Judgment K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, C.J. This petition has been preferred by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association and another seeking a declaration that Sees. 4 and 20 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, insofar as they confer absolute unguided power in the matter of framing rules for appointment to the post of President of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by the State Government, are ultra vi res, unconstitutional, and also for a declaration that Rule 3(I) of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Rules, 1982, empowering to appoint Secretary to the Government of Gujarat as President of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, is ultra vires and void and also for a direction to fill up the post of President by a qualified Judicial Officer in consultation with the High Court under Art. 234 of the Constitution of India. 2. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (for short 'the Tribunal') was established under Sec. 3(1) of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, (for short 'the Act'). Sub-section (2) of Sec. 3 enables the State Government to appoint the President and such number of other members in the Tribunal. Section 4 empowers the State Government to lay down rules prescribing the qualifications of the President and other members constituting the Tribunal, the term of their office and their conditions of service. Section 20 of the Act empowers the State Government to frame rules in consistence with the provisions of the Act and for carrying out the provisions of the Act. 3. State Government in exercise of powers conferred under Sec. 20 of the Act framed Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Rules, 1982, (for short 'the Rules'), laying down the qualifications of the President and members of the Tribunal, period of their office, terms and conditions of their service and also qualifications of the Registrar and Deputy Registrars. 4. Mr. Jitendra M. Patel, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the power conferred on the State Government under Rule 3(i)(iii)(a) empowering it to appoint a Secretary to the Government as President of the Tribunal is ultra vires the rule making powers conferred on the State Government under Sec. 20 of the Act, and would defeat the purposes and object of the Act. Learned Counsel submitted that the above-mentioned rule empowers the Government to appoint a person who has no judicial experience as the President of the Tribunal, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act as well as the purposes for which the Act was enacted, and has to be declared as unconstitutional. Learned Counsel submitted that the Tribunal for all practical purposes discharges the functions of a Civil Court, and hence, it be treated as part of the judicial system, therefore, the appointment of the President of the Tribunal can be effected only after consulting the High Court under An. 234 of the Constitution. 5. Learned Counsel took us elaborately through the powers and functions conferred on the Tribunal under the Act as well as under various statutes enumerated in the First Schedule to the Act and other related legislations. Relevant provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, Forest Act, 1927, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 and Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 were referred to. Learned Counsel submitted that the powers which are being exercised by the Tribunal were the powers once exercised by the Civil Courts and disputes which come up before are disputes of a civil nature. Learned Counsel submitted that the Tribunal has been entrusted with the duty of deciding the matters judiciously whether they are disputes between an individual and State or between' the individuals. Learned Counsel submitted that the Tribunal is a Court for all practical purposes, and it performs the judicial functions of the State, therefore, the person who mans it should be a judicial officer. Learned Counsel submitted that the constitutional requirement of an independent judiciary must apply to all institutions that administer justice, and hence, it requires the application of Art. 234 of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that the constitutional requirement of an independent judiciary was not followed in the matter of appointment of a Secretary to Government as President of the Tribunal as also no concurrence was obtained from the High Court under Art. 234 of the Constitution of India. 6. Mr. Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General appearing for the State, defended the rule which enables the State Government to appoint a Secretary to Government, retired or serving, as President of the Tribunal. 6. Mr. Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General appearing for the State, defended the rule which enables the State Government to appoint a Secretary to Government, retired or serving, as President of the Tribunal. Learned Advocate General submitted that the President and members of such a specialized Tribunal are not part of 'judicial service' of the State as dealt with under Arts. 233 to 237 of the Constitution, and as such, there is no illegality in constituting the Tribunal consisting of judicial and administrative members. Learned Advocate General submitted that State Government is well within its rights and powers to constitute the Tribunal and appoint a Secretary to Government as President to the Tribunal, who has requisite experience in dealing with various revenue laws. 7. The Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, was enacted to constitute a Revenue Tribunal for the State of Bombay, to invest it with jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revise decisions in certain cases, to abolish corresponding bodies in any part