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2009 DIGILAW 59 (GUJ)

B. C. Patel v. State of Gujarat Thro' Secretary

2009-02-03

H.N.DEVANI, MOHIT S.SHAH

body2009
JUDGMENT : Mohit S. Shah 1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the notification dated 26.03.2007 of the State Government withholding the petitioner's pension with permanent effect on the basis of the order dated 27.12.2006 of the High Court on the administrative side on the ground that the petitioner had committed misconduct while working as Civil Judge (J.D.) and JMFC at Muli " Sayla. The aforesaid order was passed by the High Court after holding a departmental inquiry. 2. The facts leading to filing of this petition, briefly stated, are as under :- The petitioner was appointed as a Civil Judge (J.D.) and Judicial Magistrate First Class on 14.06.1982. Upon attaining the age of superannuation i.e. after completion of 58 years on 30.04.2004, the petitioner retired from service. However, long prior to his retirement, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 21.09.1995 and charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 31.01.1996. The gravamen of the charge in the departmental inquiry was that the petitioner had indulged in corrupt practices as a Judicial Officer. The charge-sheet contained charges in respect of the following acts of misconduct :- "(1) On 15.1.1993, the petitioner accepted Rs. 200/- through Mr KG Parmar in Criminal Case No.320/92 for imposing nominal sentence i.e. TRC/ Rs. 100/-. (2) On 22.1.1993, the petitioner accepted Rs. 400/- through Mr Jayeshbhai Shah in Criminal Case No.65/92 for imposing nominal sentence i.e. TRC & Rs. 100/- (3) On 22.1.1993 the petitioner accepted Rs. 800/- through Mr KG Parmar in Criminal Case No.16/93 for imposing nominal sentence i.e. TRC & Rs. 100/-. (4) On 24.1.1993 the petitioner accepted bribe through advocate Rajubhai in NC Case Nos.126/92 and 191/90. (5) On 1.1.1993 the petitioner accepted bribe from advocate Mr KG Parmar and disposed of NC Case No.1/93. (6) On 16.1.1993 the petitioner accepted bribe from Mr KG Parmar and disposed of NC Case No.135/92. (7) On 11.3.1993, the petitioner demanded money from Francis Peter David accused of Criminal Case No.33/93 and on his refusal to understand, the delinquent imposed penalty of Rs. 2000/- for offence punishable under section 279 etc. whereas in Criminal Case No.68/93 on the very same day imposed penalty of Rs. 100/- collecting Rs. 800/- from the accused." 3. (7) On 11.3.1993, the petitioner demanded money from Francis Peter David accused of Criminal Case No.33/93 and on his refusal to understand, the delinquent imposed penalty of Rs. 2000/- for offence punishable under section 279 etc. whereas in Criminal Case No.68/93 on the very same day imposed penalty of Rs. 100/- collecting Rs. 800/- from the accused." 3. After holding the departmental inquiry, the inquiry officer submitted report dated 13.01.2000 holding that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved and that the petitioner be exonerated from all the charges. The matter thereafter came to be considered by the High Court on the administrative side. Ordinarily, it would not have been necessary to refer to the composition of the Disciplinary Committee, but since the matter came to be considered by several Disciplinary Committees for the reasons indicated hereinafter, we would make a reference to the composition of the Disciplinary Committees :- Committee I Mr. Justice D.C.Srivastava and Mr. Justice A.R. Dave Committee II Mr. Justice B.J.Shethna and Mr. Justice A.R. Dave Committee III Mr. Justice D.K.Trivedi and Mr. Justice N.G. Nandi Committee IV Mr. Justice P.B. Majmudar and Mr. Justice D.H. Waghela 4. When the matter came to be considered by the First Disciplinary Committee, by order dated 04.06.2001, the Committee observed that the Committee was unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusions of the Inquiry Officer. The Committee also observed that the philosophy propounded by the Inquiry Officer appeared to be his personal philosophy and the inquiry officer had overlooked the principle that in a domestic inquiry, charges are not to be proved against the delinquent beyond all reasonable doubt as in a criminal case and that preponderance of probabilities has to be taken into account. The Committee examined the allegations against the delinquent and observed as under :- "The High Court has examined the allegations against the delinquent. The Committee examined the allegations against the delinquent and observed as under :- "The High Court has examined the allegations against the delinquent. Some of the allegations are such, which prima facie without any evidence indicate that the orders passed by the delinquent are totally contrary to law and further it appears that prima facie such orders were passed for ulterior consideration and not keeping in view the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, Indian Penal Code and Motor Vehicles Act." The Committee discussed the evidence with reference to each allegation and came to the following conclusions :- (i) Allegation No.1 is established that the order was passed by the officer for ulterior consideration and not in accordance with law. (ii) Allegation Nos. 2 and 3 were proved. (iii) As regards allegation Nos. 4, 5 and 6, the Committee noted that the Inquiry Officer had not given any finding on these allegations and therefore, the Committee had no occasion to examine the record and to give its own findings. (iv) As regards allegation No.7, the Committee disagreed with the Inquiry Officer and held that the demand of illegal