Judgment : Would the presumption referred to in S. 146 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, "the Act") extend to the cause of dishonour stated in a memo of dishonour issued from the drawee bank, or, the presumption is regarding the fact of dishonour alone, is the question raised for a decision in this revision. 2. Petitioner faced trial in the court of learned Judicial First Class Magistrate-II, Palakkad in S.T.No.808 of 2005 on a private complaint preferred by respondent No.1, a Private Limited Company engaged in conducting Kuries. According to respondent No.1, petitioner joined three Kuries run by it, two tickets having a Sala of Rs.1,25,000/ - each and another having a Sala of Rs.3,00,000/-. All the Kuries were prized by the petitioner and he received the respective prize money undertaking to pay the future installments without default. He failed to keep up the undertaking. Respondent No.1 alleged that as per ticket Nos.41/84 and 41/85 Rs.67,500/- and Rs.70,000/- respectively, are due. As per Kuri ticket No.44/29 Rs. 1,90,000/- is due. Petitioner paid Rs.1.500/-. Respondent No.1 issued notice to the petitioner on 4.7.2003 demanding payment of entire balance amount due. Petitioner paid another sum of Rs.1,000/-. For the balance sum of Rs.1,35,000/- covered by ticket Nos.41/84 and 41/95 and for the sum of Rs.1,90,000/-covered by ticket No.44/29 petitioner issued Exts.P3 and P4, cheques. Those cheques according to respondent No.1, were dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. Exts.P5 and P6, memos issued by the drawee bank are produced to prove the same. On getting intimation regarding dishonour respondent No.1 issued notice to the petitioner intimating dishonour and demanding payment of the amount. Notice was served on the petitioner and he sent Ext.P8 reply. Since the amount as per the notices was not paid, respondent No.1 preferred the complaint. Director of respondent No.1 gave evidence as P.W.1 regarding the transaction and execution of the cheques. According to the petitioner no such amount was due and signed, blank cheques taken as security at the time of receiving the Kuri amount are misused. Learned Magistrate was not impressed by the contention raised by petitioner and found him guilty which learned Additional Sessions Judge confirmed. That verdict is under challenge in this revision. 3. According to the petitioner no such amount was due and signed, blank cheques taken as security at the time of receiving the Kuri amount are misused. Learned Magistrate was not impressed by the contention raised by petitioner and found him guilty which learned Additional Sessions Judge confirmed. That verdict is under challenge in this revision. 3. So far as execution of the cheques is concerned evidence is given by P.W.I. It is not disputed that petitioner had issued Exts.P3 and P4 cheques to respondent No.1 in connection with the Kuri transaction. Petitioner made an attempt to disprove the claim of respondent No.1 regarding the amount due by summoning relevant day books, ledger extract, etc., from respondent No.1. Those documents are marked as Exts.D1 to D5. Those documents did not help the petitioner in his challenge to the amount due. Courts below referred to Exts.D1-to D5 also and found that amount as stated in Exts.P3 and P4 was due to respondent No.1. Accordingly it was found that petitioner has issued the cheques in favour of respondent No.1 for discharge of legally enforceable debt/liability. That finding rested on a proper appreciation of evidence which required no interference in revision. 4. It is contended by learned counsel for petitioner that Exts.P5 and P6 (memos of dishonor issued from the drawee bank) are not properly proved by examining the officials of the drawee bank and that presumption referred to in S.146 of the Act is not available for Exts.P.5 and P6. Learned counsel contends that the presumption is only regarding the fact of dishonor and not as to the cause of dishonor. According to learned counsel, provisions of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 (for short, "the BBE Act") are not applicable to memos of dishonour. 5. S.4 of the BBE Act reads thus: 4. Mode of proof of entries in bankers' books.-- Subject to the provisions of this Act a certified copy of any entry in a bankers' books shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of the existence of such entry, and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts, therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself is now by law admissible, but not further or otherwise". (emphasis supplied) The expression "bankers' books" is defined in S.2(3) of the BBE Act as: "include ledgers,-day-books, cash-books, account-books and all other books used in the ordinary business of a bank" . "Certified copy" is defined in S.2(8) of the BBE Act as: "Certified copy means a copy of any entry in the books of a bank together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such entry, that such entry is contained in one of the ordinary books of the bank and was made in the usual and ordinary course of business, and that such book is still in the custody of the bank and where the copy was obtained by a mechanical or other process which In itself ensured the accuracy of the copy, a further certificate to that effect, but where the book from which such copy was prepared, a further certificate to, that effect, each such certificate being dated and subscribed by the principal accountant or manager of the bank with his name and official title." A reading of S.4 along with the definitions above extracted would show that the mode of proof referred to in S.4 is available only to the certified copy of ledgers, day-books, cash book, account books and all other books used in the ordinary business of a bank. A memo of dishonor is neither any such book as understood in S.2(3), nor its certified copy. It is only a memo issued based on the fact of dishonor which may be entered in the relevant ledger or other document. Learned counsel therefore is right in contending that the mode proof and the evidentiary value attached to certain documents as referred to in S.4 of the BBE Act is not available to a memo of dishonour. Then the question is whether the presumption referred to in S. 146 of the Act is available to Exts.P5 and P6, the memos of dishonour. That provision reads thus: 146. Bank's slip prima facie evidence of certain facts.