of the State, and to provide for matters connected therewith, and it repealed the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1939, (for short 'the Act of 1939'), which did not provide for the post of President as such, but power was conferred on the rule-making authority. Rule 4(1) of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Rules, 1939, (for short 'Rules of 1939'), prescribed the qualifications for the post of President, which stated that the President should be a person who had officiated as a Judge of a High Court or had served as such or exercised the powers of a District Judge or Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, for a period of not less than ten years and had retired from service of the Crown in India. In the year 1941, Rule 4(1) of Rules of 1939 was amended by the Government Notifications dated 5-12-1940 and 22-9-1941, and Rule 4(1) prescribed that the President should be a person who had officiated as a Judge of a High Court or had served as, or exercised the powers of a District Judge or Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, for a period of not less than ten years and had retired from the service of the Government of India or the Government of any State. It is pertinent to note that while introducing the Bill, which ultimately became the Act of 1939, the then Revenue Minister had stated in the Assembly that the Tribunal should consist of three members, of whom the President should be of the status of a retired High Court Judge or a District Judge of not less than 10 years standing (vide Debates in Bombay Legislative Assembly dated 18-4-1939, page 3092 and O. 3097). In May, 1957 Rule 4(1) was substituted which enabled the rule-making authority inter alia to appoint a Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Legal Department and the Remembrance of Legal affairs as President or the Tribunal. Later, the Act of 1939 was substituted by the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. 8. Tribunal has been constituted under Sec. 3 of the Act and sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 says that the Tribunal shall consist of the President and such number of other members as may be appointed by the State Government. Section 9 refers to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which states that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain and decide appeals from and revise decisions and orders of officers, not below the rank of a Collector or Deputy Commissioner, in respect of cases arising under the provisions of the enactments specified in the First Schedule. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 10 says that the Tribunal shall also have no jurisdiction in respect of a matter which in its opinion involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of the invalidity of which in its opinion is necessary to the disposal of that matter. Section 15 says that if at any stage in any proceedings before the Tribunal it appears to the Tribunal that the proceedings raise a question, as to the interpretation of a law, and which is of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to issue notice to the State Government, the Tribunal shall issue notice to that Government and that Government may, if it thinks fit, appear and the Tribunal shall then hear the State Government before deciding the question. 9. 9. Section 13(1) says that the Tribunal will have the powers of a Civil Court which provision reads as follows : "13(1) In exercising the jurisdiction conferred upon it by or under this Act, the Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, affirmation or affidavit, of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, of compelling discovery and the production of documents and material objects, requisitioning any public record or any copy thereof from any Court or office, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents, and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Secs. 195, 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and its proceedings shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Secs. 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. (2) In the case of any affidavit to be filed, any officer appointed by the Tribunal in this behalf may administer the oath to the deponent." Section 20 deals with rule-making powers which reads as follows : "(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Ofticial Gazette, make rules consistent with the provisions of this Act for carrying into effect the purposes of this Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, such rules may provide for the following matters, namely : (a) the qualifications of the President and. other members of the Tribunal; (b) the period of office and the terms and conditions of service of the President and other members of the Tribunal; (c) the qualifications of the Registrar and Deputy Registrars; (d) any other powers of a Civil Court which may be vested in the Tribunal. (3) Such rules shall be subject to the condition of previous publication." 10. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Rules, 1982, were framed by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred under Sec. 20 of the Act. Rule 3 is the rule with which we arc concerned in this case and we extract the same hereunder in its entirety : "3. (3) Such rules shall be subject to the condition of previous publication." 10. