Judgment :- The unsuccessful writ petitioner has filed this appeal, challenging the legality and correctness of the order passed in Misc.W.4285/09 in WP.No.11881/2009 dated 29.6.2009 and also the order passed in WP. No.11881/2009 dated 29.6.2009. 2. Facts leading to this case are as hereunder: As per Annexure-A tender notification dated 24.12.2008 KSRTC invited e-Tender; inviting applications both for pre-qualification and commercial offers through e-Tender process for construction of Ultra Deluxe Rajahamsa Bus Bodies on 210”/218”/222”/244” WB Chassis of 200 numbers by fixing the EMD amount of Rs.1,00,000/-and tender document fee of Rs.10,000/-. As per e-Tender notification, tender forms were to be issued between 29.12.2008 and 13.1.2009, pre bid meeting was fixed at 14.00 hours on 16.1.2009, last date for submission of tender is 23.1.2009 till 14.00 hours, opening of pre qualification cover at about 14.30 hours on 23.1.2009 and opening of financial bid at 15.00 hours on 29.1.2009. 3. Again as per Annexure-A1 a corrigendum was issued to the notification dated 24.12.2008 on 27.2.2009 reducing the quantity of buses from 200 to 100 and changing the time schedule. As per the corrigendum, pre-bid meeting was scheduled to be held on 23.3.2009 at about 14.00 hours, issuance of tender forms from 4.3.2009 to 18.3.2009 during office hours, last date for submission was up to 14.00 hours on 30.3.2009, opening of pre-qualification cover was fixed at 14.30 hours on the same day and opening of financial bid shall be on 4.4.2009 at 12.00 hours. As per Annexure-D, certain pre-qualification criteria’s were changed in the corrigendum. Therefore, in the pre-qualification meeting, writ petitioner sought for change of terms and conditions incorporated under the corrigendum on the ground that only to favour certain person, KSRTC has changed the norm by fixing that a tenderer should have constructed ultra deluxe/Hi-tech luxury coaches from 2004-05 and that it cannot participate in the tender process. A representation was also submitted on behalf of the writ petitioner requesting the KSRTC to change the eligibility criteria as per Annexure-F dated 23.3.2009. Thereafter, writ petitioner participated in e-tender. 4. On 30.3.2009, pre qualification cover was opened and the same was sent for evaluation. Subsequently, by giving a notice to all the participants, the technical bid was opened on 6.4.2009 and only R-3 was found to be eligible in pre qualification tender. Writ petitioner was found unqualified as it did not fulfil terms and conditions of the tender notification. 5. On 30.3.2009, pre qualification cover was opened and the same was sent for evaluation. Subsequently, by giving a notice to all the participants, the technical bid was opened on 6.4.2009 and only R-3 was found to be eligible in pre qualification tender. Writ petitioner was found unqualified as it did not fulfil terms and conditions of the tender notification. 5. Challenging the legality and correctness of the conditions imposed in the tender document contending that certain conditions are imposed only to favour R-3, writ petition was filed by the writ petitioner seeking the following reliefs: “a) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the clause 2(b) of the terms and conditions laid down in Annexure-B to the tender document/application pursuant to the tender notification No.KSRTC/2008-09/T-80 27.2.2009 due on 30.3.2009 issued by R-2 produced as Annexure-D. b) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction declaring that the action of R-2 in not opening the commercial bid of the petitioner. c) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing R-2 to open the commercial bid of the petitioner dated 30.3.2009 produced as Annexure-L. d) Grant such other relief that this Hon’ble court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the matter.” 6. KSRTC as well as R-3 filed detailed counter denying the allegations made in the writ petition. It was contended that the writ petition filed by the petitioner was not maintainable and that the petitioner cannot challenge the terms and conditions of the eligibility criteria as it was for the KSRTC to fix the eligibility criteria in order to get better buses in the interest of traveling public. According to KSRTC in order to get best quality of luxury buses constructed by an expert in construction of luxury buses terms and conditions of pre-qualification were revised and so also other terms and conditions and it further contended that as 200 buses were not required, it was reduced to 100, therefore corrigendum was issued in the best interests of the Corporation and not to favour either R-3 or any other persons. 7. 7. During the pendency of the writ petition on 28.4.2009, writ petitioner filed an application under Order-IV Rule-17 of CPC seeking permission of the court to amend the writ petition and the said application was numbered as Mis.W.4265/2009. The main contention in the amendment application was the very notification dated 24.12.2008 and corrigendum dated 27.2.2009 are contrary to Sec.18-A of The Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Act’) contending that in view of Sec.18A(2) of the Act as the procurement was worth more than Rs.10 lacs, without there being a valid notification issued by the Government of Karnataka to notify e-tender, Corporation had no authority to invite e-tender, therefore tender notifications questioned in the writ petition including the corrigendum were invalid and only on the said ground writ petitioner requested the court to quash the notifications. 