gratification by the petitioner from Mr. Francis David was established and since Mr. Francis David did not meet with the petitioner's demand, the fine of Rs.2,000/- was imposed on the accused which was reduced in revision. The Committee then concluded in the following terms :- "14. After considering the enquiry report as a whole and the materials on record, the High Court (Committee) is of the view that the delinquent indulged in corrupt practices by entertaining the accused in his chamber and pressurising the accused Mr. Francis Peter David in his chamber to pay bribe so as to favour him by imposing nominal fine in a case against the said accused, and that the delinquent is guilty of dereliction in discharging his judicial function as he was passing orders in violation of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and Bombay Prohibition Act and that his conduct was also unbecoming of a judicial officer, inasmuch as, he called one of the accused in his chamber to satisfy his demand for illegal gratification. Thus, it is a fit case where show cause notice of dismissal should be issued to the delinquent. 15. Thus, it is a fit case where show cause notice of dismissal should be issued to the delinquent. 15. The office is, therefore, directed to issue notice to the delinquent to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. 5. In view of the aforesaid report dated 04.07.2001 of the first Committee, the High Court on the administrative side issued show cause notice dated 04.07.2001 indicating that the High Court has tentatively come to the conclusion that the charges were proved against the petitioner for the reasons indicated in the tentative decision and therefore, the petitioner was called upon to show cause why the petitioner should not be dismissed from service. It was also indicated in the show cause notice that the petitioner should state whether he wished to be heard in person. Along with the said show cause notice, the petitioner was also supplied a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer and the tentative decision of the High Court on the administrative side. 6. After receiving the show cause notice dated 04.07.2001 along with the report of the Inquiry Officer and the tentative decision on the administrative side of the High Court, the petitioner submitted his reply dated 02.08.2001. The matter then reached hearing before the Second Disciplinary Committee. Before the said Committee, apart from raising contentions on merits, the petitioner also submitted as regards the tentative decision taken by the High Court that it cannot be said to be a tentative one, but it was a final one as High Court had already come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner were fully proved. It was submitted that before taking the tentative decision, the High Court had neither issued notice to the petitioner, nor heard the petitioner and that fresh notice should be given to the petitioner and only after considering the reply to such notice, the High Court can take appropriate decision in the matter. It was also submitted on behalf of the petitioner that if the Committee was not inclined to accept the contentions and merits of the above contentions, then, considering the long service of more than 19 years, instead of passing major penalty of dismissal, any minor penalty can be imposed. Committee II accepted the first contention and gave its finding and direction in the following terms :- "7. Committee II accepted the first contention and gave its finding and direction in the following terms :- "7. Admittedly, the High Court, while disagreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer arrived at a conclusion that the Enquiry Officer was not justified in exonerating the delinquent for the charges levelled against him, but before doing so the High Court was bound to record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give the same to the delinquent officer and opportunity to represent before it. Under the circumstances we direct the office to supply the copy of tentative decision arrived at by the High Court disagreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer to the delinquent calling upon the delinquent to show cause as to why this Court should not take different view in the matter than the view taken by the Enquiry Officer in his Report. 7. In compliance with the above direction, the High Court on the administrative side issued a show cause notice dated 31.12.2001 and informed the petitioner that the High Court had tentatively come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved and therefore, the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why the High Court should not take different view in the matter than the view taken by the Inquiry Officer and why the penalty of dismissal should not be imposed upon the petitioner. 8. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 02.08.2001 in which, the petitioner sought to defend his judicial orders on merits. 