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Rules, 1982, were framed by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred under Sec. 20 of the Act. Rule 3 is the rule with which we arc concerned in this case and we extract the same hereunder in its entirety : "3. Qualification of President and Members of Tribunal - (I) The President shall be a person who has not attained the age of 65 years, and (i) Who is or has been a Judge of a High Court, or (ii) Who is an Advocate qualified to be a Judge of a High Court, or (iii) Who has, for a period of not less than three years, held the office, or as the case may be, exercised the powers of - (a) The Secretary to the Government of Gujarat; (b) The Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad; (c) A District Judge; (d) The Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad; (e) A Member of the Industrial Court constituted under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946; (t) A Member of the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; or (g) A Member of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. (2) A Member shall be a person who has not attained the age of 65 years, and - (a) Who is holding or has held an office not lower in rank than that of- (i) A Collector; (ii) A Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat; (iii) A District Judge; (iv) An Assistant Judge, or a Civil Judge (Senior Division) appointed under the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869, or a Civil Judge holding an equivalent office under any other law for the time-being in force; or (b) Who is an Advocate or attorney of the High Court, or a legal practitioner entitled to practise before Courts other than the High Court under any law relating to legal practitioners for the time-being in force in this State, has practised for not less than five years in any Civil Courts or before the Tribunal, and is, in the opinion of the State Government, well versed ill revenue and tenancy laws." 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that Sec. 4 read with Sec. 20 authorising the State Government to frame rules prescribing qualifications for the President and Members of the Tribunal confer absolute, unguided and uncanalised powers on the State Government and are unconstitutional on account of excessive delegation of legislative power, without any guidelines, safeguards and criteria and also violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel raised a contention that Revenue Tribunal is a Civil Court exercising original and appellate jurisdiction, and the person presiding over it ought to be termed a District Judge, as envisaged under the inclusive definition of the term contained in Art. 236. Therefore, the appointment to the post of the President of the Revenue Tribunal ought to be made only after consultation with the High Court as provided under Art. 234 of the Constitution. It is also submitted that the post of President of the Revenue Tribunal is a part of the judicial service of the State, and is therefore, covered by the provisions contained in Arts. 234 and 235 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention placed considerable reliance on the Apex Court's decision in State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners Association & Ors., 1998 (2) GLR 1079 (sq. Reference was also made to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat & Anr., 1998 (2) GLR 1135 (FB). 12. Learned Advocate General placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. K. Mohanlal & Anr., JT 1998 (4) SC 110, has submitted that the Tribunal constitutes a composition of judicial and administrative members and absence of a provision requiring consultation with the Chief Justice of High Court will not make the rule unconstitutional. Learned Advocate General submitted that the Tribunal as such would not form part of a judicial system. Further, the Tribunal's order can always be questioned under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned Advocate General also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in V. K. Majotra v. Union of India & Ors., 2003 (8) SCC 40 , and submitted that a judicious mix of judicial members and those with grass-root experience be welcomed. 13. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned Advocate General also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in V. K. Majotra v. Union of India & Ors., 2003 (8) SCC 40 , and submitted that a judicious mix of judicial members and those with grass-root experience be welcomed. 13. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has been constituted to entertain and decide appeals from and revise decisions and orders of officers, not below the rank of a Collector or Deputy Commissioner, in respect of cases arising under the provisions of the enactments specified in the First Schedule. First Schedule of the Act refers to Sees. 37(2), 39A, 43, 46, 47, 51, 61, 79A, except Clause (b) thereof, of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and the said provisions were extended to Kutch area of State of Bombay and Saurashtra area of State of Bombay. It also refers to Sees. 11, 12, 15 and 16 of the Forest Act, 1927, and also Saurashtra area of State of Bombay. Now, those areas have been merged in the State of Gujarat, and therefore, those areas also come within the jurisdiction of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Sub-section (3) to Sec. 37 states that any suit instituted in any Civil Court after the expiration of one year from the date of any order passed by the final appellate authority (may be Revenue Tribunal) then the suit be dismissed if it is brought to set aside such an order. The above provision indicates the jurisdiction exercised by the Revenue Tribunal is akin to that of a Civil Court. 14. In this connection, we may also refer to Sec. 117KK of the Code which refers certain matters to the Revenue Tribunal for its opinion. Section 117L says that the opinion of the Revenue Tribunal along with settlement report be laid on the table of the State Legislature and a copy thereof shall be sent to every Member and the report shall be liable to be discussed by a resolution moved in the State Legislature. 