reported in that report dt.28.02.09. Details of the confidential information are not recorded or conveyed in that report dt.28.02.09. 49. We now come to the order of detention and the grounds. In para.1 of the order of detention reference is made to the report of the 4th respondent. In para.2 it is mentioned that the 3rd respondent is satisfied that the detenu is a known rowdy. In para.3 it is stated that the confidential information received from the police has instilled the requisite satisfaction in the mind of the District Magistrate that his detention is necessary to prevent the commission of objectionable acts by the detenu. Significantly in the order, in the grounds accompanying the order or in the documents that were perused by the District Magistrate and copies of which were given to the detenu, it is not revealed what this confidential information is. Nay these documents reveal that even the District Magistrate was not specifically aware of the confidential information on which the satisfaction was entertained. Pointedly the question was asked whether the District Magistrate had received any confidential information other than these reports. It is conceded that there is no other confidential information received by or placed before the District Magistrate. 50. Can reliance be placed on confidential information when there is no such specific confidential information revealed from all the documents made available ? This is the question to be considered now. It is very evident from the scheme of the KAAPA that a District Magistrate may have with him confidential information to which he could apply his mind and on the basis of which an order of detention can be passed. The proviso to Section 7(2) which we extract below clearly shows that the detaining authority may have such information, but need not choose to reveal such information if the disclosure of such information would reveal the source of the information to the detenu. The proviso to Section 7(2) which we extract below clearly shows that the detaining authority may have such information, but need not choose to reveal such information if the disclosure of such information would reveal the source of the information to the detenu. Section 7(2): The grounds of detention, specifying the instances of offences, with copies of relevant documents, as far as practicable, on the basis of which he is considered as a "known goonda" or "known rowdy" and giving such materials relating to his activities on the basis of which his detention has been found necessary, shall be furnished to him as soon as possible, nevertheless, in any case, within five days of detention and he shall also be informed in writing, under acknowledgment, of his right to represent to the Government and before the Advisory Board against the arrest and detention. Provided that nothing in this Section shall require any authority to disclose to the detained person any fact, the disclosure of which will reveal the identity of any confidential source or the disclosure of which will be against the interest of internal security or national security." (emphasis supplied) The crucial question here is not whether confidential information or the source thereof were revealed to the detenu or not. The question is whether the District Magistrate had any such confidential information and whether he did apply his mind to such confidential information. 51. We are afraid that if we do not insist on the availability of such confidential information with the District Magistrate before he relies on the same and unless he is obliged to apply his mind to such confidential information, the life and liberty of a citizen will be in peril. The C.I's report does not reveal the specific information. The Superintendent of Police refers to some confidential information, but does not give details of it. The District Magistrate referred to the confidential information vaguely but did not specify the same. But there is nothing to show that he had any tangible confidential information or that he applied his mind to such confidential information. We are left in the dark about such confidential information or the source thereof or even the nature and quality of the information. 52. We have no hesitation to agree with the learned Addl.D.G.P that this is in the realm of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. We are left in the dark about such confidential information or the source thereof or even the nature and quality of the information. 52. We have no hesitation to agree with the learned Addl.D.G.P that this is in the realm of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. If the detaining authority in a case of preventive detention entertains the requisite subjective satisfaction, the sufficiency, adequacy and acceptability of such information is not justiciable before a Court exercising the power of judicial review of such administrative action. But in a case where the court is satisfied that there was no such information at all, definitely that is crucial. It vitiates the satisfaction allegedly entertained. It vitiates the order of detention. We have gone through all the available documents. We have gone through the counter affidavits filed. Significantly there is not a semblance of satisfactory material to show that any confidential information was placed before the District Magistrate by the Superintendent of Police. This therefore is a case where such confidential information was not at all available before the Detaining Authority. Attempt to rely on such confidential information which was not there to justify the order of detention cannot hence be permitted. We find merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the absence of such tangible material and in the light of the omission to place such material if any at least before the Court, the subjective satisfaction allegedly entertained by the detaining authority on the basis of such alleged confidential information must be held to be not valid or proper. 