JUDGMENT ARUNA SURESH, J. (1) An unknown girl, aged about eight years was noticed by police official sitting near police post, Durga Puri Chowk on 7.6.2003 at about 1.40 a.m. Information was accordingly sent through wireless to Police Station Shahdara. This information was recorded in DD No.87B Ex.PW-l/A by H.C. Nasir Abbas (PW-1). Asi Krishan Pal (PW-4) was entrusted with the investigation of this case. (2) Asi Krishan Pal along with Const. Ajay Kumar went to Durga Puri Chowk and recorded the statement of the said girl. The said girl disclosed her name as V. (the actual name of the prosecutrix is not disclosed to maintain her dignity). In the complaint Ex.PW-4/B she disclosed that her parents had died in Bangalore when she was very young, that she along with her elder brother Murli came to Delhi and were living on platform No. 1, New Delhi Railway Station along with their grandmother (Daadi) and one lady named Roza. About 2-3 days prior to lodging of the complaint Roza made her to sit in an auto in which a boy was also sitting. Roza told that boy to drop her somewhere. The said boy took her to his house in Gali No. 5. The said boy took her inside a room on the first floor of the house where she stayed for the night. On that night the said boy seeing her alone asked her to be quiet on the point of knife, removed her clothes, gagged her mouth and raped her. When he left her alone and came downstairs, she also came downstairs and ran away to the place from where she was recovered. On this statement Asi Krishan Pal made his endorsement Ex.PW-4/C and sent the rukka to the police station for the registration of the case. FIR No. 205/2003 under Sections 363/376 IPC was registered at Police Station Welcome. (3) Appellant was arrested on 8.6.2003 at 9.10 p.m. by Asi Rajbir Singh (PW-12). (4) Asi Krishan Pal could not contact the relatives of the prosecutrix at New Delhi Railway Station. He contacted Child Help Line Care and got the prosecutrix medically examined through lady Asi Renu (PW-3). Asi Rajbir Singh recovered the knife and seized the same vide Ex.PW-8/F. He also got bony age of the prosecutrix determined by way of ossification examination and her age was found to be between 6 to 8 years. He contacted Child Help Line Care and got the prosecutrix medically examined through lady Asi Renu (PW-3). Asi Rajbir Singh recovered the knife and seized the same vide Ex.PW-8/F. He also got bony age of the prosecutrix determined by way of ossification examination and her age was found to be between 6 to 8 years. The appellant was charged for having committed offences under Sections 363/376 IPC on 28.1.2004 and he was put to trial. (5) The learned ASJ found the appellant guilty of having committed offence under Sections 363/376 IPC vide his judgment and order dated 14.10.2005 and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and also to pay a fine in the sum of Rs.5000/-, in default simple imprisonment for one year. (6) Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order dated 14.10.2005 this appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging his conviction for the above said offences and also the quantum of sentence inflicted upon him. Prosecutrix is the most material witness in this case. Besides her testimony, MLC Ex.PW-3/A and CFSL report Ex.PW-12/E and F and the testimony of Const. A. Parashad (PW-2) translator are other material evidence for the prosecution which need due consideration and deliberation. (7) At the time of the incident prosecutrix did not know Hindi. The investigating officer Asi Krishan Pal, therefore, took the assistance of Const. A. Parashad, the translator to record her statement on 8.6.2003 at 8.00 a.m. Const. A. Parashad has categorically deposed that as the prosecutrix was unable to express herself in Hindi, therefore, whatever she stated in Telegu was translated by him in Hindi. The prosecutrix as PW-5 has also deposed that her statement Ex.PWr4/B was recorded by the police after her recovery with the help of a translator. (8) However, at the time when she was examined in the court on 13.1.2005 i.e. after about two years of the date of the incident she had made her statement in Hindi as she had learnt Hindi during her stay at Children Home for Girls, Department of Social Welfare, Nirmal Chaya Complex. She was sent to the Children Home by the court for the simple reason that her family members could not be located or traced out by the investigating officer at New Delhi Railway Station, nor he could get proper assistance from the prosecutrix about the details of her family members and their place of residence. She was sent to the Children Home by the court for the simple reason that her family members could not be located or traced out by the investigating officer at New Delhi Railway Station, nor he could get proper assistance from the prosecutrix about the details of her family members and their place of residence. Undisputedly she belonged to Bangalore from where she along with her brother came to Delhi after the death of her parents and started living at the Railway Station. She was an orphan girl. She remained at Children Home for Girls since 11.6.2003 i.e. after her recovery till 12.4.2009 when her custody was finally handed over to her maternal grandparents on our directions issued on 