Judgment : While admitting the civil revision petition on 07.11.2008 in C.R.P.M.P.No.5882 of 2008 interim stay as prayed for had been granted. C.R.P.M.P.No.7856 of 2008 is filed to vacate the interim stay granted by this Court in C.R.P.M.P.No.5882 of 2008 by vacate stay petitioner-respondent No.2. 1. 2. Sri N. Ranga Reddy, learned Standing Counsel representing Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, the first respondent in the civil revision petition, entered appearance on behalf of the first respondent. Though the matter is appearing under the caption "Interlocutory", at the request of the counsel Sri P.R. Prasad, learned counsel representing petitioner and Sri N. Ranga Reddy, learned Standing Counsel representing R-1 in the civil revision petition and Sri Suryanarayana, learned Senior Counsel representing the vacate petitioner-R2 in the civil revision petition, the civil revision petition itself is being disposed of finally. .3. This civil revision petition is preferred by Rajendranagar Residents Welfare Association, represented by its Secretary, as against an order made in I.A.No.31 of 2007 in A.S.No.222 of 2000 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. The said application was filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code" for the purpose of convenience) read with Rule 28 of the Civil Rules of Practice, to add Rajendranagar Residents .Welfare Association, represented by its Secretary as second respondent in the appeal and the second defendant in the suit O.S.No.166 of 1993. The learned Second Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, after referring to the respective stands taken by the parties, having formulated the point for consideration at para 4, recorded reasons at paras 7 to 19 and ultimately dismissed the application without costs. Aggrieved by the same, the said Rajendranagar Residents Welfare Association, represented by its Secretary, had preferred the present civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. 4. Aggrieved by the same, the said Rajendranagar Residents Welfare Association, represented by its Secretary, had preferred the present civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. 4. Sri P.R. Prasad, learned counsel representing the revision petitioner had taken this Court through the respective stands taken by the parties and further had taken this Court through the findings recorded by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam while dismissing the application aforesaid and would maintain that though the petitioner is not having direct interest, inasmuch as to protect the public interest, the petitioner intends to come on record, the dismissal of the application by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam on unsustainable grounds cannot be sustained. The learned counsel also would maintain that it is settled proposition of law that where third party rights are affected and also to avoid multiplicity of proceedings the court is under an obligation to implead such parties. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel also pointed out that the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam should have taken into consideration the fact that though the decree obtained by the second respondent is not binding on the petitioner society, the said society cannot take up any developmental activity as open spaces and other sites earmarked for the said purpose would vests with the Corporation and, thus, without the consent of the Corporation, the society cannot proceed any further. The learned counsel also would maintain that when once decree operates against the Corporation, as a consequence, the interest of the members of the society also would be affected and this fact was not appreciated by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam in proper perspective. The learned counsel also in all thoroughness had taken this Court through the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application and also the stand taken in the counter of R-2. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. 3. 5. Sri N. Ranga Reddy, learned Standing Counsel representing R-1 had made submissions at length placing historical background of the litigation and also relied on certain decisions. .6. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. 3. 5. Sri N. Ranga Reddy, learned Standing Counsel representing R-1 had made submissions at length placing historical background of the litigation and also relied on certain decisions. .6. Sri Suryanarayana, the learned Senior Counsel representing R-2 made elaborate submissions relating to the scope and ambit of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code and would maintain that none of the tests to be satisfied to implead this party had not been satisfied and when that being so, the dismissal of the application cannot be found fault. The counsel also pointed out to the specific stand taken by the second respondent in the counter and explained since the proposed party is neither a necessary party nor a proper party to be brought on record and especially in the light of the convincing reasons which had been recorded in elaboration by the learned II Additional Senior Civil .Judge, Visakhapatnam, and also keeping in view the ambit of exercise of power of superintendence by this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the civil revision petition deserves a dismissal. The learned Senior Counsel also placed strong reliance on several decisions. 4. 7. Heard the counsel on record and also the learned Senior Counsel as specified supra. 5. 8. In the light of the submissions made by the counsel referred to above, the following points arise for consideration in the present civil revision petition. .