8. It was further contended that a notification in fact had been issued by the State of Karnataka giving effect to from 16.3.2009 since notifications issued in the present case was prior to 16.3.2009 if any e-tender notification is issued by the Corporation the same has to be held to be bad in law and requested the court to allow the amendment with a liberty to include additional prayer to quash Annexure-A and A1 in accordance with law. 9. Respondents filed detailed objections to the said application; on the ground that when writ petition itself was not maintainable, question of challenging the legality and correctness of Annexure-A or A1 does not arise at all. According to Corporation, petitioner having participated in the proceedings and having realised that he has no case on merits, cannot be permitted to invoke the provisions of Sec.18a of the Act since Corporation is in the habit of calling e-tenders right from 2003 and therefore the said practice continued and even the petitioner was a beneficiary under earlier notifications. In the circumstances, Corporation requested the court to dismiss the application. 10. Learned single Judge heard the matter in detail and thereafter matter was reserved for orders. Order was pronounced on 29.6.2009. In the open court and on 29.6.2009 he has heard the Misc, Petition and rejected the application on the ground that the said petition has become infructuous on account of dismissal of the writ petition on merits. The legality and correctness of these two orders are called in question in this appeal. 11. Order was pronounced on 29.6.2009. In the open court and on 29.6.2009 he has heard the Misc, Petition and rejected the application on the ground that the said petition has become infructuous on account of dismissal of the writ petition on merits. The legality and correctness of these two orders are called in question in this appeal. 11. We have heard Sri. Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, Smt. Swetha Anand, counsel for R-1 & 2, and Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing for R-3. 12. Sri. Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has raised the following points in support of his appeal: According to him, corrigendum has been issued by changing the terms and conditions of the eligibility criteria only to avoid the appellant as it was well within the knowledge of the respondent-corporation that the appellant had earlier constructed buses of the Corporation and has supplied the same as it was within the knowledge of the Corporation that if the eligibility criteria is amended appellant cannot compete with R-3. In other words, he contends that only to favour R-3 eligibility criteria was modified and that the eligibility criteria was not modified with an intention to attract more competitors but only to avoid competition and to award contract to particular company or an individual. In other words, he contends that with a malafide intention the eligibility criteria has been amended by the Corporation. He further contends that if the commercial bid of R-3 is compared with the amount quoted by the appellant, R-3 has quoted the higher price and the difference would be not less than 2-3 crores which would result in loss of revenue to the Corporation, awarding of such contract to R-3 is not n the interest of the general public or the exchequer of the Corporation. He further contends that the learned single Judge did not consider the amendment application filed by the appellant before passing the judgment on merits. According to him, after the dismissal of the writ petition, application filed by the appellant for amendment of the writ petition is taken up and the same has been dismissed as having become infructuous in view of the order passed in the writ petition on merits. According to him, after the dismissal of the writ petition, application filed by the appellant for amendment of the writ petition is taken up and the same has been dismissed as having become infructuous in view of the order passed in the writ petition on merits. He further contends that whenever an interlocutory application is filed by a party, such application has to be disposed of before the matter is taken up for final hearing and only after the disposal of the interlocutory application, final order has to be passed. According to him, in the present case, after the dismissal of the writ petition, amendment application has been heard and dismissed as having become infructuous. Therefore, great injustice is caused to the appellant in not considering the application at an appropriate time. He further contends that if the application for amendment had been considered at an appropriate time, learned single Judge would have allowed the writ petition only on the ground of non-compliance of Sec.18A of the Act and as the provisions of Sec.18A of the Act is mandatory and the respondent had no other option than to call for fresh tender since the notification issued by the Government under Sec.18A of the Act has come into force w.e.f. 16.3.2009 as the tender notification in the instant case has been invited much prior to the issuance of the notification under Sec.18A of the Act as it was a question of law, learned single Judge was required to consider the application for amendment at the first instance and to consider the case of the parties on merits late. Due to non-consideration of the amendment application at an appropriate time he contends that great injustice is caused to the appellant and he further contends that illegality has been committed by the learned single Judge which requires interference by this court. 13. