Judgment : S. Nagamuthu, J. Whether the provisions of the “Industrial Disputes Act” (hereinafter referred as ‘I.D. Act’) are applicable to a non-teaching staff working is a self financing Private college governed by the provisions of the “Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulations) Act, “1976” (hereinafter referred as ‘Private Colleges Act’) is the question raised on the ground that Section 52 of the Private Colleges Act has got overriding effect on the I.D. Act, so as to make it inapplicable for such an employee, a learned single Judge of this Court answered the question in the negative. Aggrieved over the same, the management of the college is before this Court-with this writ appeal. 2. The second respondent herein, was admittedly a watchman employed in the appellant college. When he was dismissed from the College, he raised an Industrial Dispute under Section 2(A) of the I.D. Act before the Labour Court, Tirunelveli in I.D. No.80 of 2003. A preliminary objection was raised before the Labour Court, by the appellant/management that in respect of the appellant college, the I.D. Act is not applicable and therefore, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. It was contended before the Labour Court that Section 52 of the Private Colleges Act has got overriding effect over the I.D. Act and since there are in-built safeguards provided for such employees in the Act itself, it is not within the competence of the Labour Court to entertain the dispute and instead, the aggrieved should have gone for remedy available under the Private Colleges Act. The Labour Court proceeded to decide the preliminary objection regarding maintainability and by order dated 3. 2006 held that the Dispute is maintainable. Challenging the same, the appellant filed W.P. (MD). No.4926 of 2006 before this Court, wherein a learned single Judge of this Court also held the same view and dismissed the writ petition. It is the said order, which is under challenge in this appeal. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/management would submit that inasmuch as the Private Colleges Act has been given assent by the President of India and in view of Section 52 of the said Act, the same will have overriding effect and thus, the I.D. Act has got no application to the appellant/management. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/management would submit that inasmuch as the Private Colleges Act has been given assent by the President of India and in view of Section 52 of the said Act, the same will have overriding effect and thus, the I.D. Act has got no application to the appellant/management. He would refer to Article 254 of the Constitution of India to say that the I.D. Act, to the extent it is repugnant to the Private Colleges Act, is inapplicable as the State Act shall prevail in the State of Tamil Nadu. The learned counsel would further submit that there are certain safeguards provided for the non-teaching staff under the Private Colleges Act and since the very object of the Act itself is to regulate the service conditions of the staff of Private Colleges, the same will take care of the interest of the non teaching Staff also. Therefore, I.D. Act is not applicable as there is repugnancy between these two enactments; it is argued. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent would submit that absolutely there is no repugnancy between the two enactments and so, Article 254 of the Constitution of the India has got no role to play in the given situation. He would further submit that of course it is true that there are provisions to safeguard, the interest of non-teaching staff under the Private Colleges Act itself, still the same would not debar the aggrieved to invoke the provisions of the I.D. Act and to safeguard his interest as provided in the said Act. He would further submit that though both the Acts are applicable to the non-teaching staff working in private Colleges, since there is no repugnancy between these two Acts, there is a choice vested with the aggrieved employee either to work out his remedy under the State Act or under the Central Act. In the case on hand, according to the learned counsel, the second respondent has chosen to go before the Labour Court under the I.D. Act and he has not at all approached the authorities under the Private Colleges Act. He would further submit that the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge have taken the correct view to hold that Industrial Dispute is maintainable and so no interference is called for at the hands of this Court. 5. He would further submit that the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge have taken the correct view to hold that Industrial Dispute is maintainable and so no interference is called for at the hands of this Court. 5. Wehave considered the rival submissions and also perused the records available. 6. At the outset, we have to state that in view of the clear language employed under Article 254 of the Constitution of India, which came to be considered on several occasions by the Honourable Supreme Court, if only there is any repugnancy between a State Act, which has got assent of the President of India and a Central Act operating in the same field, to the extent of such repugnancy, the State Act shall prevail over the Central Act. Therefore, the crux of the question is as to whether there is any provision in the State Act relating to service conditions of non teaching staff, which is repugnant to any of the provisions of the I.D. Act. 7. Before going into the other facts of the case, let us first have a glance through the interpretation made by the Honourable Supreme Court for the term repugnancy enshrined in Article 254 of the Constitution of India. For this, a detailed survey of various judgments of the Honorable Supreme Court and reproduction of the same in this judgment are not required, as the Honourable Supreme Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd. V. Shri Kishan Bhageria AIR 1988 SC 329 : (1988) (Supp) SCC 82: 1988-I-LLJ-363, after taking note of various other judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court more particularly the judgments in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. V State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1019 : (1983) 4 SCC 45 , 87 and Deep Chand v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 648 , has laid down the tests as follows: “Therefore in order to raise a question of repugnancy two conditions must be fulfilled. The State Law and the Union Law must operate on the same field and must be repugnant or inconsistent with the other. These are two conditions which are required to be fulfilled. These are cumulative conditions. There, these laws must tread on the same field and they must be repugnant or inconsistent with each other.” ….. “The basic test of repugnancy is that if one prevails, the other cannot prevail.” 