Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—The present petition has been preferred by the petitioner seeking challenge to the action of the respondent Corporation under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). 2. Heard Mr. Joshi appearing with Mr. Majmudar for the petitioner and Mr.Shelat appearing with Mr. Dave for the respondent Corporation. 3. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that no reasons are mentioned in the decision which is impugned in the present petition inasmuch as the ongoing proposal by other financial institution and the debt restructuring formula is not taken into consideration. It has also been submitted that the action is unreasonable and therefore, would be arbitrary inasmuch as both, GSFC and GIIC are only having 2.75% share in the loan transaction, whereas of other financial institutions viz. ARCIL, SBI and others are having majority shares. ARCIL is having share of 84.05 and it has also requested by GIIC to not to take action by on series of letters. In spite of the same, the action is taken and therefore, it would be unreasonable and would not meet with the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that there is lack of bona fide on the part of the GIIC in taking action inasmuch as there are multiple proceedings initiated by respondent Corporation for recovery of the amount on one ground or the another. Therefore, it has been submitted that the action may be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Whereas on behalf of the respondent Corporation, it has been submitted by Mr.Shelat, learned Counsel that as stated in the detailed affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent Corporation, number of times opportunities were given to make the payment of the outstanding loan amount, however, no payments have been made. It has been stated that as on today, GIIC has to recover the amount of Rs. 1247.15 lac as the arrears. Therefore, the action has been initiated under Section 29 of the Act. It has also been stated in the affidavit-in-reply at Paragraph 23 that there are peculiar circumstance showing the financial condition of the petitioner as under:— “(a) The project was conceived in 1996-97 but is commissioned in 2006. 1247.15 lac as the arrears. Therefore, the action has been initiated under Section 29 of the Act. It has also been stated in the affidavit-in-reply at Paragraph 23 that there are peculiar circumstance showing the financial condition of the petitioner as under:— “(a) The project was conceived in 1996-97 but is commissioned in 2006. The cost of copper in 1996-97 was between 1700$ per tonne to 2000$ per tonne which is 8000$ per tonne in the year 2006. The company is not running to its capacity. The utilization capacity as on today is 25% to 30% only. (b) The working capital required is to the extent of Rs. 600 crores while the company does not have more than Rs. 200 crores working capital. The working capital of Rs. 200 crores is negligible for running the project. (c) The ICICI has assigned its debt to ARCIL at a very low price/consideration and has thus walked out as a creditor knowing fully well that the petitioners cannot repay their debt and leaving it to the ARCIL. (d) The value of equity shares has gone down to Rs. 3 to 5 which was at one stage Rs. 29 in the year 2006-07. (e) It is obvious that ICICI lost their confidence of the Company being viable and therefore has walked out in the Balance Sheet the net loss for the period from 1st April, 2008 to 31st December, 2008 comes to Rs. 16,398 lac and carried forward loss comes to Rs. 49,057.41 lca. The net worth is eroded to more than 50% and the capacity utilization is less than 30%.” 5. It has been, therefore, submitted that GIIC has taken action under Section 29 of the Act. It has been stated that when huge amount is to be recovered, the respondent Corporation is justified in taking action. Therefore, this Court may not interfere. 6. Having considered the above, it deserves to be recorded that it is an admitted position that the loan is taken by the petitioner company and the amount is outstanding and is payable by the petitioner to the respondent Corporation. If the attempt has been made on the part of the respondent Corporation to recover the amount by exercising the statutory power, such an action can hardly be said as unreasonable or lacking bona fide as sought to be canvassed by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. If the attempt has been made on the part of the respondent Corporation to recover the amount by exercising the statutory power, such an action can hardly be said as unreasonable or lacking bona fide as sought to be canvassed by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. The attempt to contend that the other Bankers or the financial institutions are agreeable for a different arrangement of restructuring the debt, whereas GIIC is not agreeable for restructuring the debt, even if to be considered, cannot be read to nullify the statutory power for enforcement of the recovery under Section 29 of the Act. It deserves to be recorded that in a matter to transaction of loan, once the agreement is entered into the obligation as per the contract is created and the obligation is to be discharged. It is true that in a given case the creditor may, out of its commercial/banking wisdom, may reschedule the payments or extend the benefits by entering into a new agreement, but such can hardly be asserted as of right, nor, if denied, can be said as unreasonable. Whether to extend the financial financial benefits or to restructure the debt or to grant further benefits by providing additional benefits or otherwise are essentially the question to be decided by the Corporation having availability of its resources and the obligation to pay the amount to other financial institutions or the Government from whom it may be getting the funds. This Court cannot sit in appeal over such commercial/banking wisdom or the decision of the financial institutions in capacity as the creditor. 