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent-Corporation Smt. Swetha Anand contend’s that the appellant has no locus standi since it is well within his knowledge that the appellant could not participate in the tender process on account of his ineligibility. According to her in the best interest of the corporation, the corporation in its wisdom has modified terms and conditions of the eligibility criteria to procure better buses in the interest of the traveling public. According to her in the best interest of the corporation, the corporation in its wisdom has modified terms and conditions of the eligibility criteria to procure better buses in the interest of the traveling public. Therefore, she contends that when the appellant was not qualified to participate in the tender, the question of approaching this court with a direction to modify the terms and conditions of the tender conditions and to grant relief to the appellant does not arise for consideration. She further contends that the petitioner, who has no right to participate in the tender since the respondent corporation is inviting tender from 2003 through e-tendering process, the appellant having been participated on earlier occasions through e-tendering, cannot contend that the present tender notification is contrary to Section 18-A of the Act. She further contends that appellant is estopped from contending that the tender notification is bad in law. 14. Similarly, the learned senior counsel Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil who is appearing for respondent No.3, also contend’s that the appellant cannot challenge the notification on the ground that the same is barred by provisions of Section 18-A of the Act. He further contends that raising of the ground under Section 18-A of the Act is belated one and it is an after thought as the appellant cannot succeed on merits on the grounds urged in the writ petition. 15. The learned counsel Smt. Swetha Anand relaying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of AIR India Limited vs. Cochin International Airport Limited and Others reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 , wherein at Para-7 it is held thus: “The award of contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial consideration. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is nor open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bonafide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bonafide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by malafides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness.’ 16. Taking us to para-7 of the said judgment she contends that in the instant case not such mala fide is urged against the respondent and the terms are modified only in the best interest of the corporation. Therefore, decision of the corporation altering the terms and conditions of the tender cannot be the subject matter for scrutiny of this Court. 17. To support she has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dhananjay Malik and Others vs. State of Uttaranchal and Others reported in (2008) 4 SCC 171 , at Para-7, which reads thus: It is not disputed that the respondent – writ petitioners herein participated in the process of selection knowing fully well that the educational qualification was clearly indicated in the advertisement itself as BPE or graduate with diploma in Physical Education. Having unsuccessfully participated in the process of selection without any demur they are estopped from challenging the selection criterion inter alia that the advertisement and selection with regard to requisite educational qualifications were contrary to the Rules.” 18. She further relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raunaq International Limited vs. I.V.R. Construction Limited and Others reported in (1999)1 SCC 492 , wherein at paragraph -11 the Apex Court held thus: “When a writ petition is filed in the High Court challenging the award of a contract by a public authority or the State, the court must be satisfied that there is some element of public interest involved in entertaining such a petition. If, for example, the dispute is purely between two tenders, the court must be very careful to see if there is any element of public interest involved in the litigation. A mere difference in the prices offered by the two tenders may or may not be decisive in deciding whether any public interest is involved in intervening in such a commercial transaction. It is important to bear in mind that by court intervention, the proposed project may be considerably delayed thus escalating the cost far more than any saving which the court would ultimately effect in public money by deciding the dispute in favour of one tenderer or the other tenderer. Therefore, unless the court is satisfied that there is a substantial amount of public interest, or the transaction is entered into mala fide, the court should not intervene under Article 226 in disputes between two rival tenderers.” 19. In another judgment of this court referred by the learned counsel for respondent-Corporation in the case of South India Corporation Limited vs the Karnataka Power Corporation Limited and Others reported in ILR 2002 KAR 3038, the Division Bench of this Court held that ‘eligibility criterion prescribed in Tender notification is not open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract.’ 20. Further, the learned counsel for respondent-corporation relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Education and others vs Educomp Datamatics and Others reported in (2004) 4 SCC 19 , at paras 12 and 14, wherein their Lordships held thus: “Para -12 It has clearly been held in these decisions that the terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny, the same being in the realm of contract. That the Government must have a free hand in setting the terms of the tender. It must have reasonable play in its joints as a necessary concomitant for an administrative body in an administrative sphere. The courts would interfere with the administrative policy decision only if it is arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias. It is entitled to pragmatic adjustments, which may be called for by the particular circumstances. The courts cannot strike down the terms of the tender prescribed by the Government because it feels that some other terms in the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical. It is entitled to pragmatic adjustments, which may be called for by the particular circumstances. The courts cannot strike down the terms of the tender prescribed by the Government because it feels that some other terms in the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical. The courts can interfere only if the policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. Para – 14 This apart SSI having a turnover of more than Rs.20 crores was the lowest bidder. Faced with the situation that the bids given by the respondents were not competitive with the bid given by SSI Limited, learned counsel for the respondents contended that because of the fall in price in the computer hardware and lowering of duty on the imports of the computers or its components the Government should invite fresh bids. It is not for us to comment as to what course is to be adopted by the appellants, in the changed circumstances attributed to lapse of time. It is for them to decide whether to continue with the tenders already floated, if necessary, by making negotiations so as to bring down the rates quoted or to invite fresh tenders. Relying upon these judgments she contended that there are no merit’s in this appeal and she requests this court to dismiss the appeal. 21. Per contra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant relying upon the judgment of this court in the case of Electronic Enterprises vs Karnataka Power Corporation Limited reported in ILR 1994 KAR 125 at para-13, which reads as follows: “There is a difference between the case where a person is excluded from an opportunity to carry on a trade, and a case where, a person is permitted to enter the competition in the field of trade. In the former case, opportunity is denied, resulting in the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution; similarly, exercise of the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1) is prevented; competition is inherent in the trade and in fact efficiency and service to the general public will increased only by a proper competition in the trade. That is why, an opportunity created to expand the scope for competition among the traders is not restrained in the exercise of Writ jurisdiction. That is why, an opportunity created to expand the scope for competition among the traders is not restrained in the exercise of Writ jurisdiction. However, if a person is not meted out an equal treatment and is denied of a fair consideration and opportunity given to one outweighs the skeleton opportunity to give to another, it may be a case of unfairness inviting Judicial scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution. For example, if the State invites competition and while considering the respective cases of the rivals, case of one of them is not looked into at all, or a different test or consideration is applied in favour of one, denying the benefit of such a consideration to another, the ultimate decision of the State selecting the favoured one would be invalid, because, such a selection is the result of an unfair process in arriving at the decision. Normally, it is not in the public interest to allow such a ‘decision taking process’ to be adopted by the State.” Contends that the purpose of modification of the terms and conditions of the order was only to exclude the appellant from competing with respondent No.3 – M/s. S.M. Kannappa Automobiles Private Limited. Therefore, this court can interfere in such decision taking process. 22. He also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of M/s. Esteco Coal Services Limited vs. The Karnataka Power Corporation Limited and Others reported in AIR 1997 Kar 220 at Para-14 and 19, which reads as follows: “Para-14. After giving my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel and the decisions cited at the Bar, I am of the view that the sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Claimant. (4) of the Tender Notification/document, Annexure-M, to the extend it is challenged before this court and indicated in the course of this order is liable to be declared as illegal and unenforceable, for the reasons set out hereunder Para-19. In the light of the decisions referred to above, if the validity of the clause impugned is examined, I am of the view that the sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause 4 of the Tender Notification/document, Annexure-M, are plainly unconstitutional as being violative of the right guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 14 of the constitution of India. The object of inviting the tenders and entrusting the work are three fold. The object of inviting the tenders and entrusting the work are three fold. Firstly, to locate or select highly proficient and competent handling agent, who will be able to execute the work as per the terms and conditions of the Tender Notification/document to the satisfaction of the 1st respondent without causing any delay or default in execution of the work; and secondly, to get the work done at a reasonably low cost, and to the best advantage of the 1st respondent and the State. Thirdly, to give an opportunity to all the eligible person or intending tenderers to submit their tenders. These three objectives can be achieved, if the range of competition to execute the work, is wider, and so long as, in the process the capability or the professional skill of a transport or handling agent is not sacrificed. Clause 3 of the Tender