27.2.2009. During her stay at the Children Home she was given proper education and she had passed out Vth class when her custody was handed over to her maternal grandparents at Village Vankat Gin. District Chittur. Andhra Pradesh with the assistance of the local police. Prosecutrix in her statement as PW-5 has deposed:- "About one year back I was residing at Bangalore. My father Badshaw as well as mother Malika had died. I was brought by my brother Murli to Delhi. We were residing at plat-form No. 5 at New Delhi Railway Station. My grand-mother was also living with us. One Roza was also living there. Roza made me to sit in a auto-rickshaw around 1.00 p.m. along with a boy i.e. accused present in court. (The witness has pointed out towards the accused) I do not remember his name now. He took me to his house. The gate of his house was of green colour. The accused sent his wife out of the room, inserted cloth in my mouth, gagged it and committed rape with me. The accused had also pointed out a knife to me. I felt pain at my private part and I was left alone in the house. Thereafter I came outside after jumping the small wall of the house. The police met me and my statement was later on recorded after getting the help of a translator. My statement Ex.PW-4/ B bears my thumb impression at point 'A. Now I have learnt Hindi and I am making my statement in Hindi language today. (At this stage a packet sealed with the seal of CFSL Calcutta is opened). The police met me and my statement was later on recorded after getting the help of a translator. My statement Ex.PW-4/ B bears my thumb impression at point 'A. Now I have learnt Hindi and I am making my statement in Hindi language today. (At this stage a packet sealed with the seal of CFSL Calcutta is opened). One salwar Ex.P- 1 which was seized by the police vide memo Ex.PW-3/B is the same which I was wearing at the time of rape. I pointed out the place of rape to the police. Now I do not know the name of the accused." (9) From her testimony it is clear that she was a young girl on the date of the incident when she was raped by the appellant. Being a young girl, she has described the instance of rape in the manner in which she could possibly explain it without mincing any words. She identified the appellant as the boy who had raped her. She also identified her salwar Ex.P-1 which was found to have semen stains on serological examination by CFSL, Calcutta in its report Exs.PW12/E and F. (10) Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that an adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the prosecution under Section 114 of the Evidence Act for withholding the evidence of neighbours. Roza. Murli and grandmother of the prosecutrix and also the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (as per the testimony of investigating officer.) Non examination of Roza and Murli as well as the grandmother of the prosecutrix stands fully explained on the record. Roza who was living with the prosecutrix, her brother and grandmother at the Railway Station could not be traced out. Similarly, Murli, the brother of the prosecutrix and her grandmother could not be located by the investigating officer despite search at the Railway Station. Even otherwise examination of these three persons by the prosecution would not have yielded any fruitful results as they are not the witnesses to the incident. No inference, therefore, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act can be drawn against the prosecution for withholding the evidence of Roza, Murli and grandmother as well as the neighbour who probably was narrated the incident by the prosecutrix. No inference, therefore, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act can be drawn against the prosecution for withholding the evidence of Roza, Murli and grandmother as well as the neighbour who probably was narrated the incident by the prosecutrix. (11) Asi Rajbir Singh in cross-examination though stated that he got the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. subsequently deposed that he did not get the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Under the circumstances when the prosecutrix did not know Hindi and could not converse in Hindi, the possibility of her statement being recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is minimized. The Investigating Officer stating wrongly that he got her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C, may be for failure of memory due to lapse of time or under misconception of fact. Since no such statement was recorded, it cannot be said that prosecution has withheld the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as there existed none. (12) It is further submitted that from careful scrutiny of the testimony of the prosecutrix it is obvious that entire incident had taken place in the house of the appellant, he had sent his wife outside the room and thereafter he raped the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix came out of the house after having been raped and jumped the small wall of the house in a single day which is at material variance with the prosecution case. He submitted that in her cross-examination the prosecutrix contradicted herself when she said that she did not tell the name of the accused to the police and the wife of the