(1) Whether the order under challenge in the civil revision petition be confirmed or liable to be set aside in the facts and circumstances of the case? .(2) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled? 9. Point No.1:- Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation is the appellant in A.S.No.222 of 2000 and Koyya Appalakondamma, the second respondent herein, is the respondent in the said appeal. The present revision petitioner Rajendranagar Residents Welfare Association, represented by its Secretary, filed an application I.A.No.31 of 2007 in A.S.No.222 of 2000 on the file of the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code read with rule 28 of the Civil Rules of Practice, praying for the relief of impleading itself as second defendant in O.S.No.166 of 1993 and second respondent in the appeal aforesaid. 2. 10. 2. 10. The revision petitioner-proposed party in the application averred that an agreement was entered into by the Association with the first defendant Municipal Corporation in 2002 for implementation of the programmed "Development and Management of Municipal Parks" existing in the city limits of Visakhapatnam subject to certain terms and conditions. The plaint schedule property is earmarked as a park. It is also stated that unfortunately the defendant Municipal Corporation had not taken interest in safeguarding the interest of the Association by adducing necessary oral and documentary evidence in the suit and the suit was decreed and the defendant Corporation preferred an appeal. In the said appeal one Budiredla Kanakayya Reddy filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code in I.A.No.4 of 2001 to implead him as second respondent in the above appeal and the same was dismissed on 15.4.2005 on the ground that no documentary evidence was filed in support of the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the said application. The defendant Corporation also filed I.A.No.32 of 2005 in the said appeal to reopen the matter for the purpose of examining the defendant for marking the layout plan. I.A.No.33 of 2005 was filed to permit the defendant Corporation to produce additional evidence for the purpose of marking layout plan and Lok Adalat made Award in O.S.No.481 of 1988 on the file of IV Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam. In view of the filing of the I.As, the appeal preferred by the Municipal Corporation was allowed and the matter was remanded to the trial court. As against the said order Smt. Koyya Appalakondamma preferred C.M.A.No.702 of 2005 on the file of this Court and this court was pleased to allow the said C.M.A. on01.12.2005. One of the residents of Rajendranagar Thota Peda Venkateswara Rao filed writ petition W.P.No.16186 of 2005 on the file of this court to direct respondents 1 to 3 to ensure that no encroachments should be allowed in the suit schedule property and the writ petition was disposed of on 28.11.2005. As against the order made in C.M.A.No.702 of 2005 on the file of this Court, the appellant Corporation filed a Civil appeal No.1484 of 2007 on the file of the Supreme Court of India and the Supreme Court of India, while allowing the appeal, gave a direction to consider the matter afresh. As against the order made in C.M.A.No.702 of 2005 on the file of this Court, the appellant Corporation filed a Civil appeal No.1484 of 2007 on the file of the Supreme Court of India and the Supreme Court of India, while allowing the appeal, gave a direction to consider the matter afresh. In the light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances it would be just and necessary to implead Rajendranagar Residents Welfare Association, represented by its Secretary, as second respondent in the appeal and second respondent in the suit aforesaid. 11. The said application was resisted by the second respondent by filing a counter-affidavit in detail. Several of the averments made had been specifically denied. It is no doubt stated that it is true that the suit filed by her in O.S.No.166 of 1993 was decreed in her favour and the Municipal Corporation preferred an appeal. In the appeal Budireddy Kannayya Reddy filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code to implead him as second respondent and the same was dismissed. Further it was averred in the counter that the said Budiredla people were held to be having no interest in schedule property and, therefore, they were held to be not necessary parties to the appeal. Several further details also had been narrated. No doubt, filing of I.A.No.32 of 2005 and I.A.No.33 of 2005 had been admitted and the filing of C.M.A.No.702 of 2005 and carrying the matter to the Apex Court also had been referred to in the counter. It was also specified that the documents produced are sham documents and the following aspects had been specified in the counter. (1) That the stamp on the alleged agreement bears the date 19.8.2002 and it was purchased by one B.R. Murthy, Secretary, Rajendra Nagar Residents Welfare Association by that date the petitioner Association was not in existence as the same was registered on 18.5.2005. .(2) On behalf of the Municipal Corporation the Commissioner has to sign on all the agreement and Documents etc., but it was alleged to have signed by the Executive Authority and the name of the Executive Authority was not mentioned. .(3) When any agreement executed by an organization like GVMC it will be supported by minutes of meeting and correspondence and consent of counsel authorizing the Commissioner GVMC to do such acts and no such reference was made in the alleged agreement. .(3) When any agreement executed by an organization like GVMC it will be supported by minutes of meeting and correspondence and consent of counsel authorizing the Commissioner GVMC to do such acts and no such reference was made in the alleged agreement. .