9. The matter then reached for hearing before Committee III, which held in para 5 of its order dated 19.03.2004 that the petitioner had imposed punishment not according to law and that the petitioner had imposed punishment less than the minimum sentence prescribed by law and no reasons have been assigned by the delinquent as to why minimum sentence was not awarded and why he chose to award sentence which was unwarranted by law. The Committee then referred to the submissions made by the learned advocate for the petitioner. The Committee then referred to the submissions made by the learned advocate for the petitioner. During the hearing, it was stated on behalf of the petitioner that if the petitioner was reinstated in service, the petitioner would not claim any benefit of full back wages for the period of suspension and that lenient view can be taken by imposing some minor penalty and the petitioner would give up his claim for back wages for the period of suspension and that the period of suspension be treated as spent on duty so that the pensionary benefits would be protected. The Third Committee then recorded the following finding and observations :- "In light of this contention raised before us and on examining the case on hand and as the request of delinquent for voluntary retirement was turned out on administrative side, in our view, this is not a case in which the major punishment of dismissal from service is required to be imposed and in view of the background that delinquent had remained on suspension from 1995 and all this period during suspension, he was getting 75% of the suspension allowance. All the time for 9 years, the delinquent as well as family members have suffered a lot. Loss of 9 years monetary benefits can be considered as punishment on the delinquent and in view of the facts that he is retiring in near future i.e. on 30.04.2004, we are of the view that this is not a case in which major punishment of dismissal is required to be imposed on the delinquent. However, ends of justice will meet by imposing stoppage of one increment without future effect and it will be sufficient penalty on the delinquent. The period of suspension shall accordingly be treated as on duty only for the purpose of calculating the pensionary benefits etc. and even as per the delinquent, he is not claiming any monetary benefit during the period for which he remained under suspension. 10. As per the practice of this Court on the administrative side, the decision of the Disciplinary Committee would have attained finality and would have become the decision of the High Court on the administrative side, if no other sitting Judge had put a note of dissent i.e. disagreement with the decision of the Disciplinary Committee. 10. As per the practice of this Court on the administrative side, the decision of the Disciplinary Committee would have attained finality and would have become the decision of the High Court on the administrative side, if no other sitting Judge had put a note of dissent i.e. disagreement with the decision of the Disciplinary Committee. Since a note of dissent was placed on the file, the matter was placed before the Full Court. The Full Court at the Chamber Meeting held on 26.09.2005 did not approve the decision of Disciplinary Committee III with regard to the quantum of punishment and another show cause notice, being notice dated 26.09.2006, came to be issued by the High Court on the administrative side calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why the petitioner's pension should not be withheld under Rule 24 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2002. 11. The matter then went before Disciplinary Committee IV. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 09.10.2006 in response to the said notice and contended that the departmental proceedings were not being completed for no fault of the petitioner. The petitioner had already retired and therefore, no order withholding of pension may be passed. The Committee observed as under:- "At the time of hearing of this matter on 2.12.2006, the delinquent was present before the High Court and he submitted that he does not want to say anything further and only submitted that a lesser penalty may be awarded except withholding of pension. In these circumstances, the High Court is only required to consider the question of quantum of punishment as show cause notice is issued only in connection with appropriate punishment. So far as misconduct against the delinquent is concerned, the same has already been proved earlier. The delinquent has also not addressed anything on the merits on this aspect, but he has restricted his submission only to imposition of lesser penalty. The delinquent submitted that as he has retired since long, any minor penalty, except withholding of pension, may be awarded. 12. The said Disciplinary Committee also held that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. The Committee held that serious charges were proved against the petitioner in connection with discharging judicial functions. The delinquent submitted that as he has retired since long, any minor penalty, except withholding of pension, may be awarded. 12. The said Disciplinary Committee also held that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. The Committee held that serious charges were proved against the petitioner in connection with discharging judicial functions. The Committee further observed as under :- "Some of the orders passed by the delinquent were totally contrary to law and they were found to have been passed with ulterior motive. All the charges levelled against the delinquent were accordingly held to be proved. Under the circumstances, this is not a case wherein it can be said that the delinquent has committed minor misconduct. In fact, if he were in active service, no other penalty except removal could have been inflicted upon the delinquent. Simply because the delinquent has retired from service, that itself cannot be said to be favourable circumstances in his favour especially when serious charges are proved against him. In view of the High Court, awarding of punishment should always be in the light of misconduct proved against the delinquent. Since, the delinquent was subjected to show cause notice for serious charges which have been proved, in view of the High court, the proper punishment that can be imposed upon the delinquent now is withholding of his pension with permanent effect and to treat his suspension as not on duty." The Disciplinary Committee also noted that if the inquiry were completed earlier, the petitioner would have been removed from active service much earlier by way of punishment. Ultimately, the Disciplinary Committee held that the penalty of withholding pension with permanent effect be imposed upon the petitioner and that his period of suspension be treated as not spent on duty. It is on the basis of the aforesaid order of this court that the State Government passed the impugned notification dated 26.03.2007 at Annexure-A to the petition. 