accused alone was present in the house. She did not remember about the Galat Kaam and she did not know what the accused did to her. According to him, the discrepancies as highlighted by him are inherent contradictions and without any corroboration her testimony cannot be relied upon as it seems to have been made under threat of investigating officer. We do not find the contradictions as highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant as inherent contradictions or material discrepancies causing dent to the prosecution case. The prosecutrix was examined in the court after about two years of the incident. She was a young child of about eight years of age at the time of the incident. We do not find the contradictions as highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant as inherent contradictions or material discrepancies causing dent to the prosecution case. The prosecutrix was examined in the court after about two years of the incident. She was a young child of about eight years of age at the time of the incident. With the lapse of time her memory was bound to fade a little. Therefore, the variations in the examination and cross-examination of the prosecutrix are natural. (13) The prosecutrix has fully supported the prosecution case in material particulars. (14) Learned counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice certain overwriting of the word 'torn' in place of 'hymen intact' and the fabrication of signatures of Dr. Sonal which according to him are clearly visible. Therefore, according to him the MLC has been fabricated on behest of the investigating officer. Dr. Sonal is the signatory of the MLC of the prosecutrix. She could not be examined by the prosecution as she had left the hospital. However, this MLC has been proved in evidence by Dr. Richa Aggarwal (PW-13) who identified the handwriting and signatures of Dr. Sonal on the MLC. (15) DR. Richa Aggarwal in her cross-examination admitted that there is overwriting and it is initialed. She identified the signatures/initials of DR. Sonal on the overwriting at point 'B' in the MLC. This overwriting pertains to the word 'torn' which was written on the word 'intact'. To clarify the correction/overwriting made, the word 'torn' is also mentioned above the overwriting in brackets. (16) Perusal of the MLC Ex.PW-3/A suggests that the scribe of the document had been making various corrections at various places including the name of the prosecutrix, her religion, her entry regarding status and the name of the doctor appearing as MO/SR suggesting that the scribe of the document, prepared at 2.45 a.m., was not careful in making the entries properly. The opinion of the doctor that hymen 'torn' initialed by Dr. Sonal after overwriting cannot be ignored or side away with simply because, initially the word 'intact' was written and thereafter there was an overwriting on this word when word 'torn' was written. The overwriting is in the hand of the same person with the same pen and ink who has prepared the MLC. We find no reason to disbelieve the opinion of the doctor under these circumstances. The overwriting is in the hand of the same person with the same pen and ink who has prepared the MLC. We find no reason to disbelieve the opinion of the doctor under these circumstances. It is not essential that in a forceful sexual intercourse there has to be an injury and bleeding per-vagina and also that hymen must also have a tear. Similarly, perennial tear sometimes may not occur in rape cases. In small children the hymen is not usually ruptured. Dr. Sonal did find vagina moist and erythematous. In other words the doctor found the redness of skin of the vagina which could be as a result of injury or irritation. (17) On examination the doctor found nail marks on the neck of the prosecutrix. Such marks are possible when the victim offers resistance when she is sexually assaulted. Doctor's opinion as per the MLC clearly indicates that the prosecutrix was ravished on the intervening night of 7-8/6/2003 by the appellant. (18) Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to develop a theory that it was the taxi driver who had raped the prosecutrix as is indicative from the MLC itself but, the investigating officer Asi Rajbir Sing who had earlier arrested one Yasin, the taxi driver, released him on acceptance of Rs.5000/-. Since the appellant failed to meet the demand of Asi Rajbir Singh, he was falsely implicated. However, these submissions do not lead us anywhere. There is no evidence on record to indicate that Asi Rajbir Singh had earlier arrested Yasin, the taxi driver and released him on receipt of Rs.5000/- or that he had demanded Rs.50,000/- from appellant's mother for his release. Once the core of the prosecution case is proved, these small probabilities are of no consequence. (19) In a rape case conviction of the offender can be based on the sole testimony of the rape victim may be a child provided it inspires confidence of the court. In a rape case the testimony of the victim is vital and seeking corroboration of her statement relying upon the same as a rule would amount to adding insult to injury unless the court finds compelling reasons requiring corroboration of her statement. (20) In this case the testimony of the prosecutrix inspires full confidence in the