15. Revenue Tribunal has also been conferred with power to adjudicate disputes which arise from the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Section 75(1) of the Act states that an appeal against the award of the Collector made under Section 66 may be filed to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. Section 75(1) of the Act states that an appeal against the award of the Collector made under Section 66 may be filed to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 75 says that in deciding appeals preferred under sub-sec. (1), Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall exercise all the powers which a Court has and subject to the regulations framed by the Tribunal under the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, follow the same procedure which. a Court follows in deciding appeals from the decree or order of an original Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 76(1) of the Act says that notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 an application for revision may be made to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the said Act against any order of the Collector except an order under Sec. 32P or an order in appeal against an order under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 32G. Section 80 says that all inquiries and proceedings before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sees. 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 85 deals with bar of jurisdiction. It says that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in appeal or revision. It is also stated in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 85 that no order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 85A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act further provides that if any suit instituted before or after the specified date in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or dealt with such issues under the said Act, the Civil Court shall stay the suit refer such issues to such competent authority for determination. 16. We may now refer to various provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960. This Act was enacted to fix a ceiling on holding agricultural land and to provide for the acquisition and disposal of surplus agricultural lands. 16. We may now refer to various provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960. This Act was enacted to fix a ceiling on holding agricultural land and to provide for the acquisition and disposal of surplus agricultural lands. Chapter VI of the Act deals with procedure, appeals and revision. Section 36 says that any person aggrieved by the award made by the Tribunal under Sec. 24 or by the Collector under Sec. 28 may appeal to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, 1957. Sub-section (3) of Sec. 36 says that in deciding such appeal, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall exercise all the powers which a Court has and follow the same procedure which the Court follows in deciding appeals from the decree or order of the original Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 38 says that notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, an application for revision may be made to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the said Act against any order of the Collector. Section 47 deals with bar of jurisdiction. It says that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Section 48 says that all inquiries and proceedings before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sees. 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. 17. In this connection, we may refer to certain provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The Act has been enacted to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of Bombay which extends to the State of Gujarat. In exercise of powers conferred under Sec. 84 of the Act, the Government of Bombay has framed the Bombay Public Trusts (Gujarat) Rules, 1961. Section 51 of the Act provides for consent of Charity Commissioner for institution of suit. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 51 says that if the Charity Commissioner refuses his consent to the institution of the suit under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 51, the person may file an appeal to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. References made to Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has been dealt with in Chapter XI of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 51 says that if the Charity Commissioner refuses his consent to the institution of the suit under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 51, the person may file an appeal to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. References made to Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has been dealt with in Chapter XI of the Act. Section 71 deals with appeal to Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which says that appeal to the Tribunal under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 51 against the decision of the Charity Commissioner refusing consent to the institution of the suit shall be filed within 60 days from the date of such decision in such form and shall be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed and that the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and conclusive. Section 74 says that all inquiries and appeals shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sees. 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 76 says that save insofar as they may be in consistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, will apply to all proceedings before Court under this Act. Section 80 deals with bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts. It says that no Civil Court can deal with any question which is by or under this Act to be decided or deal with by any officer or authority under this Act in respect of which the decision or order of such officer or authority has been made final and conclusive. 