(4) The agreement does not bear the date, month and year and the GVMC is not expected to sign on the un-dated agreements which is prohibited under law. .(5) When the secretary of the petitioner association is one B.R. Murthy, the present affidavit was given by one John Samuel represented as Secretary of the petitioner association. .(6) The said Samuel in his affidavit did not mention that he is the owner of a house in Rajendra Nagar. .(7) That a copy of certificate of registration was filed without Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association empowering the society by the GVMC to maintain parks. .(8) Page one of the agreement and pages 2 and 3 were not signed on behalf of Executive Authority of GVMC. At the fag-end one signature is found styling as Executive Authority without date and seal of Corporation or without the signature of the subordinates or any of the employees of GVMC. 1. 12. Further specific stand had been taken that when the Municipal Corporation itself had no right, there is no question of the said Corporation authorizing the proposed party in any way. Further, specific stand had been taken that an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code is maintainable only in a case where the party has got a right and interest in the immovable property. Several further facts had been narrated and specific stand had been taken that inasmuch as Corporation itself is not right such Corporation creating some interest in the proposed party would not arise at all. 2. 13. The order made in the Civil Appeal No.1484 of 2007, dated 19.3.2007 also had been placed before this Court. The learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, formulated the following point for consideration at para 4 Whether a third party can be added as a party in the suit as prayed for and as already aforesaid after recording reasons in detail dismissed the application without costs. .14. Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code reads as hereunder. The learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, formulated the following point for consideration at para 4 Whether a third party can be added as a party in the suit as prayed for and as already aforesaid after recording reasons in detail dismissed the application without costs. .14. Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code reads as hereunder. ."Court may strike out or add parties.___(2) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added." .15. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code empowers Court to deal with all cases of defects relating to the parties. This provision enables the court to strike out the name of any party improperly .joined or to add a party who ought to have been joined as a party. The object of the provision is to bring before the Court all persons interested in the dispute so that all such controversies involved in the suit may be determined once for all in the presence of all the parties without delay and inconvenience. It is no doubt the discretion of the Court and the Court may have to exercise the discretion to rectify the defects relating to the parties and such discretion to be exercised judicially and on sound legal principles. 3. 16. It is no doubt the discretion of the Court and the Court may have to exercise the discretion to rectify the defects relating to the parties and such discretion to be exercised judicially and on sound legal principles. 3. 16. In Anil Kumar v. Shivnath (1995) 3 SCC 147 ) the Apex Court observed that though the Court may have power to strike out the name of a party improperly joined or add a party either on application or without application of either party, the condition precedent is that the Court must be satisfied that the presence of such party would be necessary in order to enable he Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit and the object of the Rule 10 to bring on record all the persons who are parties to the dispute relating to the subject matter so that the dispute may be determined in their presence at the same time without any protraction, inconvenience and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The under noted are certain of the broad principles laid down in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum AIR 1958 SC 886 . The under noted are certain of the broad principles laid down in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum AIR 1958 SC 886 . .(1) That the question of addition of parties under Rule 10 of Order 1 of the code of Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the court, but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case; but in some cases, it may raise controversies as to the power of the court, in contradistinction to its inherent jurisdiction, or, in other words, of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in Section 115 of the code; .(2) That in a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject-matter of the litigation; .(3) Where the subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the court is of the opinion that, by adding that party, it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy; .(4) Thecases contemplated in the last proposition have to be determined in accordance with the statutory provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act; .(5) In cases covered by those statutory provisions, the court is not bound to grant the declaration prayed for, on a mere admission of the claim by the defendant, if the court has reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from the admission; (6) The result of a declaratory decree on the question of status, such as in controversy in the instant case, affects not only the parties actually before the Court, but generations to come, and in view of that consideration, the rule of 'present interest', as evolved by case law relating to disputes about property does not apply with full force; and .