K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) AN interesting question of law that has come up for consideration in the writ petition is whether clause 10. 10. 1 of the regulations framed by the Ahmedabad urban Development Authority (for short "the AUDA') in pursuance of the provisions contained in clause (m) of sub-Section (2)of Section 12 and clause (c) of sub-Section (2) of Section 13 of the Gujarat Town planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, (for short the Town Planning Act'), would amount to deprivation of property within the meaning of Article 300-A of the constitution of India'. Further question is whether the building plan has to be sanctioned applying the law applicable on the date of submission of application or its consideration'. Further question is "whether ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was justified in insisting to keep 20% land open under clause 26 while sanctioning the building plan, and whether the principle of estoppel would apply to such a stipulation, since it was accepted by the petitioner'. ( 2 ) LEARNED Single Judge did not find favour with any of the above contentions raised by the petitioner and dismissed the writ petition, against which this appeal has been preferred. ( 3 ) PETITIONER is a registered society and claims to be the owner and occupier of final Plot No. 12/1 of the Town Planning scheme No. 18 of City of Ahmedabad, admeasuring 31,102 sq. mts. (for short the land' ). The land originally belonged to one trust named Karnamukteshwar Mahadev trust, which was running a textile mill in the area in question. Textile Mills were nationalized by an Ordinance by the State of Gujarat, and the Mill in question was in the possession of the Gujarat State Textile corporation. Petitioner purchased the property in question on 18. 10. 1996 from the said Corporation. Petitioner on 13. 09. 1997 submitted a plan for putting up construction of a commercial building. First respondent - Ahmedabad Municipal corporation refused to grant development permission in exercise of powers under section 255 of the Bombay Provincial municipal Corporations Act, 1949, (for short the BPMC Act'), unless the petitioner keeps 20% of the land open. Petitioner on 13. 09. 1997 submitted a plan for putting up construction of a commercial building. First respondent - Ahmedabad Municipal corporation refused to grant development permission in exercise of powers under section 255 of the Bombay Provincial municipal Corporations Act, 1949, (for short the BPMC Act'), unless the petitioner keeps 20% of the land open. ( 4 ) PETITIONER has got a case that when the gujarat State Textile Corporation had submitted a similar application and the municipal Corporation did not insist for keeping 20% land open, therefore, petitioner maintained a stand that compelling the petitioner to keep 20% of the land open would be arbitrary and discriminatory. Petitioner further submitted that at the stage of seeking permission for development of the land under the provisions of Section 255 of of the BPMC Act, the only requirement was to maintain road margin, F. S. I. , safety measures of the buildings, distance between the buildings, and so on. It is also stated that the petitioner had purchased the land in question on the basis of a Town Planning scheme finalized in the year 1965, and construction of buildings was subject to the regulations framed under the BPMC Act. Petitioner stated that the power to vary a town Planning Scheme under the Town planning Act could have no legal consequences, unless variation was made in accordance with the provisions of the Town planning Act. Further, petitioner also stated that Municipal Corporation Resolutions nos. 33 and 384 do not intend to make a variation of the Scheme, which would be the first step in the process of variation of a town Planning Scheme. ( 5 ) MR. Prakash Thakkar, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has also made a reference to the decision of this court in Premjibhai D. Karaite @ babubhai v. Ahmedabad Municipal corporation (1996) 3 GCD 641 (Guj) and submitted that there can be no variation of a Town Planning Scheme, unless complete procedure for the same has been followed. Learned Counsel submitted that petitioner is not concerned with keeping 20% of the land open voluntarily, and the mere fact that sanction has been obtained al beit subject to clause 26 would not disentitle him from challenging such a condition, if it is not sustainable in law, and no plea of estoppel can be put against the petitioner. Learned Counsel submitted that petitioner is not concerned with keeping 20% of the land open voluntarily, and the mere fact that sanction has been obtained al beit subject to clause 26 would not disentitle him from challenging such a condition, if it is not sustainable in law, and no plea of estoppel can be put against the petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that neither Municipal laws nor Town Planning Act enable municipal Commissioner or Ahmedabad urban Development Authority (for short 'auda') to compel the petitioner to keep 20% of the land open, especially in absence of any specific provision of law to that effect. Learned Counsel submitted that clause 26 is unsustainable and violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution. Learned Senior Counsel also referred to a letter dated 20. 