53. We shall straight away advert to Section 7(2) of the KAAPA again. The learned counsel for the petitioner points out that twin satisfactions are to be entertained by the detaining authority. He must be satisfied objectively on the basis of the materials before him that the detenu is a known goonda or a known rowdy. There is no subjectivity involved in this former part of the satisfaction. But on the latter aspect - to borrow the language of Section 3(1), the decision whether "with a view to preventing such person from committing any anti social activity within the State of Kerala in any manner, it is necessary so to detain him" is in the realm of subjective satisfaction. But on the latter aspect - to borrow the language of Section 3(1), the decision whether "with a view to preventing such person from committing any anti social activity within the State of Kerala in any manner, it is necessary so to detain him" is in the realm of subjective satisfaction. Section 7 (2) which we have already extracted above also shows that the grounds of detention along with documents on the basis of which the detenu is considered to be a known goonda or known rowdy must be furnished to the accused. That by itself is not sufficient. The detenu must also be furnished "such materials relating to his activities on the basis of which his detention has been found necessary". Materials inducing the former objective satisfaction as also the materials inducing the latter subjective satisfaction must both be available. They must have been considered. Mind must have been applied to such materials and they must be furnished to the detenu. Of course the proviso to Section 7 (2) states that the source of the confidential information need not be revealed to the detenu. At any rate there must be relevant information to induce the latter subjective satisfaction in the mind of the detaining authority. The information must be considered by the Detaining Authority and they must at least be revealed to the Court when there is a prayer for invalidation of the order. Non disclosure to the detenu is permitted under the proviso only to protect the identity of the source of the information. Sans the source, the information must be revealed also. 54. The learned Addl.D.G.P is unable to satisfy the Court that there was any tangible confidential information coming within the proviso to Section 7(2) which cannot be revealed to the detenu. No attempt is made to place any such materials before us. In these circumstances, we will have to assume that there was no such material even though reference is made to such material to justify the entertainment of the latter subjective satisfaction in Ext.P3. Detention on the basis of such confidential information cannot hence be approved. 55. The learned Addl.D.G.P faced with the situation relies on Section 7(4) of the KAAPA. In these circumstances, we will have to assume that there was no such material even though reference is made to such material to justify the entertainment of the latter subjective satisfaction in Ext.P3. Detention on the basis of such confidential information cannot hence be approved. 55. The learned Addl.D.G.P faced with the situation relies on Section 7(4) of the KAAPA. We extract the same below: "Section 7(4): The order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because one or more of the facts or circumstances cited among the grounds are vague, non existent, irrelevant or invalid for any reason whatsoever and such order shall be deemed to have been made by the Government or the Authorised Officer after having been satisfied about the need for detention with reference to the remaining facts and circumstances, provided that the minimum conditions for being classified as a known goonda or known rowdy are satisfied." The learned Addl.D.G.P contends that even in the absence of such confidential information, the order of detention can be justified on the basis of the prior history of the detenu. In 12 cases he was acquitted admittedly earlier. 5 cases are pending against him. The law of preventive detention is described as the "jurisprudence of suspicion". No person is punitively detained under KAAPA for offences or objectionable acts committed by him. But he is detained only to prevent commission of such acts in future. A detaining authority is entitled to take into account all relevant circumstances when he predicts or anticipates or forecasts the possible and probable future behaviour of such a detenu. To help him in such forecast, all the past conduct of the detenu can be looked into. The learned Addl.D.G.P in this context submits that even if the confidential information is eschewed totally from consideration, the other materials relied on, though they are used primarily to entertain the former objective satisfaction, can be held to be sufficient to justify the latter subjective satisfaction. The learned Addl.D.G.P, in these circumstances, contends that the past conduct of the detenu -judged by 12 previous cases which had ended in acquittal and 5 pending cases are sufficient to entertain the requisite subjective satisfaction. 56. The learned counsel for the petitioner promptly contends that it is not the specific case of the detaining authority that the latter subjective satisfaction was entertained on the basis of the past history. 