(7) Therule laid down in Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act is not exactly a rule of res judicata. It is narrower in one sense and wider in another;" 1. 17. It is narrower in one sense and wider in another;" 1. 17. In Ramesh Hirachand v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1992) 2 SCC 524 (Equivalent to AIR 1992 SCW 846) where the plaintiff was a dealer on the land held by the Hindustan petroleum Corporation (lessee) and was in possession of a service station. The Municipal Corporation issued a notice to the plaintiff for the demolition of a certain construction alleging that it was unauthorized and the plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction against the Municipal Corporation and the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation applied for being impleaded as a party defendant on the ground that it had material to show that the structure was unauthorized and the courts below, no doubt, granted the said relief and the plaintiff approached the Apex Court ultimately and the Apex Court while setting aside the said orders came to the conclusion that the Hindustan petroleum Corporation was neither a necessary party nor a proper party to such suit. 2. 18. In Amit Kumar Shawand another v. Farida Khatoon and another (2005) 11 Supreme Court Cases 403 the Apex Court held that the power to strike out or join parties may be exercise at any stage of the proceedings and the question to be addressed by court is whether an enforceable right of a person may be affected if he is not joined. 3. 19. In P.R. Nallathambi Goundan v. Vijaya Raghavan and others AIR 1973 Madras 25 the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that persons whose interests would be affected by the litigation are entitled to come on record to protect their interests when those are jeopardized by the persons already on record. 20. InKona Venkata Siva Surya Chandra Sekhar and another v. Bonda Venkunaidu and others 2007 (3) ALD 108 the learned Judge at para 4 observed as hereunder. "Considering the submissions made on either side and on perusal of the material available on record, it is seen that even though the proposed parties are not connected to the suit agreement, the property in dispute is one and the same. Hence, the Court below is right in allowing the present application to have proper look in deciding all the issues in respect of the property in question and to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Hence, the Court below is right in allowing the present application to have proper look in deciding all the issues in respect of the property in question and to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Admittedly the other suits are also pending in respect of the same property which can be properly clubbed together with the present suit and dispose of the same by a common judgment to avoid conflict decisions. Hence, I do not find any merits in the above revision." 4. 21. In Khaja Abdul Khader v. Mahabub Saheb and others AIR 1979 Andhra Pradesh 152 while dealing with the expression "questions involved in the suit" the Division Bench observed at paras 4 and 7 as hereunder. "This claim of the petitioner is opposed by the first respondent's counsel Sri o. Adinarayana Reddy, contending, inter alia, that the decision in Sri Rama Murthy v. Venkata Subbarao (1956 Andh LT 917) should be preferred to that of Somaiah v. Amina Begum, (1975) 2 Andh WR 243: (AIR 1976 Andh Pra 182). The answer to the question largely depends upon the scope and application of the provisions of sub-rule (2) of R.10 of O.1 C.P.C. which reads thus: "Court may strike out or add parties -The court may at any state of proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added." This provision empowers the court to either strike out the name of any party improperly joined or add the name of any person who ought to have been joined or whose presence before it may be necessary in order to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suits. The intendment and object of this provision is to invest the court with ample power and jurisdiction to strike out the name of any party improperly joined or to add any person who ought to have been joined or whose presence is necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. It may also be noticed that this power may be exercised at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without the application of either party. This power must be exercised in the interest of justice and also to avoid multiplicity of suits in respect of all the questions relating to the subject-matter of the suit. This provision must be liberally construed as the intendment being effective and complete adjudication and settlement of all the questions involved in the suit. The expression "settle all the questions involved in the suit" used in Order 1, R.10(2) C.P.C. is susceptive of a liberal and wide interpretation so as to take in the final adjudication of all the questions pertaining to the final adjudication of all the questions pertaining to the subject-matter thereof. Such wide interpretation warranted by the language employed by O.1, R.10(2) C.P.C. would certainly enable the court to avoid conflicting decisions on the same questions and, at the same time, finally and effectually put an end to litigation respecting them. The framers of this rule must be held to have intended that all the material questions common to the parties to the suit and to the third parties should be tried once and for all and the court is invested to secure the aforesaid result with an ample judicious