8. These are two conditions which are required to be fulfilled. These are cumulative conditions. There, these laws must tread on the same field and they must be repugnant or inconsistent with each other.” ….. “The basic test of repugnancy is that if one prevails, the other cannot prevail.” 8. Keeping in mind the above twin tests laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court, now, we have to consider whether the Private Colleges Act and the I.D. Act Operate on the same field and whether if one prevails the other cannot prevail. In our considered opinion, it is not so. 9. Let us first take up the first test, for which it is necessary to look into the purpose and the object of the Private Colleges Act, which is as follows; “The avowed purpose and object of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 is to confer protection to the teachers and other persons employed in recognised Private Colleges against any arbitrary action or victimization of the management of such colleges. The Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, in effect, protects certain rights granted in favour of the teachers employed in recognized private colleges and at the same time it imposes duties on the management. The maintenance of educational standard and excellence of the educational institutions would depend directly on the excellence of the teaching staff, in turn, would depend on the quality and contentment of the teachers. The law relating to conditions of service pertaining to their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service which ensure contentment and decent living standard of teachers, and which would consequently enable them to render better service to the institution and the pupil.” Whereas, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been enacted by the Parliament for providing for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes. The preamble states that “whereas it is expedient to make provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes, the Industrial Disputes Act has been enacted.” Therefore, the object of the legislation is for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. The scheme of the Act would go to show that the scope of the Act is only to investigate and settle the industrial disputes. The scheme of the Act would go to show that the scope of the Act is only to investigate and settle the industrial disputes. A cursory comparison of the object of both the Acts would certainly go to show that both the Acts deal with the service conditions of the non-teaching staff working in Private Colleges and thus, they operate in the same field. Therefore, the first test laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the above said judgment is satisfied. 10. Insofar as the second test is concerned, we do not find any inconsistency between these two Acts. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is that since there are in built safeguards for non teaching staff in the Private Colleges Act and since there are also remedies available in the said Act for wrongs done to them, the provisions providing similar remedies, contained in the I.D. Act should be construed to be repugnant. In our considered opinion, it is too hard to accept the said contention. As held by the Honourable Supreme Court, the real test is that when the State Act prevails, the Central Act cannot prevail. We are at a loss to find any such provision in the State Act. Which makes the provisions of the I.D. Act non existent in its operation in the State of Tamil Nadu. When, more or less, in a similar situation, a question arose as to whether there is any repugnancy between the “Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act” and the I.D. Act, a Full Bench of this Court in Safire Theatre v. Additional Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation AIR 1978 Madras 14: (1977) 2 MLJ 191 after analyzing various judgments on this subject, has ultimately held that there is no repugnancy. The Full Bench has answered the reference follows at p.201 of MLJ: “25. Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act does not fully barf the remedy under Section 41 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947. If a decision is rendered under Section 41(2) of the Madras Act before the Government had made a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act the decision would be final between the parties. Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act does not fully barf the remedy under Section 41 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947. If a decision is rendered under Section 41(2) of the Madras Act before the Government had made a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act the decision would be final between the parties. But, before the conclusion of the enquiry under Section 41 of the Madras Act, if the Government makes a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the pending proceedings under Section 41 of the Madras Act cannot be continued. 