JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. Criminal Appeal No. 1074 of 1994 preferred by the State is for enhancement of sentence against the judgment and order dated 31.08.1994 passed by the Special Judge, Ahmedabad in Atrocity Case No. 10 of 1994, whereby the accused has been convicted of the charges levelled against him under section 304 Part II. 1.1 The original accused was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years & fine of Rs. 500/ in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for offence under section 304II of Indian Penal Code. 1.2 Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 1998 is also preferred by the State against the judgment and order dated 31.08.1994 passed by the Special Judge, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No. 10 of 1994 whereby the accused has been acquitted of the offence under sections 302, 234, 294 of Indian Penal Code and under section 32(v) of Atrocities Act and under section 135(1) of B.P. Act. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased complainant was residing in house no. 3006, Vinobhabhave Nagar, Vinzol along with his family. The present accused was his neighbour residing in house no. 3005. On 25.12.1993, at about 7.30 am the complainant's wife was fetching water from the tap situated outside their house. As the water flow was very slow, she asked the complainant to request the present accused of close one of the taps. However, the accused denied to close the tap. He started to utter abuses and therefore the complainant asked him not to utter such words. This enraged the accused and therefore he went inside and came out with a Gupti in his hand. The Gupti was used to inflict a blow on the upper region of private portion of the complainant. While trying to stop the accused, the complainant also sustained injuries on little finger of his left palm. The complainant was taken to L.G. Hospital and later to V.S. Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. 2.1 Therefore an offence was registered against the accused after and the arrest of the accused and necessary investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against him. Ultimately, as the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the same was committed to the Sessions Court. 2.2 The trial was initiated against the accused and during the course of trial the prosecution examined the following witnesses as oral evidences: (i) Dr. Ultimately, as the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the same was committed to the Sessions Court. 2.2 The trial was initiated against the accused and during the course of trial the prosecution examined the following witnesses as oral evidences: (i) Dr. Ravindra Shrikrishna Bhise Ex. 11 (ii) Jeshodaben Kalabhai Chauhan Ex. 16 (iii) Panch Kantibhai Mavjibhai Ex. 18 (iv) Jayantibhai Shivabhai Parmar Ex. 22 (v) Navnitbhai Mafatlal Khalas Ex. 23 (vi) Ex. Magistrate Dhirajlal Mehta Ex. 26 (vii) Dr. Sandip Gangaya Attaver Ex. 7 (viii) Police Constable Pershottam Bhikhabhai Ex. 31 (ix) Rameshbhai Dudhabhai Chauhan Ex. 34 (x) Dr. Jitendra Ramanlal Patel Ex. 37 (xi) Dr. Sanjiv Bhagvanjibhai Patel Ex. 39 (xii) I.O PSI Fatehasinh Shankersinh Padhiyar Ex. 43 2.3 The prosecution also exhibited the following documents as documentary evidences: (i) Dying Declaration Ex. 28 (ii) Yadi addressed to Ex. Magistrate Ex. 27 (iii) Vardhi recorded at L.G. Hospital Ex. 32 (iv) Slip signed by panch on discovery panchnama Ex. 35 (v) Vardhi recorded by PSO, GIDC, Vatva Police Station Ex. 43 (vi) Complaint Ex. 44 (vii) Report u/s 157 of Cr.P.C. Ex. 45 (viii) Panchnama relating to scene of offence Ex. 20 (ix) Vardhi recorded by PSO, GIDC Ex. 41 (x) Inquest panchnama Ex. 19 (xi) Arrest panchnama of accused Ex. 21 (xii) Discovery panchnama Ex. 36 (xiii) Post Mortem note Ex. 12 (xiv) Injury certificate of L.G. Hospital Ex. 30 (xv) Caste certificate Ex. 17 (xvi) Despatch note Ex. 13 (xvii) Receipt issued by FSL Ex. 14 (xviii) Report of FSL Ex. 15 2.4 At the end of trial, after recording the statement of the accused, and hearing arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned Sessions Judge passed the judgment and order dated 31.08.1994 as stated herein above. 2.5 Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court State has preferred the present appeals. 