court. In a rape case the testimony of the victim is vital and seeking corroboration of her statement relying upon the same as a rule would amount to adding insult to injury unless the court finds compelling reasons requiring corroboration of her statement. (20) In this case the testimony of the prosecutrix inspires full confidence in the court. Her testimony read with the opinion of the doctor in the MLC and the serological report Exs.P.W- 12/E and F of the CFSL. which indicate presence of human semen on the salwar of the prosecutrix clearly brings home the guilt of the appellant that he raped a young girl of eight years of age who was an orphan and was living on the platform. This is not a case where the prosecutrix or any of her family members had gone to the police station to lodge a complaint against the appellant. It was the police officer who had found her sitting near police post, Durgapuri Chowk at the dead of the night. She was rescued by the police officers and was got medically examined. (21) It is pertinent that her statement was recorded, by the investigating officer Asi Krishan Pal only after her medical examination when it revealed that she had been ravished by someone. It was the prosecutrix who in her statement had given the detail description of the house, its surroundings and the gali number. Not only this, she led the police to the house of the appellant and identified him. It was on her identification that the appellant was arrested. She also identified the appellant in the court. (22) The trial court, therefore, rightly held that it was the appellant who had raped the prosecutrix after providing her shelter in his own house unconcerned with the feelings of his wife. For the reasons discussed above, we find no merits in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed. 1971 CRLJ 1378 DELHI HIGH COURT Pritam Singh Safee, J. SHRI MADAN M. BEHL AND ANOTHER VERSUS NATIONAL SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION Criminal Misc. No. 264 of 1971, Decided on : April 28, 1971. ORDER This a petition preferred under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was on the 17th of March 1971, that I disposed of Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 136 of 1970. 2. No. 264 of 1971, Decided on : April 28, 1971. ORDER This a petition preferred under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was on the 17th of March 1971, that I disposed of Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 136 of 1970. 2. The explanation is contained in this petition as to in which circumstances Shri R. C. Chopra, counsel for the respondent could not be present on that date. The ultimate prayer is that the ex parte order dated the 17th of March, 1971, quashing the proceedings initiated by the complaint dated the 11th of May, 1970, against the petitioners in the aforementioned main petition be set aside. 3. Mr. N. S. Sistani, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Criminal Misc. (Main) No. 136 of 1970, who is the counsel for the respondents in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 264 of 1971, has raised a preliminary objection that the relief sought by the present applicants cannot be granted. His contention is that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code for setting aside an order which may have been passed ex parte. He has referred in the first instance to U. J. S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 . 4. For a correct appreciation of the questions of law arising before the Supreme Court it became necessary to be conversant with what is contained in paras 8 to 15 of that judgment. The court was considering as to what would happen in a case when a criminal revision is disposed of in limine and then an application is moved under Section 439(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called "the Code") praying that the sentence imposed be enchanced. In paragraph 10 of the judgment the Supreme Court made a detailed reference to the view point presented by the different Judges constituting the full Bench, the judgment whereof was reported as Emperor v. Atta Mohammad, AIR 1945 Lah. 130. Mahajan, J. (as he then was) pointed out in his judgment that the amendment bringing in Sub-section (6) of Section 439 of the Code in its present shape gave a new and unlimited right to the subject. That was so because the Judge hearing the application for enhancement was bound to give an opportunity to the accused person to urge that the conviction itself was untenable. That was so because the Judge hearing the application for enhancement was bound to give an opportunity to the accused person to urge that the conviction itself was untenable. For that purpose the Bench dealing with an application under Section 439(6) of the Code was to go into the facts. His view was that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction was a matter of mere favour and a dismissal in limine of a revision petition amounted only to refusal to look into the record and was not a judgment as contemplated by Section 369 of the Code, which is :- "369. Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force or, in the case of a High Court by the Letters Patent or other instrument constituting such High Court, no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error." 