Notification/document, Annexure-M, referred to above, sets out the main scope of the work. The nature of the work in substance to be entrusted to the handling agent relates to transport of coal from Mahnadi Coalfields Limited, Talcher at Orissa to Raichur Thermal Power Station. Therefore, the qualification or the eligibility required to be prescribed for inviting the tenders must point out with regard to the capability, competency, availability of proficient man power and other infrastructure, and experience of transporting the coal to a long distance. Such a prescription which would ensure that the transporting or handling agent is capable of executing the work of transporting the coal, is certainly be valid and cannot be charged as either arbitrary or unreasonable, and it is not permissible for this Court to interfere against the such decision taken by the 1st respondent.” 23. Having heard the learned counsel for parties, we are of the opinion that the following points are to be considered by us in this appeal: .(1) Whether the notification inviting for tenders through e-process method by respondents 1 and 2 is contrary to Section 18-A of the Act? .(2) Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in rejecting the application filed under Order VI rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, after pronouncing of the order in the main writ petition? .(3) Whether learned Single Judge was justified in rejecting the writ petition on ground that the appellant cannot challenge the terms and conditions of the modified tender conditions? .(3) Whether learned Single Judge was justified in rejecting the writ petition on ground that the appellant cannot challenge the terms and conditions of the modified tender conditions? (4) Whether this court can interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge? 24. Mr. Udaya Holla, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submits that if points (1) and (2) are considered there is no necessity for this court to consider points No.(3). According to him if point No.(1) and (2) is held in favour of the appellant than there is no necessity for this court to consider the other points No.3 as point No.(1) and (2) would go to the root of the mater. 25. In view of this submission we have to consider at the first instance the points (1) and (2) only and if these points held against appellant then only remaining points to be considered by us on merits. Re. Points (1) and (2): So far as points (1) and (2) are concerned after institution of the writ petition an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the appellant before the learned Single Judge. In the said application the appellant intended to introduce two paragraph as Para-16A and 25A and also sought for an additional prayer. 26. Proposed amendment as Paragraph -16A reads as follows: “Para-16A The impugned tender notification is dated 27.02.2009. the said tender was by way of e-tendering mode only. The said tender notification was issued by the respondent bodies belonging to the Respondent No.1, it is submitted that chapter II-A was inserted in the Karnataka transparency in public procurement Act by Karnataka Act 13 of 2007. The said provisions came into force from 02.05.2007. By inserting the said provisions, procurement by way of e-procurement was enacted. However, for any procurement entity to resort to e-procurement S18-A of the Act specifically provides that there must be a notification issued by the State Government notifying a procurement entity and the clause of procurement, for the purpose of procuring the said clause of procurement through the e-procurement platform. In the absence of the same, any procurement entity cannot resort to e-procurement and if so resorted, the same would be without authority of law and in violation of the provisions of the Act. In the absence of the same, any procurement entity cannot resort to e-procurement and if so resorted, the same would be without authority of law and in violation of the provisions of the Act. The notification under Section 18-A (2) Act was issued in respect of the R1 corporation in respect of procurements valued at Rs.10.00 Lakhs and above, on 27.02.2009, which was given effect from 16.03.2009. Hence as on the date of the impugned notification, there was no notification under Sec 18-A of the Act issued by the State Government authorizing Respondent No.2 corporation to resort to the e-procurement. A copy of the notification dt.27.02.2009 is produced here with as ‘Annexure-T’ and the copy of the order dated 13.3.2009 passed this Hon’ble court in WP.No.5775/09 c/w produced as ‘Annexure U”. Similarly, proposed paragraph -25A reads thus: “A procurement entity cannot resort to e-procurement under the provisions of the Act, in the absence of a notification issued by the State Government under Section 18-A(2) of the Act, notifying the procurement entity and the clause of procurements. In respect of the Respondent No.1 corporation a notification dated 27.02.2009 was issued by the State Government vide Annexure – T to the writ petition, in respect of procurement of value of Rs.10.00 Lakhs and above. However the same was with effect from 16.3.2009. Hence as on the date of the impugned notification, there was no notification authorizing the R1 from resorting to e-procurement. Therefore Respondent No.2 has no authority to issue the impugned tender notification through e-procurement system. Hence the side notification vide Annexure-A and A-1 is null and void, in violation and contravention of the provisions of the Act and without authority of law. Therefore, the impugned notification vide Annexure-A and A1 is liable to be quashed.” And the additional prayer’ sought through the application, is as follows: “ISSUE a writ in the nature certiorari and other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the tender notification No. T 80 dated 24-12-2008 and a corrigendum to the above mentioned notification dated 27-02-2009 issued by the 2nd respondent, produced as Annexure-A and A1 respectively.” 