3. Ms. Manisha Luvkumar Shah, learned APP has submitted that the trial court ought to have taken serious view of the matter and ought to have imposed maximum sentence upon the accused. She has submitted that considering the injuries on the complainant and the fact that he succumbed to those injuries, the sentence of five years is absolutely inadequate and that the trial court ought to have awarded maximum sentence prescribed under the Act. She has submitted that considering the injuries on the complainant and the fact that he succumbed to those injuries, the sentence of five years is absolutely inadequate and that the trial court ought to have awarded maximum sentence prescribed under the Act. 3.1 She has further submitted that the trial court failed in appreciating that the accused had a quarrel with the deceased and upon intervention the accused had gone to his home and brought a gupti by which he inflicted blows upon the deceased. This clearly shows that the act of the accused after separation from the scuffle was to kill the complainant and the prosecution has from the evidence on record proved beyond doubt that the accused has committed offence punishable under section 302 of Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order acquitting the accused is illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Mr. Ekant Ahuja, learned advocate appearing for the accused has supported the order of the trial court qua acquittal of the accused. He has submitted that no interference is called for in the same. He has submitted that this court may not enhance the sentence imposed upon by the trial court as the order is passed after considering the facts and circumstances coupled with the evidence produced on record. 4.1 Mr. Ahuja has submitted that the incident had taken place on 25.12.1993 and the accused died on 20.01.1994. He has submitted that the complainant died of septicemia and therefore even if the entire prosecution case is accepted, an offence punishable under section 302 Indian Penal Code is not made out. He has relied upon the medical evidence more particularly Ex. 11 wherein it is stated that the probable cause of death was shock as a result of septicemia following injuries. He has submitted that there was a time gap of 27 days between the date of incident and the death of the deceased and therefore the death cannot be directly attributed to the accused. 4.2 In support of his submissions, Mr. Ahuja has relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court: (i) Gurain Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 1994 SCC (Cri) 1399 wherein in para 5 the Apex Court has observed that tej deceased was taken back from the hospital to her house and thereafter she was not treated for the injury at all. Ahuja has relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court: (i) Gurain Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 1994 SCC (Cri) 1399 wherein in para 5 the Apex Court has observed that tej deceased was taken back from the hospital to her house and thereafter she was not treated for the injury at all. The injury appears to have become septic and resulted in her death. The Apex Court has observed that the offence committed by the accused would be one of culpable homicide as alleged; it may be attributed to him that by such an act he was likely to cause the death and accordingly the Apex Court altered the conviction under section 302 of Indian Penal Code to 304 part II Indian Penal Code. (ii) Ganga Dass Alias Godha v. State of Haryana reported in 1994 (Suppl) SCC 534 wherein the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of Indian Penal Code was set aside on the ground that the injured deceased was operated but unfortunately some complications set in and ultimately he died after 18 days because of septicemia and cardiac failure. (iii) B.N. Kavatakar And Another v. State of Karnataka reported in 1994 SCC (Cri) 579 wherein in para 9 on the basis of the Medical Officer therein who opined that the death was a result of septicemia, the conviction under section 302 Indian Penal Code was set aside. (iv) Sarup Singh v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1995 SC 2452 wherein in para 4 the Apex Court considering the opinion of PW 11 therein accepted the submission that the death was due to septicemia and therefore convicted the accused under section 304 part II Indian Penal Code. 5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the papers on record including the judgment and order of the trial court. We have also perused the oral as well as documentary evidence perused by the trial court. 5.1 The prosecution examined P.W. 1 Dr. Ravindra Shrikrishna Bhise at Ex. 11 who is working as Associate Professor in Forensic Medicine with V.S. Hospital. On 21.01.1994, the dead body of the complainant was brought for the purpose of autopsy by P.I of GIDC, Vatava Police Station. The post mortem was carried out on that very day. According to him, the probable cause of death was shock as a result of septicemia following injuries. On 21.01.1994, the dead body of the complainant was brought for the purpose of autopsy by P.I of GIDC, Vatava Police Station. The post mortem was carried out on that very day. According to him, the probable cause of death was shock as a result of septicemia following injuries. 