56. The learned counsel for the petitioner promptly contends that it is not the specific case of the detaining authority that the latter subjective satisfaction was entertained on the basis of the past history. No reference is at all made to acquittals in 12 earlier cases. We get that information only from the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner. The entertainment of the latter subjective satisfaction cannot be justified at any rate on the basis of 12 earlier cases which ended in acquittal. The satisfaction of the need to detain is induced only on the basis of the confidential information that is referred to in the documents. It is too late in the day for the detaining authority to fall back on the 5 cases referred above and contend that because of these cases the detaining authority entertained the satisfaction that such detention was necessary. The order of detention does not show that at all, contends the learned counsel. 57. We find merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Go through the order of detention, grounds, Section 3(1) report by the Superintendent of Police or the report of the C.I dt.16.02.09, it is impossible to come conclusion that the detaining authority specifically applied his mind to the 5 pending cases and came to the conclusion that the detention is necessary. Section 7(4) cannot, in these circumstances, come to the rescue of the respondents. 58. The learned counsel for the petitioner in this context relies on precedents to contend that there must be live link between the alleged past acts and the entertainment of the subjective satisfaction of the need for future preventive detention. The learned counsel points out that all the 4 prior incidents had taken place in the distant past, ie. on 25.03.03, 25.03.04, 28.01.2005 and 04.12.2005. Sufficient gap of time has been there for a saint to turn a sinner and a sinner to turn a saint. The counsel argues that these 4 prior incidents cannot be taken into reckoning to conclude that there is a live link between the said pieces of past conduct and the present need for future preventive detention. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the circumstance that as many as 12 cases had ended in acquittal. He contends that the police have earlier attempted to falsely implicate him. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the circumstance that as many as 12 cases had ended in acquittal. He contends that the police have earlier attempted to falsely implicate him. The present attempt is also akin to such past attempts to vex and harass him. We have no materials to go into those aspects in detail. But we do note that the 4 past events are so distantly in the past vis a vis the date of the impugned order, ie.02.05.09, that the attempt to anticipate, predict and forecast future behavior on the basis of those events does not appear to be sound or reasonable at all. They cannot be reckoned as relevant materials to induce the latter subjective satisfaction. Those 4 instances taken by themselves must be held to be not having a live link with the present order of future detention. 59. The learned Addl.D.G.P submits that at least in respect of the last case, that is the one in which the incident took place on 29.03.08, it must he held that the live link is not lost. 29.03.2008 is the date of that offence. The order of detention is passed on 02.05.09. More than a period of one year and 2 months had elapsed from the last alleged culpable act when the order of detention was passed. In Rajendrakumar v. State of Gujarat [A.I.R 1988 S.C 1255] it has been clearly held that the exercise is not one of simply counting the number of days between the last act and the order of detention. Totality of circumstances will have to be taken into account. It cannot be lost sight of that the last crime was on 29.03.08 and the order of detention was passed about 13 months after the date of the last alleged act. The learned Addl.D.G.P points out that the final report in this was filed only on 08.01.09 and that is of crucial relevance. 60. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the date of filing the final report is irrelevant. He relies on the observations in Anitha Bruse/Elizebath George v. State of Kerala [2008(4) KLT 425] to contend that even the final report is irrelevant. Even in a case where the final report under Section 173(2) has not been filed, that fact can be taken into reckoning for the purpose of Section 2(o)(ii) and 2(p)(iii), contends the counsel. He relies on the observations in Anitha Bruse/Elizebath George v. State of Kerala [2008(4) KLT 425] to contend that even the final report is irrelevant. Even in a case where the final report under Section 173(2) has not been filed, that fact can be taken into reckoning for the purpose of Section 2(o)(ii) and 2(p)(iii), contends the counsel. Hence the date of the final report is irrelevant. Even the registration of the F.I.R is sufficient if the Investigating Officer has come to the satisfaction that the accused has committed the offence, contends the learned counsel for the petitioner. Counsel relies on the observations in para.14 of Elizebath George (supra) which we extract below: Para.14: It is true that the crucial words used in Section 2(o)(ii) is "found in any investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer, authority or competent court .....". It is relevant to notice that the Police Officer has to rely on the investigation or enquiry to find that the person committed any act within the meaning of the term "goonda" as defined in clause (j) of S.2. The usage of the words "any act" is important. It is not synonymous with the words "any offence". Even otherwise, the provision for an "enquiry by a competent police officer" is also significant. The principles reiterated by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Paul Manickam & Anr. [2004(1) KLT 364 (SC) = AIR 2003 SC 4622] are relevant herein. It has been held in para.14 that "in case of preventive detention no offence is proved, nor any charge is formulated and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonability and there is no criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive justice requires an action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. [See Rex v. Hallidey (1917 AC 260): Mr.Kubic Dariusz v. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1990 SC 605)]. But at the same time, a person's greatest of human freedoms, ie. personal liberty is deprived, and, therefore, the laws of preventive detention are strictly construed, and a meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguard, however, technical is mandatory. The compulsions of the primordial need to maintain order in society, without which enjoyment of all rights, including the right of personal liberty would lose all their meanings, are the true justifications for the laws of preventive detention. The compulsions of the primordial need to maintain order in society, without which enjoyment of all rights, including the right of personal liberty would lose all their meanings, are the true justifications for the laws of preventive detention. This jurisdiction has been described as a "jurisdiction of suspicion", and the compulsions to preserve the values of freedom of a democratic society and social order sometimes merit the curtailment of the individual liberty." We are of the view that a final report as provided under S.173(2) is not a pre- condition to attract the said provision. Preventive detention is anticipatory and preventive. Thus, it is a case where the detaining authority will have to satisfy itself of the possibilities of the person indulging in acts contemplated by the respective provisions. Therefore, a final report as envisaged under S.173(2) of the Cr.P.C as such is not essential for an action under S.3 of the Act. Even though investigations are pending against the detenus who are accused in various crimes and is yet to be completed for various reasons, it will not prevent the detaining authority from examining the matter to arrive at the subjective satisfaction, even in the absence of a final report. Herein, as contended by the Addl.Director General of Prosecutions, there is a report by the Superintendent of Police along with the materials supplied by him which alone is the pre-requisite for action under S.3 of the Act. Therefore, we reject the said contention." (emphasis supplied) 61. We feel reservation to agree with the above observations. The mere registration of the F.I.R or even the prima facie satisfaction of the Investigating Officer or arrest and custody of the offender cannot, we feel, be held to be sufficient to attract S.2(o)(ii) and S.2(p)(iii). The expression "found on investigation by a police officer .... to have committed any offence" must according to us be understood only as the final finding/conclusion after complete investigation and not any interim or prima facie finding. To entertain the latter subjective satisfaction under Section 3(i) registration of a crime can be taken into consideration. But to entertain the former objective satisfaction under Section 2(o)(ii) and Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAAPA, we feel that the investigation must have been completed and final report under Section 173(2) filed. To entertain the latter subjective satisfaction under Section 3(i) registration of a crime can be taken into consideration. But to entertain the former objective satisfaction under Section 2(o)(ii) and Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAAPA, we feel that the investigation must have been completed and final report under Section 173(2) filed. That question may have to be referred for decision of a larger Bench but that question does not arise directly in this case. We disagree with the observations in para.14 of Elizebath George but do not feel the necessity or relevance to make a reference in this case as the question does not directly arise. The date of the final report is of course relevant. But the long gap of time between the date of offence No.5 (29.03.08) and the date of the order of detention (02.05.09) is the crucial circumstance while considering the question of the live link and snapping of the nexus. 62. To entertain the former objective satisfaction, the definition of a known rowdy under Section 2(p) of the KAAPA permits the detaining authority to take into account the cases that have been filed for 7 years in the past. But while entertaining the requisite latter subjective satisfaction, a stricter and more specific consideration must be employed as a person is sought to be detained without a proper trial. The Courts have zealously safeguarded the right of a detenu in such circumstances. 63. The learned counsel for the petitioner in this context wants this Court to again visit Exts.P1 and P2. The counsel contends that as late as on 07.04.09 when Ext.P2 was issued the stand of the Government (and there is no reason to assume that the Government gave a reply without reference to the subordinate officials who mattered) is that he was not required to be detained under the KAAPA. At least on 31.01.09 the Circle Inspector had reported that no detention was in contemplation. The counsel submits that in this context also, the court must advert to Exts.P1 and P2. As late as on 07.04.09 the Government had reported that there was no detention in contemplation against the detenu allegedly on the basis of a report dt.31.01.09 submitted to the Superintendent of Police by the Circle Inspector. Did anything happen on or after 31.01.09 which necessitated detention ? As late as on 07.04.09 the Government had reported that there was no detention in contemplation against the detenu allegedly on the basis of a report dt.31.01.09 submitted to the Superintendent of Police by the Circle Inspector. Did anything happen on or after 31.01.09 which necessitated detention ? No specific circumstance is pointed out, though the report of the C.I, the 3(1) report of the Superintendent of Police and the impugned order of detention suggest that it was the undisclosed confidential information that tilted the scales. 