18. We have already referred to Sec. 13(1) of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, which also says that in exercising the jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall have all powers of a Civil Court as enumerated therein and shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all purposes of Sees. 195, 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and its proceedings shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sees. 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. 19. We have elaborately dealt with the provisions of the above-mentioned legislations only to show that various disputes which arise for consideration before the Tribunal are indisputably disputes of civil nature which were earlier resolved by the ordinary Civil Courts before the establishment of the Revenue Tribunal. 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. 19. We have elaborately dealt with the provisions of the above-mentioned legislations only to show that various disputes which arise for consideration before the Tribunal are indisputably disputes of civil nature which were earlier resolved by the ordinary Civil Courts before the establishment of the Revenue Tribunal. Civil action is an action brought to enforce redress or protect or a civil right. Such an action is initiated by a party against another for the enforcement or protection of private right. It can be against a private party or a• party suing or being sued by the State. Court or Tribunal created for deciding such disputes must be considered to be Civil Court notwithstanding the fact that they are created by special statutes. Such Court includes all Courts of a civil judiciature whose procedure is in essence governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Revenue Tribunal is expected to decide various issues between individuals and between State and individuals. But for the constitution of the Tribunal, when parties' rights are infringed or invaded, the aggrieved parties would have approached the ordinary Civil Courts, which are instrumentalities of the State invested with the judicial power of the State and their authority \vas derived from the Constitution of India and from the Act constituting them. Revenue Tribunal exercising such powers is obviously part of the ordinary hierarchy of Court of judicature maintained by the State under the Constitution exercising judicial power of the State whether such bodies are called as Courts or Tribunals. Such Tribunals are very much like those of ordinary Courts discharging judicial functions though it is not called as a Court. Such bodies have all the trappings of a Court and perform the same functions which were originally discharged by Civil Courts. Generally, a Tribunal of such a nature has to satisfy the test for qualifying them to be elevated to the status of a Court and it should function as judicial authorities being invested with the judicial power of the State enabling them to resolve disputes between the parties and settling lis between them. They should also follow the essential procedural provisions, which are normally followed by judicial authorities. Further, the decisions they render would be final and binding between the parties. 20. The Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Act satisfies all the above tests. They should also follow the essential procedural provisions, which are normally followed by judicial authorities. Further, the decisions they render would be final and binding between the parties. 20. The Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Act satisfies all the above tests. When we examine the functions of the Tribunal, Revenue Tribunal, as already indicated, is invested with the judicial power of the State which was originally exercised by the Civil Courts. Civil Courts now cannot exercise those powers because of the bar of jurisdiction under various legislations referred to earlier. The Tribunal derives its authority from the statute, the nomenclature does not matter, but the substance that matters. It adjudicates upon disputes between parties and delivers binding judgments. A finality has been attached to their decisions and those decisions cannot be called in question in any Civil Court. The legislations referred to herein before and the statute by which the Tribunal was created clearly show that the powers vested on the Tribunal are similar to those exercised by an ordinary Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit. Further, it is also stated specifically that the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all purposes of Secs. 195, 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and its proceedings shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Secs. 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. We, therefore, hold that the Revenue Tribunal have all the trappings of a Court and is entrusted with the functions which are of civil nature. 21. We have already held that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in true sense of the term is a Court and now the question is whether the Presiding Officer of such Court can be said to hold a post in judicial services of the State as defined under Art. 236 of the Constitution of India. The expression District Judge referred to therein covers Civil Judges, judges of number of special Courts and Tribunals which are being set up to deal with specific cases which are ordinarily dealt with by the ordinary Civil Courts. The term 'District Judges' would now have to be inclusive of specialised Courts, such as Labour Courts, Industrial Courts, Tribunals, etc. in the hierarchy of the Courts. The term 'District Judges' would now have to be inclusive of specialised Courts, such as Labour Courts, Industrial Courts, Tribunals, etc. in the hierarchy of the Courts. When the Tribunal discharges its judicial functions to resolve disputes of a civil nature, it is highly necessary that they should be independent of the Executive, making sure that persons from non-judicial service, such as police, excise, revenue, etc. be not considered eligible for appointment as District Judges and as such fall within the expression of judicial service. Judicial service contemplates exclusively a judicial post, and recruitment of such judicial officers is required to be made in accordance with Art. 234 of the Constitution of India. 