26. On the secondquestion we hold that both the remedies are available. But if a reference has been made before the conclusion of the appeal under Section 41 of the Madras Act, the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act will have to be followed. 27. In view of our decision that after a reference had been made under the Industrial Disputes Act, the provisions of Section 41 of the Madras Act would not be applicable, the dispensing with the services of the workmen could not be challenged under Section 41 of that Act. 28. On the fourth question we hold that Section 41 of the madras Act is not repugnant to the provisions contained in Section 2-A of the Central Act and is not rendered in effective by the provisions of Article 254 of the Constitution of India.” 11. The object of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act and that of the Private Colleges Act are more or less in pari materia. While considering the scope of all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, the Full Bench, as we have already extracted, has held that the remedies available under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act and those available under the I.D. Act can co-exist and a party aggrieved can choose either one forum and after having chosen a particular forum, he cannot revert back to the other forum under the other Act. In the case on hand, the learned single Judge has taken note of the said Full bench judgment and he has rightly held that both the Acts namely private Colleges Act and I.D. Act can co-exist and absolutely there is no inconsistency or repugnancy between the two Acts insofar as they relate to safeguards and remedies provided to such employees. 12. 12. When a similar question arose as to whether there is any repugnancy between the I.D. Act and the Rajasthan Shops and Establishments Act, which is more or less similar to that of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, in National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan Bhageria (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows: “Therefore in no way the Rajasthan Act could be construed to curtail the rights of the workman to seek any relief or to go in for an adjudication in case of the termination of the employment. If that is the position, in view of the provisions 6 month’ time in Section 28-A of the Rajasthan Act has to be ignored and that cannot have any binding effect inasmuch as it curtails the rights of the workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and that Act must prevail. In the premises, there is no conflict between the two Acts a question of repugnancy.” Thus, the view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Safire Theater v. Additional Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation (supra) has got the approval of the Honourable Supreme Court by the view expressed in the above case. As held in the two judgments, applying the principles stated therein, we find that the only conclusion, which could be arrived at under second test is that both the acts can coexist and so, there is no repugnancy. 13. However, the learned counsel would focus his arguments with reference to Sections 24 and 52 of the Private Colleges Act, which according to him, would indicate that all the provisions of the Private Colleges Act would override the I.D. Act. In order to appreciate the said contention, it is necessary to rush through the said provisions, which are thus; “24. However, the learned counsel would focus his arguments with reference to Sections 24 and 52 of the Private Colleges Act, which according to him, would indicate that all the provisions of the Private Colleges Act would override the I.D. Act. In order to appreciate the said contention, it is necessary to rush through the said provisions, which are thus; “24. Chapter to have overriding effect and certain provisions thereof not to apply to minority colleges.- (1) This chapter or any rule providing if or all or any of the matters specified in this chapter or any order made in relation to any such matter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any- .(i) other law for the time being in force, or .(ii) award, agreement or contract of service, whether such award, agreement or contract of service was made before or after the date of commencement of this Act, or (iii) judgment, decree or order of Court, Tribunal or other authority: Provided that where, under any such award agreement, contract of service or otherwise, any teacher or other person employed in any private college is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable, to him than those to which he will be entitled under this Chapter, such teacher or other person shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he receives benefit in respect of other matters under this Chapter. .(2) Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be construed as precluding any such teacher or other person from entering into an agreement for granting him rights or privileges in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Chapter. .(3) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 18 and Sections 19 to 22 (both inclusive) of this Chapter or any rule providing for all or any of the matters specified therein or any order made in relation to any such matter shall not apply to a minority college.” “52. .(3) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 18 and Sections 19 to 22 (both inclusive) of this Chapter or any rule providing for all or any of the matters specified therein or any order made in relation to any such matter shall not apply to a minority college.” “52. Overriding effect of this Act.