5. The observations contained in AIR 1955 SC 633 or the provision, quoted above, do not touch the prayer before me which in substance is that no hearing having been given to the respondent before making the order dated the 17th of March, 1971, a hearing should be given. This is the grievance. 6. Mr. Sistani has next relied on Ramautar Thakur v. State of Bihar, AIR 1957 Pat 33 . It was observed by that High Court :- "There is no statutory provision for restoration of a criminal revision application dismissed for default. The power to restore such a case must therefore, be an inherent power, which is saved by the provisions of Section 561-A. Section 369 does not apply to an order passed by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction." 7. No controversy arises permitting any confusion in the present case. It was not a criminal revision which was disposed of by the order dated the 17th of March, 1971. That itself was a petition under Section 561-A of the Code. The petition with which I am dealing at present is likewise a petition under Section 561-A. 8. The third case relied upon by Mr. Sistani is Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh v. Devireddi Nagi Reddi, AIR 1962 AP 479 (FB). That itself was a petition under Section 561-A of the Code. The petition with which I am dealing at present is likewise a petition under Section 561-A. 8. The third case relied upon by Mr. Sistani is Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh v. Devireddi Nagi Reddi, AIR 1962 AP 479 (FB). The learned Judges noticed the position of law as it stood earlier to the decision made by the Supreme Court in Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376 , and then quoted the observations made by the Supreme Court in that case in paragraph 31 of their judgment. The observations so made by the Supreme Court, while considering Section 561-A of the Code, deserve to be noticed here :- "It is obvious that this inherent power can be exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically mentioned in the section. This inherent power naturally cannot be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code. It cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. It is only if the matter in question is not covered by any specific provisions of the Code that Section 561-A can come into operation, subject further to the requirement that the exercise of such power must serve either of the three purposes mentioned in the said section ........ It is only when the High Court is satisfied either that an order passed under the Code, would be rendered ineffective or that the process of any Court would be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured that the High Court can and must exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A." 9. It is clear that in a given case where the High Court is persuaded that the situation involved breach of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise satisfied that to secure the ends of justice it would be appropriate to give a hearing, the High Court may give a hearing to eliminate the grievance. 10. To be more explicit, the opportunity given for a hearing would not per se amount to the altering of the judgment, which may have already been passed. If the question of altering the judgment arises after giving the hearing the situation will then be dealt with in that context. 11. 10. To be more explicit, the opportunity given for a hearing would not per se amount to the altering of the judgment, which may have already been passed. If the question of altering the judgment arises after giving the hearing the situation will then be dealt with in that context. 11. In this case a complaint was filed against six persons. Two of them had moved Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 136 of 1970. That petition was accepted by the order dated the 17th of March, 1971. In order to satisfy my judicial conscience I have given an opportunity to Mr. R. C. Chopra to address me on the merits. The learned counsel has taken me through paragraphs 3 to 6 of the complaint. He has also referred to other parts of the complaint and has drawn my attention to the allegations contained in para 10 thereof. Paragraph 3 of the complaint is to the effect that a hire purchase agreement was executed between the complainants and accused Nos. 1 and 2, who were carrying on the manufacturing work in partnership as a small scale unit under the name and style of Messrs. Ideal Heat Treatment Electrical Furnace Company at 8/34, Najafgarh Road, Industrial Area, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi. In paragraph 5 it was alleged that accused No. 3 Shri T. C. Gandhi, who was a financier to accused Nos. 1 and 2 was acting as an agent for and on behalf of the hirers accused Nos. 1 and 2 and was in that capacity dealing with the complainants. 12. There is no allegation anywhere in the complaint that there was any privity of contract between Shri T. C. Gandhi and the complainants. In paragraph 6 it is stated that it was accused No. 3 who gave sub-lease of the machinery to accused nos. 4 to 6. There was no authority in accused No. 3 and as such he could not competently create any sub-lease. I have already observed in the order dated the 17th of March, 1971, that an illusory abetment cannot be utilised in order to bind in a group of some accused persons for purposes of a criminal trial. It need not be emphasised that the order dated the 17th of March, 1971, is confined to the complaint dated the 11th of May, 1970. 