Judgment :- The present petition coming on for admission is heard at length in view of the petitioner not choosing to deposit the rent or arrears of rent prior to the presentation of the revision petition. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner is the respondent in an eviction petition filed by the owner of the premises, who is none other than the father-in-aw of the respondent. It was this petitioner’s case before the trial Court, in which the eviction petition is pending, that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant. The trial Court having arrived at a finding that there exists a jural relationship of landlord and tenant, the petitioner seeks to prefer this revision petition. 3. The petitioner, however, has not chosen to deposit any arrears of rent. When the petitioner was called upon to deposit the arrears of rent, which the respondent-landlord seeks to claim as rent, the counsel for the petitioner contends that a plain reading of Section 45 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, would not mandate that any such pre-deposit ought to be made in a revision petition being preferred before this Court under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, since, Section 45 prescribes that a tenant shall be in a position to contest the eviction petition or to prefer or prosecute a revision petition under Section 46 against the order made by the Court on an application under Section 27 alone and that since, the present revision petition is sought to be preferred against an order passed under Section 43, there is no requirement of the petitioner making any such pre-deposit in seeking to prosecute the revision petition. In this regard, the counsel for the petitioner would seek to place reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of T.V. Usman .Vs. Food Inspector, Tellichery Municipaliy ( AIR 1994 SC 1818 ) and in particular would seek to place reliance on the following passage therein:- “In Craies” Statute Law, VIII Edn. at page 262 it is stated thus: “It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. at page 262 it is stated thus: “It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. That in each case you must look to the subject-matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory.” The Counsel would also seek to place reliance on another decision, of this court in B. Chikkanna Vs. N. Narsingha Rao And Others (ILR 1996 KAR 2970) particularly paragraph 18, which reads as follows: “18. It is rule of interpretation well established that, where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence (Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, P.229). The Court will interpret a statute as far as possible, agreeably to justice and reason and that in case of two or more interpretations, one which is more reasonable and just will be adopted, for there is always a presumption against the law maker un-intending injustice and unreason. The Court will avoid imputing to the Legislature an intention to enact a provision, which flouts notions of justice and norms of fair play, unless a contrary intention is manifest from words plain and unambiguous. A provision in a statute will not be construed to defeat is manifest purpose and general values which animate its structure. It is the duty of Courts to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what commonsense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the Courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided. Courts should not be astute to defeat the provisions of an Act whose meaning is, on the face of it, reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act, or any part of it, can be recast. It must be possible to spell the meaning intended for out of the words actually used.” Having regard to the object of the Act, a person, who is arrayed as a respondent-tenant in an eviction petition is bound to pay the rent and continue to pay the same. The tenant seeking to raise the contention that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant is one of the defences that may be set up in contesting the petition. This does not preclude the tenant from making the deposit of rent. Even assuming that till such time that the trial Court takes a decision on the application, which is again on a prima-facie test of relationship of landlord and tenant, and the respondent who has set up such a defence is precluded from making such a deposit temporarily. If the application is allowed in his favour and the parties are relegated to a Civil Court as provided under Section 43, then the liability of paying the rent would not arise. But when the respondent who is held, prima-facie, to be a tenant, seeks to challenge that finding by way of a revision petition he would necessarily have to deposit the rend claimed. For otherwise, it would enable such a person to have the luxury of prosecuting the revision petition and possibly stalling further proceedings before the trial Court, which is not the object of the Act. The very decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner would support this proposition. 4. A plain reading of Section 45 would indicate that this is the object. Therefore, the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that since the words employed in the Section would indicate that it is only if a revision petition is preferred against an order under Section 27, that would require the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent cannot be accepted. Therefore, the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that since the words employed in the Section would indicate that it is only if a revision petition is preferred against an order under Section 27, that would require the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent cannot be accepted. If this interpretation is given to the Section, then in that event it would lead to unjust results. As for instance, if the petitioner has suffered an interim order for payment of arrears of rent before the trial Court, which may not be an order under Section 27, the petitioner would yet be enabled to file a revision petition against the said order without depositing the arrears of rent. Hence, the object of the Section is to disentitle the person who is in occupation of the premises and who is said to be a tenant, from contesting any original petition or prosecuting a revision petition without depositing or paying the arrears of rent or the current rent. Therefore, there is no doubt that the petitioner is required to deposit the rents claimed by the landlord before the trial Court in the event that he wants to prosecute the present revision petition. The petitioner admittedly not being in a position to pay the huge arrears of rent claimed, that is required to be deposited, the petition is rejected as not maintainable.