discretion to add parties which are necessary or proper in this regard. The narrow interpretation of settlement of all the questions involved in the suit between the parties alone would amount to adding something into this provision which was not specifically introduced by the Sovereign Parliament. If the narrow view sought to be placed upon this provision was intended by the legislature, nothing would have prevented them from using the words 'between the parties'. If the narrow view sought to be placed upon this provision was intended by the legislature, nothing would have prevented them from using the words 'between the parties'. The crucial test for the addition or otherwise of a particular party as defendant or plaintiff is whether the presence of such party is necessary or at least proper without whom there can be no effective and final adjudication of all issues involved in the suit with regard to the same subject-matter. The intendment and object of the provision as could be gathered from the language used therein appears to us to adopt a liberal construction to enable the court to determine all the questions relating to the subject-matter of the suit arising not only between the parties to the suit but once and for all in the presence of all those parties whose presence is necessary or proper for an effective and final adjudication. This view of ours gains support from decided cases, which we shall refer. The earliest decision is that of a Division Bench of Madras High Court consisting of Chief Justice Sir Charles turner and Justice Muthuswami Ayyar in Vaidinada v. Sitaram ((1882 ILR 5 Mad 52). While considering the scope of the expression "whose presence before the court may be necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit" used in an analogous provision i.e. s.32 of the Civil P.C. of 1877 (Act X of 1877) the court rejected the contention that the expression "settle all the questions involved in the suit" must be construed as all the questions involved in the suit between the parties and observed thus: "To accept the more restricted interpretation involves the addition of words which we do not find in the Section, namely, 'between the parties to the suit' and there can be few, if any, questions which cannot be determined between the parties to the suit one way or other, and of which the determination, if they be material, will, as between the parties to the suit, not be final. On the other hand, the interpretation warranted by the terms would enable the court to avoid conflicting decisions on the same question which would do injustice to a party to the suit, and finally and effectually to put an end to the litigation respecting them. On the other hand, the interpretation warranted by the terms would enable the court to avoid conflicting decisions on the same question which would do injustice to a party to the suit, and finally and effectually to put an end to the litigation respecting them. No better instance of wisdom of such a rule could be afforded than is presented by the suit before the Court." This view was followed by Venkata Subbarao, J. in Secy. of State v. Murugesa ( AIR 1929 Mad 443 ) holding that the narrower interpretation sought to be placed upon O.1, R.10(2), C.P.C. cannot be acceded to and differed from the view expressed by Srinivasa Iyengar, J., in Vaithilinga v. Sadasiva ( AIR 1926 Mad 836 ) wherein it was held that the expression "all the questions involved in the suit" means only the questions as between the parties to the litigation. Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was) agreed with the opinion of Venkata Subbarao, J. which is consistent with the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Vaidianada v. Sitarama ((1882) ILR 5 Mad 52) and specifically dissented from the view expressed by Srinivasa Iyyengar, J. in Vaithialinga v. Sadasiva ( AIR 1926 Mad 836 ) and observed thus: "The court below has taken the view relying upon ILR 59 Cal 329 : (AIR 1932 Cal 448), that the 'questions involved in the suit' referred to in O.1, R.10(2) must mean the questions which are involved in the suit as originally framed between the parties to the suit. But this High Court has placed a wider interpretation on those words and has held that the object of the provision is that where several disputes arise out of one subject-matter all the parties interested in such disputes should be brought before the Court and all questions in controversy between them should be completely settled in the action. See 29 Mad LW 753: AIR 1929 Mad 443 ." Agreeing with the aforesaid view, Viswanatha Sastry, J. in Srirama Murty v. Venkatasubbarao (1956 Andh LT 917) said: "I am in respectful agreement with the later decisions of the Madras High Court. The expression 'questions involved in the suit' in O.1, R.10(2) means not merely the questions which are involved in the suit as between the parties originally impleaded. The expression 'questions involved in the suit' in O.1, R.10(2) means not merely the questions which are involved in the suit as between the parties originally impleaded. The object of the provision is that the real dispute raised in the suit should be decided in the presence of all the parties interested in the dispute and for that purpose, they should be brought before the Court. Order 1, R.10(2) was framed in order to ensure that the dispute might be finally determined at the same time in the presence of all the parties interested without the delay and expense of several actions and trials and inconclusive adjudications." To the same effect is the decision of Satyanarayana Raju, J. (as he then was) in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 195), which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum ( AIR 1958 SC 886 ) wherein the majority view expressed by B.P. Sinha, J. (as he then was) is to the effect that the question of addition of parties under R.10 of O.