13. Mr IS Supehia, learned advocate for the petitioner has raised the following contentions :- (i) There was inordinate delay in completion of the inquiry. The charge-sheet was issued as far back as on 31.01.1996 and the final decision was taken by the High Court on 19.03.2007 recommending to the State Government to withhold the petitioner's pension with permanent effect. 13. Mr IS Supehia, learned advocate for the petitioner has raised the following contentions :- (i) There was inordinate delay in completion of the inquiry. The charge-sheet was issued as far back as on 31.01.1996 and the final decision was taken by the High Court on 19.03.2007 recommending to the State Government to withhold the petitioner's pension with permanent effect. In view of such gross delay in completing the departmental inquiry, the final order of penalty was vitiated and was, therefore, required to be struck down. (ii) The petitioner was not communicated any tentative decision in spite of the order dated 04.12.2001 of the Disciplinary Committee. It is submitted that apart from the order dated 04.07.2001, which was not treated as tentative decision by Committee II, there was no other tentative decision of the High Court on its administrative side or that of any Disciplinary Committee. (iii) There is no finding against the petitioner that the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet were proved. Committee III which imposed the minor penalty of stoppage of one increment without future effect had held that this was not a case in which major punishment from dismissal of service was required to be imposed. Hence, the serious charges levelled against the petitioner in the show cause notice were not proved. Strong reliance is placed on the decision in P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2005 AIR SCW Page 5690 : (2005 lab IC 4342) (iv) There was no evidence on record in support of the charges. (v) Finally it is submitted that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is too harsh and grossly disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the petitioner and, therefore also, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 14. On the other hand, Mr JB. Pardiwala, learned Standing Counsel for the High Court on its administrative side has opposed the petition and submitted that the High Court had held the departmental inquiry against the petitioner and given the petitioner full opportunity to defend himself and that there was no violation of any of the procedural rules for holding such departmental inquiry. 15. Pardiwala, learned Standing Counsel for the High Court on its administrative side has opposed the petition and submitted that the High Court had held the departmental inquiry against the petitioner and given the petitioner full opportunity to defend himself and that there was no violation of any of the procedural rules for holding such departmental inquiry. 15. As regards the petitioner's contention that delay in the departmental inquiry would vitiate the entire inquiry and the final order of penalty, Mr Pardiwala has submitted that after issuance of the charge-sheet on 31.01.1996, inquiry was entrusted to a Judicial Officer in the cadre of City Civil Court Judges i.e. equivalent to District Judges. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report in January 2000 and thereafter, the matter came up for consideration before several Disciplinary Committees as indicated earlier and therefore, there was no unreasonable delay. The learned counsel heavily relied upon the observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in Paras 5.9 and 5.10 of K.B. Mehta v. Registrar, Gujarat High Court, 2004(3) GLR 2290 . 16. Mr Pardiwala has also submitted that the tentative decision taking a different view from the Inquiry Officer's report was already communicated to the petitioner along with the show cause notice dated 04.07.2001 and again with show cause notice dated 31.12.2001 (Annexure-F and Anenxure-H respectively). The grievance that tentative decision of this Court was not received by the petitioner along with the show cause notice dated 31.12.2001 was never made by the petitioner before any of the Disciplinary Committees before which the petitioner had appeared and made submissions on merits as well as on the question of penalty. The petitioner cannot, therefore, be permitted to raise any such contention at this stage after passage of seven years. 