7. Further, it can hardly be insisted by any of the debtors by invoking the principles of reasonableness upon the creditor by contending that since some of the creditors have agreed for making particular arrangement, the same may also be accepted by another creditor, who is desirous to enforce recovery of the outstanding debt. The said aspect is coupled with the circumstances that there is already a statutory power as per the Scheme of Section 29 of the Act, which begins with non-obstacle clause. Therefore, when statute has expressly authorised the enforcement of the recovery by exercising the power under Section 29 of the Act, such principles of reasonableness cannot be embodied on the premise that the other creditors have extended the restructuring the debt or otherwise. Therefore, when statute has expressly authorised the enforcement of the recovery by exercising the power under Section 29 of the Act, such principles of reasonableness cannot be embodied on the premise that the other creditors have extended the restructuring the debt or otherwise. It deserves to be recorded that when the power is so vested in any of the creditors, may be GIIC in the present case by statute, such power cannot be diluted or nullified by any other process except provided by the statute. The case of the petitioner is not that any scheme of arrangement for restructuring of the debt of the company is undertaken and the process is on and at that stage the action is taken to nullify the other statutory process of restructuring the debt. But the case of the petitioner is that merely because some creditors, may be majority, have agreed for restructuring of the debt, all creditors including GIIC should abide by it and statutory power cannot be enforced. In absence of any sanctioned scheme for restructuring of the debt, such a ground is hardly available to the petitioner, so as to nullify the statutory power of the respondent Corporation under Section 29 of the Act. 8. The attempt to contend that even if there are statutory power, the action deserves to be tested on the aspects of reasonableness or that if it lacks bona fide, this Court can interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even if considered, such principles of reasonableness or bona fide is to be considered in the facts of a particular transaction and the statutory power available with the creditor. Such principles cannot be read in absolute. Further, if the creditor is trying to enforce the recovery by exercising statutory power, the same cannot be said as unreasonable, merely because other creditors by majority have agreed for restructure of the debts. In the same manner, if the creditor is to enforce the recovery by exercising the statutory power, it cannot be said as lacking bona fide, even if such creditor has initiated other modes for recovery of different transaction or for other process known to law. In the same manner, if the creditor is to enforce the recovery by exercising the statutory power, it cannot be said as lacking bona fide, even if such creditor has initiated other modes for recovery of different transaction or for other process known to law. On the contrary, if the reasonableness and bona fide are to be tested in a transaction of loan, the petitioner has to meet with the same by discharging obligation as per the contract and non-payment of the loan can hardly be contended as reasonable action on the part of the petitioner. Further, the petitioner has not come forward to this Court by giving any proposal to make the payment of the loan within a reasonable time, but on the contrary, the action is challenged on the ground that the other creditors have agreed for restructuring of the debts and the respondent Corporation has denied the same. Therefore, under these circumstances, the attempt on the part of the petitioner can hardly be countenanced. 9. In addition to the above, it deserves to be recorded that the petitioner Company is running into huge loss since last many years. The accumulated losses even as per the petitioner is about Rs. 584 crore. Therefore, if taking into consideration the said aspects, GIIC has resorted to the proceedings under Section 29 of the Act, the same cannot be termed as unreasonable or lacking bonafide. 10. The attempt on the part of the learned Counsel for the petitioner to contend that no reasons are recorded in the impugned decision under Section 29 of the Act would hardly make any difference for two reasons; one is that in a matter of non-acceptance of the proposal for restructuring of the debts for the circumstances by GIIC cannot be challenged as if the Court of Appeal in the present case, nor detailed reasons are required to be mentioned by GIIC while communicating the decision to exercise the power under Section 29 of the Act. 11. Further, in view of the facts and circumstances and the reasons recorded herein above when this Court has also found that the action is not illegal, it would make no difference as to whether further reasons are required to be considered or not. 12. In view of the above, no case is made out for interference. Hence, the petition is rejected. 12. In view of the above, no case is made out for interference. Hence, the petition is rejected. Considering the facts and circumstances, the interim relief granted shall stand vacated. 13. At this stage, Mr.Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, prays that the ad-interim relief granted earlier be continued for some time so as to enable the petitioner to approach before higher forum. Considering the facts and circumstances, ad-interim relief granted earlier shall continue for a period of two weeks from today.