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction but of a judicial discretion to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a case : that in a suit relating to property the party sought to be added should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of a litigation, and that where the subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the court is of the opinion that by adding that party, it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. The Supreme Court held that O.1, R.10 (2) requires liberal construction. Applying the aforesaid principles of law, we have no hesitation to hold that the first respondent herein is a necessary party to the present suit. He claims to be the owner of the suit property on the ground that his great-great grandfather was granted this land by Gadwal Samsthan for the performance of the service of arranging Peerlu in Gadwal. Applying the aforesaid principles of law, we have no hesitation to hold that the first respondent herein is a necessary party to the present suit. He claims to be the owner of the suit property on the ground that his great-great grandfather was granted this land by Gadwal Samsthan for the performance of the service of arranging Peerlu in Gadwal. The plaintiffs in the suit claim to be the owners of the land in question on the ground that it is the service inam property of the Mosque. In the circumstances, we are unable to agree with Mr. Subbarao that the first respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit. The submission of Mr. Subbarao that the nature of the suit itself would be altered if the first respondent is permitted to be added as a party-defendant cannot be accepted. The defendants have already denied the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property and stated that they are in possession and enjoyment of the property. When the defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs will have to establish their title to the suit property. The Court has to determine the question of title of the plaintiffs. In order to decide the question relating to the ownership of the land, the 1st respondent, who is sought to be impleaded in the suit as a defendant and who claims to be the owner of the land in question, must be considered to be a necessary and proper party without whose presence the question cannot be finally and effectually adjudicated upon." 22. In Murahadi Syyadisyed Sha Syed Mohiddinsha Oulya Rahamtulla Alyhi Darga Committee, Nellore v. Gutam Shajad @ Shahjahan and others (2006 (1) ALD 393) the leaned Judge of this Court observed at para 6 as hereunder. In Murahadi Syyadisyed Sha Syed Mohiddinsha Oulya Rahamtulla Alyhi Darga Committee, Nellore v. Gutam Shajad @ Shahjahan and others (2006 (1) ALD 393) the leaned Judge of this Court observed at para 6 as hereunder. "Since the issue to be decided in the suit is whether the Darga, in respect of which the suit is filed, is a public or private Darga, and since the injunction sought against respondents 1 and 2 is to restrain them and "their men, relatives etc.," from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the revision petitioner over the said Darga and since respondents 3 to 5 claim that they have been worshiping in the said Darga from their childhood and that it is a public place of worship, in my considered opinion, the trial Court did not commit any error in allowing the petition of respondents 3 to 5 to come on record as defendants 3 to 5, in spite of the fact that revision petitioner (plaintiff), as Dominus Litus, can choose the defendants and cannot be compelled to fight litigation against persons with whom he does not wish to fight, because the Court under Rule 10(2) of Order 1 C.P.C. has ample power to direct impleadment of a party, if and when it feels that their presence is necessary for determination of the real matter in dispute. As stated earlier the claim in the suit relates to the nature of the Darga i.e. whether it is a private or a public place of worship. So, persons trying to establish that it is a public place of worship, disputing the contention of the plaintiff that it is a private place of worship, can be brought on record to determine the question relating to the nature of the Darga i.e., whether it is a private or a public place of worship." 2. 23. In Rekha v. Hindu Seva Prathistana, Bangaloe and others 2002 (3) CCC 117 (Kar.) the learned Judge of Karnataka High Court at paras 9 and 10 observed as hereunder. "I have given my anxious consideration to the various contentions urged on both sides. In the instant case, the subject-matter is a property that is claimed to have been bequeathed by late Pandit S. Narayana Rao. There is no dispute on this aspect. "I have given my anxious consideration to the various contentions urged on both sides. In the instant case, the subject-matter is a property that is claimed to have been bequeathed by late Pandit S. Narayana Rao. There is no dispute on this aspect. The plaintiff claims to be he beneficiary under the Will with life-interest reserved in favour of the wife and another lady mentioned in the Will dated 15.8.1990 said to have been executed by the said late Pandit S. Narayana Rao. Admittedly, the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit are in possession of the property and there is no disturbance of their possession. The relief sought for was only to restrain them from alienating the property during their lifetime, which, if done, would complicate the matter as they had only a limited interest in the property. In a suit of this nature, the petitioner claimed further interest in the property under a subsequent Will and it is the case of the petitioner that she is a legatee under the Will in respect of the very same property. The relief claimed in the suit does not go beyond restraining the defendants 1 and 2 from alienating the property. A relief of this nature, even assuming that the suit is decreed ultimately, will not in any way affect the interest of the petitioner. The petitioner, if is claiming right, title and interest to the property under a Will set up by her, it is for her to establish her case in any manner known to law. That cannot be achieved by seeking for impleadment in a suit with limited scope. It is not within the scope of the existing suit as to which of the two Wills has to prevail and in this view of the matter, the Trial Court is definitely justified in rejecting the application." 