22. The above proposition has the support of the rulings of the Bombay High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners Association, Bombay & Ors., 1986 (4) SLR 759, wherein the Court dealt with the scope of Arts. 233, 234 and 236 vis-a-vis the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The Bombay High Court held that the definition of 'District Judge' in Art. 236(a) is an inclusive definition, and covers a large filed. It includes every conceivable functionary of similar status in what was ordinarily regarded as hierarchy of Courts, but is still only inclusive in nature, which suggests that the framers of the Constitution contemplated the inclusion within the definition of 'District Judge' of functionaries outside, what was ordinarily regarded as the hierarchy of the Courts. Confirming the Bombay High Court judgment, the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association & Ors., 1998 (2) SCC 688 : 1998 (2) GLR 1079 (SC), held that the Judges of Labour Courts and Industrial Courts belong to judicial service and their appointments will have to be made in consultation with the High Court as provided under Art. 234 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court in the above judgment was referring to the definition and expression of 'District Judge' and held as follows : " 10. ... With an increase in the numbers of specialised Courts and Tribunals which are being set up to deal with specific kinds of civil litigation which would otherwise have been dealt with by the ordinary Civil Courts, we now, have a number of specialised Courts exercising different categories of civil original jurisdiction. ... With an increase in the numbers of specialised Courts and Tribunals which are being set up to deal with specific kinds of civil litigation which would otherwise have been dealt with by the ordinary Civil Courts, we now, have a number of specialised Courts exercising different categories of civil original jurisdiction. It can be specialised civil original jurisdiction pertaining to Labour and Industrial disputes specified in the relevant Acts as in the case of Labour and Industrial Courts, or it could be pertaining to recovery of bank debts and so on. The structure of Civil Courts exercising original jurisdiction is no longer monolithic. The Judge of the Principal Civil Court heading the concerned set of Courts under him and exercising that jurisdiction can also fall in the category of a "District Judge" by whatever name called. Learned Single Judge and learned Judge of the Division Bench, have therefore, held that an Industrial Court is a Civil Court exercising civil original jurisdiction; and the person presiding over it could well be termed as a District Judge. The term "District Judge" should not be confined only to the Judge of the Principal Civil Court in the hierarchy of General Civil Courts. The term would now have to include also the hierarchy of specialised Civil Courts, such as a hierarchy of Labour Courts and Industrial Courts. The fact that the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the Sessions Judge were also included in the definition of "District" Judge indicates that a wide interpretation is to be given to the expression "District Judge". The extensive definition of a District Judge under Art. 236 is indicative of the same." Apex Court finally concluded that the Government cannot appoint as District Judges persons from services other than judicial services such as police, excise, revenue, etc. Dealing with the definition of 'judicial service' in Art. 236, the Apex Court held that the judicial service consists only of persons intended to fill up the posts of District Judges and other civil judicial posts and that is an exclusive service only consisting of judicial officers. 23. In the State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Dealing with the definition of 'judicial service' in Art. 236, the Apex Court held that the judicial service consists only of persons intended to fill up the posts of District Judges and other civil judicial posts and that is an exclusive service only consisting of judicial officers. 23. In the State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. K. Mohanlal & Anr., JT 1998 (4) SC 110, the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the constitutional validity of Sec. 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, and held that because the Members of the Special Court can be appointed by the Government without consulting the Chief Justice of the State, the Special Court is an unconstitutional Court, since its members do not enjoy the same degree of independence as the members of the higher judiciary. However, Court expressed the view, that since the appointment of the Chairman has to be in consultation with the Chief Justice, it will go a long way towards securing the kind of independence that one is looking for in such a Special Court. The principles laid down in the above-mentioned decision, would apply to the facts of the present case considering the nature of functions to -be discharged by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. We are of the view that when the post of President of such a Tribunal is filled up, it is necessary that the person, who holds the post of President, should be an officer, who fall within the definition of a District Judge under Art. 236 of the Constitution of India. In such an event, the procedure laid down under Art. 234 has to be followed. 