Judgment : The petitioner field O.S.NO.39 of 1999 in the court of I Additional Senior Civil Judge, at Kakinada, against the 1st respondent, for recovery of money. He has also prayed that a charge be created on an item of immovable property. The 2nd respondent got itself impleaded in the suit, as defendant No.2, stating that the item mentioned in the suit schedule was hypothecated to it. The trial court decreed the suit. A decree was drawn in terms of Order XXXIV C.P.C., as though it is a suit for mortgage. The 2nd respondent field I.A.NO. 1456 of 2003, under Sections 151 and 153 of C.P.C., with a prayer to amend the decree. It was urged that the suit was the one, for recovery of money-simplicitor, and the decree was drawn, as though it was a suit for mortgage. The petitioner opposed the application. The trial court allowed the I.A., through order dated 19/12/2003. Hence, this revision. Sri V.L.G.K. Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner claimed a specific relief in the suit, not only for a decree for recovery of money, but also to create charge over an item of property, mentioned in the schedule, and that the decree was drawn in accordance with law. He contends that the 2nd respondent was very much a party to the suit, and there was absolutely no basis for it, to seek modification of the decree. He contends that rule 15 of order 34 C.P.C., makes the form of a mortgage decree, applicable even to cases of charge also, and in that view of the matter, the order under revision cannot be sustained. Sri M. Narender Reddy, learned counsel for the contesting party, i.e. 2nd respondent, submits that the suit field by the petitioner herein was the one, for recovery of money, and though a prayer was made for creation of the charge, the fact of the case and relevant provision of law, do not permit of such a relief. He contends that no charge as such was created, vis-à-vis the property, as provided for under section 100 of the transfer of property Act, 1882 (for short ‘the Act’). Learned counsel submits that the adoption of form of mortgage decree to cases of charge would be possible, only where a charge is created, vis-à-vis immovable property, in accordance with law, and not otherwise. The petitioner field O.S.NO. Learned counsel submits that the adoption of form of mortgage decree to cases of charge would be possible, only where a charge is created, vis-à-vis immovable property, in accordance with law, and not otherwise. The petitioner field O.S.NO. 39 of 1999 against the 1st respondent, with the following prayer: “The plaintiff therefore prays that the Hon’ble court may be pleased to pass a decree for recovery of the suit amount by awarding subsequent interest at 18% per annum yearly compound with a charge on the plaint schedule property and award costs and such other relief as the Hon’ble courts deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case”. The manner in which he is said to have created the charge over the schedule property, which comprised of items of movable property, viz., furniture, electrical fittings, stationary articles, account books, and printed books, for sale; was mentioned in para 4 of the plaint. It was pleaded that the 1st respondent borrowed a sum of Rs.20,000/- on 02/12/1994, and on the same day, he has executed a “continuous mortgage/hypothecation bond”. It is also important to note that the hypothecation was said to be continuous, and not specific to any transaction. In the words of the petitioner; “…The defendant used to borrow the amounts and discharge the same and he is in the habit of taking return of the promissory notes executed by him and since the mortgage/hypothecation bond is continuous and as he is in need of amount, he used to leave the same with the plaintiff”. The suit was decreed on 19/12/2003. The trial court prepared a decree for moneysimplicitor. However, a preliminary decree, which is prepared in the case of mortgage suits, was appended to it. The 2nd respondent felt aggrieved by the form of decree, and not by the result of the suit. Therefore, it field I.A.NO. 1456 of 2003 under sections 151 and 153 of C.P.C. the application was allowed. The correctness thereof is challenged in the revision. Before undertaking discussion on merits, the purport of the word ‘mortgage’, ‘hypothecation’, and ‘charge, needs to be examined. The reason is that the petitioner proceeded on the assumption that mortgage and hypothecation are identical, and in fact, the words were used in the plaint interchangeably. The prayer in the suit, however, was for creation of a charge. Before undertaking discussion on merits, the purport of the word ‘mortgage’, ‘hypothecation’, and ‘charge, needs to be examined. The reason is that the petitioner proceeded on the assumption that mortgage and hypothecation are identical, and in fact, the words were used in the plaint interchangeably. The prayer in the suit, however, was for creation of a charge. Before this court also, learned counsel for the petitioner pleaded that there does not exit much difference between hypothecation and mortgage. It may appear to be too fundamental to deal with such aspects, as this stage. However, it is always better to be clear, than to real under uncertainty, or to ignore the subtle distinction among the various legal phenomena. Mortgage, as defined under the Act, connotes the transfer