64. We are satisfied taking into consideration the lapse of time between the first 4 cases and the date of the order of detention as also the gap of time from the last act (5th crime dt.29.03.08) to the date of the order of detention (02.05.09) that it has to be held that there was no live link and that the nexus between the past acts and the need for detention had snapped when the order of detention was passed on 02.05.09. This is more so because there is no specific mention in the order of detention or in the sponsoring authority's report under Section 3 (i) that the subjective satisfaction was entertained or was to be entertained on the basis of the 5 cases referred above. They reveal that the 5 cases were relied on to entertain the former objective satisfaction only. Confidential information received alone was relied on to entertain the latter subjective satisfaction. A specific statement that the subjective satisfaction was entertained on the basis of the past 5 cases is not significantly made specifically in the impugned detention order or the grounds. It follows that on the challenge raised on this last aspect, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. 65. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this Court may not look at the question merely on the ground of Article 22 of the Constitution. The wider dimensions of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution in the post Maneka Gandhi era may also be taken into account. Even a piece of legislation to pass the test/scrutiny under Article 21 must be reasonable, fair and just and cannot be arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful. The wider dimensions of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution in the post Maneka Gandhi era may also be taken into account. Even a piece of legislation to pass the test/scrutiny under Article 21 must be reasonable, fair and just and cannot be arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful. Placing reliance on confidential/secret information which is not revealed to the detaining authority or Court and directing preventive detention on the basis of such information cannot at any rate pass the test of constitutional right to life guaranteed under Article 21, contends the counsel. 66. Senior Advocate Shri.K.Ramkumar wants this Court in this context to take note of the following observations in Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi and others [AIR 1981 S.C 746] "3. Now, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between 'preventive detention' and 'punitive detention', when we are considering the question of validity of conditions of detention. There is a vital distinction between these two kinds of detention. 'Punitive detention' is intended to inflict punishment on a person, who is found by the judicial process to have committed an offence, while 'preventive detention' is not by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to prevent a person from indulging in conduct injurious to the society. The power of preventive detention has been recognised as a necessary evil and is tolerated in a free society in the larger interest of security of the State and maintenance of public order. It is a drastic power to detain a person without trial and there are many countries where it is not allowed to be exercised except in times of war or aggression. Our constitution does recognise the existence of this power, but it is hedged in by various safeguards set out in Articles 21 and 22. Article 22 in clauses (4) to (7), deals specifically with safeguards against preventive detention and any law of preventive detention or action by way of preventive detention taken under such law must be in conformity with the restrictions laid down by those clauses on pain of invalidation. But apart from Article 22, there is also Article 21 which lays down restrictions on the power of preventive detention. But apart from Article 22, there is also Article 21 which lays down restrictions on the power of preventive detention. Until the decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : (AIR 1978 SC 597), a very narrow and constricted meaning was given to the guarantee embodied in Article 21 and that article was understood to embody only that aspect of the rule of law, which requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without the authority of law. ................................. .................................... ............................................ ........................................ ...................... The position now is that Article 21 as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law and this procedure must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful and it is for the Court to decide in the exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure, which is reasonable, fair and just or it is otherwise. The law of preventive detention has therefore now to pass the test not only of Art.22, but also of Article 21 and if the constitutional validity of any such law is challenged, the court would have to decide whether the procedure laid down by such law for depriving a person of his personal liberty is reasonable, fair and just. But despite these safeguards laid down by the Constitution and creatively evolved by the Courts, the power of preventive detention is a frightful and awesome power with drastic consequences affecting personal liberty, which is the most cherished and prized possession of man in a civilised society." (emphasis supplied) In that view of the matter the counsel contends that the order of detention Ext.P3 in which reference is made to secret information, which is not revealed to anyone including the court and which even the District Magistrate appears to have not seen, adverted to or considered, must be held to be bad not only for the reason that Article 22 is violated, but also for the reason that Article 21 of the Constitution is also violated. We find force in that submission. 67. We find force in that submission. 67. The above discussions lead us to the conclusion that the impugned order of preventive detention (Ext.P3) calls for interference in judicial review and deserves to be set aside for the reason that mind has not been alertly applied to the relevant facts to verify whether there is a live link between the acts complained of and the need to preventively detain the detenu. The impugned order of detention also calls for interference for the reason that reliance appears to have been placed by the Detaining Authority on non existent confidential information which was not specifically revealed to the Detaining Authority. 68. In the result: a) This Writ Petition is allowed; b) Ext.P3 order of detention and the consequent detention of the detenu Reji @ Annachi Regi is set aside. c) If the detention of the detenu is not necessary in any other case, he shall forthwith be released from custody. d) The Registry shall immediately communicate the order to the Superintendent of the Central Prison, Trivandrum, where he is detained. 69. Before finally parting with the case, we feel compellingly persuaded to make certain observations. Civil society in Kerala is perturbed and concerned by the increasing trends of criminality in social life. They perceive threat to the Rule of law. They are insistent that the same must be reversed. It is in this context that they through their legislators have enacted the KAAPA. It was a reluctant act of enactment by legislature and approval by the civil society. Despite the commitment of our society to the fundamental values of freedom, individual liberty and human rights, the polity has agreed to swallow this bitter pill (KAAPA) considering the need to eliminate criminalisation of social life. The courts have always been wary of the Executive power of preventive detention. Courts do so, cognizant of the potential threat which such laws relating to preventive detention pose to fundamental constitutional values. In the cherished battle for individual liberty and freedom procedural stipulations have been powerful weapons. It is therefore of vital importance that the Executive must act properly and efficiently and exercise the power conferred on it by the legislature in such a manner that the courts will not have to interfere on technical and procedural grounds. In the cherished battle for individual liberty and freedom procedural stipulations have been powerful weapons. It is therefore of vital importance that the Executive must act properly and efficiently and exercise the power conferred on it by the legislature in such a manner that the courts will not have to interfere on technical and procedural grounds. Good and efficient governance mandates that the Executive must exercise such powers of preventive detention with due care, caution, diligence and efficiency. There should be no chance of invalidation of any such order on procedural and technical grounds. Public servants to whom such powerful weapon is entrusted, must acquire the competence to handle the same. 70. Our experience in this jurisdiction compellingly persuade us to feel that lot more of care, competence and alertness must be displayed by those wielding such sensitive and awesome powers. These are new powers vested in the Superintendents of Police, the District Magistrates and the Government and certain amount of inadequancy during infancy is understandable. 14 District Magistrates, 14 Superintendents of Police and a few delegates under the Rules of Business of Government can easily be equipped and imparted the requisite competence. They must be given the assistance of the requisite, adequate and competent administrative and legal personnel to support them. They must all be properly trained to handle the challenge and mission before them. The political executive must ensure that an intensive training programme is undertaken with the assistance of the training academies -like the police academy or the Institute of Management in Government. The Advocate General, the Director General of Prosecutions can also be involved in the training. There must be continuing education for those who wield such powers. 71. The minimum that the civil society expects from those who are entrusted with such awesome powers is that the powers must never be invoked undeservedly against any one and when it is invoked worthily against any one, the action must never be inadequate or insufficient. The same should never suffer from any technical or procedural inadequacy. We expect the Administrate Executive to be equal to the challenge and mission before it. They must acquire the requisite efficiency. The political executive must insist that the concerned officials are trained and do have the requisite competence.