08. 2004 sent by the Municipal Commissioner to the officer-on-Special Duty, the Ex-officio deputy Secretary, Urban Development department, in support of his contention. ( 6 ) A detailed counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. It is unnecessary to refer to detailed facts referred to in the application as well as in the counter-affidavit as the basic facts are not in dispute. The question is "whether municipal Corporation is justified in incorporating condition No. 26 while granting sanction so as to leave 20% land open'. Reason for such stipulation has been stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the corporation and such a stipulation was agreed to by the petitioner. It is also stated that such a stipulation of 20% open land was made in public interest taking into consideration the future development of the area in question. Textile mill was housed in the land in question, and the land is situated in a very important commercial area in the heart of Ahmedabad city. Revised Draft development Plan published by AUDA has also indicated that in case of development or re-development of land of closed mills, while using the land for any permissible purpose other than the use of textile mill, the competent Authority shall enforce owners/applicants to contribute land to the competent Authority at the rate of 20% in aggregate of its plot/building unit. ( 7 ) MR. Mihir Thakore, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Municipal corporation, submitted in any view of the matter the petitioner had agreed to condition no. ( 7 ) MR. Mihir Thakore, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Municipal corporation, submitted in any view of the matter the petitioner had agreed to condition no. 26, and even assuming that there was no sanction of law as such for such a stipulation, since now the Regulations have come into force the AUDA can insist upon the applicant to contribute @ 20% in aggregate of its plot/building so as to provide for public amenities/public purpose in that area, which is applicable only in case of closed textile mills. Learned Senior counsel submitted that since the Authority has got the statutory backing to do so, there is no violation of Article 300-A of the constitution. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that first of all petitioner had agreed to the imposition of clause 26 and obtained the sanction, and even if the petitioner submits a fresh application, still petitioner will be governed by clause 10. 10. 1 of the Regulations. Under such circumstances, learned Senior Counsel submitted, the learned Single Judge has rightly rejected the petition. ( 8 ) WE are of the view, now the rights of parties can be adjudicated only by the regulations now in force. Land in question is now governed by the General development Control Regulations (for short gdc Regulations') framed by the AUDA. These Regulations have been framed by the development Authority in exercise of powers conferred on it, in pursuance of the provisions contained in clause (m) of sub-Section (2) of Section 12 and clause (c) of sub-Section (2) of Section 13 of the Town planning Act. In this case, we are concerned with a closed textile mill, which is covered by 10. 10. 1 of the GDC Regulations, which is extracted herein for easy reference: "10. 10. 1 CLOSED TEXTILES MILLS in case of development/redevelopment of land Of closed mills for any permissible purpose other than use of textile mills, the competent Authority shall enforce owners/ applicant to contribute land to the competent Authority at the rate of 20% in aggregate of its plot/building unit (Final plot) by reconstitution of such plot/building unit, so as to provide land for public amenities/public purpose in that area. The land so obtained shall not be used other than public purpose and public amenities. The land so obtained shall not be used other than public purpose and public amenities. " The above clause says that in case of development/redevelopment of land of closed mills for any permissible purpose other than use of textile mills, the competent Authority shall enforce owners/ applicants to contribute land to the competent Authority at the rate of 20% in aggregate of its plot/building unit (Final plot), by reconstitution of such plot/building unit, so as to provide land for public amenities/public purpose in that area. It has been specifically stated in the clause that the land so obtained shall not be used other than for public purpose and public amenities. The question is whether such a clause would amount to deprivation of property within the meaning of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India'. The above constitutional provision is also extracted for easy reference:"300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by Authority of law.