--The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of bank's slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved. That provision reads thus: 146. Bank's slip prima facie evidence of certain facts.--The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of bank's slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved. S.146 dispenses with formal proof of the documents referred to therein by examining the bank official concerned. Production of the document having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured is sufficient and when the document is produced the court shall, in respect of every proceeding under Chap.XVII of the Act presume the fact of dishonor of the cheque. Such presumption shall remain in force unless and until such fact is disproved by the person contradicting it. 6. According to the learned counsel presumption referred to in S.146 of the Act is only regarding "the fact of dishonour" and not the "cause of dishonour". Learned counsel contends that dishonor of the cheque could be for a variety of reasons and S.138 of the Act is attracted only when the dishonour is, "either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank." 7. No doubt, every dishonour of the cheque does not attract application of S.138 of the Act. It is when the cheque is dishonoured for reasons stated therein that the Section applies. Presumption referred to in S.146 of the Act is in respect of every proceeding under Chap.XVII of the Act. When the memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured is produced, the court has to presume the fact of such dishonour until and unless such fact is disproved. When S.146 says that the court is to "presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque", I am inclined to think that the dishonour to be presumed by the court is as stated in the memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured. In other words the court has to presume that the cheque is dishonoured for the reason stated in the memo. In other words the court has to presume that the cheque is dishonoured for the reason stated in the memo. In holding so, I also bear in my mind the object of introducing such a presumption by the Amending Act 55 of 2002. The object and reasons of the Amending Act, 2002 are: "to prescribe procedure for dispensing with preliminary evidence of the complainant; to prescribe procedure for servicing of summons to the accused or witness by the Court through speed post or empanelled private couriers; to provide for summary trial of the cases under the Act with a view to speeding up disposal of cases; and to make the offences under the Act compoundable". (emphasis supplied) 8. Speeding up of disposal of cases is the object for introducing the presumption by incorporating S.146. The Legislature thought that the procedure of summoning the bank officials for proof of cause of dishonour should be avoided by giving acceptability for memos or slips issued by the banks in the course of official business. The view I have taken that the presumption is attached not merely to the fact of dishonour but is available for the cause of dishonour also is consistent with the object of Legislature intended to be achieved by introducing the presumption. Learned Magistrate has rightly admitted Exts.P5 and P6 into evidence and made use of the presumption referred to in 5.146 of the Act. 9. On going through the evidence on record I do not find any illegality, irregularity or impropriety requiring interference with the finding of the courts below regarding execution of the cheques, cause of dishonour and failure of petitioner to rebut the presumption under 5.139 of the Act. Conviction of the petitioner has to stand. 10. Learned Magistrate sentenced the petitioner to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and directed him to pay Rs.3,25,000/-by way of compensation to respondent No.1. Adefault sentence of imprisonment for six months was also provided. Appellate Court modified the substantive sentence as simple imprisonment for three months while retaining the direction for payment of compensation. Default sentence was also modified as simple imprisonment for three months. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that substantive sentence may be modified and petitioner may be granted six months time to deposit compensation in the Trial Court. Counsel submits that in connection with urgent family needs such as marriage of his daughter, etc. Default sentence was also modified as simple imprisonment for three months. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that substantive sentence may be modified and petitioner may be granted six months time to deposit compensation in the Trial Court. Counsel submits that in connection with urgent family needs such as marriage of his daughter, etc. petitioner has to raise substantial amount and is placed in a financially difficult situation. I have considered the request learned counsel has made on behalf of petitioner. Considering the circumstances stated by the learned counsel and the amount involved (Rs.3,25,000/-. I am inclined to grant time till 30.12.2009 to the petitioner to deposit compensation. At the same time in case of default in deposit, petitioner has to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 11. I have dispensed with notice to respondent No. 1 since the disposal of this revision in this manner is not prejudicial to him. Resultantly, this revision is allowed in part to the following extent: (i) Substantive sentence awarded is modified as simple imprisonment till rising of the court. (ii) Petitioner is granted time till 30.12.2009 to deposit the amount of Rs.3,25,000/-(Rupees Three lakhs and twenty five thousand only) in the court below for payment to respondent No.1 as compensation. In case of default petitioner has to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. (iii) It is made clear that it shall be sufficient compliance of condition (ii) if petitioner paid the compensation to respondent No.1 through his counsel in the Trial Court and respondent No.1 filed a statement in the Trial Court through its counsel acknowledging receipt of the compensation within the aforesaid period. Petitioner shall appear in Trial Court on 31.12.2009 to receive the sentence.