13. It need not be emphasised that the order dated the 17th of March, 1971, is confined to the complaint dated the 11th of May, 1970. 13. The learned counsel has read out Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code :- "405. Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits 'criminal breach of trust'." The ingredients of the foregoing provision must be established in order to bring home the guilt to any person who may be accused of an offence either under Section 406 or 409 of the Code. 14. The learned counsel has referred to clause (Thirdly) of Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code :- 107. A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First. Instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly. Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing or Thirdly, Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 15. I do not find anything in the complaint, which may be said to be constituting a specific averment within the meaning of clause (Thirdly). In order to substantiate the submission Mr., Chopra has firstly cited Mavuthalayan v. Emperor, AIR 1934 Mad. 721 . The observation relied upon is :- "A person who knowingly aids in the disposal of stolen property falls under the third definition under Section 107 and is an accomplice." An "accused" and an "accomplice" fall in different categories in the eye of law. Before a person can be punished, he must be held to have committed an offence. For that purpose he would be accused before the court that he has committed a particular offence. That offence will have to be proved against him in the course of the trial. An 'accomplice' may not be an 'accused' person. Before a person can be punished, he must be held to have committed an offence. For that purpose he would be accused before the court that he has committed a particular offence. That offence will have to be proved against him in the course of the trial. An 'accomplice' may not be an 'accused' person. To secure the conviction of an abettor particular acts like "knowingly aiding in the disposal of stolen property", will have to be firstly alleged and then proved. 16. The case really in point, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Chopra, is Indu Bhushan Ghosh v. The State, AIR 1950 All. 639 . After going through the facts of that case it becomes visible that both Mr. Ghosh and Mr. Ram Sewak, mentioned in paragraph 12 of the judgment stood in a particular relationship. They were to perform different actions. The measurements taken at the spot as noticed in paragraph 4 of the judgment disclosed that erroneous entries had been made in the measurement books and the pits mentioned therein, did not exist at all. Both the appellants before the High Court had performed certain actions in order to complete the crime. It was not a case of mere abetment. Looking at the judgment in detail I am confirmed in my view that in case of an allegation that a person is liable to be punished because of his having abetted the commission of the crime, specific allegations ought to be made against him and proved in the course of the trial to bring home the guilt to the accused regarding the manner in which he may have abetted the commission of the crime. What is observed by the Allahabad High Court in the case referred to above is : "As to the contention of Ram Sewak's learned counsel that he merely signed the bills because they had already been signed by Ghose and Snayal, it does not execuse Ram Sewak at all. What is observed by the Allahabad High Court in the case referred to above is : "As to the contention of Ram Sewak's learned counsel that he merely signed the bills because they had already been signed by Ghose and Snayal, it does not execuse Ram Sewak at all. If a person joins another in the commission of a crime by which he is to benefit and which it would not be possible to commit but for his aid, he is guilty of the commission of the crime." Unless it is shown that the commission of the crime was not possible without the specific aid rendered by the person he would not be liable for being convicted in terms of the forgoing observation. In this case it was open to Mr. T. C. Gandhi, accused No. 3, to give an imaginary sub lease to anyone. Accused Nos. 4 and 5, whose case was dealt with while disposing of Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 136 of 1970, were necessarily not the only persons to whom a void sub-lease could have been granted. It passes comprehension how accused No. 3, could grant any consequential sub-lease to any person. After giving a detailed hearing to Mr. R. C. Chopra in every aspect of the case, I am confirmed that the order passed on the 17th of March, 1971, should stand. That order is limited to its own scope. The Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 264 of 1971 is dismissed. Any other petition otherwise pending will not be prejudiced by this order. The complainants will be at liberty to continue proceedings against accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6. Order accordingly.