24. Further strong reliance also was placed on the decision in Ramesh Hiranand Kundanmal v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others JT 1992 (2) S.C. 116 wherein the Apex Court at paras 13, 14 and 18 observed as hereunder. "A clear distinction has been drawn between suits relating to property and those in which the subject-matter of litigation is a declaration as regards status or legal character. "A clear distinction has been drawn between suits relating to property and those in which the subject-matter of litigation is a declaration as regards status or legal character. In the former category, the rule of present interest as distinguished from the commercial interest is required to be shown before a person may be added as a party. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have hat effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest andcommercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & sons Ltd., (1956) 1 All E.R. 273, wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn-Parry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England, (1950) 2 All E.R. 611, that their true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject-matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J. has stated:- "The test is 'May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights.'" The courts below have assumed that the subject-matter of the litigation is the structure erected by the respondent or in other words the service station which has been allowed to be operated upon by the plaintiff under the terms of the dealership agreement. The notice does not relate to that structure but is in relation to the two chattels stated to have been erected by the present appellant unauthorisedly. According to the appellant these chattels/structures are moveables on wheels and plates where servicing and/or repairs are done and used for storing implements of the mechanics. The second respondent has no interest in these chattels and the demolition of the same in pursuance to the notice is not a matter which affects the legal rights of the respondent. The courts below, therefore, failed to note that the second respondent has no direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation and the addition of the respondent would result in causing serious prejudice to the appellant and the substitution or the addition of a new cause of action would only widen the issue which is required to be adjudicated and settled. By the joining of the party would embarrass the plaintiff and issues not germane to the suit would be required to be raised. The mere fact that a fresh litigation can be avoided is no ground to invoke the power under the Rule in such cases." 1. 25. Reliance also was placed on the decision in Rohit Singh and others v. State of Bihar (now State of Jharkhand) AIR 2007 Supreme Court 10). 2. 26. The mere fact that a fresh litigation can be avoided is no ground to invoke the power under the Rule in such cases." 1. 25. Reliance also was placed on the decision in Rohit Singh and others v. State of Bihar (now State of Jharkhand) AIR 2007 Supreme Court 10). 2. 26. The order made in W.P.No.16186 of 2005 filed by one Thota Peda Venkateswara Rao, wherein the Municipal Corporation of Visakhapatnam, the District Collector, Visakhapatnam, The Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatnam and Rajendranagar Residents Welfare Association, shown as parties also had been placed before this Court. 3. 27. The ground on which the revision petitioner -proposed party intends to come on record is that the association intends to protect the interest of the members of the said association or the society and inasmuch as the proposed party is in a way espousing the cause of the public to safeguard the interest of the public to see that the litigation is effectually adjudicated, it is stated that the presence of such party before the Court would be essential. 28. It is not the case of the proposed party that the proposed party is having any direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. This Court also carefully considered the elaborate reasons recorded by the learned Judge while dismissing the application without costs. Even if the different tests which had been laid down relating to the impleadment of parties keeping in view the object of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code to be considered, this Court is satisfied that the order under challenge cannot be found fault. Further, this civil revision petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Unless some serious illegality or infirmity had been pointed out, in the light of the well-defined limitations, interference by this Court while exercising the general power of superintendence cannot be made. This Court is thoroughly satisfied that this is not a fit case to be interfered with. 4. 29. Point No.2:- In the light of the reasons recorded above, the civil revision petition shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.