27. In the proposed Para-16A and 25A, it is contended by the appellant that in view of introduction to Section 18-A of the Act of the Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act by Karnataka Act 13 of 2007, unless and until there is a specific notification issued by the Government notifying the procurement entity and the clause of procurement for the purpose of procuring the said clause of procurement through the e-procurement platform. The notification issued by the respondent –Corporation through e-procurement platform is null and void and the same is contrary to Section 18-A of the Act. According to the appellant the value of procurement in the instant case, is more than Rs.10 lakhs. This aspect of the matter is not in dispute. The notification, in the instant case, has been issued as per Annexure-A on 24-12-2008 and a corrigendum was issued on 27-02-2009. 28. Section 18-A of the Act, reads as hereunder: “CHAPTER IIA – E-PROCUREMENT. 18A. E-PROCUREMENT.- .(1) There shall be a single unified e-procurement platform for all procurement entity, which may be notified under sub-Section (2). .(2) With effect from such date, as may be specified by the Government, by notification, a procurement entity in respect of a class of procurement if any, as may be notified shall procure its procurements through the e-procurement platform. .(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Government may make rules, for specifying a separate procedure to be followed by procurement entities notified under sub-Section (2) for 3-procurement through e-procurement platform, and for non-application of other procedure of procurement to e–procurement.” 29. This section has been inserted by Act No.13 of 2007 and the same is deemed to have come into force with effect from 27-11-2006. As per this Section in order to call for tender for procurement through e-procurement platform, there shall be a notification issued by the Government and the same is mandatory. In the instant case, in regard to respondent-corporation such a notification has been, in fact, issued by the Government on 27-02-2009 under Reference No.DPAR 26 FGV 2003 (p-1), which notification reads as hereunder: “In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 18A of the Karnataka Transparency in Public procurement (Amendment) Act 2007, Government of Karnataka hereby notifies, the implementation of e-procurement through a single unified platform, for all procurements valued Rs.10.00 lakhs and above in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation with effect from 16.03.2009.” 30. From reading of the above notification it is clear that a notification under Section 18A of the Act has been issued by the Government by permitting the respondent – Corporation to procure through e-Procurement platform, with effect from 16-03-2009. In other words, it is clear that prior to 16-03-2009 the respondents 1 and 2 had no authority to call for tenders through e-tendering platform as there was no specific notification authorising the respondent –Corporation to invoke Section 18A of the Act. 31. As a matter of fact, the records produced before this Court discloses that in a similar circumstances, the legality and correctness of the e-tendering notification issued by the respondent-Corporation on 17-11-2008 and 03-01-2009 notifying tender only through e-tendering system in regard to procurement of tyres and tubes was the subject matter of the writ petition filed before this Court in W.P.No.853 & 1003-1004/2009 and other connected writ petitions and in another batch of writ petitions challenging the tender notification No.182 dated 02-03-2009 and tender notification No.179 dated 18-11-2008, in W.P. 5775/09 and other six connected matters, were filed. The learned Single Judge of this Court had an occasion to examine the legality and correctness of the e-tendering notified by the respondent – Corporation and the aforesaid two tender notification were issued through e-tendering system in order to procure tread rubber and its allied products. 32. The learned Single Judge of this Court on 13-03-2009 examining the legality and correctness of the e-tendering process issued by the respondent-Corporation at Para-8 of the order has observed that the respondent having realized the futility of defending action has filed a memo withdrawing earlier notification seeking liberty to issue fresh notification. Therefore, the writ petitions were allowed in terms of the memo and liberty was granted to the respondent – Corporation to issue fresh tender in accordance with law. 33. Sri Uaday Holla, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant relying upon the aforesaid judgments and documents filed by the respondent-Corporation contends that notification dated 27-02-2009 issued by the State of Karnataka would come into force so far as it relates to respondents 1 and 2 is concerned only with effect from 16.03.2009. 33. Sri Uaday Holla, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant relying upon the aforesaid judgments and documents filed by the respondent-Corporation contends that notification dated 27-02-2009 issued by the State of Karnataka would come into force so far as it relates to respondents 1 and 2 is concerned only with effect from 16.03.2009. Since on the date of Annexure-A and A1 dated 24-12-2008 and 27-02-2009, as the respondents 1 and 2 were not empowered to invoke e-tendering process in the present case has to be set aside or quashed only for want of notification as on the date of Annexure-A and A1. 