- No person shall be deprived of his property save by Authority of law. " The scope of Article 300a r. w. Article 19 (1) (f) came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Chairman, indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure industrial Coke and Chemicals Ltd. and others [ (2007) 8 SCC 705 ]. The Apex court held that right to property is a human right and a constitutional right, but not a fundamental right, and held that every claim to property is not a property right, and control of property short of deprivation, does not entail payment of compensation. The Apex Court followed the judgement of zimbabwe Supreme Court in Davies and others v. Minister of Land, Agriculture and Water Development [ (1997) 1 LRC 123 (Zim SC)] wherein it was held that the state as sovereign had the power of eminent domain, and therefore has the right to take private property for public use at any time without having to pay compensation, unless it is supported by enactment. The Apex court in the aforementioned judgment took the view that control of property short of deprivation, does not entail payment of compensation. In Chairman, Indore Vikas pradhikaran (supra) Apex Court took the view that right to property is a legal right, and the person can be deprived by his property in accordance with law. The Apex court in the aforementioned judgment took the view that control of property short of deprivation, does not entail payment of compensation. In Chairman, Indore Vikas pradhikaran (supra) Apex Court took the view that right to property is a legal right, and the person can be deprived by his property in accordance with law. ( 9 ) IN this connection, we may also refer to the judgement of the Apex Court in jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and others v. State of Gujarat and another (1995 Supp (1) SCC 596) wherein the Apex Court interpreted the provisions taking possession of, "acquired' and 'deprivation', and took the view that the word 'law' used in Article 300-A must be an Act of parliament or State Legislature, a rule or statutory order, having force of law. The court held that deprivation of property shall be only by Authority of law, an Act of parliament or State Legislature, but not by executive fiat or an order. ( 10 ) SO far as the present case is concerned, there is no question of deprivation of property. In the case of a closed mill if the land is required for development/re-development other than the use of textile mill, the applicant has to contribute @ 20% in aggregate of its plot/ building unit so as to provide land for public amenities/public purpose in that area. There is a further stipulation that the land so obtained shall not be used for other purpose than for public purpose and public amenities. Petitioner, of course, has not challenged the validity of that provision as such. We are of the view that so far as clause 26 stands, the request of the petitioner for utilization of land cannot be permitted unless he satisfies the above mentioned clause 10. 10. 1. Further, no useful purpose will be served by striking down clause 26 so far as this case is concerned, because if petitioner wants to utilise the land, petitioner has to make a fresh application, and such an application can be considered only in accordance with the regulations which are in force on the date of consideration and not on the date of submission application. ( 11 ) APEX Court in Howrah Municipal corporation and others v. Ganges Rope company Limited and others [ (2004) 1 scc 663 ) repelled the contention that law that is to be applied must a law that was applicable at the time submission of application for sanction. Following the decision of the Apex Court in Usman Gani j. Khatri v. Cantonment Board [ (1992) 3 scc 455 ] it was held that the building rules and regulations prevailing at the time of sanction are to be applied and not the rules and regulations existing on the date of application of sanction. So far as the present case is concerned, when the application for sanction was made, condition incorporated in clause 26 was imposed, and with open eyes petitioner had accepted that condition and carried out the construction, therefore, petitioner is stopped from wriggling out of that agreement. Over and above, we have already indicated that assuming that the petitioner wanted to utilize the rest of the land, he would be covered by the regulations which are now in force. ( 12 ) THE above being the factual and legal situation, the contention raised by the petitioner based on the provisions of Section 71 of the Town Planning Act, which is not relevant for deciding this case, is of no avail. We, therefore, find no error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge. ( 13 ) LETTERS Patent Appeal lacks merit and the same is dismissed. Consequently, civil Applications are also dismissed. (SBJ) (Appeals dismissed)