of interest in an item of immovable property, as a measure of security for repayment of amount borrowed by the owner of such property. Section 58 of the Act, not only enlists the categories of mortgages, but also prescribes the manner in which a mortgage can be brought into existence. The word’ ‘hypothecation’, as such is not defined in any enactment. It is also a measure of security, but vis-à-vis movable property. It is more proximate to pledge, as defined under section 172 of the Indian contract Act. The only difference is that the possession of a pledged article would be with the creditor, whereas the possession of hypothecated item of property would remain with the borrower (see union of India v. Shentilanathan 1977 (2) MLJ 499 ). If at all there exists anything in common, among mortgage and hypothecation, it is that they are forms of securities of different kinds, not constituting ‘actionable claim’ refers to these three concepts, as forming into one category, i.e. not being actionable claims. If at all there exists anything in common, among mortgage and hypothecation, it is that they are forms of securities of different kinds, not constituting ‘actionable claim’ refers to these three concepts, as forming into one category, i.e. not being actionable claims. Section 3 (c) of the Act reads as under: “Actionable claim” means a claim to any debt, other than a debt secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the Civil Courts recognize as affording grounds for relief, whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent.” ‘Charge’, on the other hand, is a burden created on an item of immovable property, either by act of parties, or by operation of law, for payment of money, to another, which does not amount to mortgage. Section 100 of the Act defines the word “charge”. It also makes the provisions governing simple mortgage, applicable to cases of charge also. It reads as under: Sec. 100 : Charges.- Where immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property; and all the provisions hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so for as may be, apply to such charge. Nothing in this section applies to the charge of a trustee on the trust-property incurred in the execution of is trust, and, save as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, no charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands of a person to whom such property had been transferred for consideration and without notice of the charge”. One thing, which becomes clear and certain is that a charge, to be recognized in law, can be created only in respect of an immovable property. There is nothing like creation of charge, vis-à-vis an item of movable property. Equivalent of charge, and even mortgage, vis-à-vis an item of movable property would be hypothecation. If we keep this broad distinction of the three concepts in view, it becomes clear that the one, claimed by the Petitioner Against the suit schedule property would answer the description of hypothecation. Equivalent of charge, and even mortgage, vis-à-vis an item of movable property would be hypothecation. If we keep this broad distinction of the three concepts in view, it becomes clear that the one, claimed by the Petitioner Against the suit schedule property would answer the description of hypothecation. As mentioned earlier, the decree was drafted, as though it is in a suit for mortgage. Order XXXIV of C.P.C prescribes the procedure for preparation and execution of the decrees in suits, relating to mortgages of immovable properties. Rule 15 thereof makes the procedure, prescribed for suits of simple mortgage, to case of mortgage by deposit of title deeds; and to those of charge, within the meaning of section 100 of the Act. Rule 15 reads as under: “ O.XXXIV, R.15: Mortgages By The Deposit Of Title-Deeds And Charge- (1) All the provisions contained in this order which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so for as may be, apply to a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of section 100 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) (2) where a decree orders payment of money and charges it on immovable property on default of payment, the amount may be realized by sale of that property in execution of that decree. It has already been observed in the preceding paragraphs that the right claimed by the petitioner was against items of movable property. Even if there existed a valid document executed in their favour, it would have amounted to hypothecation, and not charge. Once it is found that there cannot be a charge in favour of the petitioner, vis-à-vis the items of movable property, rule 15 does not get attracted to the facts of the case. The result would be that there would not be any basis to prepare a mortgage decree in favour of the petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that the suit was decreed. Therefore the decree that was drafted in favour of the petitioner, as though it was a suit for mortgage, was defective. The trial Court corrected the mistake committed by it. The order under revision does not warrant interference. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed. It is, however, left open to the petitioner to recover the suit amount by instituting execution proceedings, as in the case of a money decree. There shall be no order as to costs.