34. The learned senior counsel further contends that the learned Single Judge having heard the writ petition on merits has pronounced an order on 29-06-2009 on merits without considering the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. According to him if the learned Single Judge had taken paid to consider the application to amend some of the paragraphs in the writ petition and the prayer, he would not have dismissed the writ petition, on the other hand he would allowed the writ petition on account of non-fulfillment of Section 18-A of the Act. 35. According to him the amendment application is rejected on the ground that it has become infructuous in view of dismissal of the writ petitions. He further contends that normally whenever application is filed for amendment of writ petition the said application has to be considered at first instance and thereafter matter has to be heard on merits finally. Since the procedural mistake is committed by the learned Single Judge in not considering the interlocutory Application in the first instance and dismissing the application as having become infructuous, such an order has to be interfered by this court in this appeal. 36. The counsel for the respondent – Corporation contends that in view of the notification dated 27-02-2009 authorising the respondent – Corporation to go for e-procurement process through a single unified platform, even though notification in this case is earlier to 27-02-2009, as a regular process of issuance of tender form had not been commenced as the same has been commenced subsequent to 27-02-2009 notification. This court has to hold that there was a valid notification authorising the respondent – Corporation to procure through e-tendering process. 37. This court has to hold that there was a valid notification authorising the respondent – Corporation to procure through e-tendering process. 37. She further contends that interlocutory application as well as the writ petition were heard together by the learned Single Judge and on the same day application was rejected. Therefore, the grounds urged by the appellant shall not be accepted by this court. 38. In this background we have to examine whether the interlocutory application is rejected as having become infructuous or has been rejected on merits. If interlocutory application has been dismissed without considering the same on its merit, what would be the effect on the order passed in W.P.No.11881/2009 and whether the notification dated 27-02-2009 issued by the Government authorising the respondent – Corporation to modify the e-processing system, which could come into effect from 16-03-2009. 39. We have given our anxious consideration to the order passed on the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 and also the order pronounced in W.P.No.11881/2009. On a careful consideration of the grounds urged in the original pleadings and in the amendment pleadings, the learned Single Judge was required to consider two points. If the amendment application had been allowed then it was imperative on the part of the learned Single Judge to consider whether e-processing, which was called in question, which has been issued by the respondent-Corporation, was with or without authority of law. If learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion that notification in the instant case, was issued without any authority as contemplated under Section 18-A of the Act, in such an event the writ petition had to be allowed and notification had to be quashed only on the ground of non-fulfillment of Section 18-A of the Act and if learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the respondents 1 and 2 had authority to issue e-tendering procurement, in such an event the dismissal of the writ petition on other ground would stand on a different footing. In such an event there was no occasion to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. 40. In such an event there was no occasion to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. 40. But, in the instant case, two points were to be considered by the learned Single Judge, one is, in regard to validity of the notification and another is in regard to merits of the appellant’s contention in excluding him from participating by modifying the tender conditions. The judgement pronounced by the learned Single Judge only deals with maintainability of the writ petition questioning the modification of the tender notification. In view of the various judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent – Corporation, we are also of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has not erred in dismissing the writ petition in regard to the authority of the respondent land 2. But unfortunately, the learned Single Judge has not dealt with the authority of the respondent – Corporation in inviting tender without there being any notification as contemplated under Section 18-A of the Act. 41. Therefore, we have to consider whether the learned Single Judge has committed an error in dismissing the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil procedure as having become infrucutuous, is just and proper? 42. An Interlocutory application is filed seeking consideration before the final disposal of a case. The Courts should therefore consider such interlocutory applications at the earliest point of time. It is only as a matter of exception and based on the facts and circumstances of the case that an interlocutory application could be considered at the stage of final disposal of the case for reasons to be recorded. In the instant case the Learned Single Judge has filed to take note of the existence of the interlocutory application. It is only after the Judgement was pronounced that, the order on the interlocutory application was passed separately. This would imply that not only at the stage of final arguments but also while pronouncing the judgment, the learned single Judge has not considered the same. 43. The procedure adopted by the Learned Single Judge in rejecting the interlocutory application as having become infrucutous due to the final disposal of the case is not only erroneous but is opposed to the basic principles of Jurisprudence. 