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force including any regulation or statute of any University.” A close reading of these two provisions would make it undoubtedly clear that, if only there is any inconsistency between any of the provisions of these act, then, to the extent of such inconsistency, the private Colleges Act would prevail upon. But, as we have already stated, we are unable to find any inconsistency between any of the provisions of these two enactments and instead, these two Acts, though operate in the same field, only provide for relief to the workmen under the machineries provided under both the Acts. 14. Mr. M. Vallinayagam, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant further submitted that the very fact that assent of the President was obtained would go to indicate that there is inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Act or otherwise there would have been no necessity for reserving the State Bill for the assent of the President. In our considered opinion, such presumption cannot be drawn at all. Though such argument was initially made by the learned counsel for the appellant, later on, he fairly conceded, that such kind of presumption cannot be had, for which he himself, in a fair manner, placed before this Court a Full Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.P.S.W.I. Co-operative Society Limited, v. Labour Court, Hyderabad (R 1987 Andhra Pradesh 182), wherein in paragraph 15, the Full Bench has held as follows: “15. We do not find any substance in the argument that the very fact that the President’s assent was sought and obtained, established beyond doubt that there was repugnancy between the two legislations. There is no provision in the Constitution which lays down that a Bill which has been assented to by the President would be ineffective as an Act if there was no compelling necessity for the Governor to reserve it for the assent of the President. There is no provision in the Constitution which lays down that a Bill which has been assented to by the President would be ineffective as an Act if there was no compelling necessity for the Governor to reserve it for the assent of the President. There might be a genuine doubt about the applicability of any of the provisions of the Constitution which required the assent of the President to be given to it in order that it might be effective as an Act. If the Governor in exercise of this discretion decided to reserve the Bill in such a situation for consideration of the President to avoid any future complication, that act could not be put forward as a proof of the existence of repugnancy between the Parliamentary enactment and the Bill which had been reserved for the assent of the President.” While referring to Section 41 and 42 of Andhra Pradesh Shops Act, the Full Bench has held as follows; “The object behind the provisions made in Sections 40 and 41 of the A.P. Shops Act was not to deprive the shop employee of a right or remedy available to him, but only to provide the additional forum for seeking speedy solution to the problem arising out of the termination of his service. There is no authority or constitutional bar against the State legislature providing such an additional remedy in favour of the employee. The option is left with the shop employee, who is aggrieved by the termination of his service. He may, at this choice and convenience, either pursue the remedy involving Section 2-A of the I.D. Act or approach the appellate authority (in case of necessity, the Labour Court also in Second Appeal). The apprehension that the availability of two forums for the employee to seek redressal of his grievance would lead to conflict of decisions is quite unwarranted it is needless to say that the principles of constructive resjudicate would operate in these, fields also. Once on the culmination of the ‘proceedings in one of the channels the decisions becomes final under either of the enactments, that binds both the parties arid the issue could not be allowed to be re-agitated in the proceedings in the other channel.” 15. The above judgment also fortifies the conclusion, which we have presently arrived at herein before. 16. Once on the culmination of the ‘proceedings in one of the channels the decisions becomes final under either of the enactments, that binds both the parties arid the issue could not be allowed to be re-agitated in the proceedings in the other channel.” 15. The above judgment also fortifies the conclusion, which we have presently arrived at herein before. 16. At this juncture, useful reference may also be made to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in R.V. Thevar Memorial Girls High School v. Director of School Education 2002 (4) CTC 129 , wherein the Division Bench has held that the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act 1973, which is in pari materia to the private Colleges Act, is applicable to both teaching and non teaching staff. Placing reliance on this judgment, the learned counsel would submit that since the teaching staff are not workmen as defined in the I.D. Act and since they cannot approach the forum under the I.D. Act for any relief, the same should be made applicable to the non teaching staff of the private colleges also. This argument does not persuade us for the reason that teaching staff cannot approach the Labour Court because they are not workmen as defined in I.D. Act, whereas the non teaching staff of all the private Colleges have been held to be workmen by the Honourable Supreme Court in A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu (1988) 4 SCC 42 . Therefore, non teaching staff working in private educational institutions, who are workmen, can very well avail the remedy available under the I.D. Act and such remedy cannot be curtailed in any manner, because they have got similar remedies under the Private Colleges Act. As we have already concluded, the only restriction is that having chosen to go before one forum, a non teaching staff cannot revert back to the other forum. Except the said restriction, in all other aspects, in our considered opinion, both the Acts can co-exist and there is no repugnancy at all. 17. In view of all the above, we hold that the Labour Court was right in deciding the preliminary issue in favour of the workman, which was upheld by the learned single Judge. In the result, the writ appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed, consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.