17. Mr Pardiwala has also submitted that show cause notice with tentative decision of Committee I indicating reasons for disagreeing with findings of the Inquiry Officer on charge Nos.1, 2, 3 and 7 was communicated to the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner's case was considered by several Disciplinary Committees comprising of sitting Judges of this Court and that none of the Committees had accepted the report of the Inquiry Officer exonerating the petitioner from the charges. Committee III and Committee IV had held the petitioner to be guilty of the charges, particularly, charge Nos.1 to 3 and 7 which were all very serious charges. Committee III and Committee IV had held the petitioner to be guilty of the charges, particularly, charge Nos.1 to 3 and 7 which were all very serious charges. It is submitted by Mr Pardiwala that the Inquiry Officer, even while exonerating the petitioner had not found that the petitioner's orders were in accordance with law, but the Inquiry Officer had merely given benefit of doubt to the petitioner for holding that the charge of corrupt practice was not proved against the petitioner. The High Court on the administrative side had issued show cause notice to the petitioner specifically indicating that after considering the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record of the inquiry, the High Court has tntatively come to the condclusion that the charges were proved against the petitioner for the reasons stated in the tentative decsion" and that thereafter, no Disciplinary Committee had given any finding in favour of the petitioner as far as the merits of charge Nos.1 to 3 and 7 are concerned. It is submitted that the petitioner had in fact submitted before Disciplinary Committees III & IV that looking to the length of service put in by him, a minor penalty may be imposed. This plea had appealed to Committee III, but the Full Court did not accept the said recommendation of Committee III and directed that show cause notice be issued to the petitioner as to why the petitioner's pension should not be withheld. This itself indicated that the serious charges levelled against the petitioner were found by the final disciplinary authority i.e. Full Court of the High Court as having been proved against the petitioner and therefore, the penalty to withhold the pension was proposed to be passed. Mr Pardiwala has, therefore, submitted that it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved. 18. We have given anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. 19. As regards the first contention that the delay in completion of the inquiry vitiated the inquiry and the final order of penalty, it is necessary to refer to the following pertinent observations made by this Court in K.B. Mehta v. Registrar, Gujarat High Court, 2004(3) GLR 2290 :- 5.9 The High Court, by the very nature of its powers, has besides its main Judicial work, a control jurisdiction over the entire subordinate judiciary. It is not just a full time job of conducting departmental proceedings. Time consumed in initiating and deciding the departmental proceedings by the High Court cannot be viewed on the scale of number of days or months, because, that is not the only work to be done. It is only one type of ancillary work of judicial administration to be done by Judges who devote most of their time to doing judicial work in order to cope up with the mounting arrears. Therefore, delay in initiating and deciding the departmental proceedings has to be viewed in this background so far as the judicial institutions are concerned. 5.10 In the present case, the departmental proceedings were allowed to be completed by the delinquent who never challenged them on the ground that delay had caused any prejudice to him. When the departmental proceedings are allowed to be completed without any plea of prejudice on account of delay being raised and initiation and conduct of the proceedings is not challenged, the delinquent is deemed to have waived any objection on the ground of prejudicial delay and it would not be open to the delinquent to challenge the order of punishment on the ground of delay in taking the disciplinary action. 20. It is true that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 21.09.1995 and the charge-sheet in the departmental inquiry was issued on 31.01.1996. The inquiry was entrusted to an officer in the cadre of District Judge who was holding the post of Judge, City Civil Court at Ahmedabad. The record of a large number of cases was placed on the record of the inquiry. A number of witnesses were examined. The inquiry officer was a sitting Judicial Officer discharging onerous responsibilities. Hence, the time taken in completion of inquiry by the Inquiry Officer cannot be said to be unreasonably long. Thereafter, the matter was considered by the High Court on its administrative side and a number of Disciplinary Committees had to hear the matter for the reasons already indicated earlier. The observations made by this Court in K.B.Mehta's case (supra) regarding delay in such inquiries being conducted by Sitting Judges would apply with equal force when the matter was under consideration of the High Court on its administrative side. Besides the petitioner had never made any grievance against the alleged delay in completion of the departmental inquiry. 21. The observations made by this Court in K.B.Mehta's case (supra) regarding delay in such inquiries being conducted by Sitting Judges would apply with equal force when the matter was under consideration of the High Court on its administrative side. Besides the petitioner had never made any grievance against the alleged delay in completion of the departmental inquiry. 21. As rightly observed by Disciplinary Committee IV, merely because the petitioner has retired from service, the charges which are proved against him do not vanish. In fact, if the inquiry were completed earlier, the petitioner would have been removed from active service much earlier by way of punishment. Simply because the departmental inquiry continued for a long time, it cannot be said to be a ground favourable to the petitioner as by the said delay, the petitioner was not prejudiced as he was paid subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% of the salary all throughout without doing any work. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, it is not possible to accept the first contention that there was unreasonable delay in completion of inquiry or that such delay would vitiate the final order of penalty. 22. As regards the second contention that the tentative decision was not communicated to the petitioner, we find considerable substance in the submission of Mr Pardiwala that a copy of the tentative decision of the High Court was enclosed with the show cause notice and that the petitioner had never made any grievance before Disciplinary Committee III or Disciplinary Committee IV about non-receipt of the tentative decision. It clearly appears that it was understood all along that the order dated 04.07.2001 of Disciplinary Committee II was treated as a tentative decision and the petitioner was required to meet with the reasons indicated in the said tentative decision. 23. Reliance placed by Mr. Supehia on the decision in Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 3734 is misconceived. That was a case where the delinquent was not informed that the Disciplinary Committee had given only a tentative decision and that he could show cause against that also. 23. Reliance placed by Mr. Supehia on the decision in Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 3734 is misconceived. That was a case where the delinquent was not informed that the Disciplinary Committee had given only a tentative decision and that he could show cause against that also. In the facts of the instant case, show cause notice dated 31.12.2001 clearly indicated that decision of the Disciplinary Committee was only a tentative one and the petitioner was specifically informed that the show cause notice was issued as to why the High Court should not take a different view in the matter than the view taken by the Inquiry Officer and why the penalty of dismissal should not be imposed upon the petitioner. Nothing could be clearer than this. The petitioner was fully heard in the matter by Disciplinary Committee III and it was on account of the lenient penalty proposed by the said Disciplinary Committee that the Full Court did not approve of the said proposal and instead decided that a show cause notice be issued for withholding the pension. It was, therefore, not necessary to indicate in the next show cause notice dated 26.09.2006 that the petitioner may also show cause why the High Court should take a different view than the view taken by the Inquiry Officer. 24. As regards the fourth contention, we find that Disciplinary Committee IV did give the petitioner an opportunity to address on the merits of the charges of misconduct. The said Disciplinary Committee clearly noted as under :- " So far as misconduct against the delinquent is concerned, the same has already been proved earlier. The delinquent has also not addressed anything on the merits of this aspect but he has restricted his submission only to imposition of lesser penalty." The said Disciplinary Committee clearly gave the following findings in the impugned order dated 27.12.2006 :- Some of the orders passed by the delinquent were totally contrary to law and they were found to have been passed with ulterior motive. All the charges levelled against the delinquent were accordingly held to be proved. Under the circumstances, this is not a case wherein it can be said that the delinquent has committed minor misconduct. In fact, if he were in active service, no other penalty except removal could have been inflicted upon the delinquent. All the charges levelled against the delinquent were accordingly held to be proved. Under the circumstances, this is not a case wherein it can be said that the delinquent has committed minor misconduct. In fact, if he were in active service, no other penalty except removal could have been inflicted upon the delinquent. Simply because the delinquent has retired from service, that itself cannot be said to be favourable circumstances in his favour especially when serious charges are proved against him. In view of the High Court, awarding of punishment should always be in the light of misconduct proved against the delinquent. Since, the delinquent was subjected to show cause notice for serious charges which have been proved, in view of the High court, the proper punishment that can be imposed upon the delinquent now is withholding of his pension with permanent effect and to treat his suspension as not on duty. 25. Coming to the fourth submission of Mr Supehia for the petitioner that there was no evidence to prove the charges levelled against the petitioner, it is not open to this Court to sit in appeal over the decision of the disciplinary authority. The law on this aspect is well-settled. If there is some material on record in support of the charge, it is not for this Court to examine sufficiency or otherwise of the material. 26. In a recent decision in North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. H.H. Pujar, 2008(10) Scale 78 : (2008 Lab IC 3332) the Apex Court has reiterated the following principles laid down in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, 1977(2) SCC 491 : (1977 Lab IC 845):- "The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, excluding of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. ... ... .... The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of undertaking and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny." 27. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of undertaking and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny." 27. Applying the above principles, we find that it is not possible to treat the impugned order of the High Court on its administrative side as perverse. 28. Mr Supehia also submitted that though in the tentative decision dated 04.07.2001, it was indicated that charge Nos.1 to 3 and 7 were proved and that the findings of the Inquiry Officer on charge Nos.4, 5 and 6 were not examined, even then in the final order, the High Court on its administrative side has proceeded on the basis as if all the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet were proved. It is, therefore, submitted that the final decision is vitiated by non-application of mind. 29. We have carefully examined this contention also. As indicated earlier, charge Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are about acceptance of illegal gratification for imposing nominal sentence which was less than the minimum sentence prescribed by law and without recording adequate reasons. Charge No.7 was that the petitioner had demanded money from the accused and on his refusal to accede to the demand, the petitioner imposed a heavy penalty of Rs.2,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 279 of the Motor Vehicles Act, (which was reduced in revision). Whereas in another case, the petitioner imposed penalty of Rs.100/- after collecting Rs.800/- from the accused of that case. Looking to the seriousness of the above charges, it is immaterial whether charge Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were not found to have been proved against the petitioner. When some charges levelled against the delinquent are proved and the charges are serious enough to warrant punishment of dismissal, even if the other charges contained in the charge-sheet are not proved, the order of dismissal will not be set aside. 4, 5 and 6 were not found to have been proved against the petitioner. When some charges levelled against the delinquent are proved and the charges are serious enough to warrant punishment of dismissal, even if the other charges contained in the charge-sheet are not proved, the order of dismissal will not be set aside. In State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779 , the Apex Court held as under :- "If the order of dismissal may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry Officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all, it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice." 30. Mr Supehia submitted that it was in (Mr.) V.K. Bhatt v. (M/s.) Aryodaya Ginning Mills Limited, Ahmedabad, 1996(1) GLH 678 that the Court shall not impose less than the minimum sentence without recording adequate reasons, that before 1996, the Judicial Officers were passing orders of sentence till the rising of the Court and nominal fine in prohibition cases and that it was only after the aforesaid judgment that the Court started imposing minimum sentence. 31. Though the submission may prima facie appear to be attractive, we cannot overlook the fact that the High Court on its administrative side has found the petitioner used to impose less than the minimum sentence, where his demands for illegal gratification were being met and that when such demands were not being met, the petitioner used to impose heavy fine. 32. 32. As regards the contention that the accused in criminal case referred to in Charge No.7 was not examined, it was already indicated to the petitioner in the tentative decision dated 04.07.2001 that though Francis David did not appear before the Inquiry Officer, Jayesh who had drafted the complaint on behalf of Francis David, did appear as a witness before the Inquiry Officer and Jayesh had stated that Francis David was called by the petitioner in his chamber and on coming out of his chamber, Francis David told Jayesh that the Magistrate demanded Rs. 2,000/- and also told him that if Rs. 2,000/- will be paid, then the fine will be nominal. This evidence of Jayesh before the Inquiry Officer cannot be brushed aside as irrelevant or inadmissible. The statement given by the accused Francis David to this witness is certainly relevant and admissible and there is no reason why in a domestic inquiry, such statement should be ignored. Considering the fact that the fine of Rs. 2,000/- imposed by the petitioner on Francis David was reduced in revision, looking at the matter in the totality of the circumstances, the demand of illegal gratification by the petitioner from Francis David could be taken as established. The Writ Court will not, therefore, interfere with the finding of the disciplinary authority and the order of penalty based thereon. 33. The contention that the quantum of penalty is too harsh and disproportionate is stated to be rejected because if the inquiry had concluded before retirement, the penalty could only have been dismissal from service. 34. As regards Mr Supehia's contention that even if the impugned order of penalty remains, the petitioner is entitled to other reliefs such as payment of gratuity, refixation of salary and revision in pension, we find that the petitioner does not seem to have made any such demand before the High Court earlier. The question of revision in pension would not survive in view of the order of penalty. We, therefore, leave it open to the petitioner to make a representation to the High Court on its administrative side and the High Court shall consider the same in accordance with law. 35. Subject to the above observations, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.