43. The procedure adopted by the Learned Single Judge in rejecting the interlocutory application as having become infrucutous due to the final disposal of the case is not only erroneous but is opposed to the basic principles of Jurisprudence. We would reiterate that all applications filed during the pendency of a case would necessarily have to be considered at the earliest point of time. The procedure adopted by the learned Single Judge in finally hearing the matter without considering the pending application is not only erroneous but a procedural irregularity. The Courts are duty bound to consider all interlocutory applications before the consideration of the final case on merits. Exceptionally the same may be considered at the stage of final hearing for reasons to be recorded. The failure to consider the application before passing an order on merits is erroneous. The procedure adopted by the learned single Judge is erroneous and opposed to law. 44. In view of the amendment to the Act and insertion to Section 18-A of the Act, as it is mandatory on the part of the Government and other statutory corporation to procure through e-processing system only from the date of notification issued by the State of Karnataka. In the Instant case, the notification is issued on 27-02-2009 but the said notification has come into effect only from 16-03-2009. In regard to earlier notification to procure tread rubber and allied products, this court has taken a view that earlier tender notification as bad in law and rightly on his say if the respondent – Corporation has quashed the e-notification. But in the instant case, as on the date of Annexure-A and so also on Annexure-A1, there was no notification authorising the respondent – Corporation to procure through e-procurement platform. When there is no authorisation as provided under Section 18-A of the Act which is mandatory, we are of the view that learned Single Judge has committed an error in rejecting the application for amendment and dismissing the said application as having become infructuous without considering the legal consequences of inviting tender through e-procurement without there being any authorization as required under Section 18-A of the Act. 45. In is no doubt true that the appellants have participated in the tender process, it is open for the appellant to challenge the legality and correctness of the notification as contrary to Section 18-A at the first instance. 45. In is no doubt true that the appellants have participated in the tender process, it is open for the appellant to challenge the legality and correctness of the notification as contrary to Section 18-A at the first instance. The learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 contends that the appellants having participated in the tender process and at later stage cannot contend that the notification is bad in law in view of Section 18-A of the Act. In other words, she contends that appellant is estopped from contending notification as bad in law. 46. Mr. Uday Holla, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contends that there cannot be any estoppal against the statute, when there is clear violation of the statute the respondents 1 and 2 cannot contend that on account of participation of appellant the appellant cannot challenge the legality and correctness of the notification. 47. We have considered the rival arguments submitted by respective Advocates. It is no doubt true that appellant had participated in the tender process, but at the same time when there is violation of the statute, we are of the opinion that there cannot be any estoppal against any parties. Therefore, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in rejecting the amendment application without considering the same on merits. We are also of the opinion that the tender notification issued as per annexure-A and A1 by the respondent – Corporation is in clear violation of Section 18-A of the Act, as there is no notification issued by the State of Karnataka as on Annexure-A and A1 authorising the respondent – Corporation. The notification issued on 27-02-2009 would come into force only with effect from 16-03-2009. Therefore, when notification has been issued earlier even though tender document has been issued subsequent to 27-02-2009, it cannot cure the defect, as the notification itself is one without jurisdiction. 48. In the circumstances, we answer the points 1 and 2 in favour of the appellant. In view of our finding on Points 1 and 2, we are of the opinion that there is no necessity for us to consider the other points. 49. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.11881/2009 dated 29-06-2009 and also the order passed in Misc.W.No.4265/2009 in W.P. No.11881/2009 are hereby set aside. 49. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.11881/2009 dated 29-06-2009 and also the order passed in Misc.W.No.4265/2009 in W.P. No.11881/2009 are hereby set aside. The writ petition filed by the appellant is hereby allowed. The notification issued by the respondents 1 and 2 as per Annexure-A and A1 dated 24-12-2008 and 27-02-2009, are hereby quashed. Liberty is granted to the respondent-Corporation to call for fresh tender in accordance with the Government notification dated 27-02-2009 under Ref.No.DPAR 26 EGV 2003 (p-1). Parties to bear their costs.