24. We are, therefore of the considered view that the functions, which are being discharged by the Tribunal, were once exercised exclusively by the civil Courts, and hence, the person presiding over the Tribunal can only be termed as a 'District Judge' under Art. 236 of the Constitution of India, and hence, the necessity of getting concurrence from the High Court under Arl. 234 of the Constitution of India. 25. 234 of the Constitution of India. 25. We may also in this connection refer to Sec. 15, which states that if at any stage in any proceedings before the Tribunal it appears to the Tribunal that the proceedings raise a question, as to the interpretation of a law, and which is of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to issue notice to the State Government, the Tribunal shall issue notice to the Government and the Government may, if it thinks fit, appear and the Tribunal shall then hear the State Government before deciding the question. Above-mentioned provision will show that the Act has vested considerable power on the Tribunal to decide the question as to the interpretation of a law which is of such a nature and of such public importance and the same to be decided after issuing notice to the Government, and if a Secretary to Government is to man the Tribunal, we fail to understanding how effective he would be as President of the Tribunal in deciding such a question of law and public importance, especially when the interest of an individual is pitted against the interest of the State Government. Further various issues, which come up for determination before the Tribunal have intrinsically interrelated with personal laws of the parties, such as succession, inheritance and the interpretation of various provisions of Hindu Law, Mohammedan Law and other related legislations. Interpretation of the provisions of transfer of property relating to testamentary disposition, gift, exchange, etc. may also come up. Several complicated and complex legal issues often come up for determination before the Tribunal, which requires considerable legal knowledge and experience. Secretary to the Government without any sound knowledge on those legislations will find it extremely difficult to decide those issues and justice may be the casualty. 26. Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done. Secretary to Government, while in office must have imbibed consciously or unconsciously some pre-dispositions or interest in the subject, which is called upon to decide as an adjudicator at the Tribunal. As President of the Tribunal he cannot develop the same kind of neutrality and objectivity towards the issues. A reasonable man, in such situation, has enough cause to feel concerned about the objectivity of the Secretary to Government as the adjudicator. As President of the Tribunal he cannot develop the same kind of neutrality and objectivity towards the issues. A reasonable man, in such situation, has enough cause to feel concerned about the objectivity of the Secretary to Government as the adjudicator. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has to decide several cases, in which State Government has vital interests. A Government Secretary who has served the Government for a number of years, would also have an institutional bias, especially, when the appointing authority itself is the Government. Government cannot be a judge of its own cause. The Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, therefore, rightly stipulated that the appointment of the President of the Special Court be made only in consultation with the Chief Justice. 27. Provisions of Sec. 20 of the Act oblige the State Government to frame rules which are consistent with the provisions of the Act for carrying out the purposes of the Act and Rule 3(1)(iii)(a), according to us, is not consistent with the provisions of the Act or would not aid in carrying out the purposes of the Act and the duties and functions conferred on the Tribunal under various legislations referred to by us hereinbefore in this judgment. Necessity of posting a Judicial Officer as President of the Tribunal was also highlighted while the original bill was introduced in the Bombay Legislative Assembly, which would indicate the purpose and object of legislation. 28. The above being the factual and legal position, we are of the view that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has also the trappings of a Civil Court and the President who man the Tribunal can only be a Judicial Officer, a District Judge, and hence, concurrence of the High Court is necessary under Art. 234 of the Constitution of India. 29. Consequently, the State Government ought to have followed the procedure laid down under Art. 234 of the Constitution of India, which having not been done. we are inclined to strike down Rule 3(1)(iii)(a) conferring the power on the State Government to appoint a Secretary to Government as President of the Tribunal, which in our view, is beyond the rule-making powers of the State Government, and therefore, held ultra vires the provisions of the Act. Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. we are inclined to strike down Rule 3(1)(iii)(a) conferring the power on the State Government to appoint a Secretary to Government as President of the Tribunal, which in our view, is beyond the rule-making powers of the State Government, and therefore, held ultra vires the provisions of the Act. Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. Learned Advocate General made a request for stay of the judgment for a period of four weeks after pronouncement of the judgment. Considering the importance of the questions involved, prayer for stay of the judgment for a period of four weeks is granted. (SBS) Petition allowed.