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Allahabad High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 6 (ALL)

RAM BHAJAN v. STATE OF U P

2009-01-05

TARUN AGARWALA

body2009
TARUN AGARWALA, J. Heard Sri Neeraj Tiwari, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K. K. Chand, the learned standing counsel for the respondents. In spite of service of the summons, the respondent No. 4 is not present. 2. Prior permission from the District Inspector of Schools to fill up the post was granted, pursuant to which, an advertisement was issued and the petitioner was selected. The papers of the recommendation of the selection committee was forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools for consequential approval. In the meantime, the petitioner was issued an appointment letter, pursuant to which, he joined and started working. Since financial approval was not granted, the petitioner filed a writ petition which was disposed of by an order dated 25. 4. 05 directing the Regional Committee to decide the matter. The Regional Committee by its order dated 13th September 2005 held that the selection was made in accordance with the provision and that previous permission was taken by the institution and consequently accorded financial approval. The Joint Director of Education by an order dated 19. 9. 05, directed the District Inspector of Schools to pass a consequential order. Based on the aforesaid order, the District Inspector of Schools passed an order dated 30. 9. 05 granting financial approval from the date of joining. 3. Based on the order of the District Inspector of Schools, the petitioner moved a representation praying for the payment of arrears of salary from 27. 3. 2001 on the ground that he had joined the post from 21. 3. 2001. This representation of the petitioner was rejected by the impugned order dated 22. 5. 2007. The petitioner, being aggrieved, has filed the present writ petition. 4. The bone of contention is, as to what date, the petitioner is entitled for the payment of salary. According to the learned standing counsel, the petitioner is entitled for the payment of salary from the date he joined the post after financial approval was granted. The learned standing counsel submitted that under regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, no appointment letter could be issued by the institution without obtaining previous approval from the Inspector. 5. The learned standing counsel has also placed reliance upon a decision of the Division Bench in Jagdish Singh, etc. The learned standing counsel submitted that under regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, no appointment letter could be issued by the institution without obtaining previous approval from the Inspector. 5. The learned standing counsel has also placed reliance upon a decision of the Division Bench in Jagdish Singh, etc. vs. State of U. P. and others, 2006 (3) ESC 2055 , wherein it has been held that prior approval under Regulation 101 means prior approval by the District Inspector of Schools after completion of the process of the selection and before the issuance of the appointment letter to the selected candidate. 6. In the light of this judgment, the learned standing counsel submitted that the petitioner was only entitled for the payment of salary from the State exchequer under the Payment of Salaries Act after he joined pursuant to the order of the financial approval being granted by the District Inspector of Schools. 7. There is no quarrel with the proposition submitted by the learned standing counsel for the respondents but in the present facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to agree with the submissions made by the learned standing counsel for the reasons stated herein under. 8. The petitioner no doubt was issued an appointment letter prior to the approval issued by the Regional Committee. The Act is silent with regard to the time frame to be given to the authority to grant approval or disapproval of an appointment when the Act is silent, the normal rule is that action should be taken within a reasonable period. 8. In the present case, the papers were forwarded immediately after the selection process was completed in March 2001. The approval was granted by the Regional Committee by 13. 9. 2005 only when a direction was issued by the High Court. The authorities slept over the matter, for which the Committee of Management nor the petitioner could be blamed. The entire responsibility to act timely was upon the authority which it failed to exercise within a reasonable period. Further, this Court finds that the District Inspector of Schools had issued a direction that the petitioner would be entitled for payment of salary from the date of his joining. 10. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner joined the post on 27. 3. 2001. Further, this Court finds that the District Inspector of Schools had issued a direction that the petitioner would be entitled for payment of salary from the date of his joining. 10. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner joined the post on 27. 3. 2001. The District Inspector of Schools has no where stated that the petitioner would be entitled for the payment of salary from the date of joining pursuant to the order of the financial approval. Consequently, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of being given the salary from the State exchequer under the Payment of the Salaries Act from the date when he actually joined even prior to the financial approval being granted by the Regional Committee. 11. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed and a writ of mandamus is issued commanding the District Inspector of Schools to pay the salary to the petitioner from the date when he had joined the institution on the post in question within three months from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order. .