5.2 In the cross examination P.W 1 has admitted that pus is found if faceal matter leaks from intestine of human being. If injury is caused to intestine, faceal matter may come out. If intestine is injured and the same is operated and surgical stitches open up, then faceal matter may leak. Due to defect in taking stitches during the surgery, such leak is possible. If proper care would not have been taken, there would be no pus and the patient would not have died due to septicemia. The patient could have survived. He has admitted that in order to cause external injury no. 1, blow should be inflicted on the chest. 6. From the evidence on record, more particularly the medical evidence it has been established that stab injury with the muddamal article gupti was inflicted on the abdomen of the complainantdeceased. Therefore he was treated in the hospital and during the process he succumbed to the injuries. It is borne out that the complainant died due to septicemia after 27 days occasioning due to septicemia. However, the prosecution has established that injury found on the person of the complainant was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. 6.1 It is also required to be borne in mind that the incident took place on 25.12.1993 and the deceased died 27 days later on 20.01.1994 due to septicemia and other complications. Only one blow was inflicted upon the deceased by the accused with gupti. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to hold that the accused intended to cause death. In any event the medical evidence also shows that the injured deceased was treated but unfortunately some complications set in and ultimately he died. The decisions cited by the learned advocate appearing for the accused are aptly applicable on the facts and circumstances of the present case. 7. In any event the medical evidence also shows that the injured deceased was treated but unfortunately some complications set in and ultimately he died. The decisions cited by the learned advocate appearing for the accused are aptly applicable on the facts and circumstances of the present case. 7. Keeping in view the medical evidence and the established facts and circumstances of the case on the record, we are of the opinion that the accused can be clothed with the knowledge that the injury that he was causing to the deceased with a gupti on his abdomen, a vital part of the body was likely to cause his death though without any intention to cause death the same was inflicted. He gave a single blow on the abdomen of the deceased. The offence would therefore squarely fall under section 304 Part II of Indian Penal Code. We accordingly find the order of conviction of the trial court just and proper. 8. As regards the order of acquittal is concerned, when the offence squarely falls under section 304 part II Indian Penal Code, the section under 302 cannot be applicable on the facts of the present case. We are of the opinion that the trial court has rightly acquitted the accused of the offence so charged with. 8.1 Moreover, it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the wellsettled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the court below." 8.2 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 the Apex Court laid down the following principles: "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 8.3 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 8.4 Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. Reported in (2007) 3 SCC 75, the Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision the Court has observed as under: "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 8.5 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. State of M.P., reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5589. Thus, the powers which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 8.6 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 wherein it is held as under: "... This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary, (1967) 1 SCR 93 : AIR (1967) SC 1124 that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 8.7 Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. It is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. It is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. The trial court has rightly acquitted the accused of the charges levelled against him under sections 302, 234, 294 of Indian Penal Code and under section 32(v) of Atrocities Act and under section 135(1) of B.P. Act. The prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt these charges against the accused. 9. In that view of the matter, the sentence awarded to the accused is also just and proper. No inadequacy is found in the quantum of sentence as submitted by Ms. Shah, learned APP. The trial court considering the nature of offence has sentenced the accused to five years' rigorous imprisonment and the same is not required to be enhanced. 10. In the premises aforesaid, the judgment and order dated 22.09.1995 passed by the Special Judge, City Civil & Sessions Court, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No. 10 of 1994 is confirmed. Both the appeals stand dismissed accordingly. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Appeals dismissed.